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The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience 
 
Abstract 
The referendum is one of the most studied and practiced  
institutions of semi-direct democracy around the world, in several 
latitudes and historical times, in different systems and political regimes, at 
international, national, regional or local levels, with different legal 
frameworks and with various political consequences. However, Portugal, 
whose constitutional experience begins in 1820 with the liberal revolution, 
had its first democratic referendum only in 1998. On the other hand, there 
is no significant research on the referendum in Portugal, and certainly 
none that studies it from its inception. The object of this study is to fill this 
obvious gap, and to address the actual place of the referendum in 
Portuguese political life and debate. 
In the first place, we shall try to conceptually characterize the 
referendum, in order to establish its fundamental typologies regarding the 
most relevant experiences in this field and to situate the case for and 
against the referendum as an expression of semi-direct democracy in the 
political and philosophical debate of different historical moments. In the 
next chapters, entirely dedicated to the Portuguese case, we shall present 
the historical evolution of the national and local referendum in the 
constitutional and political life in Portugal since 1820. An added emphasis 
will be given to the referendum experience of the Portuguese democracy 
born in 1974, particular attention being payed to the political debate about 
the formal introduction of the referendum in the 1976 Constitution and to 
the concrete experience of referendums proposed and held since then. 
Finally, we shall try to understand the role of the referendum as an 
instrument of democracy and citizenship in Portugal, at different levels of 
its possible application. 




Het Referendum in de Portugese Constitutionele Ervaring 
 
Abstract 
Het referendum is een van de meest bestudeerde en beoefende 
instellingen van semi-directe democratie in de wereld, in verschillende 
breedten en historische tijden, in verschillende systemen en politieke 
regimes op internationaal, nationaal, regionaal of Hlokaal niveau, met 
verschillende wettelijke kaders en met diverse politieke gevolgen. Echter, 
Portugal, wiens constitutionele ervaring begint in 1820 met de liberale 
revolutie, had zijn eerste democratische referendum pas in 1998. 
Anderzijds is er geen significant onderzoek naar het referendum in 
Portugal, en zeker geen onderzoek vanaf de aanvang van het referendum. 
Het doel van deze studie is om het aanwezige gat te vullen en om de plek 
van het referendum in het Portugese politieke leven en debat te benoemen. 
 In de eerste plaats, zullen wij pogen het referendum conceptueel 
te karakteriseren, om de fundamentele typologieën jegens de meest 
relevante ervaringen in het veld en om de zaak te situeren tegen het 
referendum als een expressie van semi-directe democratie in het politieke 
en filosofische debat in verschillende historische momenten. In de volgende 
hoofdstukken, geheel toegewijd aan de Portugese situatie, zullen we de 
historisch evolutie van het nationaal en lokaal referendum in het 
constitutionele en politieke leven van Portugal sinds 1820 presenteren. 
Extra nadruk zal worden gelegd op de ervaring van het referendum in de 
Portugese democratie, geboren in 1874. Additionele aandacht wordt besteed 
aan het politieke debat over de formele introductie van het referendum in de 
constitutie van 1976 en de concrete ervaring van referendums die sindsdien 
zijn voorgesteld en gehouden. Tot slot, zullen we proberen te begrijpen wat 
de rol van het referendum als instrument van democratie en burgerschap in 
Portugal is, op verschillende niveaus van de mogelijk toepassing. 
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The referendum is not part of the Portuguese political tradition. 
Indeed, the first proposal for the direct consultation of electors did not 
occur until the beginning of 1870s, almost half a century after the 
approval of the first Portuguese Constitution in 1822. This suggestion was 
not adopted, and the first referendum in Portugal was not held until the 
beginning of the 20th century. 
After the 1910 Republican Revolution, it became possible to 
hold local referendums.  Indeed, some even took place, albeit under very 
limited terms. However, somewhat ironically, the first national plebiscite 
was organised in 1933 by the dictatorship, Estado Novo (New State), 
which was established after the military coup of 1926.  This plebiscite was 
held to legitimise a Constitutional text drawn up under the direction of 
Salazar himself. The text, which supported the authoritarian regime, 
applied with revisions until the regime’s final downfall in 1974. The 
plebiscite of 1933 was the first experience of a national referendum in 
Portugal and, given its non-democratic character, it tainted the image and 
notion of the referendum (in the eyes of Portuguese democrats in 
particular) for years to come. 
In the early 1960s, when the regime engaged in colonial wars 
against the liberation movements of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique, some sectors suggested an appeal to the referendum as a 
potential means of resolving problems that had no military solution. For 
some, the referendum would be a road to self-determination.  For others, it 
would legitimise colonisation. However, neither the Portuguese regime 
nor the liberation movements were interested in that kind of solution. The 
regime insisted on the war, even though no end was in sight, and both the 
Portuguese opposition and the liberation movements believed that the 
liberation of the colonial territories was only a matter of time. 
After the 1974 Democratic Revolution, the idea of a referendum 
resurfaced regarding two central issues of Portuguese political life: 
decolonisation and the Constitution. Some sectors opposing the 
recognition of the independence of former Portuguese colonies claimed 
that referendums could aim at, and allow for, federative solutions as an 
alternative to independence.  However, these suggestions were ephemeral, 
since the way to independence had already proved itself to be irreversible. 
Furthermore, such a solution was unacceptable to the liberation 
movements, and was not supported by either the revolutionary military or 
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democratic forces in Portugal. Curiously, many years later, the former 
Portuguese colony of East Timor arrived at independence through a 
referendum, achieving its liberation not from Portuguese colonial rule, but 
from Indonesian occupation that lasted between 1975 and 2001. 
Within Portugal itself, the referendum flag was brandished by 
the opponents of the 1976 Constitution, who tried to use a plebiscitary 
means to promote a change in the Constitutional order. The defeat of this 
attempt in the 1980 presidential election created the conditions for a 
peaceful acceptance of the referendum as a complementary device of 
representative democracy. Thus, the successive Constitutional revisions 
allowed for three different types of referendums to take place: the local 
referendum in 1982, the national referendum in 1989 and finally the 
referendum in the autonomous regions in 1997.  
From 1990 onwards, the question was not whether referendums 
were possible, but the circumstances under which they should be held. 
Three main issues mobilised support for referendums: the ratification of 
the European Union treaties by Portugal; the decriminalisation of 
abortion; and the creation of administrative regions. Since the approval of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, demands for European treaties to be 
ratified by referendums have been a constant feature of Portuguese 
political life. However, no referendum has ever been held in this context. 
On the other hand, the decriminalisation of abortion was considered by 
referendums in 1998 and 2007, and the creation of administrative regions 
was also submitted to a referendum in 1998. 
Therefore, if it is true that the referendum in Portugal does not 
enjoy a strong tradition, it is also true that several political and 
Constitutional controversies have involved debates about whether or not 
to hold a referendum. As such, the circumstances in which national and 
local referendums are held make useful case studies, the relevance of 
which we shall try to demonstrate in this work. After approaching the 
theoretical basis of the referendum and its expression in political thought 
and practice, we shall develop in detail the theme of the referendum in 
Portuguese policy.  The starting point will be the advent of liberal 
Constitutionalism with the 1820 revolution. 
Firstly, we shall draw on the historical evolution of the 
Portuguese Constitutional experience, focussing on the referendum 
proposals introduced in each period, even those that did not formally 
materialise. This evolution has three distinct parts: Monarchic 
Constitutionalism (1820-1910); the First Republic (1910-1926); and the 
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dictatorship of the New State (1926-1974), during which the 
Constitutional plebiscite of 1933 took place. 
The debates surrounding the potential use of referendums to 
resolve colonial issues, and to facilitate or stall the decolonisation process, 
will be considered in detail. To begin with, these will be analysed through 
a close discussion of the hypothetical referendums regarding the 
Portuguese colonial statutes that were proposed by some voices in the 
early 1960s. After that, reference will be made to the attempts to avoid the 
decolonisation process by drawing on a referendum.  This section will 
focus on how this was implemented by each of the former colonies on 
their road to independence. The case of East Timor deserves a special 
reference, because it was militarily occupied by Indonesia in 1975, a few 
days after its declaration of independence, eventually winning back its 
independence precisely by means of a referendum held in 1999 under the 
aegis of the United Nations. 
The main aim in this study is to analyse the role of referendums 
in Portuguese democracy between 1974 and 2011. The first issue under 
analysis will be the Constitutional referendum, including the proposals 
which aimed a) at approving a provisional Constitution by referendum 
(1974), b) at submitting the approval of the Constitution to a referendum 
after its passing in the Constituent Assembly (1976), c) at changing the 
Constitution by referendum (1980), and d) at enshrining the referendum 
as a normal procedure of Constitutional revision. 
Afterwards, the experience of local referendums, which the 
Constitution has permitted since 1982, will be discussed. All local 
referendum proposals will be discussed, including those that were 
formally considered, and the four local referendums that were actually 
held. Reference will also be made to the Constitutional and legal provision 
that allowed for the holding of referendums in the autonomous regions of 
the Azores and Madeira, which has not had any practical consequence 
until now. 
Particular attention will be paid to national referendums. 
Reference will be made to their inclusion in the 1989 Constitutional 
revision and the law of 1991. After this first phase, there will also be 
reference to the unsuccessful draft referendums presented in advance of 
the 1997 Constitutional revision, and the passing of the referendum law of 
1998, which preceded the first national referendums of the democratic 
period. This section will conclude with a synthesis of the subsequent legal 
evolution, with reference to every draft referendum that were presented.  
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A detailed anlaysis will consider each of the three main 
questions underlying the debate on the referendum in Portugal during the 
last decades: the referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion; the 
referendum on the creation of administrative regions in the Portuguese 
mainland; and the referendum on the participation of Portugal in the 
European integration process. Each of these themes will be treated in a 
specific section. Finally, a global account of the experience of the 
referendum during the Portuguese democracy will be presented and some 
conclusions will be drawn on the future of referendum in Portugal. 
The present work will focus on referendum proposals actually 
made, regardless of their formal requirements. However, particular 
attention will be paid to the draft referendums formally introduced in the 
Portuguese Parliament in each historic period. As Portugal’s central 
legislative body, the Parliament has unavoidably been the centre stage for 
political debate.  It bears a special responsibility in the discussion and 
voting on all decisions about whether or not referendums should be held. 
Therefore, a significant part of the present research is based on the 
systematic survey and study of the parliamentary debates on referendums 
in general and each draft referendum in particular. The activities of the 
Portuguese Parliament in relation to referendums are, in fact, the main 
focus of the present work. 
This is the first global study of the referendum in Portugal. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, some works were published following the 
Constitutional and legal sanctioning of national referendums. They 
analysed the referendum as an institution, and the terms of its application 
at the national level. However, the first national referendum occurred only 
in 1998, and few articles in scientific journals were published on the 
results of this referendum, or other national referendums held since then. 
In fact, there are no scientific works on the referendum in Portugal, 
tracing the historical evolution of that institution from the beginning of the 
19th century until now. Thus, the parliamentary debates of the 19th century 
on referendums are presented here for the first time, alongside the first 
analysis of local referendums during the First Portuguese Republic (1910-
1926).  
This is also the first work referring specifically to the role of the 
referendum in the Portuguese decolonisation process, before and after the 
1974 Revolution. Regarding the democratic regime, this is also the first 
work to contemplate all the parliamentary debates and proposals on the 
referendum in Portugal, and the only comprehensive academic analysis of 
all the local and national referendums ever held in the country. In these 
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circumstances, this thesis seeks to fill a significant gap in legal and 
political theory, and in philosophy studies in Portugal.         
Which leads me to a few words on the reasons for the 
submission of this work in the Netherlands and at Leiden University in 
particular. Despite their significant Constitutional differences, Portugal 
and The Netherlands have curiously close positions regarding 
referendums. The referendary institution is recognised in both 
Constitutional orders, at local and national levels, but in both cases, the 
use of referendums has been very scarce.1 There have been some 
experiences at a local level, on relatively unimportant questions, and a few 
experiences at a national level with controversial results, in regard to both 
participation and political consequences. Besides, the result of the Dutch 
referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty was one of the decisive 
reasons to avoid a similar referendum in Portugal, and also to avoid a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in both States. 
The search for a scientific vision of the referendum in the 
present work, avoiding Portuguese political controversies, seems to 
indicate The Netherlands as a European State well chosen for that 
purpose. In addition, submission at Leiden University is a real privilege, 
given the great prestige of this ancient institution and its reputation for 
quality, which is acknowledged around the world. The precious support of 
Professor Grahame Lock in Leiden, and Professor João Bettencourt da 
Câmara as co-supervisor in Lisbon, guarantee that this research meets the 
most exacting academic and scientific standards. 
                                                 
1 On the referendum in Dutch Constitutional experience before the referendum on the 
European Constitutional Treaty, see Holsteyn (1996).  
32 
 
The Referendum in Practice and Theory  33 
 
Part I 
The Referendum in Practice and Theory 
1. The Origins 
The word ‘referendum’ orginates in the Latin expression ad 
referendum, which was used in diplomatic affairs to name an agreement 
concluded by a deputy under reserve of ratification. Initially, the 
referendum was primarily an act of control: an instrument through which 
the people, as represented, could ratify the acts of the assembly as 
representative. In this sense, the referendum appears as something related 
to the imperative mandate (Vega, 1985, p. 113) and its development is 
linked to the exercise of direct democracy (Duarte, 1987, p. 199). 
Some authors find the distant ancestors of the referendum in 
Ancient Greece and Rome. The Spanish author José Luís López González 
(2005, p.12) refers to Athenian democracy, after the Cleisthenes reforms 
(508 BC) as the classic example of direct democracy, having the ekklesia 
(popular assembly) as the main structure of government. The first 
demonstrations of direct democracy came from the political organisation 
of the Greek city-States, where the citizens gathered to decide on the most 
important matters of the city. This model of decision-making was 
obviously impossible in communities of significant size and, as Gonzalez 
observes, one should not excessively idealise the classic formulas of direct 
participation.  Important social sectors, including slaves, women, 
foreigners and citizens with less economic power, were excluded from the 
decision-making processes.  
Other distant origins of the referendum were probably the 
deliberative practices of the plebs during the Roman Republic.  The 
plebiscite, or plebs, decree was the method used to approve certain types 
of laws binding only to plebeians (González, 2005, p.12). The Portuguese 
author Jorge Miranda (1996a, pp. 232-233) refers to the plebiscitum as a 
type of leges rogatae, decisions made at diets that, after 287 BC (Lex 
Hortensia de plebiscitis), became binding for all. The Middle Ages also 
had some methods of direct democracy in the Swiss cantons, where the 
free men gathered in Landsgemeinde to discuss and decide on the main 
problems of their communities (Duarte, 1987, p. 200). 
Though Swiss cantons made decisions by referendum two 
hundred years earlier, the word referendum, in its current meaning, 
appeared in English only in the 1880s, to denote the idea of putting issues 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  34 
 
directly to the electorate (Butler & Ranney, 1978, p. 4). This was defined 
by Jorge Miranda (1996a, p. 231) as the popular vote which used 
individual and direct citizens’ suffrage to reach a political or 
administrative decision, as well as an indication to the government or 
administrative bodies, or even for other constitutionally or legally 
established ends. 
Since its inception, direct democracy has struggled with the 
question of how to link citizens to political decision-making procedures.  
This led to the appearance of institutions like the referendum. It was 
through popular consultation that the referendum tried to conciliate the 
exercise of power by representation and its direct exercise by the people 
(Duarte, 1987, p. 200).  However, according to David Butler & Austin 
Ranney (1978, p. 5), there is little benefit in going back to the distant 
origins of referendums in the assemblies of Greek city-States and the 
plebiscitum in Rome, or even in the cantons of 15th century Switzerland, 
or in France, which legitimised its annexation of Metz by a vote in 1552. 
The first examples of modern referendums are found in the popular votes 
by which, starting in 1778, some American States adopted and altered 
their Constitutions.  Other early examples include the efforts of Girondins, 
and subsequently Napoleon Bonaparte, to demonstrate support for 
successive annexations and key Constitutional revisions. 
2. Direct and Representative Democracy in the United States 
Some commentators believe that, in 1778, the commonwealth of 
Massachusetts became the first polity in history to use the Constitutional 
referendum (Ranney, 1978, pp. 68-69). In 1777 the legislature drew up a 
Constitution, which was delivered to all town meetings, and stipulated that 
this Constitution would take effect only if it were approved by two-thirds 
of the voters. The draft was defeated, and only in 1780 was a new 
proposal accepted. In 1779, the Constitution of New Hampshire was also 
rejected in a referendum, and was only approved in 1783. But, of course, 
what interests us here is the resort to the referendum rather than its 
particular outcomes.  
In the following years, other Constitutional referendums were 
held in the United States: Rhode Island in 1788, Maine in 1816, 
Mississippi in 1817, Connecticut in 1818, and Alabama in 1819. 
Therefore, referendums have been used for the approval of Constitutional 
amendments in most States since their very inception as States of the 
Union. Presently, 49 of the 50 States may use it, Delaware being the only 
exception (Ranney, 1978, p. 69). The Constitutional referendum was the 
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first device of semi-direct democracy established in the federated States, 
and the only one until the end of the 19th century, when other instruments 
of direct democracy (referendums, statutory or by citizen’s initiative) were 
introduced mainly in the western States, until they became frequent forms 
of political and legislative decision-making.    
However, although the holding of referendums became a 
political device at State level, their use did not extend to the Union itself. 
In fact, the Constitution of the United States of America does not include 
any form of direct or semi-direct democracy. Representative government 
was enshrined as an absolute principle of the Union, thus establishing the 
checks and balances necessary to prevent the supremacy of factions, and 
to defend the rights of minorities.  These considerations were thought to 
be essential to the survival and cohesion of the Union. 
The argument that referendums are only possible in small 
communities is easily denied if we consider that some very large States 
uses referendums routinely. The essential argument for refusing semi-
direct democracy devices was the challenge of uniting States with very 
different interests that should be democratically respected. The concept of 
common interest supported by Madison was based on the diversity of 
human society, and very far from the notion of the general will of the 
people espoused by Rousseau in the Social Contract (Marques, 2011, p. 
122). 
For the Founding Fathers, the problem was not the territorial 
dimension of the Union, but the very nature of representative democracy. 
This issue is stressed and its implications discussed by João Bettencourt 
da Câmara, who notes that Madison in the United States, like Sieyès in 
France, considered it quite clear that representative democracy was 
radically different from direct democracy, affording a higher form of 
representation. Direct democracy was, in this sense, false democracy, as 
opposed to the true form, present only in representative democracy 
(Câmara & Martins, 1997, pp. 169-170).2     
In the Federalist Paper No. 10, James Madison criticised what he 
called a pure democracy, a ‘society consisting of a small number of 
citizens who assemble and administer the government in person, which 
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. Theoretic politicians, 
who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously 
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political 
                                                 
2 See also Câmara (1998, pp. 76-122). 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  36 
 
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and 
assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions’. 
The main difference between that ‘pure’ but undesirable 
democracy and the desirable republic was precisely the advantages of the 
representative government: ‘the delegation of the government to a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest’. The effect of this difference is ‘to 
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium 
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under 
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced 
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public 
good than if pronounced by the people themselves’.3 
In the Federalist Paper No. 51, Madison and Hamilton stressed 
‘the great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against 
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against 
the injustice of the other part. If a majority be united by a common 
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure’.4 
In fact, as João Bettencourt da Câmara stresses, having in mind 
the Federalist Paper No. 635, the main difference between the United 
States and the ancient Greek republics, in Madison’s view, was the total 
exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any immediate 
and direct share in the government (Câmara, 1997, pp. 170-171). 
3. The Referendum in the French Revolution 
3.1. Rousseau versus Montesquieu 
In Europe, the referendum began its development as a 
widespread institution following the French Revolution. It was then that 
the confrontation between the theories of representative democracy and 
direct democracy, having Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as 
figureheads, took place (Urbano, 1998, p. 8).  At the end of the 17th 
century, thinking on ownership and representation of sovereignty was 
divided in two theoretical tendencies: Montesquieu’s national sovereignty 
                                                 
3 Available at: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/fed-papers.pdf, p. 44 
[accessed 12 June 2012]. 
4 Available at: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/fed-papers.pdf, p. 233 
[accessed 12 June 2012]. 
5 Available at: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/fed-papers.pdf, pp. 280-286 
[accessed 21 June 2012]. 
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and representative government, and Rousseau’s popular sovereignty and 
rule by direct democracy. The political model built by Montesquieu was 
based on the idea of representation. He considered the mass of the people 
incapable of taking political decisions by themselves, and that the 
institutions of direct democracy held the danger of plebiscitary perversion 
and were in direct contradiction with the theory of national sovereignty.    
The institution of referendum had its theoretical grounds in the 
Social Contract: sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, 
cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does 
not admit of representation; it is either the same, or other; there is no 
intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and 
cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry 
through no definitive acts. Every law the people has not ratified is null 
and void – is, in fact, not a law (Rousseau, 1762/1973, p. 240). 
 
Neither Montesquieu nor Rousseau expressly foresaw any form 
of popular vote in the manner of the modern referendum.  However, 
Rousseau was one of the first to express the logical need for direct popular 
participation as a necessary condition for the creation and maintenance of 
a democracy, and for the legitimation of political order. In Rousseau’s 
works, there are no specific references to the popular referendum. His 
kind of democracy was closer to that of Athenian assemblies, but the idea 
of a modern referendum underlies his conception of the process of 
government (Urbano, 1998, pp. 12-14). In the event, Article 6 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen expressed a 
compromise, hedging between a solution based exclusively on 
representation, and the admission of the future enshrinement of devices 
typical of semi-direct democracy, like the referendum. Law is the 
expression of the general will and every citizen has a right to participate 
personally, or through his representatives, in its foundation (Rodrigues, 
1994, p. 57). 
3.2. Condorcet’s Contribution  
In the French Revolution, Condorcet and Sieyès led opposing 
sides in the debate between direct and representative democracy. 
Condorcet was the first supporter of semi-direct democratic institutions, 
proposing several measures inspired by Rousseau’s ideal. These were 
aimed at correcting potential dysfunctions of the representative system, 
which was the form of government he supported. The representative 
system should be the basis of political organisation, but it should be 
complemented by corrective means of direct democracy (Duarte, 1987, 
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pp. 227-228). These measures, which in fact were the principles of 
referendum and popular initiative, were received in his Girondist 
Constitutional draft, and introduced at the Convention on 15 and 16 
February 1793 (Urbano, 1998, pp. 16-18). 
As Anne-Cécile Mercier (2003, p. 487) suggests, Condorcet had 
the courage to resist surrendering himself unconditionally before the 
representative system. With the right of popular initiative, his purpose was 
to adapt direct democracy to the geographic constraints of large States. 
The draft was received with indifference, but sparked confrontations 
between Girondists and Montagnards. The victory of the latter 
condemned the proposal to defeat. 
Condorcet’s concept was based on the idea that the first of all 
rights was the natural and primitive equality of Man. From that descends 
the right of suffrage, but also the right to participate in legislative 
processes through a system of popular initiatives.  These turned popular 
sovereignty into something real (Mercier, 2003, p. 489).  Condorcet was 
an admirer of the American Constitutional experience, particularly of the 
Pennsylvanian Constitution. The Girondist Constitution was the result of 
the systemic union between the principles of New England and the French 
philosophy of the 18th century (Mercier, 2003, pp. 490-491). 
Condorcet’s work was based on the conviction of the superiority 
of direct democracy, which he aimed to put in practice in a large nation. 
He went further than the Constitutional referendum in an essay written in 
1789 titled ‘Sur la necessité de faire ratifier la Constitution par les 
citoyens.’ In it, he gave people the power to initiate a Constitutional 
dialogue between themselves and the Constituent Assembly, and he made 
reference to a desirable widening of the referendum to legislative matters 
(Mercier, 2003, p. 493). 
The Constitutional draft drawn by Condorcet included a Title 
VIII on the ‘censure of the people on the national representation acts’. 6  
This title gave fifty citizens, who lived in the circumscription of the same 
primary assembly, the right to scrutiny, along with Constitutional, 
legislative and administrative acts, and the right to initiate the procedure 
to change an existing law or to enact a new law. 
For that purpose, these fifty citizens had the right to gather their 
primary assembly the Sunday following the submission of the draft or 
                                                 
6 Available at: http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/co1793pr.htm#8 [accessed 10 February 
2011]. 
The Referendum in Practice and Theory  39 
 
subject. The discussion would continue for a week. On the following 
Sunday, the members of the primary assembly would decide if there 
should be any deliberation on the proposed subject. In the case of an 
affirmative vote, all the primary assemblies of the same commune would 
be called in order to deliberate on the same subject. If the majority of the 
citizens of the commune decided positively, all the primary assemblies of 
the department would be called to vote on the same subject. If the 
majority of the primary assemblies of the department voted in favour, the 
proposal would be submitted to the legislative body for consideration. 
The legislative body should then decide within 15 days whether 
a deliberation should be taken. In the case of an affirmative vote, the 
proposal would be addressed to the representatives, who should decide on 
the concrete proposal within the next fifteen days. If the legislative body 
refused to decide, or rejected the proposal, all the primary assemblies of 
the whole territory would be called to vote directly on the legislative 
body’s decision. If that referendum contradicted the decision of the 
legislative body, the latter should be dissolved, new elections should be 
held, and the representatives who opposed the popular will would not be 
eligible for re-election. The new assembly would decide again on the 
subject. 
For a Constitutional revision, the citizens would have the right to 
call a National Convention for that purpose using the same process. 
However, the legislative body should always consult the primary 
assembly directly, submitting the draft amendments to popular suffrage. If 
citizens rejected the draft, it should be changed and submitted again to the 
people. In case of a second rejection, the Convention would be dissolved, 
and the people would decide directly if a new convention should be 
called. 
This right of initiative was defeated in the Convention. 
However, the Montagnard Constitution of 1793 included some provisions 
of direct democracy.7 Article 115 enshrined a Constitutional referendum 
by popular initiative. If the absolute majority of departments, the tenth 
part of their regularly formed primary assemblies, demanded a revision of 
the Constitution or an alteration of some of its articles, the legislative 
body was obliged to gather all the primary assemblies of the Republic in 
order to ascertain whether a national convention should be called. Articles 
58 to 60 provided that all proposed laws should be printed and sent to all 
                                                 
7 Available at: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=862&Itemid=26
4 [accessed 10 February 2011]. 
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the communes of the Republic. If, 40 days after sending the proposed law, 
the absolute majority of departments, one-tenth of all the primary 
meetings legally assembled by the departments, had not protested, the bill 
would be accepted and would become a law. In the event of a protest, the 
legislative body should call for primary meetings (Guedes, 1978, p. 160; 
González, 2005, p. 17). 
Moreover, the 1793 French Constitution (Year I), as well as the 
1795 (Year III) and 1799 (Year VIII) Constitutions were ratified by 
plebiscites (Wright, 1978, p. 139). The first referendum in France took 
place on 24 June 1793 to approve the Montagnard Constitution. 
In an article criticising the Constitution of Year I, under the title 
‘Aux citoyens français sur la nouvelle Constitution’, Condorcet proposed 
what he believed should be the basis of a new social organisation at that 
moment of the Revolution. This included the absolute equality among 
citizens, the unity of the legislative body, the necessity to submit the 
Constitution to the immediate acceptance of the people, and the need to 
establish periodic assemblies that could amend the Constitution.  It also 
provided the people with the means to call these assemblies when they felt 
their freedom was being threatened or their rights were violated by the 
established powers. The idea, above all, was to organise a way for the 
people to express their voice on the need for any reform, therefore 
avoiding both oppression and the need for insurrection (Mercier, 2003, p. 
504). 
Condorcet intended to make discussions and votes prevail over 
arms and violence. This revealed a different logic from the reasons for 
supporting the popular initiative in other countries, particularly in the 
United States at the end of the 19th century, where the central worries 
related to the dysfunctions of the representative system (Mercier, 2003, p. 
505). 
3.3. The Bonapartist Referendums 
The use of popular consultations in France entered a second 
phase at the beginning of the 19th century. The referendum was used by 
Napoleon Bonaparte to ratify the Constitutional arrangements that made 
him consul (February 1800), consul for life (May 1802) and emperor 
(May 1804). The restoration of the empire was also ratified by a 
referendum in May 1815 (Wright, 1978, p.139). 
Vincent Wright (1978, p. 140) refers to the way that the 
reputation of the referendum as a Bonapartist device was reinforced in the 
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19th century when Louis Napoleon, nephew of Napoleon I, used it to 
legalise and legitimise his coup d’état of 21 and 22 December 1851, his 
restoration of the empire (21 November 1852), his annexation of Nice and 
Savoy (15 and 22 April 1860), and his liberal Constitutional 
ammendments (8 May 1870). The French Constitutions of 1852 (Article 
6) and 1870 (Article 13) gave the President or the Emperor the faculty of 
appealling to the people. 
One possible reaction to the Napoleonic plebiscites was that the 
1875 French Constitution of the III Republic did not include any type of 
referendum. Indeed, referendums were to remain unmentioned until the 
end of World War II.   
4. The Swiss Experience 
In Switzerland, the referendum was used at the end of the 
Middle Ages in several cantons, most notably in Bern. In the 17th and 18th 
centuries it was suppressed by the development of a form of oligarchic 
government. It reappeared in the 19th century, first in isolation at the time 
of a national vote on a Constitution for the Swiss Republic, and then more 
generally in the liberal regeneration around 1830 (Aubert, 1978, p. 39). 
In June 1802, the Swiss people voted for the first time on the 
text of the Helvetic Constitution.  It was clearly announced that 
abstentions would be considered as affirmatives. The Constitution was 
accepted with 92,500 votes against and 72,500 votes in favour because 
there were 167,000 abstentions (Aubert, 1978, p. 39). 
In Switzerland, the tradition of direct democracy helped to 
propagate the idea of referendum. The Landsgemeinde drew inspiration 
from the pact that united the three Waldstätten (Schwyz, Uri and 
Unterwald) in the 13th century. Its origin was not Athenian but Germanic. 
The Germans had a strong tradition of natural goods management by 
democratic and communitarian means (Mercier, 2003, p. 506). 
The Constitution of the Republic of Geneva, voted by the 
citizens in February 1794, gave the people the right to approve or reject 
laws and edicts.  Drafts made by representatives could be submitted for 
approval or rejection by the people, if required by 3,500 electors within 30 
days of their publication (Rodrigues, 1994, p. 60). 
Most cantons accepted the custom of submitting their 
Constitutions to the people. When Switzerland became a federation in 
1848, the new Constitution was submitted to the people in the great 
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majority of cantons (Aubert, 1978, p. 39). Jorge Miranda (1996a, p. 240) 
notes that the scheme present in the 1848 Federal Constitution of 
Switzerland, with mandatory Constitutional referendums and optional 
legislative referendums required by the citizens, remains to the present 
day. According to José Luís López González (2005, p. 16), the institutions 
of direct democracy were enshrined in the Swiss Federal Constitution – 
such as in the canton’s Constitutions –  as a way to balance the transfer of 
powers from the cantons to the Federation. 
Since 1848, and particularly since 1870, the Swiss have accepted 
the principle that almost every major national decision can become the 
subject of a popular vote (Butler & Ranney, 1978, p. 5). From 1848 until 
the end of the 19th century, 55 referendums took place in Switzerland at a 
federal level.  Between 1900 and 1945, 87 referendums were held. 
5. Other Experiences in the 19th Century 
In the second half of the 19th century, a boom of referendums 
took place in the North American States and in Switzerland. Maria 
Benedita Urbano (1998, p. 24) sees common reasons for this 
development: the democratic traditions of both federations, and the federal 
structures, with their pronounced decentralisation of political power. 
Butler & Ranney (1978, p. 6) explain that referendums are 
widely used only in Switzerland and a dozen States of the American 
Union, because only in these polities was there longstanding pre-
referendum experience with direct government using face-to-face 
assemblies of citizens. Some small Swiss cantons have regularly made 
decisions by Landsgemeinden since the 13th century. Similarly, New 
England towns have conducted their affairs by town meetings since the 
17th century.  In the 19th and early 20th centuries, such assemblies were 
impractical in the pioneer western territories and States. Thus, 
referendums came into being as useful ways of adapting the principles of 
a direct democracy to the limitations and necessities of large populations. 
Furthermore, the referendum was used in the 19th century to 
resolve territorial questions. In the case of the Italian Unification, 
referendums were held in Lombardy, Tuscany, Sicily, Naples, Venice and 
Rome between 1840 and 1870. The same happened in Greece, Prussia and 
Finland. 
Until the end of the 19th century, the referendum was scarcely 
used in other countries and for other purposes. Only 13 States held 
referendums. From the first referendum in France, in 1793, until the end 
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of 1899, Switzerland held 56 referendums (55 since 1848), but the 
remaining sovereign States only held 24, including 10 in France. The 
others were in Greece, Romania, Malta, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Liberia.  
However, in the transition from the 19th to the 20th centuries, the 
use of referendums and the theoretical debate surrounding their use, 
increased substantially. The referendum was introduced into the political 
practice of many countries, and the subject of the referendum interested 
some distinguished authors in the fields of political science and 
Constitutional law. 
6. The Referendum in the 20th Century 
6.1. The Theoretical Debate 
The highest moment of referendums in the world was also the 
moment when this institution was most criticised.  The contradiction 
between the referendum and representative democracy was stressed.  
However, it was also the time of an intensive debate about the advantages 
and disadvantages of the referendum, either as an instrument of semi-
direct democracy against the representative government, or as a useful 
instrument to correct some of its recognised dysfunctions. The framework 
for this debate was provided by the philosophical conceptions that came 
from the 17th century, and by the practice of some referendary 
experiences. 
According to Butler & Ranney (1994, pp. 11) democrats have, 
since the 17th century, divided into two main schools of thought regarding 
the institutions required to enact the democratic principles of popular 
souvereignty, political equality, popular consultation and majority rule. 
One might be called the participationist or direct-democracy school, led 
by such classical theorists as Jean Jacques Rousseau and such modern 
theorists as Benjamin Barber, Lee Ann Osbun and Carol Pateman. 
Opposing this conception is the representationist or ‘accountable elites’ 
school of democratic theory, led by such writers as John Stuart Mill, 
Henry Jones Ford, Joseph Schumpeter, Elmer Eric Schattschneider and 
Giovanni Sartori. 
Proponents of direct democracy have traditionally stressed 
Rousseau’s objection to representative government: popular sovereignty 
cannot be subject to representation. As soon as the people transfer their 
powers to representatives, giving them a non-imperative mandate, they 
lose their freedom. Butler & Ranney (1994, p. 12) summarized the 
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arguments of this school as follows: 1) the only way to achieve the ideal 
that political decisions be made in full accordance with the wishes of the 
people is to ensure that those wishes are expressed directly, not mediated 
or interpreted; 2) the higher end that democracy seeks is the full 
development of each citizen’s full human potential, which can be realised 
only by their direct and full participation in public affairs, not by 
delegating their civic powers to representatives.  
On the other hand, the writers from the school of democratic 
theory argue that the dream of direct democracy is relevant only for 
polities so small that all citizens can meet face-to-face in one place at one 
time, and when all citizens can spend all their time on political decisions. 
The only way to achieve that dream is through the election of 
representatives who represent their constituents in lawmaking assemblies 
and, at the end of their terms, are held accountable by their constituents 
for their performance in the use of their temporary powers (Butler & 
Ranney, 1994, p. 13).          
According to Butler & Ranney (1978, p. 24), the main argument 
for referendums consisted of two basic propositions: 1) the popular and 
universal legitimation of the decisions, given that all political decisions 
should be as legitimate as possible and 2) that direct democracy was the 
highest degree of legitimacy, since the decisions are made by the direct, 
unmediated vote of the people. For the supporters of the democratic 
advantages of referendums, people may or may not trust legislators, 
cabinets, and prime-ministers, but they certainly trust themselves most of 
all, and decisions in which popular participation is direct and unmediated 
by others produce more accurate expressions of their will than decisions 
in which they participate only by electing others who make the decisions 
for them (Butler & Ranney, 1978, p. 25). 
From the 19th to the 20th century, the main arguments in favour 
of referendums were Stated by Swiss writers like Simon Deploige (1892) 
or William Rappard (1912), and particularly by the leaders of the 
Progressive Movement in the United States (Butler & Ranney, 1978, pp. 
26-27). The Progressive Movement operated in most American States 
from the 1890s to World War I, having as principal leaders luminaries like 
Robert M. La Follete of Wisconsin, Hiram Johnson of California, 
Theodore Roosevelt of New York, and Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. 
Their main purpose was to introduce several reforms in order to increase 
the participation of ordinary citizens in governmental decisions. The 
referendum was one of these reforms (Butler & Ranney, 1978, p. 27). 
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The progressive case rested upon two beliefs. The first was their 
faith in the unorganised, free individual. The second was hostility towards 
intermediary organisations. Any organisation that seeks to interpose itself 
between the people and their government is bound to subvert democracy 
and the public interest. When a group organises itself permanently, and 
seeks to influence government decisions on a wide range of issues, it will 
inevitably distort the popular will and promote its special interest over the 
public interest (Butler & Ranney, 1978, pp. 27-28). 
The synthesis of benefits of direct democracy according to the 
progressives, were the following: a) any issue can be put on the law 
making agenda; b) decisions are brought close to the people; c) decisions 
are always made in the clean open air; d) popular will is accurately 
expressed; e) the end of apathy and alienation; f) public interest is served; 
and g) the citizens’ human potential is maximised (Butler & Ranney, 
1978, pp. 29-30). 
The influence of the progressives in the United States had 
profound consequences. It was precisely from the beginning of the 20th 
century, as already seen, that the referendum was to become a common 
device in several States of the Union. Between 1906 and 1918, nineteen 
States adopted the referendum for Constitutional amendments or ordinary 
legislation (Ranney, 1978, p. 69).  
Meanwhile, in Europe, some authors criticised the use of the 
referendum, concerned about its opposition to representative democracy. 
A. Esmein (1894), in a work published in the first issue of the ‘Revue du 
Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l’Etranger’, 
considered an illusion the idea that the referendum and the representative 
government could be superposed without inconveniences. According to 
him, the referendum could prevent bad and arbitrary laws, but it could 
also be an invincible obstacle to a good legislative process. The best laws, 
the most useful to national progress may come up against popular 
prejudices and thoughtlessness, sometimes due to a provision of 
secondary importance, hidden in some article (Esmein, 1894, p. 40). On 
the other hand, the possibility of a referendum decreases the responsibility 
of legislative assemblies, and consequently their ability to usefully discuss 
legislation (Esmein, 1894, p. 41). Later some other authors, including 
Georges Burdeau (1950, pp. 13-14) and Mirkine-Guetzévitch (1931), 
called into question the need or the opportunity for the referendum in the 
political context of the time. 
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In The Case Against the Referendum, published by the Fabian 
Society in 1911, the British author Clifford Sharp summarised the main 
arguments against the referendum, as follows: a) the weakening of the 
power of elected authorities; b) the inability of ordinary citizens to make 
wise decisions; c) the impossibility to measure the intensity of belief; d) 
the making of forced and not consensual decisions, while the true 
democratic decisions were not competitive; e) the danger for minorities; f) 
the weakening of representative government. He summed up by saying 
there was no particular reason to suppose that the adoption of the 
referendum in England would result in special advantage to any party. It 
must be admitted that when the unit of government is small and the 
population homogeneous in character, the advantages of the referendum 
are very considerable. But when the unit of government is large and the 
population heterogeneous, the inherent defects of ‘majority rule’ assume 
overwhelming importance (Sharp, 1911, pp. 18-19). 
The scepticism of the strongest supporters of representative 
government regarding the advantages of the referendum does not mean 
that all those who criticised representative government as an expression of 
the popular will supported the referendum as a viable or suitable 
alternative. In fact, the Swiss and North American experiences never 
awakened great enthusiasm in Europe. Everyone considered that direct 
democracy, as a rule, could only be viable in small communities, not 
being suitable in societies with the dimension and complexity of the 
modern State. Furthermore, the use of plebiscites as devices to realise 
imperial ambitions, as in France under Bonaparte’s rule, inspired some 
caution regarding the referendum as a means for expressing the citizens’ 
will. 
However, even among those who believed that representative 
government was the most democratic and effective system, there was 
some dissatisfaction regarding the perversions and dysfunctions resulting 
from the influence of the political parties.  Concern was expressed that 
political parties captured the political system, substituting themselves for 
the sovereign will of the citizens. Even authors who coherently supported 
the representative government, from conservatives to progressives, 
recognised the need to correct its dysfunctions as a way to defend it. 
This subject, the crisis of representative government and its 
divorce from citizens, which remains an ongoing concern in the 21st 
century, gave rise to strong criticisms at the beginning of the 20th century, 
particularly from  Moisei Ostrogorski,  who strongly criticised the 
influence of political parties in democratic systems. His seminal works, 
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Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, contained studies of 
political parties in England (Volume I) and in the United States (Volume 
II), and were published for the first time in 1902.  Ostrogorski argued that, 
in the modern conditions of universal suffrage, parties became oligarchic, 
with their bureaucratic structures aimed purely at gaining and retaining 
political power.  Thus, parties substituted themselves for the true will of 
the citizens. 
As Lipset (1964, p. xx) States in his Introduction to the North 
American edition of Ostrogorski’s main work, the parties, which were 
created to promote the national interest upon some particular principle on 
which they all agreed, necessarily form permanent organisations staffed 
by professional politicians. The need to maintain the party apparatus 
inevitably leads parties to modify their initial principles and activities, 
instead favouring activies and policies that maximise financial and 
electoral support to the organisation. Rather than being a means to an end, 
parties (i.e. the perceived interests of the party elite) become ends in 
themselves. 
The studies of Ostrogorski8 had a substantial influence on other 
European authors, including Robert Michels and Max Weber. Michels 
was a German Italian with a background in the socialist movement.  He 
later became a strong supporter of Italian fascism.  In his book published 
in 1911, Political Parties – A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy, he used the German Social 
Democratic Party as an example of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Michels 
argued that this organisational form had become endemic in the conditions 
of mass democracy (Michels, 2009).9  
In his conference in Munich on 28 January 1919, Politik als 
Beruf (Politics as a vocation), Weber ackowledged the influence of 
Ostrogorski, making a detailed reference to his reflections about the 
political parties in England and in the United States and their effects on 
the political system. In England, the party machinery normally turned out 
MPs that were little more than well-disciplined ‘yes men’. The caucus 
machine in the open country is almost completely unprincipled if a 
strong leader exists who has the machine absolutely in hand. Thus, the 
plebiscitarian dictator actually stands above parliament. He brings the 
masses behind him by means of the party machine, and the members of 
parliament are merely political clients enrolled in his following. From this 
                                                 
8 On Moisei Ostrogorski, see in Portuguese, Balão (2001). 
9 On Robert Michels, see in Portuguese, Teixeira (2000).  
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viewpoint, in the United States, the spoils system means that quite 
unprincipled parties oppose one another. Thus, they are organisations of 
job hunters, designing their changing programmes according to the needs 
of vote-grabbing. 
In post-World War I Germany, Weber saw only two options:  
leadership democracy with a 'machine', or leaderless democracy.  He 
defined the latter as the rule of professional politicians without a calling, 
without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader, i.e. what party 
insurgents usually designated as 'the rule of the clique'. At that time, in 
Germany, Weber perceived that the system had only the latter type of 
party. Also in Germany, Carl Schmitt, a steady supporter of the Nazi 
regime, published The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, strongly 
criticising the Republic of Weimar regime (Schmitt, 1988) in 1923.    
The first decades of the 20th century were times of political 
instability and social crisis, sparking great dissatisfaction with 
representative democracy and the role of the political parties. The model 
of representative government was challenged from both the left and the 
right. However, these challenges did not increase support for semi-direct 
democracy devices like referendums. The reality was quite the reverse. In 
Russia, the 1917 Revolution challenged the bourgeois representative 
system with the first experience of a socialist State. In Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Germany, and in other European States, fascism emerged from 
the ruins of representative governments and discredited party systems, 
offering the propertied classes protection from the rise of the workers’ 
movement and against the spread of the Soviet revolution. It is significant, 
however, that fascism, while rejecting democracy as a political system and 
free elections as a method for choosing representatives, used plebiscites to 
assure their formal legitimacy in Italy, Germany and Portugal. 
Even among the liberals, nobody wanted to replace 
representative democracy with any kind of semi-direct democracy.  This 
was unanimously considered to be impossible in large communities. Not 
even Ostrogorski supported referendums as an alternative to the 
dysfunction of parties systems, perhaps thinking that their control over the 
political system could be further exacerbated by the referendums. The 
solution proposed by Ostrogorski was a form of temporary parties, 
supporting concrete causes and extinguished once they achieved their 
goals. However, debates about the advantages and disadvantages of 
referendums were kept alive inside the liberal camp, with several authors 
supporting their importance as a useful supplement to representative 
democracy. 
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This was the case of Albert Venn Dicey, who made an important 
contribution to the theory of referendums. Although he initially opposed 
the introduction of referendums (Qvortrup 2005, pp. 46-51), describing 
them in 1884 as one of the most dubious devices of Swiss democracy, he 
gradually changed his view.  His primary concern was the lack of a 
Constitutional check on the powers of the House of Commons, which 
increased the possibility of a fundamental change passing into law, even if 
undesired by the majority of the nation.  Dicey’s main argument for 
introducing the referendum was a profound dissatisfaction, and 
frustration, with the practical implementation of the principles of 
representative government, which he hoped (and believed) could be 
remedied by elements of direct democracy.  
Dicey did not view the referendum as an antidote for all the 
deficiencies of parliamentary government, nor did he believe that 
representative government could be replaced. The referendum was merely 
a popular veto, limiting the parliamentary system and balancing the 
powers of the legislative and executive bodies provided both could appeal 
to it. It would also set boundaries on the influence of the parties in 
political life.  According to Dicey (1915, p. xcii), parliamentary 
government had suffered an extraordinary decline. The causes were the 
same referred by Ostrogorski. Party government inevitably gives rise to 
partisanship. At the very least, this produced a machine that might engage 
in political corruption, thus distorting the work of the fairly-elected 
legislature and misrepresenting the permanent will of the electors (Dicey, 
1915, p. xciv). 
 However, Dicey did not ignore the arguments against the 
referendum. In England the introduction of the referendum would mean 
the transfer of political power from knowledge to ignorance. The 
Parliament contained a far greater proportion of educated men, endowed 
with marked intellectual power and trained in the exercise of high political 
virtues, than would be found among electors assembled merely by chance 
(Dicey, 1915, p. xciv). The referendum might indeed often stand in the 
way of salutary reforms, but it might on the other hand delay or prevent 
innovations condemned by the weight both of the uneducated and of the 
educated opinion (Dicey, 1910, pp. 551-552). The same arguments were 
used by James Bryce (1921, p. 159): while it was possible to achieve 
consensus in the Parliament, the same was not possible by referendum, 
because it did not give any opportunity to amend a measure or arrive at a 
compromise upon it; in other words, it is the bill, the whole bill, and 
nothing but the bill. 
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For these reasons, Dicey (1915, p. c) recommended that the 
referendum should be used purely as a means for the people to veto 
legislation passed by the House of Commons. According to him, the 
referendum, if introduced in England, would be strong enough to curb the 
absolutism of a party possessed of a parliamentary majority. The 
referendum is also an institution that promises some considerable 
diminution in the most patent defects of party government and, if 
judiciously used, might revive faith in the parliamentary government by 
checking the omnipotence of partisanship (Dicey, 1915, p. xcvii).   
In a similar vein, authors like Leon Duguit (1948, pp. 148-149), 
Maurice Hauriou (1929, pp. 134, 144-146, 547, 549-550) and mainly 
Carré de Malberg (1931, pp.15-27), considered that the referendum was 
not only perfectly compatible with representative democracy, but even a 
necessary complement to it, in order to limit the absolute power of 
parliaments, governments and political parties.  Carré de Malberg even 
considered that the referendum should work as an element to moderate the 
absolute supremacy of parliament, joining the advantages of a 
parliamentary system and democracy. The representative powers of the 
parliament would remain, but they would be constrained by the powers of 
the represented people. 
Butler & Ranney (1994, pp. 14-15) also stressed the idea of the 
referendum as a supplement, rather than an alternative, to the 
representative government. Representative government must, and should, 
be the basic institutional form for democracy in any densely populated 
community, such as modern nation States. But representative democracy 
can be improved by permitting, under certain conditions, the direct votes 
of citizens to confirm, reject, or even make laws. 
Therefore, those who supported the referendum as a useful 
supplement for representative democracy excluded the referendum by 
popular initiative, i.e. referendums invoked by the will of the citizens who 
gathered a certain number of signatures. In such cases, the referendum 
could be indeed a challenge to representative government. However, the 
use of the referendum decided by parliament, i.e. suggested and approved 
by the main parliamentary parties, could reinforce the popular legitimacy 
of certain decisions which might otherwise lead to divisions inside the 
parties. The referendum would be a pacifying element inside the parties, 
preventing the risk of divisions on fragmenting issues.  
The main parties could decide if, how and when the referendum 
should be called.  However, by delegating the decision on the submitted 
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issue to the electors, they would escape the responsibility of the choice. In 
this manner, the risk of discredit of parties or governments by 
referendums could be limited, but could not be avoided entirely.  For 
example, the referendums of the 21st century on the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe were implemented to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the European integration, but became an instrument for its rejection and 
highlighted the chasm between rulers and citizens on this issue.        
In summary, the main benefits anticipated from referendums 
were the increase of legitimacy and participation. Democratic regimes rely 
on the consent of citizens rather than on the coercive power of 
governments to ensure the rule of law. One of the greater virtues of 
referendums derives from the belief of most ordinary people that decisions 
they make themselves are more legitimate than those made by public 
officials, even if they are elected public officials. Direct popular decisions 
made by referendums have a legitimacy that indirect decisions by elected 
representatives cannot match. This does not mean that all decisions should 
be made by direct vote of the people. It does not even mean that decisions 
made by referendums are wiser or more prudent than those made by 
representatives. It means only that when a representative democracy 
wishes a particular decision to be made with maximum legitimacy, it 
would do well to make that decision by referendum (Butler & Ranney, 
1994, pp. 14-15). 
However, there are consistent arguments against referendums in 
democracy: 1) ordinary citizens have neither the analytical skills nor the 
information to make wise decisions on technically complex issues; 2) 
decisions by elected officials involve weighing the intensity of 
preferences and melding the legitimate interests of many groups into 
policies that will give all groups something of what they want; 3) 
decisions made by representatives are more likely to protect the rights of 
minorities; 4) by allowing elected officials to be bypassed by encouraging 
officials to evade divisive issues by passing them on to the voters, 
referendums weaken the prestige and authority of representatives and 
representative government (Butler & Ranney, 1994, pp. 16-17). 
In an attempt to summarise the causes of popularity of the 
referendum at the beginning of the 20th century, Maria Benedita Urbano 
(1998, pp. 25-28) refers to three main reasons: 1) the crisis of the 
parliamentary system: the excess of power of the executive bodies, 
reinforced by the World War I and led to the discredit of parliament, 
labelled by its instability; 2) the success of the Swiss and North American 
experiences, and the good results from the popular consultations for the 
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resolution of territorial issues after the end of the World War I; 3) the 
transition from the liberal State to the mass State, when the widening of 
suffrage spurred a conception of parliament as an instrument of the 
bourgeoisie, which disregarded popular interest. 
Another Portuguese author, Maria Luísa Duarte (1987, p. 220), 
stressed this last point. The liberal State was founded on a representative 
model, characterised by the hegemony of the parliament, the strictly 
representative nature of the mandate, and the censitary suffrage. The rules 
to check the right to vote were undoubtedly aimed at safeguarding the 
oligarchic structure of the liberal society and the political supremacy of 
the bourgeoisie. The restriction of suffrage left out those who could 
jeopardise the political uniformity of the parliament. 
The most evident signs of challenge to the liberal political model 
came from the struggle for universal suffrage and from the critics of the 
parliamentary system. The causes of that challenge came essentially from 
the changes of the liberal economic system which had unavoidable effects 
on the social structure, with the appearance of intermediate bodies 
between the individual and the State, namely the political parties. 
The steady growth of a working class, and the concentration of 
population in urban centres, created a working class that was politically 
vocal and organised around trade unions. Some political parties followed 
ideologies against capitalism, liberalism and the parliamentary system, 
and developed intense campaigns for universal suffrage. The transition 
from representative government to representative democracy became 
indispensable to the survival of the representative system. The direct 
participation through referendum appeared as a possible way of 
compromise, a solution to the insufficiencies of the pure representative 
model.  
6.2. The Weimar Constitution 
Within the first decades of the 20th century, the referendum was 
enshrined in the Constitution of several States in all continents. However, 
the most complete example of Constitutional reception by direct 
democracy institutions was the 1919 Weimar Constitution of Germany.10 
In fact, in the Weimar Constitution, we can see several types of direct 
democracy institutions (Rodrigues, 1994, pp. 64-65): 
                                                 
10 Available at: http://www.zum.de/psm/weimar_vve.php [accessed on 15 February 2011]. 
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a) Recall of the Reich President, who could be deposed by 
plebiscite, which had to be suggested by the Reichstag, 
whose decision required a majority of two thirds. The 
rejection of the deposition was regarded as a re-election and 
resulted in the dissolution of the Reichstag (Article 43). 
b) Legislative referendums, by popular, presidential or 
parliamentary initiative: a law passed by the Reichstag had 
to be presented in a plebiscite, if the Reich President 
decided so, within the period of one month. A move 
supported by one third of the members of the Reichstag and 
one twentieth of the registered voters could suspend the 
proclamation of a law and submit it to plebiscite. A 
plebiscite also had to be held if one tenth of the registered 
voters demanded a law draft to be presented. The plebiscite 
would not be held if the law draft in question had been 
accepted or unaltered by the Reichstag. In regard to the 
budget, taxation laws and pay regulations, only the Reich 
President could request a plebiscite (Article 73). 
c) Referendum of arbitrage between parliamentary chambers: 
in case of disagreement with the Reichsrat regarding a law 
passed in the Reichstag, the Reich President might call for a 
plebiscite. If the President did not call the plebiscite, the 
law was regarded as not having been passed. If the 
Reichstag decided against the Reichsrat objection with a 
vote of more than two thirds, the Reich President had to 
either proclaim the law or call for a plebiscite (Article 74) 
within three months. 
d) Constitutional referendum: Constitutional changes should 
be passed by a two thirds majority both in the Reichstag 
and in the Reichsrat. The amendments could be submitted 
to plebiscite if demanded by one tenth of the registered 
voters. An absolute majority of the registered voters was 
required in order for the amendment to pass. If the 
Reichstag decided on a Constitutional amendment against 
Reichsrat objection, this could require a plebiscite to be 
held (Article 76). 
e) Local referendum: The alterations of territory must be 
decided by the majority of the population (Article 18). 
6.3. Referendums in the 20th Century: 1900-1945 
In the first four decades of the 20th century, the devices of semi-
direct democracy were disseminated across Europe and the rest of the 
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world. Between 1900 and 1945, there were, in Europe alone, 87 
referendums in Switzerland, and 98 referendums in 32 other countries (see 
Table 2). Australia was the second State in the world in terms of the 
number of referendums (22 in that period). It is interesting to note the 
significant use of referendums in America, probably influenced by the 
tradition and frequent use of referendums in the North American States, 
though not in the United States as a whole. During that period, 
referendums were also held in Bolivia, Canada, Chile (4), Guatemala, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (4). In Europe, several referendums 
took place in Germany (6), Greece (4), Austria, Denmark (3), Iceland (6), 
Italy (2), Estonia (5), Latvia (4), Finland, Portugal, Romania (3), 
Luxembourg (3), Poland (3) and Sweden.  
However, not all of these referendums were democratic 
consultations. On the contrary, several plebiscites were designed to give 
formal legitimacy to authoritarian regimes. These were held without any 
possible alternatives or public freedoms, and under the severe repression 
of any type of opposition. Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Salazar 
in Portugal, among other dictators in Europe, used the referendum to give 
formal legitimacy to strengthen their absolute powers. In these kinds of 
plebiscites, which were made in a non democratic context, the official 
propaganda completely nullified the significance of a referendum as an 
instrument of direct democracy (González, 2005, pp. 20-21). 
6.4. The Referendum after World War II: 1945-1969 
Some authors, like Michael Gallagher (1996, p. 230) highlight a 
retreat from the use of referendums in Europe after World War II. The 
referendum was used to decide some institutional problems, including in: 
Belgium in 1950 on the return of Leopold III; Italy in 1946 on the choice 
between the Republic or the Monarchy; Greece in 1946 on the return of 
George II; Iceland in 1944 on its separation from Denmark; and France, 
where it was restored 76 years after, by the hand of General De Gaulle, in 
1945, in order to put an end to the III Republic, and later in 1946, 1958, 
1961, 1962 and 1969. 
However, the number of referendums increased substantially in 
the world. Between the beginning of 1900 and the end of 1944, 61 
sovereign States held 214 referendums. Even considering the number of 
referendums held in Switzerland (84), more than 130 referendums were 
held in the rest of the world. A significant number of States that became 
independent after World War II, and particularly at the beginning of the 
1960s as result of the decolonisation movement, used the referendum as a 
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process to declare the sovereign will of their people in favour of 
independence. This was the case in Cambodia (1955), Togo (1956), 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ivory 
Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal (1958), Somalia and Samoa (1961) and Algeria (1962).     
6.5. The Referendum in the 1970s and 1980s: 1970-1989 
In the following years, the number of referendums increased 
further. From the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1989, 68 States held 324 
referendums. Switzerland held 147 while the other countries had 177 (see 
Table 2). During this period, there was a visible dispersion of referendums 
around the world. In Australia, after some retraction in the 1950s and 
1960s, the referendum was once again used frequently (16 times). 
Meanwhile, Italy became the second user in Europe, with 15 referendums. 
Other significant cases were the Philippines (12), Ireland (9), Egypt (8), 
Samoa (7), and New Zealand (5). 
In 1972, the first referendums regarding the European 
integration process were held at the time of the first enlargement. 
Denmark and Ireland decided to join by referendum, while Norway 
resolved not to acceed by referendum as well. France submitted the EEC 
enlargement to a national referendum. In 1975, the United Kingdom held 
the first national referendum of its history on the renegotiation of the 
terms of European integration. Finally, in 1986 and 1987, Denmark and 
Ireland submitted the ratification of the Single European Act to a 
referendum. 
 6.6. Referendums in Modern Times: 1990-2011 
Again, over the past two decades, the use of referendum 
increased substantially (LeDuc, 2003, p. 13). Between the beginning of 
1990 and the end of 2011, 107 States held 642 national referendums, with 
200 held in Switzerland and 442 in the rest of the world (see Table 2). 
Italy distinguished itself as second most active referendum user in the 
world, holding 54 in that period on several public issues. Ireland also 
increased the frequency of referendums, holding almost one referendum 
per year (a total of 20). 
In recent times, a significant use of the referendum has been in 
relation to the appearance of new independent States in the International 
Community, following the fall of the Soviet Union and the disaggregation 
of former Yugoslavia. The new independent States used the referendum 
not only as a device to decide on their independence, but also to approve 
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Constitutions or to decide several public issues. Therefore, we can note 
that 41 referendums were held in Azerbaijan, 19 in Lithuania, 15 in 
Slovakia, 12 in Slovenia, 11 in Kyrgyzstan, eight in Latvia, seven in 
Ukraine, six in Russia, four in Georgia, three in Armenia, Belarus, 
Estonia, Moldova and Serbia, two in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and one in Croatia 
and Turkmenistan. 
Other States held referendums in significant number, like the 
Federated States of Micronesia (16), Ecuador (15), Uruguay (11), New 
Zealand (10), or Bolivia and Venezuela (6). In these years, for the first 
time in history, the number of States with referendums became the 
majority (107 against 73). 
 6.7. The Special Case of ‘European Referendums’ 
The referendum has been a common feature of the European 
integration process since 1972, when the enlargement of the European 
Communities from six to nine members was submitted to referendum in 
France on 23 April. With the accession of new members, there were new 
submissions to referendum in Ireland on 10 May and in Denmark on 26 
September, both with affirmative results. However, in Norway, which 
held a referendum on 26 September 1972, the electors voted against 
joining the EEC. 
 In the United Kingdom, there was no referendum on accession 
to the EEC, although the Labour opposition demanded one. After the 
electoral victory of Labour in 1974, Harold Wilson, who had strongly 
criticised the Conservatives for signing a treaty that he believed was 
economically disastrous for the UK, sought to demand a re-negotiation of 
accession conditions.  A national referendum on EEC membership was 
held on 5 June 1975, the first national referendum in the history of the 
United Kingdom. 
A second wave of referendums was held in 1992 with regard to 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish people rejected the treaty on 2 June. It 
was accepted in Ireland (18 June) by a comfortable margin, and more 
narrowly in France (51.04%) on 20 September.  
According to its own rules, the Treaty could not come into force 
unless ratified by all twelve Member States. The ratification process was 
suspended and the Danish electors recipients of strong pressure from 
European governments pushing for a fresh referendum to consider a set of 
derogations agreed in Edinburgh.  The Edinburgh Agreement was 
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submitted to referendum in Denmark on 18 May 1993, under the threat 
that Denmark’s would be excluded from the European Union in case of a 
negative answer. The ‘Yes’ campaign won at last. 
After Maastricht, the referendum was used again regarding the 
adhesion of Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway. Austria (12 June 
1994), Finland (16 October), and Sweden (13 November), voted ‘Yes’ on 
the referendum regarding their EU membership. On 28 November, 
Norway voted ‘No’ again. 
In 1998, two Member States submitted the Amsterdam Treaty to 
referendum: Ireland on 22 May and Denmark on 28 May. The result was 
affirmative in both cases. 
On 28 September 2000, the Danish electors refused to approve 
the European currency by referendum. On 7 June 2001, Ireland held a 
referendum on the ratification of the Nice Treaty. The result was a refusal. 
A fresh referendum was held on 19 October 2002, and approval was 
gained after the opportunity was offered for Ireland to avoid taking part in 
a EU mutual defence pact. 
At the time of the 2004 enlargement, the accession of 10 new 
Member States led to nine referendums. Cyprus was the only nation that 
did not submit its accession to a referendum. Referendums were held in 
Malta (8 March 2003), Slovenia (23 March), Hungary (12 April), 
Lithuania (10/11 May), Slovakia (16/17 May), Poland (7/8 June), Czech 
Republic (13/14 June), Estonia (14 September) and Latvia (20 
September). The results were affirmative in every cases. 
On 14 September 2003, the Swedish voters refused the single 
currency by referendum.  Sweden remains outside the euro zone. 
In 2005, after the signature of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, four Member States held referendums: Spain, on 
20 February, voted ‘Yes’; France, on 29 May, voted ‘No’; The 
Netherlands, on 1 June, voted ‘No’; Luxembourg, on 10 July, voted ‘Yes’. 
The negative results in France and The Netherlands, two 
founding States of the European Community, threw the EU into a crisis. It 
would not be possible to save the Constitutional Treaty. The solution 
previously used for two small countries, Denmark and Ireland, was not 
appropriate for two founding States at the heart of the European Union, 
one of them a major power and a key part of the ‘European locomotive’. 
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The agreed ‘solution’ among the European leaders was the 
Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 December 2007. The new Treaty would drop 
the Constitutional formula, but it would contain the essence of the 
Constitutional Treaty. Referendums would not be held in the ratification 
process, avoiding the risk of fresh defeats. Spain would not repeat the 
referendum because the Treaty was the same; France and The Netherlands 
did not repeat the referendums because the Treaty was different. Despite 
the protests of those who supported the need for referendums to grant 
legitimacy to the European integration process, the only recognised 
exception was Ireland; its Constitution required a referendum to ratify the 
Treaty. 
After 32 referendums on the European integration process, 
European leaders now had a change of heart, refusing referendums on the 
Lisbon Treaty. The referendum, recognised since 1972 as a proper and 
democratic way to legitimise European integration was, by 2007, treated 
with suspicion. It became clear that, for European leaders, there are other 
values in the European Union that are heavier than popular participation. 
The referendum, as a democratic device was defeated, except for 
the only exception allowed, Ireland, which saved the honour of the 
institution. On 12 June 2008, the Lisbon Treaty was refused by the Irish 
people, who, so to speak, voted on behalf of all like-minded European 
citizens who did not have the possibility to pronounce themselves. 
However, higher interests prevailed, and the Irish people had to 
vote again in a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on 3 October 2009. That 
time the ‘Yes’ became the winner and the way was open for the enactment 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, nobody has doubts that the Irish 
Republic should hold as many referendums as needed for the approval of 
the Treaty. The European Union process defeated the referendum as an 
institution and disregarded it as an expression of popular will. 
7. Defining Referendums 
7.1. Types of Referendums 
According to Arend Lijphart (1984, p. 206), referendums fail to 
fit any clear universal pattern. The referendum label includes a variety of 
situations and usages which bear only a superficial similarity to one 
another (Uleri, 1996, p. 3). In fact, each referendum is unique, and the 
political context can differ widely (LeDuc, 2003, p. 15). 
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Number of States 52 68 121 146 180 180 
With referendums 13 32 61 68 107 139 
Without 
referendums 39 36 60 78 71 40 
       
Number of 
referendums 80 185 214 324 642 1445 
In Switzerland 56 87 84 147 200 574 
In other States 24 98 130 177 442 871 
       
Constitutional 








3 14 29 6 23 75 
Referendums on 
other public issues 33 96 72 136 328 665 
 
Sources: LeDuc (2003); Uleri (2003); Butler &Ranney (1994); Gallagher & Uleri (1996); 
Centre for Research on Direct Democracy, available at 
http://www.c2d.ch/inner.php?table=dd_db [accessed 29 February 2012]. 
 
Table 2 - Number of Referendums by State 
Number of referendums Number of States 
20 or more 8 
10 or more but less than 20 12 
More than 5 but less  than 10 28 
Between 1 and 5  91 
None 41 
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Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish some types of semi-
direct democracy devices which come under the label of referendums. 
Several authors have created typologies, and some of these are 
summarised below. 
First, we must properly distinguish between referendums and 
recalls.  The latter are a negative variant of personal election involving a 
vote that terminates the mandate of an elected person (Butler & Ranney, 
1978, p. 5). In recent years, Venezuela in 2004 and Bolivia in 2008 have 
seen recalls.  These ended in the victory of the elected presidents.   
In Portugal, Jorge Miranda (1996a, pp. 237-238) refers to a large 
number of possible classifications of referendums: a) internal or 
international law; b)  national, regional or local scope; c) Constitutional, 
legislative, political or administrative; d) mandatory or optional; e) of 
popular, parliamentary, governmental, presidential or monarchic 
initiative; f) binding or advisory; g) positive or negative; h) suspensive or 
resolutive. 
Maria Luísa Duarte (1987, pp. 207-208) distinguishes the types 
of referendums by having in mind a) the subject of the consultation, on 
constituent (to approve a Constitution), Constitutional (to approve a 
Constitutional revision), legislative, administrative, or international issues; 
b) the territorial scope, at national or infra-State levels; c) the nature of a 
mandatory or optional consultation; d) the effects of the consultation, 
which may be binding or advisory. 
In France, Jean-Louis Quermone (1985, pp. 577-590) adopted a 
classification that is not so different: a) mandatory or optional; b) binding 
or advisory; c) by governmental origin (Head of State, Head of 
Government or parliamentary majority) or popular initiative; d) 
Constitutional or legislative; e) on rules or plebiscitary; f) of national, 
regional or local scope. 
David Butler and Austin Ranney, (1978, pp. 23-24) in their 
comparative study, classified referendums into four basic types: 
a) Government controlled referendums, when the government 
has the power to decide whether a referendum will be held. 
This includes the subject matter and wording of the 
proposition to be voted on, the proportion of yes votes 
needed for the proposition to win, and whether the 
outcome will be binding or merely advisory. 
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b) Constitutionally required referendums, when the 
Constitution requires certain kinds of measures adopted by 
the Government to be approved by the voters before they 
can take effect. 
c) Referendums by popular petitions, when ordinary voters 
are authorized to file a petition demanding that a certain 
measure adopted by the Government be referred to the 
voters. If a majority of the voters support a repeal, the law 
is voided regardless of whether the Government wishes to 
retain it. 
d) Popular initiatives, when ordinary voters are authorized to 
file a petition demanding that a certain measure, which the 
Government has not adopted, be referred to the voters. If 
the required majority of voters vote in favour, it becomes a 
law regardless of whether the government opposes it. 
An interesting classification was drawn by Gordon Smith (1976, 
p. 6). This author establishes a functional variance of the referendum, 
based on the degree of control exercised by political authorities. The 
referendum is controlled if the government can decide if, when and how it 
will be held in order to obtain foreseeable results in favour of the 
governing authority. The reverse applies to an uncontrolled referendum. 
The continuum of control has to be construed as an expression of manifest 
intention, apart from the particular issue and irrespective of the actual 
result. 
However, the intention behind the referendum is one thing; the 
consequences are quite another, and the sum of them may be supportive or 
detrimental to a regime. The consequences may have a fundamental 
impact on the system. Thus, in a similar fashion to the continuum based 
on control, it is feasible to distinguish a second type of effects with two 
extremes: pro-hegemonic and anti-hegemonic (Smith, 1976, p. 7). 
For the purpose of Gordon Smith’s classification, Arend Lijphart 
(1984, pp. 261-262) points out that the majority of referendums are 
controlled and pro-hegemonic. Governments have used the referendum 
when they expect to win. The mandatory referendums were not totally 
controlled, and not all the controlled referendums are pro-hegemonic 
because governments cannot always foresee the results. The referendums 
in France and The Netherlands on the European Constitutional Treaty are 
good examples of controlled but anti-hegemonic referendums.  
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Pier Vincenzo Uleri (1996, pp. 6-7), distinguishes some types of 
referendums: 
a) Prescribed referendum is a referendum according to rules 
and a discretionary referendum is one at the discretion of 
some person or institution. 
b) Prescribed referendums can be mandatory or optional. If it is 
mandatory, the procedure is automatic in the sense that the 
vote must be called in order for a decision to be valid and 
enter into force. It is optional when it is promoted at the 
request of an agent entitled by the Constitution or law.  
c) Binding and advisory votes. A vote is binding when its 
outcome must be accepted and adopted by Parliament and 
Government, or when the referendum vote is itself the 
decisive act. It is advisory when its outcome has only an 
indicative value, with the last word going to Parliament and 
Government. However, most de jure advisory votes have 
been considered de facto as binding ones. 
The same author also distinguishes two general classes of 
popular votes: referendum and initiative. The criterion should be the 
promoter of the vote: promoted at the voters’ request and promoted by 
other agents. 
Another criterion is the comparison between the promoter of the 
request for consultation and the author of the act put to the vote. Decision-
promoting votes are those in which the promoter of the consultation and 
the author of the decision put to vote coincide. Decision-controlling votes 
are all votes in which the promoter of the consultation and the author of 
the decision put to vote are two different agents. The decision-controlling 
vote can be a rejective vote, on a decision taken but not yet implemented, 
and an abrogative vote on an existing State of affairs (Uleri, 1996, pp.10-
14). 
Finally, the Canadian author Lawrence LeDuc (2003, p. 39) 
distinguishes four forms and variations of the referendum: a) mandatory 
Constitutional referendum (binding referendum); b) abrogative 
referendum (popular veto); c) citizen initiated referendum (popular 
initiative); d) consultative referendum. 
According to another criterion, the same author (2003, p. 47) 
refers to different political functions of the referendum, which he 
classified as follows: 
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a) The referendum as the recourse of the Prince: implemented 
by a State President, Head of Government, or ruling figure 
to obtain public endorsement of a person, regime or 
programme. 
b) The referendum as the recourse of the citizens: initiated by 
citizens or groups either against the governing authorities or 
without their approval. 
c) The referendum as the recourse of the parties: a vote 
organised by the governing party as part of its political 
agenda or to resolve internal political conflicts. 
7.2. Typology of Subject Matters of Referendums 
How have referendums been used around the world? Butler and 
Ranney (1978, pp. 18-19) point out that a look at the list of referendums 
offers a powerful deterrent to easy generalisations about why they have 
been held. Each seems to have a special history, rooted in an individual 
national tradition. The reasons for each referendum, its treatment by 
politicians and by voters, and its consequences fail to fit any clear 
universal pattern. However, according to the same authors, common 
elements can sometimes be detected: first, where there is Constitutional 
necessity; second, where there is a legitimating function; third, where 
there is a transfer of decision-making. 
On his turn, Lawrence LeDuc (2003, p. 33) establishes a 
typology of subject matters for referendums in the following terms: 
a) Constitutional issues: amendments to the Constitution and 
changes in political institutions, forms of governance, basic 
laws, etc. 
b) Treaties and international agreements: all agreements 
between nations, supranational organisations, etc, whether 
such referendums are Constitutionally mandated or not. 
c) Sovereignty: referendums on territorial questions, issues of 
national self-determination, devolution of authority, 
federation, secession. 
d)  Public policy: referendums on policy questions, including 
consultative votes on government proposals, abrogative 
votes on public laws, citizen initiatives, etc. 
8. Towards a Global Balance 
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When discussing referendums, we can speak about two different 
worlds: in Switzerland, California, and a few other States of the USA, 
initiatives and referendums are prominent strands in the fabric of political 
life. In all other countries referendums are held infrequently, usually only 
when the government thinks they are likely to provide a useful ad hoc 
solution to a particular Constitutional or political problem or to set the seal 
of legitimacy on a change of regime (Butler & Ranney, 1978, p. 221). 
In fact, referendums are relatively rare events in the politics of 
most nations. In only a few countries is the referendum a long-established 
and frequently used device for obtaining popular consent on major public 
questions. Switzerland uses the referendum as an integral part of its 
process of government, and Australia and Ireland do so for all 
Constitutional changes. In a few other instances, notably Italy, the 
referendum is a more frequently used, but still far from routine, part of the 
political process (LeDuc, 2003, p. 30). 
As we can see in Table 2, until the end of 2011 there were only 
eight States in the world which used the referendum for 20 or more times 
in their history, and only 12 more States that used it for 10 or more times. 
However, 127 other States held referendums. Table 1, having considered 
180 sovereign States (all with more than 100,000 inhabitants), allows us 
to conclude that the large majority (139) held referendums only 
occasionally. 
Switzerland is a world apart. From the 1,445 referendums that 
we could identify around the world, at a national level in sovereign States 
before the end of 2011, 574 of them were held in Switzerland and 871 in 
other States. In these latter, the referendum was used more frequently in 
Italy (72), Australia (48), Azerbaijan (41),11 Ireland (33), New Zealand 
(26), France, and Uruguay (25).     
Using Lawrence LeDuc’s typology of subject matters for 
referendums, we can see that the majority were Constitutional 
referendums, held to approve or ratify new Constitutions, Constitutional 
amendments, changes in political institutions, forms of governance or 
basic laws (638); 75 were held to decide on territorial questions, issues of 
national self-determination, devolution of authority, federation, or 
secession; 67 were held on treaties or international agreements, and 665 
were held on other policy questions submitted to voter decision. 
                                                 
11 29 on the same day. 
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As LeDuc points out (2003, p. 30), the referendum has been 
used not only to manage questions of major Constitutional change but also 
to allow citizens to influence the decisions of government directly on a 
wide range of policy matters, at least partly in response to a widespread 
sense of dissatisfaction with democratic performance in many countries. 
But, as Uleri refers (1996, p. 1), sometimes they have made life more 
complicated for governments, parliaments and political parties. At other 
times they have been useful instruments to solve difficulties that these 
bodies seemed unable or unwilling to tackle. 
9. Referendum and Democracy 
At the very beginning of their comparative study, Butler and 
Ranney (1978, p. 1) assert that referendums, as a means of making 
government decisions or giving legitimacy to them, have a history that is 
almost as old as democracy. However, they point out that a few admirable 
democratic societies have never tried the device, while some authoritarian 
ones have grotesquely abused it.  
Returning to Uleri (1996, p. 1), we can say that the referendum 
phenomenon needs to be considered in the light of the origins, tradition 
and development of liberal democratic representative institutions and 
government. The tension between Montesquieu and Rousseau, between 
representative and direct democracy, traversed the history of the modern 
Constitutional State. Nevertheless, its fundamental structures had been 
built on the basis of representative democracy. However, the referendary 
appeals for the people to ratify government decisions, from Rousseau’s 
concept of democracy, were never forgotten (Vega, 1985, pp. 102-103). 
In theory, the referendum is not incompatible with representative 
institutions, but only with a certain form of representative government. 
Historically the referendum has been defined with the liberal State of pure 
parliamentarianism, with its corollaries, restricted suffrage, representative 
mandate and primacy of the parliament. However, the parliamentary 
system suffered the influence of a dynamic that seeks to limit the powers 
of the parliament, through the strengthening of the executive and the 
effectiveness of the direct participation of voters. The referendum does 
not, however, necessarily undermine the parliamentary institution, since 
its integration in the system is submitted to a basic principle of 
complementarity (Duarte, 1987, p. 230). 
In each institutional crisis, from the representative government 
to representative democracy, from liberalism to the interventionist State, 
from the latter to neo-liberalism, the idea of referendum is reborn, as a 
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corrective device, as a way of control, as a formula of citizen participation 
and an expression of popular will, and as a counter power regarding or 
vis-avis the parties (Vega, 1985, cited in Cardoso, 1992, p. 26). 
The referendum, as an arbitrage process, is a serious 
inconvenience to the balance of powers. In the case of conflict between 
the Head of State and Parliament, it can degenerate in plebiscitary 
consultation, with the strengthening of the President and the weakening of 
the Parliament. In the case of conflict between the chambers, it nullifies 
the High Chamber.  In the case of conflict between the Parliament and 
Government, it causes institutional instability, leading to the fall of one of 
them (Duarte, 1987, pp. 225-226). The referendum as a process of control 
does not have these risks. It allows for the control of the representatives 
by the electoral body, through the expression of their will on this or that 
political decision, in addition to the guidance of the parties (Duarte, 1987, 
p. 226). 
As a way of direct participation, the referendum allows for the 
approximation between the adoption of public decisions and the electoral 
body affected by such decisions. But it is not possible to conceive of a 
democratic system based exclusively on successive direct decisions taken 
by the voters. The problem is not technical. Indeed, it is easy to admit that, 
in a near future, the development of technology for electoral purposes, 
namely by electronic means, can make easier the holding of referendums 
(Câmara, 1997, pp. 166-176). If the Constitutional State presupposes the 
limitation of power, such limitation would be impossible in a direct 
democracy, because it is not capable of guaranteeing political pluralism 
(González, 2005, pp. 9-10). If the referendum is used with electoral 
purposes, not as a complement of the elections but as their replacement, it 
becomes a device opposed to the democratic principle. It does so because 
runs contrary to the purpose of elections.  It is the choice between several 
options that gives suffrage its genuine significance (González, 2005, p. 
32). 
As Uleri stresses (1996, p. 2), it is not possible to contrast 
representative democracy and direct democracy, simply because no 
modern political regimes use referendums as the main decision-making 
system. The referendum phenomenon generally presupposes an 
interaction with the mechanisms and processes of the political system that 
work within it.  In fact, as LeDuc (2003, p. 31) refers, many nations have 
traditionally combined elements of both direct and representative 
democracy in their political institutions and have merely shifted the 
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balance more towards one or the other at different moments in their 
history. 
Representative democracy, that is, parliamentary democracy, is 
the general rule followed in the exercise of constituted power. In that 
sense, and apart from certain exceptions like the Swiss case, the 
referendum as a direct democracy device has a complementary role. From 
the participative point of view, it adds value to representative 
democracies. The referendum is one of the several participative 
techniques in a fully pledged democracy, endowed with effective political 
pluralism and with guaranteed fundamental rights under the rule of law. 
Even the referendum in Switzerland is used as a supplement to 
representative democracy (only 4% of the bills are decided by popular 
referendums). The experiments with deliberative democracy clearly 
indicate that referendums can serve only as supplements to representative 
democracy (Qvortrup, 2005, pp. 40-41). 
In unusual situations, like the adoption of fundamental decisions 
or the option between alternatives that seriously divide public opinion in a 
democratic context, the referendum can assure that the final decision 
adopted has sufficient social support (González, 2005, p. 24). However, 
the authoritarian experience of referendums goes to show that the 
referendum is a technique and, consequently, it is value-free, in principle. 
It is necessary to know in which context, with which contents, purposes, 
conditions and guarantees the referendum takes place, in order to establish 
a concrete evaluation (González, 2005, p. 21). It would be difficult to 
conclude that there is a clear pattern connecting the use of referendums 
with democratic practice (LeDuc, 2003, p. 29). The referendum is a 
political device, which can be democratic, but which is not necessarily 
democratic. Governments have chosen to hold referendums mainly for 
reasons of political convenience rather than in response to overarching 
general theories about how laws should be made and unmade (Butler & 
Ranney, 1978, p. 24). 
Indeed, as Matt Qvortrup (2005, p. 10) points out, democracy is 
more than plain majority vote. The essence of democracy is not the vote 
but the discussion. The vote is assuredly an integral part of democratic 
decision-making. When the matter has been fully discussed, then a vote 
must be taken. This understanding of democracy has usually led 
theoreticians and practitioners to the conclusion that representative 
democracy must be the norm and that referendums are to be avoided as a 
device of pure direct democracy. A system that allows voters to vote only 
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‘yes’ or ‘no’ would institutionalise majoritarianism, and consequently be 
inimical to the ideal of democracy as discussion. 
The referendum as an institution cannot represent the future of 
democracy, but in the democracy of the future there could be an 
increasing number of votes by referendum.  There are important 
differences between countries, especially with regard to those that adopt 
referendum by initiative and those that do not (Uleri, 1996, p. 17). Giving 
citizens the chance to express their views directly on important political 
questions, or providing them with additional opportunities to intervene in 
the sometimes impenetrable processes of political decision-making, seems 
an obvious remedy for the present democratic malaise. While the 
referendum may not be capable of resolving all of democracy’s problems, 
it does respond to at least some of the concerns expressed by many 
citizens in contemporary democratic societies (LeDuc, 2003, p. 20). 
The framework of references for the democratic participation of 
citizens cannot, therefore, be reduced to the dilemma between the typical 
work of representative democracy and the appeal to the referendum. 
Between the extremes, there are all the mechanisms of participative 
democracy that coexist with representation, such as the exercise of the 
right of petition, the participation in a wide range of associations 
(political, civic, trade unions), the legislative initiative of citizens, and the 
free exercise of fundamental rights of citizenship. 
In 1975, during the electoral campaign for the first free elections 
in Portugal after the revolution, which had the participation of 92% of 
registered voters, it was said that the vote is the weapon of the people. 
There is no doubt that, in democracies, the vote is, and must remain, a 
decisive and fundamental way of expressing the popular will. However, 
the participation of the citizens in a democracy cannot be limited to 
periodic voting in elections or referendums. If it is true that there is no 
democracy without the right to vote, it is also true that there is more to 
democracy than the vote. 








The Constitutional Monarchy: 1820-1910 
1. Experiences and Constitutional Tradition in the 19th Century 
1.1. Constitutional Antecedents 
The years preceding the liberal revolution of 1820 in Portugal 
were painfully marked by three French invasions, the flight of the Court to 
Brazil (which was then a Portuguese colony), and by de facto British rule 
following the defeat of Napoleon’s troops. Since Britain declared war on 
the French Convention in 1792, Portugal was internally divided between 
the ‘French party’ and the ‘English party’. This severely affected the 
country given the contradictory pressures from France and Britain, and the 
oscillations of the Spanish position in that conflict.   
In 1807, Napoleon ordered the closure of Portuguese ports to 
British ships under the terms of the Continental Blockade. Given the 
initial Portuguese refusal to accept that diktat, Napoleon, after celebrating 
the Treaty of Fontainebleau with Spain and the King of Etruria, which 
divided Portugal among the three powers, ordered his troops to advance 
upon Lisbon.  Under the command of General Junot, Napoleon’s troops 
aimed to impose the blockade that would otherwise have been ineffective. 
Unable to resist, the Portuguese Royal Family fled to Brazil, after a secret 
agreement with England (Cronin, 1979; Vicente, 2004). 
On 23 May 1808, with the country under French occupation, the 
Three States (Junta dos Três Estados)12 decided to request a Constitution 
similar to the one of the Great-Dukedom of Warsaw.  They also requested 
the appointment of a Constitutional king from the Emperor’s family. A 
deputation was sent to Napoleon, who was then in Bayonne.  This request 
                                                 
12 Junta dos Três Estados was the name of the Portuguese Courts during the Ancient 
Regime.  
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for a Constitution13 was the first systematised proposal for a Portuguese 
Constitution (Araújo, 1993, p. 31; Canotilho, 1993, p. 149). However, the 
request had no hope of success.  That same year, following developments 
in Spain, a popular rebellion broke out. With the British aid requested in 
June 1808, Junot’s troops were expelled. Two other invasions were 
defeated, commanded respectively by Generals Soult and Massena, in 
1810.14  
With the King absent in Brazil, Portugal was, in practice, under 
British occupation. In fact, the Regency was subordinate to the British 
high command, which was insured by William Beresford, who supported 
the conservative members of the Regency.  He worried about maintaining 
order and preventing the social, political and ideological effects of the 
revolutionary ideals, which had been reinforced in Portugal by the French 
invasions (Marques, 1992, p. 27). The Portuguese felt themselves 
abandoned by their Monarch, and complained about the constant drainage 
of money to Brazil. On the other hand, they regretted the commercial 
decline and the permanent deficit, and resented British influence on the 
Army and on the Regency (Marques, 1998, p.15). The abuses which 
British soldiers inflicted on the civilian population, and the subordination 
to which they held the Portuguese military, caused considerable anger, 
which increased after the condemnation and execution of several Masonic 
plotters, including a prestigious Portuguese General, Gomes Freire de 
Andrade, in October 1817. 
The revolutionary movements that occurred in Europe and North 
America at the end of the 18th century implemented many of the concepts 
and political values of Enlightenment thought: freedom, equality, safety, 
individual property, citizens’ rights and duties, national representation, 
tolerance, and the social pact. From those concepts, although defined in 
different ways, for instance, in the works of Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mably, Sieyès, or Holbach, there appeared new 
interpretations of political liberalism.  Constitutional solutions were found 
in the work of Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Constant or Guizot (Vargues, 
1993, p. 45). The Portuguese press, published abroad, mainly in England, 
was the core of the Portuguese liberal political formation. All these 
publications demanded a Constitution for Portugal and Brazil, and had as 
models English and French Constitutionalism as well as the Spanish 
Constitution of 1812 (the liberal Cadiz Constitution). In Portugal, the 
                                                 
13 Called in Portugal Súplica de Constituição. Text available in Praça (1894, pp. IX-X). 
14 On the French invasions, see Bainville (1931); Araújo (1993); Vicente (2004) and 
Serrão (1983).  
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secret societies that were forbidden and severely repressed in 30 March 
1818 were important bases for the liberal movement (Vargues, 1993, p. 
45). 
1.2. From the Revolution to the Constitution   
Meanwhile, several liberal revolutions occurred in 1820.  In 
France, there was an increase in the popular and military struggle against 
the restored monarchy after the fall of the empire. In Naples and Sicily, 
liberal rebellions broke out.  In Spain, in January 1820,  troops that should 
have proceeded from Cadiz to the American colonies under Colonel 
Quiroga and Major Rafael del Diego rebelled, proclaiming their allegiance 
to the Constitution approved in that Spanish city, in 1812 (Marques, 1992, 
p. 30; Ventura, 2004b, p. 158).  Finally, in Portugal, due to the spread of 
dissatisfaction in military circles, a rebellion emerged in Oporto, on 24 
August, and a Committee named Junta Provisional do Governo do Reino 
was created. Its purpose was to summon a parliament (Cortes) and draw 
up a Constitution (Marques, 1992, p.18). As Isabel Nobre Vargues (1993, 
p. 45) remarks, the first Portuguese liberal movement represented, in 
Europe, an aspect of the liberal victory (in Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Greece) over the royalists, represented by France and the Holy Alliance, a 
coalition that included Russia, Austria and Prussia.   
As had happened in Oporto, there was also a military uprising in 
Lisbon, on 20 September, and another Governmental Council (Junta 
Governativa) was constituted. The divergences between both committees 
on the electoral system for the Constituent Courts, and the very contents 
of the Constitution, almost caused a confrontation due to the disagreement 
concerning the “Instructions” for the election of the Constituent Assembly 
(Ventura, 2004a, p. 159; Santos, 1990, pp. 43-44). These Instructions 
were approved at last in a second version on 22 November 1820, 
according to the method established in the Spanish Constitution of 1812, 
which was adopted by the Kingdom of Portugal (Marques, 1992, p. 19; 
Santos, 1990, pp. 122-144).15 
The election of the Constituent Assembly took place in 
December 1820, yielding a majority of owners, merchants, jurists and 
bureaucrats, who immediately requested the return of King João VI to 
                                                 
15 See text in Almeida (1998) which contains all of the Portuguese electoral legislation 
practically up to 1926, with an introduction by the author and a valuable synoptic board of 
the legislative evolution. The text with all of the Portuguese electoral laws can also be seen 
in Namorado & Pinheiro (1998).  
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Portugal. The Constituent Assembly met between 24 January 1821 and 4 
November 1822.16 The King arrived in Lisbon on 3 July 1821. 
The Bases of the Constitution were approved on 9 March 1821, and the 
King swore them in on 4 July. It Stated that sovereignty lay within a free 
and independent Nation, that it could not be the property of anybody 
(Article 20), and that the form of government was a hereditary 
Constitutional monarchy with fundamental laws regulating the exercise of 
the three political powers (Article 18). Only the Nation could draw up the 
Constitution or Fundamental Law, through its freely elected 
representatives (Article 21). Once drawn by the Extraordinary Assembly, 
the Constitution could only be reformed or changed in some of its articles 
four years after its publication. Even then, two thirds of the deputies had 
to agree on the need for the intended alterations. This being the case, the 
reform could only take place in the next legislature, with the deputies 
having the powers needed for that purpose (Article 22).17 
1.3. The Constitution of 1822 
The first Portuguese Constitution was approved on 23 
September 1822, and sworn in by the King on 1 October.18 As has been 
shown, the approval of the 1822 Constitution did not involve any 
plebiscitary device, in spite of that institution being well known by then. 
In fact, the plebiscite had recently been used in other places. Several 
Constitutions were approved by referendums in the American States and 
also in Europe. Besides the Swiss experience, the French Constitutions of 
Year I (1793), Year III (1795) and Year VIII (1799) were approved by 
plebiscites, (Guedes, 1978, pp. 156-170) and the same happened in Italy, 
with the Constitutions of the Cisalpine and Liguria Republics, in 1797, 
under Napoleon’s influence (Uleri, 2003, pp.120-121). The French 
Constitution of Year VIII was changed by plebiscites, creating the 
Consulate for life (4 August 1802) and, then, the hereditary imperial 
dignity (18 May 1804). However, the Portuguese constituent deputies of 
1821-1822 never considered holding a plebiscite. 
                                                 
16 All parliamentary debates that took place in Portugal since 1821 until now are available 
on the site of the Portuguese Parliament (Assembleia da República) at 
http://debates.parlamento.pt [accessed 8 March 2011] 
17 Text available at http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/portugal/liberalismo/bases821.html 
[accessed 8 March 2011].          
18 On the Constitution of 1822, see Marques, A. H. O. (1998, pp. 73-74); Canotilho (1998, 
pp. 123-128); Miranda(1981, pp. 226-230); Sá (1994, pp. 137-140); Gouveia (2010, pp. 
419-430). See the text in Assembleia da República (2004, pp. 7-106). 
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The 1822 Constitution which, according to Gomes Canotilho 
(1993, p. 150), was the first demonstration of the democratic constituent 
power and its limit, recognised only the representative principle. Article 
26 provided that sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation, and it could not 
be exercised by anyone, except legally elected representatives. Therefore, 
the Constitution assumed the structural principles of the liberal doctrines: 
national sovereignty, representation, independence of powers, and 
fundamental rights.   
Like the French Constitution of 1793, the Portuguese 
Constitution of 1822 welcomed the popular sovereignty principle and 
opted for a directly elected unicameral parliament, reflecting the influence 
of Rousseau (Machado, 2001, pp. 140-141). However, the Portuguese 
Constitution did not adopt the principle of popular ratification of laws 
passed by the Parliament as laid down in Articles 58 to 60 of the French 
Constitution. On the contrary, influential deputies, including Borges 
Carneiro and Manuel Fernandes Thomaz, explicitly rejected the plebiscite. 
According to the latter in the 5 November 1821 session of the Constituent 
Assembly, the people used their right to elect the legislators: ‘The people 
have to receive the Constitution as it will be presented and take into 
consideration that Congress will only propose a Constitution aimed at the 
happiness of the Nation. Therefore, the people have to voluntarily obey.’ 
(DCGENP, 217, 5 November 1821, p. 2949).19 
In the 1822 Constitution, legislative power belonged to a single 
assembly. The monarchic principle remained, but the King’s authority 
came from the Nation. His power was founded in the Constitution, rather 
than in divine right or the inherited principle. The King had important 
powers, but he did not have the right to dissolve parliament. As Luís Sá 
(1994, p. 139) points out, that was the monarchic Constitution where the 
representative principle was taken further, undermining the aristocratic 
principle.    
In the Constitutional revision procedure provided in Article 28 
of the 1822 Constitution, some authors glanced in a relatively explicit, 
although indirect, way at the principle of voter’s ratification of the 
decisions taken by Parliament (Cardoso, 1992, pp. 67-68; Urbano, 1998, 
pp. 97-100).  In fact, taking inspiration from Article 22 of the Bases, the 
Constitution laid down that any revision could only happen four years 
after its publication. Only then, could Constitutional changes be proposed 
                                                 
19 All mentions and expressions cited from Portuguese texts were translated by the author 
from the original. 
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to Parliament. In that case, the proposal would be read three times with 
intervals of eight days. If the proposal had been admitted for discussion, 
and if two thirds of the deputies had agreed on its need, it would be 
published as a decree, ordering that, in the elections for the next 
legislature, the voters should give the deputies special powers to make that 
revision, which, if passed, would be recognised as Constitutional.  
As Maria Benedita Urbano writes (1998, p. 99), it was natural 
that, when those elections took place, the subject of the revision would be 
unnoticed in the wider context of other relative subjects to the normal 
tasks of the chambers, making it difficult to know the exact position of the 
voters regarding the changes proposed to the Constitutional text. Fernanda 
Lopes Cardoso (1992, p. 68) echoed this point, noting that voters were 
likely to overlook their right to amend the Constitution. 
1.4. From the Constitution to the Constitutional Charter   
The 1822 Constitution was in force only briefly. Brazil’s 
precipitous independence inflicted a mortal blow to the Courts and made 
the liberals extremely unpopular. The economic crisis, and advances by 
the conservative party, combined with the European situation, worked 
against the liberal movement, causing its collapse (Marques, 1998, p. 21). 
In this context, counter-revolutionary forces led by Queen Carlota 
Joaquina and by Infant Dom Miguel, prompted a military coup on 27 May 
1823, which led to the dissolution of Parliament on 3 June, followed by 
the fall of the Constitution on 4 June (Vargues & Torgal, 1993, p. 67). 
However, King Dom João VI did not wish to see the return to 
absolutism.  On 18 June 1823 he appointed a committee to draw an 
improved and modified Fundamental Law to the Portuguese Monarchy, 
annoying the most conservative sectors, but gaining the support of liberals 
(Marques, 1992, p. 40). At the same time, and in order to placate the 
victors of the coup, he decreed the dissolution of Parliament (Marques, 
1992, p. 22; Vargues & Torgal, 1993, p. 69). At the end of 1823, the 
committee had a moderate draft of a Constitutional text (Canotilho, 1998, 
p. 135).  Its approval was nonetheless prevented by political instability 
due to successive anti-liberal movements. In the event, King Dom João VI 
did not grant the Constitutional text made by the committee and, on 4 June 
1824, he decided to declare and establish the ‘old, true and only’ 
Constitution of the Portuguese Monarchy (Santos, 1990, pp. 45-46). 
King Dom João VI died on 10 March 1826, ending his 
moderating influence and throwing the country into open conflict once 
again. By decree published on 6 May 1826, he appointed his eldest son, 
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Dom Pedro, as his successor, who therefore became King Dom Pedro IV 
of Portugal and Emperor of Brazil. In Portugal, a Regency Council headed 
by the Infanta Isabel Maria, took charge of government, representing the 
new monarch’s will. From Brazil, the successor gave his providences: he 
granted a Constitutional Charter (Carta Constitucional) made under his 
own direction and gave the Portuguese Crown to his daughter, Maria da 
Glória, who would marry Dom Pedro’s brother Infante Dom Miguel, 
under the condition of his Charter’s oath. The Constitutional Charter 
arrived in Lisbon, taken by the British ambassador Charles Stuart, and the 
Regent swore allegiance to it on 31 July 1826.   
1.5. The Constitutional Charter of 1826   
The Constitutional Charter was written in Brazil between 24 and 
29 April 1826. Its main inspiration was the Brazilian Constitution of 1824, 
which itself followed the French example of 1814.  This Constitutional 
form was also copied by several regions in South Germany, and also by 
Poland, thus reflecting the conservative reaction against the enacting of 
popular Constitutions.20    
The Charter did not receive only the three known political 
powers − legislative, executive and judicial − but joined them into a 
moderating power, a theoretical product of Benjamin Constant that was 
introduced in Portugal by Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira. The King had the 
power to appoint the Peers of the Kingdom without restrictions, to 
dissolve the Lower Chamber, to veto and give sanctions to Parliament 
diplomas, and to extend and adjourn the Parliament sittings. All these 
competences gave the King such power that it annulled the representative 
essence of the legislative bodies (Sá, 1994, p. 142; Santos, 1990, p. 203). 
The Charter established the Parliament (Cortes) as holder of 
legislative power, with the King’s sanction, and composed by The 
Chamber of Peers (Câmara dos Pares) and the Chamber of Deputies 
(Câmara dos Deputados). The Peers’ nomination by the King was made 
for life and it was hereditary, without any fixed number of members.  On 
the other hand, the Deputies were indirectly elected. 
The Constitutional Charter did not contain any device of semi-
direct democracy. Like the Constitution of 1822, the Charter retained the 
principle of parliamentary renewal in case of Constitutional revision. 
                                                 
20 On the Constitutional Charter see Marques, A. H. O. (1998, pp. 74-76); Canotilho (1998, 
pp. 135-141); Miranda (1981, pp. 230-237); Sá (1994, pp. 140-147); Gouveia (2010, pp. 
432-442). 
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Articles 140 to 143 established that, once the Constitutional Revision Act 
was approved, it would be sanctioned and enacted by the King. In such an 
Act, the voters were requested to give the deputies special powers to make 
that reform in the next election. In the first sittings of the next legislature 
the subject would be retaken, and if passed, it would be enacted solemnly, 
and joined to the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, from all Constitutional revisions made during the 
force of the Charter, named as Additional Acts (Actos Adicionais), only 
the one of 1895 respected the established rules. The Additional Acts of 
1852 and 1908 were approved by dictatorial decrees (Carvalho, 1980, pp. 
95-113).    
1.6. From the Constitutional Charter to the 
       ‘September Revolution’  
While the supporters of the absolute monarchy were mobilised 
against the Charter, the liberals saw it as a base for the establishment of a 
Constitutional regime (Marques, 1998, pp. 24-25; Santos, 1990, pp. 47-
48). Infant Dom Miguel, advised by Metternich, initially accepted the 
conditions imposed by King Dom Pedro IV to give him the Regency. On 
3 July 1827 he swore allegiance to the Charter, and on 22 February 1828 
he returned to Lisbon. However, the general atmosphere of the country 
soon led him to betray his commitment to the Charter (Santos, 1990, p. 
49). 
On 13 March, the Deputies’ Chamber was dissolved.  The 
Constitutional Charter was repealed on 3 May.  On 5 May, the Three 
States of the Kingdom were summoned to proclaim Dom Miguel as the 
absolute King on 25 June 1828. This left Portugal diplomatically isolated: 
the new King was recognised only by the Vatican, United States and 
Spain (Vargues & Torgal, 1993, p. 73; Santos, 1990, pp. 139-140). The 
return to an absolutist regime was characterised by violent repression. 
At the beginning of the 1830’s, the international situation 
became more favourable for the liberals. Belgium became independent 
and adopted a Constitution. In France, Charles X was deposed, with Louis 
Philippe D’Orleans ascending to the throne.  This favoured Pedro’s cause 
(Santos, 1990, p. 52). In England, Palmerston replaced Wellington as the 
Government’s leader. Therefore, the Holy Alliance suffered a hard blow. 
Two of the most influential European countries – France and England – 
had changed their political positions, and they became more receptive 
towards the Portuguese liberals (Ventura, 2004a, p. 177).  In 1831, King 
Dom Pedro, who was having serious political troubles in Brazil, abdicated 
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in this country in favour of his son, Dom Pedro II.  He boarded a shop to 
Europe in order to lead the liberal forces. The economic, political and 
military support that he could obtain, led him to victory in the civil war in 
1834.    
After the defeat and exile of Dom Miguel, the Constitutional 
Charter was restored and the elections were called, although the right to 
vote was severely restricted (Maltez, 2004, p. 245). King Dom Pedro IV 
died on 24 September.  His daughter, Queen Maria II, succeeded him, and 
the Duke of Palmela led a conservative Government. 
Fresh elections took place in July 1836, against a backdrop of 
disturbance and instability. The Government obtained the majority, but 
the liberal radical opposition had an important victory in the Oporto 
district. When these elected Deputies landed in Lisbon on 9 September, 
they were received in apotheosis by the Lisbonian people and the National 
Guard, and imposed a new government formed by the insurgents (Silva, 
1993, pp. 89-105). The ‘September Revolution’ was only supported by the 
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and by the town popular classes.  It 
was strongly opposed by the “new Chartist aristocracy” (Santos, 1990, p. 
56; Ribeiro, 2004, p. 338). 
In spite of clear divisions among the supporters of the 
September Revolution, the revolt attempts from the Charter supporters 
were controlled (Ribeiro, 2004, pp. 339-349) and there were elections. 
These were held according to rules contained in the legislation of 1822 
(Santos, 1990, p. 154), to elect the General, Extraordinary and Constituent 
Courts (Cortes Gerais, Extraordinárias e Constituintes).  These met from 
January 1837 to March 1838, to make and pass the new Constitution.   
In April 1838, the new Constitution was passed and sworn. That 
Constitution reflected the special circumstances of its creation process, as 
well as the attempt to conciliate the 1822 Constitution and the 
Constitutional Charter (Marques, 1992, pp. 81-82). 
1.7. The Constitution of 1838 
The 1838 Constitution was characterised by the abolition of 
moderating power, and by the return to the three classic powers.21 It 
adopted bicameralism, but did not give the High Chamber the role of 
representing and preserving the aristocracy’s interests. In fact, the Senate, 
                                                 
21 On the Constitution of 1838, see Canotilho (1998, pp. 145-148); Miranda (1981, pp. 
238-240); Sá (1994, pp. 147-150); and Gouveia (2010, pp. 446-454). 
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(Câmara dos Senadores), was elective and temporary (Article 58), with 
the renewal of half of their members whenever there were elections for the 
Deputies’ Chamber (Article 62).   
The 1838 Constitution represented a pact between Parliament 
and the Queen, and a compromise between national sovereignty and the 
monarchic principle (Sá, 1994, p. 149; Canotilho, 1998, p. 158). It 
reinStated the Sieyès line of democratic constituent power, which meant 
that a Constitution could only be created by a constituent power that lives 
in the Nation. The King led the executive power, and also had the powers 
to give sanction and enact laws, and dissolve the Deputies’ Chamber if the 
“salvation of the State” required it. 
This Constitution was not approved by any plebiscitary process 
and, much like its antecedents, excluded any devices of that nature. The 
Constitutional revision process followed the same model as the previous 
Constitutions, based on the principle of voter ratification. Draft 
amendments could be presented in the Deputies’ Chamber and, if they 
were passed in both Chambers, they would be sanctioned by the King and 
submitted to the next Parliament after elections. If they were approved, 
then they would be considered as part of the Constitution without 
dependence on any sanction. 
1.8. The Replacement of the Constitutional Charter   
The 1838 Constitution lasted four years. With the dissolution of 
the National Guard, the September Revolution lost one of its main 
supporting bases (Santos, 1990, p. 58). Consequently, in April 1839, the 
Government fell and was succeeded by an ambiguous Government that 
was against the Constitution but working in its framework. However, on 
27 January 1842, a coup d’état led by Costa Cabral proclaimed once again 
the Constitutional Charter.   
Under the flags of order and economic development, a new 
strong man, Costa Cabral, established a repressive regime in the country 
and closed the Parliament. On 5 February 1844, the individual guaranties 
were suspended and the Parliament was kept closed until 30 September 
(Ribeiro, 1993a, p. 109). 
Costa Cabral won the elections of 1845 by resorting to 
widespread electoral fraud (Santos, 1990, p. 164), arousing a strong sense 
of disapproval and opposition. In March 1846, riots broke out with a 
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strong revolt called Maria da Fonte,22 which led to the Government’s 
resignation. On 23 July Marshal Saldanha led a coup d’état and a new 
Government that reignited the civil war in October, with a large revolt 
named Patuleia,23 that was only defeated by an English, French and 
Spanish joint military intervention, thus forcing the Gramido Convention 
on 29 June 1847 (Ribeiro, 1993a, pp. 107-119).   
In the next elections Costa Cabral reappeared and got to lead the 
Government again on 18 June 1849, until being dismissed after several 
political scandals (Maltez, 2004, pp. 323-327).  Another coup, led from 
Oporto by Marshal Saldanha in April 1851, represented a turn in the 
political and Constitutional Portuguese history with the beginning of the 
Regeneration (Regeneração).   
1.9. The Regeneration and the Additional Act to the 
       Constitutional Charter 
The new Government was constituted on 22 May 1851. In a 
country strongly traumatised and divided, power was taken by a wide 
political room where the centre prevailed with strong populist support 
desiring the end of instability. This is when Fontes Pereira de Melo 
appeared as the political leader who was able to break up with the military 
coups and give stability to the institutions. He also established national 
consensus based on the centre (Ribeiro, 1993b, p. 121; Telo, 2004, pp. 
118-119; Mónica, 1999). 
The Regeneration meant the end of ideological conflicts in 
favour of pragmatism over the classes based on promises of economic 
welfare and material progress. The two parties created then - Regenerador 
and Histórico – worked according to a tacit agreement for political 
conciliation. This marked the beginning of a long period of a rotational 
system (rotativismo) where both parties alternately shared the exercise of 
power (Proença & Manique, 1992, pp. 18-19). According to Pereira 
Marques (1992, p. 47), from 1851 until the Republican Party’s boom in 
the 1880s and 1890s, it can be said that there was no real opposition 
against the institutions, the forms of governance, the policies, and the 
economic and social structures in Portugal.  Between 1851 and 1865, the 
regeneradores from the centre-right and the históricos from the centre-left 
shared power, and the convergence between both parties brought a union 
government in 1865 (Silva, 2004, p. 195).   
                                                 
22 Maria da Fonte is a legendary woman who would lead the beginning of that revolt. 
23 The word patuleia comes from pata-ao-léu which means barefooted people in Old 
Portuguese slang. The term expresses obviously the social origin of the revolt. 
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The Additional Act to the Constitutional Charter gave 
expression to the new regime and arose from a commitment between 
cartistas and moderate setembristas. The main Constitutional changes 
were a return to the direct election of deputies and a marginal widening of 
suffrage (Almeida, 1998, p. XI).   The Additional Act, however, did not 
respect the process foreseen in the Constitutional Charter for its own 
revision. In the Decree of 25 May 1851, which prepared the ground for 
reform, the Queen admitted that she decided to ignore the formalities 
prescribed in the Charter ‘on behalf of the public salvation supreme law’ 
(Canotilho, 1998, p. 158).    
The expression ‘Additional Act’ was introduced by Benjamin 
Constant and had its origin in a project submitted to popular ratification in 
1815 (Additional Act to the Empire Constitutions). One year before the 
Portuguese Additional Act, Louis Bonaparte called the people to 
pronounce on his maintenance, with enough powers to make a 
Constitution. However, the Portuguese ‘regenerators’ had no intention of 
submitting their Constitutional reform to any form of popular ratification 
or instituting some device of that nature.   
2. The First Proposals for Referendum 
2.1. The Proposals by Ferreira de Melo 
At the beginning of 1868, the political crisis returned with a 
popular revolt on 1 January in Oporto and in Lisbon, called Janeirinha, 
due to the approval of a new consumption tax. In a scene of deep 
economic crisis, this movement strongly affected the liberal political class 
and the traditional power of the Histórico and Regenerador parties. That 
situation opened the way for several radical governments, called 
“reformists” (reformistas), who governed with great difficulty due to lack 
of parliamentary support (Silva, 2004, pp. 195, 202). 
A new political cycle started, marked by the appearance of new 
parties and instability (Maltez, 2004, p. 392). It was in this context of 
political and parliamentary instability that Ferreira de Melo proposed, in a 
speech addressed to the Deputies’ Chamber in the session of 30 July 1869, 
that the parliamentary system had broken down and should be temporarily 
substituted by a government legitimised by plebiscite.   
António Augusto Ferreira de Melo (1838-1891) was descended 
from a convinced liberal family (Moreira, 2005). His father, Joaquim 
Ferreira de Melo, took up arms for the liberal cause and was also a 
Member of Parliament between 1858 and 1864 (Soares, 2005). A law 
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graduate (1858) and a barrister in Oporto, Ferreira de Melo was a 
councillor of the Supreme Administrative Court in Lisbon. Nobleman, 
commander and academician, author of several works on Law, he would 
come to be distinguished in 1870 with the title of viscount (Visconde de 
Moreira de Rei). 
Until 1868, Ferreira de Melo stayed outside the political life and 
he did not belong to any party. After the Janeirinha movement, he 
decided to intervene because he agreed with its purposes, although he had 
not taken part in the revolt. In April 1868 he was elected to Parliament for 
the first time, in the single member constituency of Fafe, his birthplace. 
During the disturbed period of 1868-1871, he remained outside the parties 
and, for that reason, he was absolutely free to approve or to criticise the 
measures taken by successive governments.   
Ferreira de Melo’s speech before the Chamber of Deputies was 
made on 30 July 1869 (DCSD, 67, 30 July 1869, pp. 959-962). The 
reformist Government led by Sá da Bandeira had been in power for a little 
over a year (since 22 July 1868), and it was in crisis following the 
resignations of the Justice and Finance Ministers. It would fall just 12 
days later.  
In his speech, Ferreira de Melo began by approaching the 
political crisis, expressing his approval of the Finance Minister’s (Conde 
de Samodães) resignation and declaring that he no longer had any reason 
to oppose the Government.  He even expressed his trust in Sá da 
Bandeira’s capacity to recompose the Cabinet, but he clearly showed his 
dissatisfaction with the financial policy taken by former governments and 
his great scepticism about the near future. The solution proposed was to 
interrupt the parliamentary system for some time, in order to save freedom 
and the institutions.   
A government called by popular will would present a 
programme or a Statement to the country saying which reforms were 
required. It would clearly expose the extraordinary means needed to carry 
that government, and its programme would be introduced to the country 
and submitted for its approval. The government would become legitimate 
by a plebiscite, with the voters being asked whether they agreed to grant 
extraordinary powers for a certain and fixed time in order to turn the 
suggested programme into reality. 
Ferreira de Melo’s proposal expressed his concern about the 
good administration of the country, which needed to pay greater attention 
to the health of public finances, reducing expenses and making savings, 
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raising revenue and prioritising the organisation of all services. This is 
what he expected from the Governments after the Janeirinha revolt, but 
its performance had been disappointing. The administration before the 
revolt was the ruin of the country, but the following governments had also 
fallen short of expectations. 
Ferreira de Melo suggested four reasons for persistant problem 
of poor governance: a) the inoperativeness, incompetence and discredit of 
the Parliament; b) the rivalries and the incoherence in the governments’ 
formation, given the conventions that ruled their formation and behaviour; 
c) governments’ weaknesses due to the parliamentary system i.e.  deep 
reforms caused great resistance, and no parliamentary system had the 
necessary strength to prevail in making difficult decisions; d) the 
falsification of the parliamentary system, which was endemic and 
influence the elections, the organisation of the cabinets, and had 
consequences for the entire civil service. 
Ferreira de Melo criticised the dependence of parliament and 
government members on the installed powers who decided their election 
and their maintenance in power through electoral fraud. Therefore, he 
expressed his conviction that the change would only be possible by a 
fundamental change in the ‘rules of the game’. In his view, the solution 
was to interrupt the parliamentary system for a period of time. An 
exceptional situation and a serious crisis of the system demanded an 
exceptional solution. Suspending the Parliament would create the 
conditions for its rehabilitation. The speaker supported a reformist and 
revolutionary government, which would have sufficient strength to 
transform the country’s aims into realities.  The parliamentary system 
would then be re-introduced, saving and respecting the Constitutional 
institutions that had fallen into disrepute. 
This change, qualified by the speaker as revolutionary, would 
mean a rupture with the Constitutional Charter without using military 
means. Ferreira de Melo’s declaration did not suggest a military 
revolution, or any other procedure by which the national will would be 
usurped.  
This last point is important for two reasons: Firstly, the speaker 
rejected the traumatic experiences of the past, which were nevertheless 
still recent. The country had lived for three decades, between 1820 and 
1850, in an almost permanent climate of civil wars and riots perpetrated 
by military officers. He did not want a return to that past but, mindful of 
the crisis engulfing the country after almost 20 years of relative peace, he 
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proposed something somewhat new, a ‘regeneration’ of sorts.  Military 
means would be rejected, and change would come from the people, 
without arms, but with a plebiscite. Secondly, Ferreira de Melo refused 
any means by which it could be possible for someone to usurp a position 
which he felt belongs only to national will. In other words, he refused any 
solution that could impose personal power through plebiscite. He was 
probably thinking about the French plebiscitary experiences of the 19th 
century held precisely for that purpose, which were deeply unpopular in 
Portugal for very comprehensible reasons. 
Ferreira de Melo proposed the appeal to national sovereignty to 
save the country from the crisis. That solution returned to a conception 
that was well accepted by the vintistas and setembristas, who never 
looked favourably on the change to the Constitution made by a 
Constituent Assembly, which expressed national sovereignty for a 
Constitutional Charter as being granted by the King’s sovereign will. As 
he said: ‘I respect very much the Constitutional Charter, which is the 
fundamental law of the country, but I respect the national sovereignty 
much more, which did not disappear even after Charter enactement’ 
(DCSD, 67, 30 July 1869, p. 960).  
The proposed solution included four stages: First - The 
Constitution of a revolutionary reformist government, coherent in its 
composition and unfamiliar to the installed powers, would be composed 
by members who put the interest of the country above their personal 
interests. Second - The popular legitimation of the government, its 
programme, and its extraordinary powers by plebiscite. That government 
would be in charge of appointing a concrete day to hold elections for a 
new Constituent Assembly. Third – The electoral rules for the 
Constituent Assembly would be changed. By ending electoral abuses, a 
free election would result in representatives that were faithful to the purity 
of the parliamentary system later established. Fourth – The return to the 
parliamentary system after the established period has ended.  Prior to this 
time, the government would have extraordinary powers to turn its 
promises to the country into reality, and those in the Constituent 
Assembly would judge its actions definitively. 
There remained, however, a decisive problem: the legitimacy of 
the new government. Ferreira de Melo resolved it simply: it would be a 
revolutionary government, resultant from a rupture with the Constitutional 
Charter. That is to say: resulting from a Constitutional coup d'état. That 
government could be imposed in one of two ways: through petitions 
signed by the voters addressed to all the State powers and other interests 
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or through a coup d'état. Ferreira de Melo preferred the first solution but 
he did not exclude the second, as long as it was by peaceful means. The 
military solution was expressly excluded. 
Ferreira de Melo’s proposal did not raise significant reactions. 
Only Deputy Vasconcelos de Gusmão (Matos, 1999) referred to the 
speech, addressing it to the literary field, and depreciating its political 
value (DCSD, 67, 30 July 1869, pp. 963-964).   
In the event, Ferreira de Melo’s speech had no relevant political 
consequences. He was a politician without a party, and therefore he lacked 
the resources to move forward with a political project and engage support 
for an ambitious proposal of political change. He was not a military chief 
able to impose a coup d’état with the Army’s support (it is probably for 
this reason that he declared to refuse that solution). He was, in the end, a 
Member of Parliament who was annoyed with the political and 
Constitutional situation of the nation and, given his independent status, he 
proposed a Constitutional change based on popular will.  
It was certainly an unrealistic proposal, as events would 
demonstrate, and it had all the less impact for having been made by a 
deputy who had some notoriety despite his relative youth as a 
parliamentarian. As discussed by Fernando Moreira (2005, p. 819), 
Ferreira de Melo distinguished himself very quickly in the Chamber of the 
Deputies as one of the remarkable figures of the Portuguese parliamentary 
system in the second half of the 19th century. However, his pioneer spirit 
proposing to introduce the plebiscite in Portugal has always been ignored 
by historians and political scientists, perhaps because there were no 
institutional consequences.   
Ultimately, Ferreira de Melo’s diagnosis of the crisis was 
prescient. The Government of Sá da Bandeira fell on 9 August, 10 days 
after the above mentioned speech was given, and was substituted two days 
later by a government led by the Duke of Loulé, which included members 
from several groups opposing the Reformistas (Maltez, 2004, pp. 394-398; 
Santos, 1990, p. 190). Facing a strong parliamentary opposition and 
fearing military intervention, Loulé obtained from the King, on 20 January 
1870, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. Fresh elections were 
held on 13 March, which the Government predictably won.   
During this period of difficult and unstable governance, Ferreira 
de Melo proposed another way to directly hear the citizens' will. This no 
longer concerned the government of the nation, but a concrete 
governmental measure. In fact, following a decree on property enrolment, 
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published on 30 December 1869, raised a popular riot broke out in April 
1970 in the municipality of Ovar. The intervention of the armed forces 
caused several deaths and injuries. Commneting on these events, Ferreira 
de Melo, in the Chamber of Deputies session of 23 April 1870, deplored 
the tumult as much as the repression. He criticised the governmental 
decree and proposed a solution to check its acceptance or its rejection on 
the part of the receivers (DCSD, 17, 23 April 1870, p. 155).   
The population would express their will addressing petitions to 
the Government and/or to the Parliament, and demonstrate their support or 
opposition towards the measure in question. After considering the 
expressed positions, Parliament would have an easy and simple process in 
knowing the will of the population in order to take the right position. 
However, in his speech Ferreira de Melo did not hide his disagreement 
regarding the decree in question. He did not propose a plebiscite, which is 
usually understood as transferring directly a decision to the electors. That 
way of listening to the citizens by the exercise of the petition right would 
not be binding. The Parliament retained full autonomy in decision-making 
as a representative body, by either contradicting the will of the country or 
respecting it.    
We cannot say this time that we are before a proposal of a direct 
or semi-direct democratic device, rather we are before a proposal that 
endorsed a very relevant political value to the citizens’ direct initiative, 
expressed through a sort of petition right. The autonomy of the 
Parliament’s decision was not formally questioned, but the legislative 
body would have the citizens’ will, expressed that way, as a relevant 
element used to consider its position, which would be hardly ignored.   
The Government responded as if Ferreira de Melo had suggested 
introducing plebiscites. The Finance Minister, Anselmo Braamcamp, in 
his answer, considered that such arbitrariness would be the destruction of 
the Constitutional principles. Thus, the proposal was unacceptable. 
Calling on the people to make decisions by any kind of plebiscite would 
be equivalent to abandoning the basic principles of the representative 
system (DCSD, 18, 25 April 1870, p. 167). 
The refusal of that proposal was founded basically on four 
aspects: a) such a proposal was unusual, almost unbelievable, and against 
the bases of the representative system; b) it would create a strange 
precedent, which would destruct the Constitutional principles; c) the 
proposal meant a plebiscite (which becomes clear as to the unpopularity 
of this device among Portuguese politicians); d) through such a procedure, 
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particularistic  interest would prevail over the general interest and the free 
exercise of the parliamentary mandate as a principle of the representative 
system would be prejudiced.   
Nevertheless, even without the acceptance of Ferreira de Melo’s 
proposal, the popular revolts against the property enrolment decree soon 
lead to its revocation. However, not even that fact could prevent a military 
uprising led by Marshall Saldanha to impose a dictatorship on the night of 
18 May 1870. Between 19 and 26 May, Saldanha was the only member of 
the Cabinet, and his new Government lasted only until 29 August. After a 
temporary government, led again by Sá da Bandeira, a new political cycle 
began with a new Government led by Fontes Pereira de Melo which lasted 
from 13 September 1871 to 1 March 1877 (Santos, 1990, pp. 193-194; 
Maltez, 2004, pp. 404-410). 
2.2. The Historic Party Draft, Introduced by José Luciano 
       de Castro   
In 1872, in the framework of a failed revision of the 
Constitutional Charter, a draft introduced by José Luciano de Castro on 
behalf of the Historic Party proposed to introduce the referendum into the 
Constitution for the first time in Portugal. José Luciano de Castro had one 
of the most outstanding and durable political careers of the 19th century in 
Portugal (Moreira, F., 2004). A law graduate who worked as a journalist, 
he was only 19 years old when he was elected to parliament in 1854. His 
political life began in the Regenerator Party, but he left it in 1859, joining 
the Historic Party in 1861. In the 1860s, he became one of the most 
outstanding deputies of his party. 
After Fontes Pereira de Melo’s ascent to power, leading the 
Regenerator Party, José Luciano de Castro, by then the third figure of the 
Historic Party, assumed the need to have two parties that were politically 
placed in the centre, and which would ensure the rotation of the 
government. As he defined in the Chamber of Deputies session of 13 
September 1871, ‘one, more or less conservative, the other, more 
advanced, liberal, and democratic, without harming the question of 
freedom through order and material progress meanwhile not forgetting 
that the material improvements of the country are also questions of 
freedom’ (Moreira, F., 2004, p. 837; Maltez, 2004, p. 406). From 1886 to 
1906 José Luciano led the Government on three separate occasions. The 
end of his political life arrived only with the fall of the Monarchy in 1910.   
On 24 January 1872, José Luciano introduced a draft to reform 
the Constitutional Charter on behalf of the Historic Party, saying then that 
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in order to change the Constitutional dispositions, national sovereignty 
should always be consulted directly. In future revisions, and after the 
ordinary chambers declared the need of the reform, and other chambers 
with special powers for making it were called,24 the approved changes 
should be submitted for popular ratification. Consequently, José Luciano 
proposed to lay down in the Constitutional Charter a new provision that 
no changes could be made to it without being ratified by the popular vote. 
Luís Barbosa Rodrigues (1994, p. 244) qualifies such a referendum as 
Constitutional, mandatory and binding. 
This draft was actually the first formal proposal to introduce the 
referendum in Portugal. Therefore, it meant a deep break with the political 
and Constitutional Portuguese tradition. The Constitutional Charter had 
been granted by the King in 1826, and had been changed by the 
Additional Act approved by Parliament in 1852. The previous 
Constitutions (1822 and 1838) had been approved by Constituent 
Assemblies.   
José Luciano based the need for a new revision of the 
Constitutional Charter on the ‘implacable lapse of time’, which demanded 
new improvements in the political system. Meanwhile, he refused to give 
Parliament the exclusive power to change the Constitution, given the 
inalienable character of popular sovereignty, but also keeping in mind the 
serious imperfections of the representative system. As he said during the 
session of 24 January 1872, political Constitutions are not eternal. No 
matter how perfect they are, they cannot resist progressive changes, which 
civilisation imposes on all people through its infinite march (DCSD, 15, 
28 January 1872, p. 120).  
The need for a referendum to change the Constitution was 
justified by three main reasons: 1) the direct participation of the country in 
the political institution; 2) the legitimation of the reform with the strength 
of the popular vote; 3) the insufficiency of the representative devices for 
expressing national sovereignty. 
It is important to underline this last point. José Luciano did not 
hide his disillusionment with the political representation and electoral 
                                                 
24 This was the procedure established in the Constitutional Charter for its own revision. 
Thus, the draft introduced by José Luciano contained only two provisions. The first, 
detailing the Constitutional dispositions which would be changed, and the second, 
disposing that, for the next legislature, the electors would give their representatives special 
powers for that reform.    
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procedures: ‘Election after election, the ministries go up and down, the 
dissolutions are repeated with an almost unalterable regularity, and the 
country remains disappointed with so many adversities, having lost faith 
in its regeneration and tired of choosing today what they will choose again 
tomorrow. The election, as an essential basis of the representative system, 
is a fraud. The vote doesn't ordinarily translate the will and thinking of the 
nation’ (DCSD, 15, 28 January 1872, p. 121).  
Before these considerations, we can understand that the appeal 
to popular sovereignty would add something more: the widening of 
suffrage. José Luciano’s draft proposed a substantial expansion of the 
right to vote, which would be given to all male citizens in the ownership 
of their civil rights, turning them into the receivers of inalienable national 
sovereignty. Notice however that he did not intend an absolute break with 
political representation. José Luciano did not propose any plebiscite that 
would give legitimacy to a Constitutional reform. The Parliament would 
continue to be the seat of the Constitutional reform. The Parliament would 
have the initiative, and be the scene of any discussion and approval of 
proposals for Constitutional change. Only after that would the people be 
called to ratify the proposals passed in Parliament through direct suffrage. 
That referendum should be mandatory and binding.   
José Luciano called upon the experience of North American 
States. However, he was discreet in this brief reference, which was 
intended only to show that his proposal would not be originally 
Portuguese. A focus on comparing political experience could bring about 
difficulties in acceptance of referendum proposals. The United States, 
Switzerland, and France were the obvious comparitors, and they pointed 
towards an inevitable relationship between the referendum and republican 
institutions. This was certainly not the purpose of José Luciano de Castro, 
who was a staunch supporter of the Monarchy until the end of his life in 
1913.  
Luís Barbosa Rodrigues (1994, p. 120) discussed the inspiration 
for Luciano de Castro’s draft. Across Europe, democratic tendencies 
intensified around 1870, revealed by the British electoral reform of 1867, 
the Spanish revolution of 1868, the evolution of the French Empire in a 
liberal direction and its fall in 1870, and the unification of Italy.  It is 
possible that some of these tendencies could have provided inspiration for 
the relatively vast set of proposals introduced by José Luciano, namely 
those regarding the expansion of suffrage. However, as for the 
referendum, the inspiration in the international experience seems to be 
more indefinite and seems to report more to an idea than to a model. What 
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he proposed was the introduction of a device already being used in other 
States, which did not mean the adoption of their Constitutional models.   
Nonetheless, the Chamber of Deputies refused to admit the draft 
for discussion.  After its third reading, 26 members voted in favour, but 47 
refused it. 
3. The Last Years of the Constitutional Monarchy   
3.1. The Proposal for an Organic Plebiscite to Sell the 
       Colonial Domains 
The Conference of Berlin, which represented the great first 
division of the African continent among the European powers, and the 
established of new rules for the ‘scramble for Africa’, was an enormous 
challenge for the Portuguese ambitions in that continent. Portuguese and 
British interests clashed, and the British made an ultimatum, threatening 
to break diplomatic relations between both countries if the Portuguese did 
not withdraw immediately from all of the disputed areas. The capitulation 
of the Portuguese Government was considered a national humiliation, 
leading to a patriotic wave of anti-British sentiment, which also 
discredited the Portuguese Monarchy. In retrospect, Britain’s ultimatum is 
often considered to be the beginning of the end for the Portuguese 
Monarchy (Matos, 2004). Therefore, it is not strange that a significant 
proportion of the political and parliamentary debates of that time have had 
colonial politics as a theme. 
On 1 February 1892, looking for solutions to the financial crisis 
that the country faced, José Bento Ferreira de Almeida (Almeida, 2004) 
proposed a bill in the Chamber of Deputies suggesting a sort of organic 
referendum to sell colonial territories to raise money. In those terms, the 
Government would be authorised to sign and ratify a convention 
transferring the sovereignty of the colonial domains of Guinea, Ajudá, 
Cabinda, Mozambique, Macau and East Timor. The funds obtained would 
be applied to the immediate solvency of the internal and external floating 
debt, providing a base to convert the general public debt, thus reducing the 
interest rate (DCSD, 17, 1 February 1892, p. 3). 
After extensively laying out his reasoning (DCSD, 17, 1 
February 1892, pp. 3-5), Ferreira de Almeida proposed that the bill be 
printed and sent to all the elected and legally constituted bodies of the 
country (district authorities [juntas gerais], municipal authorities 
[câmaras municipais] and parish authorities [juntas de freguesia]), trading 
and industrial associations, and also to scientific institutions. Therefore, 
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they would give their opinion within a month, and simply declare their 
approval or rejection. The absence of an answer in due time would be 
considered as an approval (DCSD, 17, 1 February 1892, p. 5).   
According to Ferreira de Almeida, his proposal for an organic 
referendum was justified by three reasons: 1) the Chamber was in the third 
year of its legislative period; 2) when its election took place there were no 
opinion movements concerning the reduction of the colonial domain, and 
3) the subject had high national importance. In other words: Ferreira de 
Almeida called into question the legitimacy of Parliament to pass his 
proposal. According to him, the subject was too fresh for Parliament to 
make a decision, given that Parliament had been elected three years earlier 
and the subject had not been a matter of electoral debate. 
However, the arguments contained significant weaknesses. If the 
Parliament did not have legitimacy, the decision should surely be 
addressed to the electors and not to the corporations. In that point Ferreira 
de Almeida, seemed to be undermining the representative institution, 
denying Parliament the legitimacy that he recognised in corporative 
institutions.  Moreover, abstentions would count as affirmative votes. The 
simple lapse of time had the effect of a favourable vote, which was a type 
of tacit acceptance.   
This bill was evaluated in two readings, the second of which was 
held in the session of 3 February 1892, and it was decided that would not 
be admitted for subsequent discussion.  However, it gave rise to some 
controversy by those in favour, such as Abílio Lobo (Pereira, 2005) and 
Augusto Fuschini (Silva, 2005), and those against it such as João 
Franco.25 
Abílio Lobo agreed that Parliament did not have sufficient 
legitimacy to legislate on the proposed subject. In spite of not having an 
imperative mandate to the Parliament when it was elected, the theme of 
selling colonies was not in public discussion. Therefore, the voters did not 
have the possibility of knowing about that matter and consequently they 
could not give their opinion to Parliament. Therefore, Abílio Lobo thought 
that Parliament did not have powers to decide about the sale of the 
colonies, and considered it reasonable that the country decide the issue. 
Therefore, the proposed plebiscite would be ‘perfectly suitable’ (DCSD, 
21, 3 February 1892, p. 6).   
                                                 
25 João Franco was a regenerator politician in great ascension that would later become 
famous as a Minister and Head of Government, having interrupted those functions after 
King Carlos’ murder in 1908.  
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  Similarly, Augusto Fuschini was in favour of a plebiscite: ‘If 
you ask my opinion, I will say that we must not sell the colonies, but the 
country can think in a different way, and we must not constitute ourselves 
as an association of 160 Statesmen going against the will of the country. 
(…) The plebiscite form is perfectly acceptable; it does not offend the 
dignity of Parliament and it allows us to clearly know the opinion of the 
country on an important subject’ (DCSD, 21, 3 February 1892, p. 7).  
In this last case, the reasoning seems to be weak and 
contradictory. Fuschini simultaneously declared the Parliament’s dignity 
and undermined it by calling it a ‘Statesmen association’ that did not 
represent the will of the country. In addition, it was precisely in this point, 
the validity of the representative democracy that seated the argument 
against Fuschini’s opinion, which was uttered by João Franco: 
‘So, aren’t we here, because of the rights given to us by our 
country? Aren’t we the representatives of the country? If the deputies had 
to discuss, not as independents, but through the force of a plebiscite, what 
would Parliament have served for? (…) The Constitutional Charter as is 
constitutes the law that rules us, and because of it, the legislative power is 
completely independent and does not lack the consultation of anyone to 
deliberate as it pleases. This is the reason why I believe Mr. Ferreira de 
Almeida’s proposal could not be accepted. (…) So, aren’t we here making 
laws on a daily basis on such important subjects, as  for instance, taxes 
and those regarding freedom and individual property without previously 
consulting local corporations?  (…) If we, an independent legislative 
power with the right to impose taxes and decide on other serious matters, 
recognised at the same time that, for certain subjects, we did not have our 
own authority and needed to appeal to the administrative corporations, as 
if they were the representatives of the country, the duty of the executive 
power would be, in this case, to close this Chamber and fire all of us for 
we would be worthless and represent nothing’ (DCSD, 21, 3 February 
1892, pp. 7-8). 
This refutation deserves attention, insofar as it represents a 
significant argument against the referendum on behalf of representative 
government. This subject had never been discussed in such clear terms in 
the Portuguese Parliament, and the three main arguments extended were: 
a) The Constitutionality - The Constitutional Charter did not 
provide the possibility of referendums. It adopted a 
separation of powers principle and gave legislative 
responsibilities to Parliament. The referendum would be an 
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unConstitutional interference in that principle and it would 
reduce the representative institution to uselessness. 
b) The importance of the subjects under a decision – 
According to João Franco, the importance of the subjects 
under a decision could not serve as an argument. Parliament 
existed not only to decide on smaller subjects, but also, and 
mainly, to deliberate on important subjects including ‘taxes, 
and those concerning freedom and individual property’ 
(DCSD, 21, 3 February 1892, p. 8). 
c) The legitimacy - If the Parliament’s legitimacy was 
contestable, then the corporations’ mandate was, at best, 
identical, and never superior. Otherwise, the Parliament 
would have to consult the corporations on all decisions that 
it had to take, and in that case, the Parliament ‘was worth 
nothing and did not represent anything’ (DCSD, 21, 3 
February 1892, p. 8).   
3.2. The Fall of the Monarchy and the Plebiscite to Avoid 
       the  Republic   
In 1908 the siege of the Monarchy was drawing to an end. On 1 
November the Republican Party won the municipal elections in Lisbon. 
The republican disturbance worsened, and the deeply divided monarchic 
field could not provide a government with even the minimum of stability. 
Consequently, the stage was set for a revolution.  
On 20 September 1910, Paiva Couceiro,26 a distinguished 
military officer for African campaigns who would lead several military 
attempts from Spain to throw down the Portuguese Republic, was 
interviewed by the newspaper O Porto, and defended a ‘plebiscitary 
dictatorship’ as the only solution for the existent impasse. According to 
him, such a solution was ‘out of his principles’, but necessary to avoid the 
Republic (Maltez, 2004, p. 563). 
Paiva Couceiro’s proposal, which came from a military that 
belonged to the more conservative royalists, was a desperate attempt to 
head off the upcoming republican revolution, which would occur 14 days 
later. Although the proposal was ‘against his principles’, Couceiro thought 
that the parliamentary system had failed, and that system of government 
was unable to support the monarchy. Therefore, the solution would have 
                                                 
26 On Captain Henrique Paiva Couceiro, see Menezes (2011) and Valente (2006). 
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been a military coup, not to make the republic but to avoid it. The 
plebiscite would come later as an instrument of legitimacy.  
Pulido Valente (2006, p. 69) sees Paiva Couceiro’s proposal as a 
stripping of King Manuel’s authority. In fact, the legitimacy of the 
dictatorship would only stem from the plebiscite, which would not be 
subject to Royal agreement. The King would be seen as a simple 
adornment: he could neither remove nor survey the military, which would 
supporter of the plebiscitary dictatorship. At the end, the King could not 
even decide his own future role, which was under military guardianship, 
and, in theory (with the elections being the way they were), under the 
people’s sovereignty. The King had to accept what the military and the 
people would give him. 
Couceiro wanted a plebiscite as a way to legitimise the use of 
military force. The dictatorship would only last the time needed to execute 
a programme of governance whose nature was unknown, to maintain 
order and focus on national security (in other words, for sweep the 
Republican Party), and to change the Constitutional Charter by means that 
were neither foreseen nor permitted. 
In the event, the revolution could not be suppressed. On 5 
October 1910, the Portuguese Royal Family left the country and was 
exiled to England.  On 8 October, Paiva Couceiro resigned from his 
position in the Army, and once again in his resignation letter, he declared 
the need for a plebiscite that allowed the Nation to decide between the 
Republic and the Monarchy. Pulido Valente (2006, p. 84) explains that 
Couceiro refused both the Republic and the Old Monarchy, and not 
knowing what to do, he found the solution in the people’s sovereignty. In 
other words, he wanted to follow the Bonapartist example of a regime and 
introduce a government based on a plebiscite, which would be able to 
unite the Portuguese people. Couceiro had understood that the old parties 
could not compete with the new mass parties, so he wanted to use the 
plebiscite to drown the urban vote inside the rural vote, and the southern 
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Chapter 2 
The First Republic: 1910-1926 
1. The National Referendum in the Constitution of 1911 
1.1 The Republican Revolution 
The Republican Revolution began on 3 October 1910. In the 
face of indecision and disillusionment amongst officials, the rebellion 
capitalised on the determination of army soldiers and sergeants, supported 
by Lisbon civilians.  The support of three warships was decisive in the 
face of an Army that had little interest in fighting the revolution (Valente, 
2004, pp. 113-150). The republican forces soon reached victory, 
abolishing a Monarchy that had lasted eight centuries.  On 5 October, a 
republican regime was proclaimed with the strong support of the people of 
Lisbon.27   
As soon as the Republic was proclaimed, a provisional 
government with full powers was organised, led by Teófilo Braga. The 
majority of the Government belonged to the political group led by Afonso 
Costa, the Republican Party top figure. However, the Government also 
integrated the most outstanding figures of the other main political 
tendencies that had emerged in the Republic, including António José de 
Almeida and Brito Camacho.28  As João Bonifácio Serra (1992, p. 21) 
States, the Provisional Government’s action cannot be described as a 
coherent sum of measures or a product of a defined programme, 
accomplished by a unified team. On the contrary, these actions were the 
result of ministerial whims, a symptom of an acephalous government 
where ministers each acted independently.  As a consequence, the 
governmental programme appeared disconnected and incoherent. 
The regulation for the Constituent Assembly election was 
established through Provisional Government Decrees, published on 14 
March and 5 April 1911. The electoral constituencies were established by
                                                 
27 On the republican revolution and the subsequent political evolution, several reference 
works exist, such as: Maltez (2005); Marques (1978, 1991, 1998); Medina (2004); Ramos 
(1994); Santos (1990); Serra (1992); Valente (2004); Wheeler (1978). 
28 These three personalities would come to lead the three main parties of the republican 
regime: Afonso Costa led the widely prevailing Democratic Party (Partido Democrático); 
António José de Almeida, was at the forefront of the Evolutionist Party (Partido 
Evolucionista); and Brito Camacho was head of the Unionist Party (União Republicana). 
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 the Decree of 20 April 1911. The elections were summoned on 28 May 
1911, by a Decree dated 28 April.29    
1.2. The Constitution of 1911 - General Aspects 
The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 19 June 
1911.  Its first sittings sanctioned the Revolution of 5 October 1910, thus 
proclaiming the Democratic Republic and abolishing the Monarchy. 
Neither the Provisional Government nor the Republican Party introduced 
any draft Constitution, preferring to leave the Constituent Assembly 
totally free on this matter (Souza, 1913, p. 5). However, the Head of 
Government, Teófilo Braga, drew a Constitutional draft, which was 
distributed to the Cabinet and addressed to the Constituent Assembly for 
consideration, under the title of “Indications” (Braga, 1911). 
During the sessions held on the 20 and 21 June 1911, the 
Constituent Assembly put a committee in charge of working out the 
Constitutional draft. This was chaired by Correia de Lemos and had 
Sebastião de Magalhães Lima as the reporter.30 Furthermore, some 
deputies introduced their own Constitutional drafts. Some citizens even 
openly introduced Constitutional texts to be considered by the Constituent 
Assembly.31    
The draft made by the Constitutional Committee was introduced 
during the session of 3 July 1911.  It had a strong leaning towards a 
presidential system, in the line of the North American and Brazilian 
Constitutions. This was broadly rejected from the instant discussion on the 
general principles began. After that debate, the Constitutional draft was 
                                                 
29 These statutes are published in Namorado & Pinheiro [1998 (II) pp. 515-536] and 
Almeida (1998, pp. 525-583). 
30 See biographical syntheses of all First Republic parliamentarians and ministers in 
Marques, et al. (2000). 
31 These were the cases of Fernão Botto-Machado (Machado, 1911), José Barbosa 
(Barbosa, 1911) or Machado Santos (Santos, 1911). The Parliamentary Historical Archive 
of the Assembly of the Republic holds original typewritten or handwritten Constitutional 
drafts presented by Deputies João Gonçalves and António Cabreira, and also by José 
Soares da Cunha e Costa, a lawyer who sent a Constitutional draft to the Constituent 
Assembly to be taken into consideration. The Deputy Nunes da Mata introduced a 
Constitutional draft during the debate on the general principles, in the 19th session, on 12 
July 1911. The Masonic Organization Grémio Montanha also sent a draft to the 
Constituent Assembly (Grémio Montanha, 1911). 
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modified and a consensus emerged around the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy.32 
The 1911 Constitution did not include the national referendum.  
However, some of drafts that were introduced contained references to 
referendums. The lawyer José da Cunha e Costa rejected the idea, 
rejecting the Swiss Constitution as a source of his draft, considering that 
its application in Portugal would soon lead to anarchy.  Meanwhile, some 
deputies welcomed it in their proposals, although under different forms. 
 1.3. The ‘Popular Veto’ in João Gonçalves’ Draft 
The draft introduced by João Gonçalves proposed, in Article 43, 
the existence of ‘initiative committees’ in both parliamentary chambers 
(the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate). These would be charged with 
creating laws, and could utilise the advisory referendum of the municipal 
authorities (câmaras municipais) and other corporations on any statute 
under procedure.   
Article 101 (and the following articles) of the same draft also 
proposed that the country could object to the adoption of certain 
parliamentary deliberations within 15 days if a two-thirds majority had not 
been obtained in either chamber. In that case, those deliberations were 
submitted to a ‘popular veto’.  The right to reject legislation was restricted 
to loans, administrative issues, electoral subjects and Constitutional 
revisions. The legislative chambers could also add new topics to be 
submitted to the popular sanction if a two-thirds majority was not 
obtained. The municipal authorities would make the complaints, which 
had to be signed by a quarter of the voters under their governance. After 
that, the text would be submitted, within 15 days, to the vote to all of the 
Nation’s municipal authorities. ‘Special legislative committees’ were 
chosen to express the will of each constituency.   
João Gonçalves even suggested that legislative committees and 
municipal authorities should have the right to initiate legislation. These, in 
turn, could take the initiative on subjects that could be submitted to a 
‘popular veto’. If they represented at least a quarter of all votes pertaining 
to the committees and câmaras of the entire country, they could introduce 
their bills directly to Parliament. 
                                                 
32 For the main aspects of the 1911 Constitution, see Souza (1913); Miranda (1981, pp. 
240-246); Lopes (1992); Canotilho (1998, pp. 156-171); Gouveia (2010, pp. 455-473) and 
Assembleia da República (2011).  
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If those bills were rejected by either of the parliamentary 
chambers by a two-thirds majority, they would be rejected for all intents 
and purposes. If the rejection was decided by an inferior number of votes, 
the bill could be submitted to the vote of the municipal authorities and 
legislative committees. If some parliamentary chamber passed a counter 
project, it could also be submitted to the ‘popular veto’. 
The matters excluded from the ‘popular veto’ included: the State 
Budget, the State accounts, expenditure on war materials, alliances and 
treaties, and resolutions taken by the Chambers in secret sessions.  In 
addition, matters considered urgent by both parliamentary chambers 
would be exempt, provided a two-thirds majority in both chambers agreed 
with this categorisation.   
1.4. The Referendum in Botto-Machado’s Draft   
In the introduction of the Constitutional draft published by 
Fernão Botto-Machado there is a staunch defence for the referendum as 
found in Switzerland and other republics: without the referendum, the 
people’s sovereignty would continue to be defrauded. For Botto-Machado, 
a republic without a referendum is nothing but an ‘ancient regime’ 
(Machado, 1911, p. 16). 
The proponent criticised the republicans, who had been ‘so 
radical’ before, but were now saying that the people were not prepared for 
the referendum. According to him, they had forgotten that the referendum 
had been practised in the Greek and Roman Republics two thousand years 
before. If people were insufficiently educated, it was necessary to educate 
them, since only those who get accustomed to using freedoms know how 
to use them.    
However, he did not introduce a concrete proposal. He was still 
almost willing, as an experiment, to propose the referendum only in the 
cities of Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, naturally the most educated and 
involved in political life. Nonetheless, the fears were such that he 
proposed that the referendum be only exercised by the members of the 
municipal authorities (vereadores). In those terms, Botto-Machado 
proposed a sort of organic referendum, under the designation of 
‘legislative review’. Any legislative proposal approved in the legislative 
chambers could be submitted to the referendum of vereadores before 
becoming a Law of the Republic. 
This referendum would be optional and remain in the 
Government’s free will, but it could be mandatory on Acts that raised 
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taxes, whenever requested by more than half of the presidents of district 
authorities (juntas gerais), by one tenth of the vereadores, or by more than 
a thousand comunas.33 The Republic’s budget could never be submitted to 
referendum.     
Regarding a Constitutional revision initiative, Botto-Machado 
also proposed the intervention of local and regional power bodies: the 
Constitution would be reviewed whenever the people’s sovereignty 
determined it, or at least every 10 years if demanded by two thirds of both 
legislative chambers or by the districts, municipalities and comunas. This 
proposal, however, was badly explained. The expression ‘at least every 
ten years’ was ambiguous: would the revision be mandatory every 10 
years, or would it be possible at any moment? The author also failed to 
explain how the people’s sovereignty would be demonstrated in order to 
make a Constitutional revision.   
1.5. Other Proposals for National Referendum 
The draft made by the Constitutional Committee did not 
welcome the referendum at a national level. Only Article 56 allowed for a 
Constitutional revision to be anticipated in five years34 if such was 
claimed as necessary by two thirds of the vereadores. However, during 
the Constituent Assembly debates, some deputies suggested a number of 
ways in which the national referendum could be included in the text.     
The unionist Goulart de Medeiros introduced two proposals: the 
first was a device to resolve deadlock between the parliamentary 
chambers. If neither of the chambers would withdraw their opinions, then 
the matter could be resolved by a supreme appeal to the Nation as the first 
and genuine holder of sovereignty (DANC, 20, 13 July 1911, p. 12).  The 
second consisted of, according to Jorge Miranda (1996a, p. 245), a 
singular modality of a referendum on unConstitutionality: The Supreme 
Court of Justice would judge any complaint against the enactment of 
unConstitutional Acts. Depending on that decision, there would then be an 
appeal to the Nation, which would be consulted directly (DANC, 49, 15 
August 1911, p. 29).   
Carlos Olavo proposed the popular referendum as way to 
dissolve Parliament in case of conflict between the Legislative and 
Executive powers. ‘When there is a conflict between the executive power 
                                                 
33 In Botto-Machado proposal, ‘comuna’ would be the same as parish (freguesia), 
the smallest local authority. 
34 The ordinary revision should happen, according to the draft, every 10 years. 
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and Parliament, the people are consulted. If the people’s answer 
authorizes the dissolution, it means removing the mandate which had been 
given to the representatives; if it does not authorize it, Parliament remains 
in its powers with reinforced proof from the popular vote’ (DANC, 22, 17 
July 1911, p. 11). This proposal meant, according to Luís Barbosa 
Rodrigues (1994, p. 121), an arbitrage model coupled with a mechanism 
of popular decision-making, seeking to solve conflicts between Parliament 
and the Executive. 
The draft sent to the Constituent Assembly by the Masonic 
organisation, Grémio Montanha, did not forget the referendum, but 
established it only for the future and in an undefined way.  As provided in 
Article 110, five years after, if the National Assembly should want it, it 
could decree and regulate the referendum. That is, in the first five years of 
Constitution validity, the referendum would not be admitted. After that 
period, the referendum could be decreed and regulated by the Parliament. 
None of these proposals progressed because of the fears 
mentioned by Botto-Machado in his draft introduction about the people’s 
lack of political culture. These fears were shared by others, including José 
de Freitas, who noted that: ‘In Portugal, I would admit the referendum if 
our people were not in the pitiful delay of civic education in which they 
find themselves and if the monstrous percentage of more than 70 percent 
of illiterates did not exist’ (DANC, 22, 17 July 1911, p. 18). 
2. The Plebiscitary Purposes of Paiva Couceiro 
Military attempts to restore the Monarchy were commanded 
from Spain by Captain Paiva Couceiro, who invaded the north of the 
country twice, in October 1911 and July 1912. However, these raids were 
carried out by a small and ill-armed group of fighters who joined forces in 
Spain, and were easily defeated by the republicans due to their weakness. 
It also matters to refer that the conspiracy programme did not explicitly 
want to reestablish the Monarchy, but only to challenge to the Republican 
Government to accept a plebiscite on the choice of the regime (Maltez, 
2005, p. 188; Ventura, 2004b, p. 184; Ramos 1994, p. 459). 
On 18 March 1911, Paiva Couceiro sent an ultimatum to the 
Republican Government inviting it to dissolve the Republic and to trust 
the country to a new power, which would re-establish order and would 
organise elections so the sovereign people could peacefully decide 
between the Monarchy and the Republic (Couceiro, 1917, p. 10; Lavradio, 
1942, pp. 186-188). Two days after, on 20 March, he escaped to Spain, 
after being advised that he would be arrested (Valente, 2006, pp. 85-86). 
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Couceiro hoped to take power by military means, and then hold 
a referendum on the regime, followed by free elections.  However, he 
expressed no desire to return Dom Manuel II on the Throne (Valente, 
2004, p. 254). His first purpose was ‘to cease the revolutionary State of 
the country’, accomplish ‘free and fair elections as soon as possible’, and 
consecutively to move on to ‘the choice of the regime, the Constitution 
and the Higher Magistrate’ (Dias, 1912, p. 99). 
As Rui Ramos (1994, p. 459) explains, the will of the 
conspirators to separate themselves from the unpopular Constitutional 
Monarchy was so strong that Paiva Couceiro openly declared that he did 
not want to restore the Monarchy, but rather requested a plebiscite on the 
regime. He hoped that his entrance in Portugal could break out a general 
revolt in the country, which could isolate Lisbon. However, as Couceiro 
was alone in Spain, with some serious communication problems, this 
scenerio of simultaneous revolts was unfeasible and the invasions were 
easily dominated by the Republicans (Valente, 2004, pp. 254-255). 
Couceiro, or at least some of his supporters, played a double 
game in search of help near those faithful to Dom Manuel II. In the 
Memoirs of Marquis of Lavradio we can read that the relationship 
between Couceiro and Dom Manuel was not easy, given that the former 
King could not accept the idea of a plebiscite to choose between the 
Monarchy and the Republic. In fact, it was on behalf of that idea that the 
supporters of the absolutist branch of the Monarchy made their 
propaganda. Meanwhile, some of Couceiro’s followers made the King 
aware of their conviction that Couceiro’s idea didn't have any importance 
and that as soon as he entered Portugal, he would acclaim the Monarchy 
and Manuel II as King (Lavradio, 1942, pp. 194-195).   
The ambivalence of the movement was criticised heavily by 
Dom Manuel II. In a Statement on 31 October 1911, he greeted the 
partisans committed to the restoration of the Monarchy, but he considered 
the movement to be neutral, because it joined persons who had completely 
different ideals and hoped to overcome the decisions of the country in a 
future plebiscite. In addition, he expressly declared his complete 
disapproval towards the neutrality of the movement and his rejection of 
any kind of agreement with the other royalist party (Lavradio, 1942, p. 
208). 
This Statement would give rise to great perplexity in those who 
struggled inside the country for the monarchic restoration.  Even some 
close confidentes of Dom Manuel II, including his private secretary, 
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Marquis of Lavradio, objected and requested the dismissal of his functions 
as a consequence of this disagreement (Lavradio, 1942, p. 209). The 
Statement was not only considered to be ungrateful by those who 
struggled in Portugal for the restoration of the Monarchy, but it also 
allowed the miguelistas to increase their influence in those movements. 
That Statement would have also caused a deep displeasure in Couceiro 
and, as he wrote to Lavradio, it would have reinforced the miguelistas 
who accepted his idea of the monarchic restoration by plebiscite 
(Lavradio, 1942, pp. 212-215). 
Nevertheless, the disagreement was resolved during Couceiro’s 
journey to Richmond (London), where the King was exiled. After a two 
hour meeting with Dom Manuel, Couceiro agreed to end the neutral 
movement (Lavradio, 1942, pp. 217-219). Paiva Couceiro’s plebiscitary 
purposes never achieved success. By the time of his second frustrated 
attempt of military invasion, in 1912, when he occupied the small town of 
Vinhais, he did not introduce himself as a proponent of a plebiscite but as 
a royalist, acclaiming Dom Manuel II as King (Ramos, 1994, p. 460). 
It is important to remember that the idea of a plebiscite against 
the Republic was not a new idea in Paiva Couceiro’s thought. He had 
pleaded this idea during the Monarchy, as a way of avoiding the advent of 
the Republic, and he renewed it as a way of defeating the Republic. 
Obviously, at the basis of that proposal was the idea that the Republicans 
had electoral influence only in the urban centres, and that the electoral 
mobilisation of rural areas could favour royalist purposes. 
Furthermore, in several occasions, Couceiro would come to 
repeat his proposal of plebiscite. He did it in 1914, when he was included 
in an amnesty, but nobody followed him (Valente, 2006, p. 122). He did it 
again in 1918, during Sidónio Pais’ Government, and in 1919, then in 
harmony with a significant part of the monarchic opposition who also 
assumed that claim. Vasco Pulido Valente (2006, p. 126) refers that, in his 
first appointment with Sidónio Pais, António Cabral, one of the eminent 
figures of the monarchic opposition, asked for a plebiscite on the regime, 
which Sidónio refused almost angrily. 
In the summer of 1918, Couceiro insisted on the presence of 
several military chiefs who conspired with him, and on the need of a 
military cabinet to assure public order and to make a plebiscite (Valente, 
2006, pp. 127-128). After Sidónio Pais’ death, Couceiro, who was still in 
exile, urged a revolt against Canto e Castro, claiming the need for a 
military dictatorship and a plebiscite (Valente, 2006, p. 129). Even after 
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the defeat of the ‘Monarchy of the North’ proclaimed by him between 19 
January and 17 February 1919, and already exiled in Spain, he repeated 
the idea of a plebiscite in an interview to the newspaper El Sol. According 
to Pulido Valente (2006, p. 129), the reaffirmation of that proposal by 
Couceiro was the discredit of the ‘Monarchy of the North’ and of himself.  
3. The Local Referendum 
3.1. The Constitutional Inception 
In the draft introduced for the discussion of general principles on 
3 July 1911, the referendum did not obtain any Constitutional inception, 
neither at the national level nor in the sphere of local administration. As 
for the latter, the draft only referred, in Article 61, that ‘special laws based 
on autonomy and decentralization compatible with the Nation’s unity, 
readiness and effectiveness of National Defence, and municipal financial 
resources, will reorganise the local administration, as well as the mainland 
and adjacent islands and the overseas provinces.’     
However, that position soon changed during the debate. During 
the 10 July session, Pedro Martins proposed a motion to introduce the 
autonomy of local administration and the municipal referendum (DANC, 
17, 10 July 1911, p. 12). On 12 July, Barbosa de Magalhães defended the 
administrative referendum ‘although in a restrictive way’ (DANC, 19, 12 
July 1911, p. 20). On 13 July, Eduardo de Almeida proposed the 
introduction of referendums in each parish (freguesia) of the mainland to 
decide on its most important and private interests, and the municipal 
referendum in Lisbon and Oporto (DANC, 20, 13 July 1911, p. 18). On 14 
July, João Gonçalves, recovered his ‘popular veto’ and ‘popular 
legislative initiative’ as a draft amendment (DANC, 21, 4 July 1911, pp. 
18-19).  Celestino de Almeida considered the referendum to be very 
convenient at a local level, but not for laws and Governmental Acts 
(DANC, 22, 17 July 1911, p. 15). Finally, Jacinto Nunes introduced a 
motion to reinforce local autonomy, proposing a sort of organic 
referendum exercised by the municipal authorities on certain deliberations 
from the district authorities, which was well accepted by the Committee.   
As a consequence of these debates, the Constitution Committee 
amended the text. The version introduced for discussion on the details 
already suggested that, in Article 55, the organisation and attributions of 
administrative bodies would be regulated by special law. It also Stated 
that they would be based on the referendum exercised by the municipal 
authorities from the district authorities’ deliberations, and by the parish 
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authorities on the deliberations from the municipal authorities if they 
involved an increase in expenses.35 
The opinions expressed during the discussion of the details 
concerning this proposal were very divergent. Miranda do Vale 
completely disagreed, considering that the members of the juntas de 
freguesia would be less cultured than the vereadores, and the same 
happened with the vereadores in regards to the members of the juntas 
gerais of districts. But there were other reasons: if a municipal authority 
wanted to improve the conditions of the seat of the municipality, and for 
that reason decided on a certain number of extraordinary expenses, the 
surrounding juntas de freguesia could agree on making a constant 
obstructionism of all improvements that the câmara wanted to implement.  
Therefore, in order to avoid that, he proposed that the referendum be 
enshrined in the Constitution ‘in the terms and for the deliberations 
prescribed by law’ (DANC, 50, 16 August 1911, p. 12). 
João de Menezes proposed the final solution for Article 66 of the 
Constitution on behalf of the Committee. The organisation and attribution 
of administrative local institutions would be regulated by special law, 
which would be based on the exercise of referendum in the terms 
established by law.   
Marnoco e Souza (1913, pp. 593-595), although considering the 
limited nature of the Constitutional disposition, welcomed it 
enthusiastically: according to him, that reform allowed a wider 
decentralisation, and a more effective control by the people on the local 
administration acts. The responsibility of administrative bodies before the 
people in the referendum system made them unavoidably more careful 
and attentive to the exercise of their functions. The people, through 
referendum practice, would become enpowered, over time, to exercise the 
referendum in the great issues of national politics. 
Although the Constitutional and legal inception of local 
referendum was, beyond doubt, a feature of the first Portuguese Republic, 
there are no specific studies on that subject, except for brief references in 
publications on the referendum in general or about local power during that 
historical period.36 The authors only referred that the referendum was 
merely sent to the local administration level, (Cardoso, 1992, p, 69; Pinto, 
                                                 
35 The original hand written document is available at the Historic Parliamentary Archive of 
the Assembly of the Republic, Lisbon. 
36 See Oliveira (1996a) and Baiôa (2000) for the local power in the First Portuguese 
Republic. 
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1988, p. 64; Duarte, 1987, pp. 9-10), which is correct, and some of them 
referred to the legal provisions in it (Suordem, 1997, pp. 23-26), but there 
is no publication about its concrete application. Nevertheless, the local 
referendum existed from this time. 
3.2. The Administrative Code 
   3.2.1. General Aspects 
Article 85 of the 1911 Constitution charged the first Congress of 
the Republic with the task of drawing up the Administrative Code. When 
the Republic was established, João Franco’s Administrative Code, 
published on 4 May 1896, was still in force. It was strongly centralist, and 
its structure was considered to be intensively conservative and 
incompatible with the republican system’s doctrines. This was affirmed by 
the introduction of the Decree of 13 October 1910, which determined that 
if the Administrative Code were not enacted in accordance with 
republican principles, the administrative bodies established by the 
Administrative Code of 6 May 1878 would be reinStated. However, as the 
simple resurrection of the Code of 1878 was not viable, the courts had to 
admit the validity of the Code of 1896 in some matters. Therefore, with 
the Republic maintaining two codes, a new one became indispensable.  
The Republic had a historical commitment to the principles of 
administrative decentralisation. One of their first ideologists, José Félix 
Henriques Nogueira, conceived the Republic as a federation of 
municipalities (Silva, 1976). Portugal would be organised into one 
hundred municipalities, which would be as self-sufficient as possible.  
They would be associated into regions, thus constituting a federal State 
where the central power would have scarce and controlled powers 
(Oliveira, 1996a, pp. 243-245). However, as César de Oliveira mentions 
(1996a, p. 259), during the revolutionary period, republicanism was in a 
contradictory position. On the one hand, it had the duty to decentralise in 
order to implement the ideals of its heritage; on the other, the jacobinism 
of its main leaders’ impelled the Republic towards centralism. Shortly 
after, on 25 October 1910, the Home Minister, António José de Almeida, 
appointed a commission to draft the Administrative Code, led by José 
Jacinto Nunes.   
   3.2.2. The Bill 
The Administrative Code Bill, introduced in the Chamber of 
Deputies on 21 November 1911 (Ministério do Interior, 1911), where 
discussions began on 13 February 1912 in the Chamber of Deputies and 
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19 June 1913 in the Senate, did not contain, in its initial version, any 
mention of the popular referendum. Only certain kinds of deliberations 
required any participation from the citizens. 
The Government could: change municipalities from a district to 
another, and civil parishes from a municipality to another; create new 
municipalities and new parishes; change the seat of municipalities and 
civil parishes; and extinguish districts, municipalities and civil parishes 
that did not have enough resources to satisfy their obligatory duties.37  
However, those decisions required the assent of two-thirds of the 
respective voters (Articles 4 to 7). The extinguished civil parishes and the 
municipalities would be incorporated, entirely or partly, into contiguous 
similar constituencies, according to the will of the majority of the 
respective inhabitants (Article 8).   
There were also provisions for some types of organic 
referendums. Certain deliberations from the district authorities required 
the approval of the majority of municipalities. When the municipal 
authorities deliberated on important financial matters (Article 102), the 
most significant taxpayers could take part in the meetings, in an equal 
number to that of the vereadores, thus having a deliberative vote. 38 On the 
other hand, the parish authorities could not make some deliberations 
without the favourable opinion of the majority of the 10 most significant 
taxpayers of the parish (Article 181).    
   3.2.3. The Debate in the Chamber of Deputies 
During the debate of the Administrative Code in the Chamber of 
Deputies, the issue of local referendums was widely discussed. Barbosa de 
Magalhães considered the referendum principle as one of the most 
precious liberal conquests. In the parishes, it should be direct. In the 
municipalities, the parish authorities should exercise it, because they 
would know the needs and conveniences of their municipality better 
(DCD, 60, 28 February 1912, p. 5). He also proposed that complaints be 
presented to the administrative courts in order to dissolve the 
administrative bodies. These should be submitted to referendum and must 
obtain the support of two thirds of voters (DCD, 85, 26 March 1912, p. 
14). João de Menezes defended that the right to vote for the popular 
                                                 
37 The Government within the first six months of the Code’s validity could take these kinds 
of deliberations. After that period, such decisions could only be taken by the legislative 
power (Article 10).   
38 The number of vereadores could be 32, 24 or 16, depending on the size of the 
municipality. 
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referendum would be restricted to male citizens, 31 and older, that paid 
taxes because otherwise a popular referendum would not be obtained but 
rather the cacique’s will (DCD, 61, 29 February 1912, p. 8).   
Filemon de Almeida proposed that the change of municipalities 
to other districts or the change of parishes to other municipalities should 
be voted by two thirds of the respective electors. A referendum should be 
mandatory whenever it was requested by at least a third of the members of 
the municipal or parish authorities, or by a tenth of the registered electors 
(DCD, 81, 21 March 1912, p. 30).  This idea obtained acceptance from the 
Chamber of Deputies, but was rejected in 1913 by the Senate.  
Dias da Silva proposed that the parishes with more than a 
thousand inhabitants could exercise functions that belonged in general to 
the municipal authorities, thus exercising, according to the proposed 
designation, ‘communal functions’. The Congress of the Republic would 
declare the establishment of those communal functions by petition, 
subscribed by a third of the parish electors and sanctioned in referendum 
by two-thirds (DCD, 124, 31 May 1912, p. 10). The petition should be 
sent to the Home Minister who within two months should submit it to the 
referendum. Jacinto Nunes, believing that it would create a new category 
of administrative bodies, vehemently contested Dias da Silva’s proposal. 
In the session of 31 May 1912, the Public Administration 
Committee introduced its draft for discussion regarding the 
responsibilities of parish authorities, proposing that some of their 
deliberations should be submitted to referendum. Jacinto Nunes clearly 
showed his disagreement (DCD, 124, 31 May 1912, p. 12).   
Finally, the version passed in the Chamber of Deputies included 
the local referendum in the following situations:   
a) The suppression and the creation of municipalities and 
parishes, as well as the change of parishes to other 
municipalities, should be requested by a third of the electors, 
and voted by two thirds of them (Articles 4 to 7). The 
abolished constituencies would be integrated, wholly or 
partly, into contiguous similar constituencies, according to 
the proposal made by the respective administrative body, 
sanctioned by referendum (Article 9).   
b) Some deliberations of district authorities should be approved 
by a majority of municipal authorities in order to become 
‘executory’ [Article 56(§1)]. 
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c) Certain deliberations from municipal authorities should be 
approved by most of the parish authorities in order to 
become ‘executory’ (Article 107), and some of them would 
have to be submitted to referendum if requested by a tenth 
part of the electors [Article 107(§1)].   
d) Some deliberations from parish authorities should be 
obligatorily submitted to referendum in order to become 
‘executory’ (Article 190).39    
   3.2.4. The First Debate in the Senate 
On 19 June 1913, the Senate began to debate the Administrative 
Code Bill, already passed in the Chamber of Deputies.  Before the debate 
began, it decided to consider only 12 of the 20 proposals. The 
Administrative Code, given its scale and complexity, would need time and 
reflection, which was impossible in such a short period. On the other 
hand, the provisional situation of the administrative bodies should cease 
immediately (DS, 134, 19 June 1913, p. 15). Thus, the Senate did not 
discuss territorial division, the suppression or creation of municipalities 
and parishes, or the change of parishes to other municipalities, including 
the referendums needed for those changes.   
The rest was the organic referendum of municipal and parish 
authorities, as well as the popular referendum on the deliberations from 
parish authorities, which were the object of several Statements. Pedro 
Martins considered the referendum a beautiful idea and a democratic 
aspiration, but worried that under the special conditions of the country, it 
might be risky and dangerous (DS, 135, 19 June 1913, p. 73). João Freitas 
was more pessimistic, fearing that the experience was disastrous because 
the exercise of the referendum presupposed a degree of civic education 
that the people, mainly in the rural areas, lacked at the current time (DS, 
137, 20 June 1913, p. 29).   
   3.2.5. Law No. 88, of 7 August 1913 
The result was Law No. 88, of 7 August 1913 (DG, 183) on the 
organisation, working, attributions and responsibilities of administrative 
bodies.  Local administrations were not definitively reorganised by a new 
Administrative Code. According to Law No. 88, the administrative bodies 
were the junta geral in the district, the câmara municipal in the 
                                                 
39 In the Portuguese Administrative Law, ‘executory’ is the ability of an administrative act 
to be fully effective: in other words, it is an act which is coercive by itself and executed 
without a judicial decision (Correia, 1982, p. 332-334). 
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municipality, and the junta de paróquia in the civil parish (Article 2).40 
Regarding the organic or popular referendum, it essentially welcomed the 
proposal passed in the Chamber of Deputies. Under these terms it Stated 
that: 
a) Some deliberations from the juntas gerais or câmaras 
municipais, only became executory, after being submitted 
to an organic referendum and approved, respectively, by the 
majority of the câmaras municipais or juntas de paróquia 
[Article 45(§ unique) and Article 96]. 
b) Some deliberations from the câmaras municipais should be 
submitted to the popular referendum, if requested by a tenth 
part of the electors [Article 96(§1]. In the case of a popular 
referendum request, the organic referendum from the juntas 
de paróquia would not be held (DCD, 52, 13 February 
1912). 
c) Some deliberations from the juntas de paróquia had to be 
submitted to popular referendum to become executory 
(Article 147). 
In general, the deliberations that could be submitted to 
referendum were those that proposed increased expenditure. Given that 
the right to vote was still restricted at the time, the local referendum was 
essentially gave taxpayers the right to prevent any deliberations from 
administrative authorities that had financial implications.  
Meanwhile, Congress passed a law concerning expropriation in 
the public interest, which actually included the local referendum for the 
first time. While the Chamber of Deputies discussed the Administrative 
Code, Senator Silva Cunha introduced a bill in the Senate proposing that 
there should be a declaration of public interest in order to expropriate 
which would be submitted to a referendum of the constituency electors in 
case the expropriator was an administrative body. The Senate passed the 
proposal on 13 May 191241 and the Chamber of Deputies did the same on 
6 July 1912. Thus, the Law of 26 July 1912, in Article 3(§ unique), laid 
down that the declaration of public interest for expropriation purposes 
would be made by the legislative power, or by referendum in the 
                                                 
40 Fernando Farelo Lopes (1992, p. 87) informs that there were 17 districts, 263 
municipalities and 3,620 parishes in Portugal in 1914. 
41 The Senate passed the proposal despite some controversy: Machado de Serpa declared 
that he could not admit the referendum in a country of illiterates (DS, 87, 13 May 1912, p. 
9). Bernardino Roque said that in the northern provinces of the country ‘the referendum is 
perfect celestial music, because nobody knows what that is’ (DS, 87, 13 May 1912, p. 7). 
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respective constituency, depending on whether the expropriator was the 
State or an administrative body (DG, 185, 1 August 1912).    
   3.2.6. The Second Debate in the Senate 
On 12 March 1914, the Senate re-opened discussion of the 
Administrative Code. The Committee responsible for appreciating the 
Deputies Chamber proposal gave an opinion (DS, 54, 12 March 1914, p. 
7) and foresaw that some decisions could be submitted to referendum if 
requested by a third and voted by two thirds of the male citizens aged 21 
and over who fully enjoyed their civil rights. These decisions were a) the 
passage of municipalities to an upper order42 when they did not have the 
number of inhabitants demanded but had a remarkable industrial and 
commercial increment [Article 4(§3)]; b) the annexation and disunion of 
administrative circumscriptions (Article 6); c) the creation of new 
municipalities and parishes (Article 7); d) the incorporation of suppressed 
circumscriptions (Article 10). 
Senator Leão de Meireles proposed that the right to vote in the 
referendum would only be granted to male citizens, aged 21 and over, 
voters, owners and industrial taxpayers, in the full enjoyment of their civil 
rights, and residents in the circumscription for more than six months (DS, 
70, 6 April 1914, p. 14). The Senate rejected the proposal (DS, 72, 14 
April 1914, p. 14), but passed a proposal by Pais Gomes giving the right 
to vote in the referendum to taxpayers (DS, 70, 6 April 1914, p. 14).    
The Bill of Administrative Code submitted by the Committee to 
the Senate contained a Title XV on the referendum (DS, 116, 17 June 
1914, pp. 40-41), which laid down that: 
1) The referendum would be exercised by all male citizens, 
aged 21 and over, in full enjoyment of their civil rights, 
residents in the circumscription, who were electors or 
taxpayers (Article 251). 
2) The ballots would be a flat piece of paper, one green 
coloured for approval, and the other red for rejection 
(Article 252). 
3) The referendum would be realised by the assemblies on an 
appointed Sunday at least twenty days before by the 
                                                 
42 The municipalities could be of the first order (district capitals, municipalities with more 
than 40,000 inhabitants, and still those whose chief-town was a city with more than 18,000 
inhabitants); second order (municipalities with more than 18,000 and less than 40,000 
inhabitants) and third order (all others).  
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administrative body whose deliberation was in cause. It 
would also be publicised by warning and published in the 
local newspapers along with posted edicts (Article 255). 
4) After the chair of the assembly was constituted, the call for 
votes would take place and each citizen, when called, would 
give his ballot to the chairperson (Article 256). 
5) The deliberation under referendum would be confirmed if it 
had the participation of 30% of registered citizens, except 
for decisions relating to administrative circumscriptions. 
The discussion did not end, however, in that legislative session. 
The following years would be disturbed by the beginning of World War I, 
the postponement sine die of the parliamentary elections, and the 
establishment of a dictatorship government led by General Pimenta de 
Castro at the beginning of 1915. In this manner, the local referendum 
remained without any type of regulation, despite its urgency.   
3.3. The Lack of Regulation and Its Consequences 
In 1914, despite the lack of regulation on the local referendum, 
Congress (which joined the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) created 
seven new municipalities by law: Bombarral (Law No. 123, of 28 March); 
Alpiarça (Law No. 129, of 2 April); Ribeira Brava (Law No. 154, of 6 
May); Alcanena (Law No. 156, of 8 May); Sines (Law No. 167, of 19 
May); Alportel (Law No. 178, of 1 June); Castanheira de Pêra (Law No. 
203, of 17 June). This attitude from Congress attracted severe criticism.  
In the session of 18 March 1914, which passed the bill to create 
the municipality of Bombarral, approved by the Chamber of Deputies but 
refused by the Senate, Jacinto Nunes considered that the only serious, 
loyal and honest way to decide the issue would be the referendum (DC, 7, 
18 March 1914, p. 8). In the Senate sittings of 17 April 1914, in which a 
bill to create the municipality of Ribeira Brava was discussed, Senator 
Tasso de Figueiredo proposed the postponement of that decision until the 
appreciation by the Chamber of Deputies on the Administrative Code had 
already passed in the Senate. The idea was to avoid the creation of 
municipalities under extraordinary conditions (DS, 75, 17 April 1914, p. 
10). The Chamber passed the postponement, but on 27 April, the bill was 
passed, in spite of several protests. 
These discussions were repeated throughout 1914 due to a 
veritable avalanche of bills aimed at changing administrative 
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circumscriptions.43  At the Chamber of Deputies’ session on 22 April 
1914, Barbosa de Magalhães, on behalf of the Public Administration 
Committee, appealed to the urgent regulation of Law No. 88, having 
obtained a promise from the Head of Government that such would be 
made as soon as possible (DCD, 79, 22 April 1914, p. 9).   
While the legislative power did not approve the regulation for 
the local referendum, some decisions were taken without a referendum. 
Three parishes were created in 1915: Painho (municipality of Cadaval), 
Caneças (Loures), Estoril (Cascais); Six in 1916: Quarteira (Loulé), S. 
Mamede (Batalha), Santa Iria de Azóia (Loures), Amadora (Oeiras), Vale 
de Paraíso (Azambuja), Cristelo (Paredes). In 1917, even after the 
publication of the law which established the rules for local referendums, 
the municipality of Marinha Grande was created by law, without a 
referendum.  
Although the lack of a referendum had consequences concerning 
the bills needed to change administrative circumscriptions, it also 
concerned other types of decisions. For instance, in the Senate session of 
27 June 1914, Senator Tasso de Figueiredo criticised a bill that authorised 
the Câmara Municipal of Vila Real de Santo António to create a tax.  
Such authorisations should have been submitted to a referendum, and the 
Chamber approved the objection (DS, 127, 27 June 1914, pp. 6-9). 
Another problem was that some deliberations from local 
authorities needed a referendum to approve their execution. Given that the 
way to accomplish the optional referendum requested by the electors was 
not regulated, nothing prevented the deliberations.  However, in the case 
of deliberations that needed an organic referendum from parish 
authorities, which was mandatory, the courts judged that those 
deliberations were merely provisional until a referendum took place. In 
fact, in April 1917, the Supreme Administrative Court granted an appeal 
against a deliberation from a parish authority, which had acquired a piece 
of land, without a referendum. 
During this period, certain deliberations of local authorities had 
to be confirmed by referendum.  However, until 1916, no law governed 
the conduct of referendums.  After the publication of Law No. 621, of 23 
June 1916, the court ruled that all decisions made in the previous years 
were only provisional until approved by a referendum. This judgment was 
based on Article 12 of that Law, which applied retrospectively. The Court 
                                                 
43 See for example: DS (83, 29 April 1914, p. 5) or DS (87, 6 May 1914, p. 16). 
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therefore considered that all pending deliberations must be submitted to a 
mandatory referendum [DG (II) 91, 18 April 1917]. 
3.4. The First Restrictions on the Extent of the 
       Local Referendum  
On 24 August 1915, António Fonseca, who was member of the 
Democratic Party, introduced a bill.  It stated that the deliberations from 
the municipal authorities regarding expenses only had to be submitted for 
approval from parish authorities, or through a referendum, if the increase 
of taxes was greater than that of the previous year. The same rule would 
be valid for the referendum on the decisions regarding taxes taken by 
parish authorities (DCD, 56, 24 August 1915, p. 15).  The Chamber of 
Deputies approved this bill on 26 August 1915, thus giving origin to Law 
No. 446, of 18 September 1915 [DG (I) 189].  
Nevertheless, even within this new legal system, the law was 
sometimes ignored. For example, during the session of 10 February 1916, 
Jorge Nunes, member of the unionist opposition, criticised the municipal 
authority of Oporto for having increased taxes without respecting the 
Administrative Code, that is, without consulting the parish authorities 
(DCD, 38, 10 February 1916, p. 15). 
3.5. Law No. 621, of 23 June 1916 
   3.5.1. The Debate in the Chambers 
Finally, on 24 March 1916, the Public Administration 
Committee introduced, in the Chamber of Deputies, a bill regulating the 
local referendum [DG (II) 72, 27 March 1916, pp. 1095-1099]. The Bill 
drew on the debate that had taken place two years previously in the 
Senate, and proposed that: 
a) The restriction of the electoral body, which gave male 
citizens aged 21 and over the right to vote, as long as they 
fully enjoyed their civil rights, were electors or taxpayers, 
and lived in the constituency for more than one year. 
b) The reduction of the municipal authorities’ deliberations 
submitted to the parish authorities’ organic referendum.  
c) The restriction of the deliberations submitted to the 
municipal referendum required by one tenth of the electors, 
which could only happen on deliberations concerning loans 
or taxes. 
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d) The suppression of an organic referendum from parish 
authorities on deliberations made by Lisbon and Oporto 
municipal authorities, which could be submitted to popular 
referendums only for the restricted terms mentioned above. 
The debate began on 10 May 1916 (DCD, 85, 10 May 1916) and 
the Public Administration Committee prepared a new draft, which was 
different in some aspects from the previous one. The text no longer 
referred to the abolision of municipalities and freguesias (new designation 
for the parishes), but only mentioned their creation, which still had  to be 
approved by referendum, requested by a third of the electors and voted by 
two thirds of them. To change parishes from one municipality to another, 
it would suffice to have the approval by a third of the electors.   
The electoral body for the referendum would be the same as for 
other electoral acts, with references to the taxpayers’ participation and to 
residence in the circumscription for more than one year having 
disappeared. Those who did not vote would no longer be considered as 
giving tacit approval. The new draft changed other details, namely the 
ballot paper, which should have only one colour, thus guaranteeing the 
secrecy of vote. 
The Chamber reduced the use of the organic referendum from 
parishes on the municipalities’ deliberations, but not to the extent 
proposed. As for the electors’ optional referendum, the restriction was 
more evident: the taking out of loans and the creation of taxes could be 
subject to a popular referendum. There would be no special regime for 
Lisbon and Oporto. The deliberations from municipal authorities would be 
tacitly approved if the parish authorities did not communicate their 
resolutions within the 45-day term. 
Parish authorities repeatedly requested restrictions on the 
popular referendum for two main reasons. The first was the staff resource 
required by the local authorities to raise the referendary device with all the 
legal requirements, and the second was the difficulty felt by the local 
authorities of obtaining revenues, given the foreseeable refusal of any tax 
increase by taxpayers (DCD, 71, 12 April 1916, p. 4).  
After passing, the bill returned to the Senate for further debate 
during the session of 19 May 1916. The Chamber introduced further 
amendments: a) the change of parishes to other municipalities would need 
the vote from two thirds of the electors, and not only a third; b) the 
referendum on the creation of new municipalities should take place in 
The First Republic: 1910-1926   115 
 
each parish that had requested it; c) the approved rules should be applied 
to the pending cases (DS, 72, 19 May 1916, pp. 21-22).   
 3.5.2. The Rules Passed  
This long and troubled legislative process ended with the 
passage of Law No. 621, of 23 June 1916, which finally regulated the 
local referendum in the following terms:44 
1) The creation of new municipalities, the partial or total 
change of parishes to other municipalities, or the change of 
villages from a parish to another, should be requested by a 
third of the voters and should be passed a two-thirds 
majority. 
2) For annexations or the dissolution of unions, such as the 
creation of parishes or municipalities, the referendum only 
took place in the area that proposed to separate. It was 
summoned by the administrative body of that 
circumscription within 15 days of the delivery of a request 
signed by a third of the citizens registered in that part. If that 
summon was not made, any elector could request it to the 
district judge. 
3) The Law introduced some restrictions on the extent of local 
referendums, but the taking out of loans and the creation of 
taxes could be submitted to referendum if requested by a 
tenth of the citizens. 
4) When the parish authorities had not communicated their 
resolution on the municipal deliberations submitted to the 
organic referendum within 45 days, tacit approval would be 
assumed.  
5)  The citizens registered to vote in each constituency had the 
right to vote in the local referendum. 
6) The ballot papers would be in white, flat, printed or 
lithographed paper, and would only mention: ‘aprovo’ (I 
approve) or ‘rejeito’ (I reject). 
7) The referendum would be held by assemblies, which would 
meet on a Sunday scheduled at least 20 days before by the 
administrative body. The deliberation from this body would 
be publicised by advertisements in local newspapers and 
divulged in common places, thus informing citizens of the 
purpose of the referendum. 
                                                 
44 For a detailed description of the local referendum procedure, see Oliveira (1924). 
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8) The assemblies’ chairpersons were appointed as Stated in 
the Electoral Code, and the chairs were constituted much 
like the parish elections.    
3.6. The First Local Referendum on Territorial Issues   
The first local referendum on territorial issues that we have 
observed occurred in the small parish of Covelo de Paivô, located about 
30 kilometres from the seat of the municipality (S. Pedro do Sul), and 
about 15 kilometres from the seat of the neighbouring municipality 
(Arouca). For geographical reasons, the people of Covelo de Paivô wanted 
to become part of the Arouca municipality and the legislative power 
approved the proposal, without a referendum, by publishing a Law on 16 
February 1917. 
The municipality of S. Pedro do Sul objected to the decision, and on 24 
June 1917, the people of the parish were consulted through a local 
referendum on whether they preferred to remain in the Arouca 
municipality or return to S. Pedro do Sul. This referendum was mentioned 
in the Senate as being the first time that such an act would take place (DS, 
69, 22 June 1917, pp. 3-4). However, the Administrative Court of Aveiro 
would consider that referendum null and void. A valid referendum was 
held on 15 July, in accordance with Law No. 621, of 23 June 1916. 
Therefore, the integration in Arouca proceeded, and the boundary 
reorganisation of July 1917 remains in place to this day. 
4. The New Republic (República Nova)   
4.1. The ‘Sidonist Interregnum’ 
On 5 December 1917, exploiting the dissatisfaction that came 
from all sides towards the Portuguese participation in World War I, Major 
Sidónio Pais, Professor at Coimbra University and Finance Minister of the 
first Constitutional Government, instigated a coup d'état. Having the 
support of the urban populations who had backed the 1910 revolution, he 
was able to resist the government’s counteroffensive, proclaiming a 
Revolutionary Committee that arrested the President (Bernardino 
Machado) and the Head of Government (Afonso Costa), dissolved 
Congress, and established a regime called the New Republic (República 
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Nova).45 On 10 January 1918, the new power dissolved all administrative 
bodies. 
The simultaneous elections for the President of the Republic and 
for a Parliament with constituent powers took place on 28 April 1918. 
Meanwhile, a new electoral law gave the right to vote to all male citizens 
aged 21 and over. With the widening of suffrage, the population that could 
be registered to vote increased from 617,201 to 1,510,545 and the 
effective census had about 900,000 electors registered. Sidónio Pais was 
elected President with 513,958 votes. Participation in the parliamentary 
elections was very low (36% in Lisbon) due to the call for abstention 
made by the Democratic, Evolutionist and Unionist parties (Marques, 
1978, p. 610; Maltez, 2005, p. 243).   
The new Parliament met between 23 July and 6 August 1918, 
but it did not decide how the new Constitution should be drawn up. 
Sidónio Pais merged the functions of President and Head of Government, 
and he broke with the syndical movement that had supported his 
ascension to power. The regime leaned to the right and assumed a fascist 
character (Serra, 1992, pp. 60-61; Santos, 1990, pp. 255-260). On 14 
December 1918, Sidónio Pais was murdered in Lisbon. During the 
‘Sidonist interregnum’, the Government created three new parishes by 
decree: Penha de França (Lisbon), Serra de Santo António (Alcanena) 
and S. Cristóvão (Montemor-o-Novo). Only in the last one did the decree 
refer to the execution of Law No. 621, which demanded that its creation 
be requested by a third of the electors and voted for by two-thirds.    
 4.2. The Referendum in Carneiro de Moura’s 
Draft Constitution 
On 24 July 1918, the ‘sidonist’ Senator Carneiro de Moura, 
introduced a draft Constitution (Serra 1992, p. 60-61), which proposed the 
inception of the national referendum.  If the President of the Republic 
refused to give assent to a statute, after hearing the Council of State,46 he 
could submit the final decision to a popular referendum (Article 79).47 If 
                                                 
45 On the New Republic, see Serra (1992, pp. 54-57); Santos (1990, pp. 83-85), Maltez 
(2005, p. 234) and Wheeler (1978, pp. 151-173). 
46 According to the draft, the Council of State would be composed by the Presidents of the 
Legislative Chambers, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Dean of the 
University of Lisbon, the Commander of the Navy, the Commander of the 1st military 
division, and six members representing the working class, fine arts, agriculture, industry, 
trade and liberal professions. 
47 If the President did not appeal to the popular referendum, he should enact the diploma 
within a 15 day term (Article 80). 
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the popular referendum approved the statute, it would be enacted (Article 
81). If the referendum rejected an important resolution of the Legislative 
Power, the President could dissolve both parliamentary chambers, after 
hearing the Council of State (Article 112). Beside this proposal of national 
referendum, the draft also included the popular referendum on subjects of 
great regional interest (Article 141).   
The Carneiro de Moura draft, in its most relevant part, which 
was the inception of the national referendum, wanted to reinforce the 
President’s Constitutional position.  This idea was dear to ‘sidonism’, and 
the alliance with the popular strata that supported the New Republic. In 
the case of conflict with Parliament, the President could appeal directly to 
the people, and the defeat of the legislative body by the people triggered 
the power of dissolution. This draft, however, would expire with the new 
parliamentary elections in May 1919 without ever being discussed. 
4.3 The Royalists and the Plebiscite 
With the Democratic Party removed from power by Sidónio’s 
revolution, and with elections expected during February 1918, the 
supporters of the Monarchy tried to organise their own participation. 
Hoping to achieve that aim, they created a monarchic electoral 
commission and, on 2 February, they met Sidónio Pais. According to the 
former minister, António Cabral, who took part in the delegation, the 
purposes of that meeting were to discover Sidónio’s guidelines and 
political intentions.  But they also sought to find out if they would be 
permitted to distribute their electoral propaganda freely in assemblies and 
meetings, diffusing their ideas, publishing their principles, introducing 
their candidates, and using, in accordance with the law, every legitimate 
way that they judged necessary to take a condign representation in 
parliament (Cabral, 1932, p. 359). 
Sidónio Pais guaranteed the freedom to meet, and to make 
electoral propaganda.  However, he tried to lure Cabral and his followers 
into accepting the new situation by expressing the desire that the 
supporters of the Monarchy participate in the Republic on equal terms 
with the republicans, arguing that, with a new Constitution, the moment 
was opportune (Cabral, 1932.p. 360). António Cabral considered the 
proposal insulting and threatened to leave. Sidónio, trying to pacify him, 
defined his proposal as an experiment instead of an abdication. The 
monarchists would support Sidónio in the direct presidential election in 
order to avoid the disturbances. Before such an appeal for a direct vote, 
the royalists replied with a proposal for a plebiscite, so that the nation 
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could freely choose the political system. According to António Cabral 
(1932, p. 360), Sidónio refused that idea peremptorily and appeared to be 
annoyed. 
The supporters of the Monarchy did not accept the compromise 
and insisted, during that year, on their claim for a plebiscite. Miguel Dias 
Santos (2003, p. 170) made a survey of the claim for a plebiscite by the 
monarchic press in 1918, referring to articles published in the newspapers 
A Pátria on 13 February, 16 August, 1, 2 and 17 October, 7, 19 and 22 
November; O Liberal on 19 and 26 February; and Diário Nacional on 14 
February and 27 November. In spite of being well aware that Sidónio 
Pais, as a republican, would never accept the plebiscite, the monarchic 
press demanded it consistently througout 1918. The plebiscite would 
become a flag of some supporters of the Monarchy. However, the idea 
was not unanimous among them, and the exiled King did not accept it. 
That was clear in the monarchic movements in the aftermath of Sidónio 
Pais’ death. 
Hipólito Raposo (1945, pp. 42-45), a supporter of Paiva 
Couceiro’s military movements against the Republic which gave place to 
the ephemeral proclamation of the ‘Monarchy of the North’ in January 
1919, recalls in his memoirs that he tried to obtain the approval of the 
exiled King for those military movements, and that he himself sent a 
document to the King’s representative, Aires de Ornelas. That document 
asked for the opinion of Dom Manuel II about the possibility of a military 
movement promoted by monarchic and republican military officials, and 
proposed that the country hold a plebiscite on the political system. The 
verdict brought on that paper by Aires of Ornelas was, for the first point: 
‘Go on! Words of the King’. However, as for the second: ‘I do not see 
reason for a plebiscite.’ 
Monarchic opinion remained divided over the plebiscite. João de 
Almeida (1937, pp. 216-217), who fought militarily for the monarchic 
restoration, defended the plebiscite for tactical reasons in the beginning, 
but he later changed his opinion, deciding that the plebiscite would only 
serve to legalise the will of the Government that imposed it. Alfredo 
Pimenta (1937, p. 161) considered himself an anti-liberal and anti-
democratic royalist. He was an admirer of Dom Manuel II and, in a text 
written in 1925, he expressed his agreement with the King's position, 
refusing the idea of a plebiscite in principle. He thought the plebiscite was 
contrary to the monarchic doctrine. The King was a King because of the 
Grace of God. His power came from God. A plebiscitary King would be a 
King of the democracy, a King of the vote, a King of the ballot, a King of 
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the party. His conclusion was that a plebiscitary monarchy would be a 
republic.   
The monarchic position on the plebiscite varied therefore 
between the positions of those who refused it for reasons of principle, like 
Dom Manuel II himself, and others who accepted it for tactical reasons. 
For the Miguelist branch, the idea of a plebiscite allowed them to join the 
opposition to the Republic and to fight against the return of Dom Manuel 
II to the throne. For the supporters of a restoration by military means, the 
plebiscite would appear as a way of avoiding the pure and simple return of 
a Monarchy that had been defeated. They were conscious that achieving 
restoration without broadening their political support base would be 
difficult, and they wanted to legitimise the return of the Monarchy through 
plebiscitary means.  On the other hand, the plebiscite idea, when working 
as a ‘democratic’ challenge to the Republican regime, was intended to 
unite, and to win the support of, all those discontented with the Republic, 
taking full benefit of the deep political instability and crises that typified 
the First Portuguese Republic.   
Therefore, the idea of a plebiscite did not have unanimous 
support amongst the supporters of the Monarchy, and it was even opposed 
by the exiled King. Nevertheless, the defeat of the military attempts to 
restore the Monarchy excluded the possibility of such a plebiscite.  The 
ephemeral proclamation of the Monarchy in occupied places during those 
campaigns was made on behalf of the return of King Manuel II, and never 
under condition of a plebiscite to confirm his legitimacy. The practical 
difficulties of the plebiscite would be certainly real. However, it is not 
relevant to analyse these in detail, since the question was solved by 
revolutionary means.  The monarchic reaction was centered 
fundamentally in military actions in spite of its weakness. The plebiscite 
functioned as a political argument for some monarchic sectors, but a 
plebiscite would have beeen unlikely even if the military outcome had 
been different.   
5. The Last Years of the First Republic 
5.1. The Constitutional Revision of 1919 
After Sidónio Pais’ murder, the Government assumed executive 
power based on the Constitution of 1911 and decided to hold elections for 
a new President of the Republic according to its rules. The President 
elected was Admiral Canto e Castro, who completed Bernardino 
Machado’s term of office, which finished on 5 October 1919. Tamagnini 
Barbosa assumed Government leadership.   
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Until February 1919, the country had a president and a 
government with disputed legitimacy, since Bernardino Machado had 
never resigned. Furthermore, it faced revolutionary revolts in Lisbon and 
Covilhã (10 January), and Santarém (12 January), along with the 
declaration of the Monarchy in the North of the country by Paiva 
Couceiro on 19 January, and a monarchic military revolt in Lisbon on 22 
January. When the republican opposition overthrew the monarchic revolt 
in Lisbon, a government led by José Relvas, which included all parties 
from the ‘Old’ Republic, took power on 27 January 1919. The ‘Monarchy 
of the North’ surrendered on 17 February. The Parliament, which had 
carried over from Sidonism, was dissolved on 19 February. In the 
legislative elections, which took place on 11 May 1919, with electoral 
suffrage again restricted, the Democratic Party elected 55% of the 
deputies, in spite of the absence of Afonso Costa, exiled in Paris after 
Sidónio’s coup (Serra, 1992, pp. 63-71).   
In August 1919, there was a Constitutional revision process. 
Two draft amendments included different kinds of referendums. The draft 
from the socialist José António da Costa Júnior, proposed, in the provision 
regarding local institutions, the inclusion of the exercise of referendum by 
universal suffrage, on any political, social or economic measure that could 
worsen or make it difficult for the municipal community (DCD, 26, 22 
July 1919, p. 52). 
The draft introduced by José Mendes Nunes Loureiro and other 
members of the Democratic Party (DCD, 26, 22 July 1919, p. 53) 
proposed the referendum for Congress dissolution. If some proposal for 
the self-dissolution of Congress were introduced, it would be dissolved if 
the proposal was approved in a joint session with both Chambers. 
However, if the proposal obtained a third of the votes from the Congress 
members, it would be submitted to referendum.   
The schedule of the referendum would imply the immediate 
suspension of the ministers’ functions, with the Government being 
assumed by a body called the National Council, chosen during a joint 
session of both Chambers of Congress. In case of a negative answer from 
the voters, the ministers would retake their functions immediately. These 
proposals did not have any success and, once again, the arguments against 
the referendum were based on the citizens’ lack of knowledge and 
understanding.48 The fact that the dissolution of Congress was 
                                                 
48 In that sense, see the speeches by António Maria da Silva and Vasco Borges (DCD, 31, 
30 July 1919, pp. 14 and 27). 
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Constitutionally forbidden until then was a real problem for the republican 
political system, and explains the association between the referendum and 
Congress dissolution. That power would later be conferred to the 
President of the Republic, although in a conditioned way, but the 
referendum did not obtain any role in that process.   
5.2. The Local Referendum in the Last Years of the 
       First Republic 
The final years of the First Republic were categorised by a 
dizzying succession of governments, and this instability would lead to its 
final collapse. The Democratic Party was torn apart by dissidence. The 
Evolutionist and Unionist Parties disappeared, giving room to the Liberal 
Party. From the death of Sidónio in February 1919, until 19 October 1921, 
the country had 13 governments. On the night of 19 October 1921, the so-
called ‘bloody night’, the Head of Government, António Granjo, and other 
key republicans were assassinated. 
The next Government lasted only 17 days. The only exception to 
this instability, which lasted until the collapse of the Republic, was a two 
year period, between 1922 and 1923, when a clear electoral victory for the 
Democratic Party allowed for some governmental stability under António 
Maria da Silva’s leadership. From 21 January 1920 to 30 May 1926, the 
country had 24 governments (Santos, 1990, pp. 260-275, Maltez, 2005, 
pp. 249-333).However, in those last years of the First Republic, references 
to the local referendums are frequent in the parliamentary works, namely 
regarding the creation of parishes. Between 1919 and 1925 (inclusive), the 
legislative power created 28 new parishes, and the holding of the 
referendums demanded by law were expressly referred in respective 
works.49 There are also references to referendums on the annexation and 
disunion of parishes,50 to proposals refused due to the lack of legally 
required referendums (DCD, 49, 11 March 1924, p. 7), as well as to 
referendums held in parishes on other issues. 
                                                 
49 As examples see the references to referendums held in Bustos (Oliveira do Bairro), 
(DCD, 81, 14 January 1920, p. 3); Vila Cortumes (Alcanena), (DCD, 85, 20 February 
1920, p. 4); A-Ver-o-Mar (Póvoa de Varzim), (DCD, 44, 8 April1921, p. 4); Afrivida (Vila 
Velha de Ródão), (DCD, 90, 3 August 1922, p. 26); Albergaria dos Doze (Pombal), (DCD, 
161, 1 November 1922, pp. 4-7); Lomba da Fazenda (Nordeste), (DCD, 7, 14 December 
1923, p. 9); Vila Nova de S. Pedro (Azambuja), (DCD, 115, 2 July 1924, p. 22); Queluz 
(Sintra), (DCD, 68, 23 April 1925, p. 7); or Silveira (Torres Vedras), (DCD, 34, 21 April 
1925, pp. 16-17). 
50 As an example see the disunion of a part of Alverca and its annexation to Alhandra, 
preceded by referendum (DCD, 67, 6 June 1922, p. 32). 
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Chapter 3 
The Dictatorship of the New State: 1926-1974 
1. The Military Dictatorship 
1.1 The Military Coup of 28 May 
On 28 May 1926, General Gomes da Costa, former Commander 
of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in  World War I, led a military 
revolt in the northern city of Braga and started a march towards Lisbon. 
Most of the army joined him after some hesitation, while the rest 
remained neutral. In Lisbon, the Government resigned on 30 May and 
President Bernardino Machado resigned on 31 May, giving complete 
power to one of the revolutionary leaders, Commander Mendes Cabeçadas 
(Rosas, 1994, p. 156; Marques, 1998, p. 278; Maltez, 2005, pp. 324-328). 
The new power had neither any political or governmental 
project, nor any effective and united direction. As Fernando Rosas points 
out (1994, p. 155), this military conspiracy lacked a clear leadership. The 
conspiracy was separated into political-military factions, each having their 
own leaders with different strategies. Jorge Campinos (1975, p. 39) 
emphasises that the military movement was united only by the common 
idea to reestablish public order, without knowing what to do the next day. 
Having risen to power promising stability and order, the effectiveness of 
the military government was hampered by heterogeneity and disunity of 
its own (Oliveira, 1992, p. 13). 
On 17 June, Mendes Cabeçadas, who was still a rightist 
republican, thought that the military coup of 28 May should not put an end 
to the liberal-parliamentary system, but should regenerate it (Rosas, 1994, 
p. 151).  As a result, he was expelled from the Government. His place was 
taken by Gomes da Costa himself, with the support of the most extreme 
right wing and anti-republican faction, led by General Sinel de Cordes. 
However, given his absolute political incompetence, Gomes da Costa was 
no more than an ornamental figure of the movement, and was removed 
from power on 9 July by a new military coup commanded by Generals 
Óscar Carmona and Sinel de Cordes.  They then assumed the positions of 
Head of Government and Finance Minister, respectively (Marques, 1998, 
p. 375).  On 26 November, Carmona was appointed provisionally as both 
President of the Republic and Head of Government. 
In 1927, several republican military revolts against the 
dictatorship were defeated.  The extreme right wing reinforced its position 
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by improving its repressive mechanisms (Marques, 1998, pp. 380-381). 
As António Pedro Ribeiro dos Santos points out (1990, p. 277), the 
winners felt that the maintenance of the dictatorship would not be possible 
without a social base of support. Therefore, in the first anniversary of the 
28 May revolution, through Carmona’s voice, they declared the intention 
of calling elections with the clear purpose of getting that support. Thus, on 
29 December 1927, Decree No. 14,802 on the electoral census expanded 
the right to vote. 
On 25 March 1928, the only candidate for the Presidency of the 
Republic, Óscar Carmona, was directly elected with 761,730 votes. The 
election was governed by Decree No 15,063, of 25 February 1928, from 
his own Government. Carmona’s entrance into the Presidency on 15 April 
changed the military dictatorship into a national dictatorship (Maltez, 
2005, p. 345).  For Marcello Caetano (1956, p. 2), this election was a 
plebiscitary ratification of the revolution. Meanwhile, the financial 
policies from the dictatorial governments, led by Sinel de Cordes, and 
Ivens Ferraz after 16 February 1928 failed completely (Maltez, 2005, pp. 
335-338; Rosas, 1994, p. 219).  
1.2. The Rise of Salazar 
On 18 April 1928, Carmona instituted a new government led by 
Colonel José Vicente de Freitas, with António de Oliveira Salazar as 
Finance Minister, establishing, in the words of José Adelino Maltez 
(2005, p. 346), a ‘finance dictatorship’ inside the national dictatorship. 
The purpose of Vicente de Freitas’ Government initially seemed to be 
reconciliation with republican positions (Rosas, 1994, p. 168). However, 
the reinforcement of most right-wing positions, including Salazar’s, halted 
that tendency with the support from catholic conservatives, young sidonist 
officials and Carmona. This was achieved first through a governmental 
reshuffle which happened on November 1928, secondly, by forcing 
Vicente de Freitas’ dismissal on 8 July 1929, and substituting him with 
Ivens Ferraz, and finally by forcing General Domingos Oliveira to take his 
place on 21 January 1930 (Marques, 1998, pp. 383-384; Almeida, 1999, 
pp. 87-88). 
The dismissal of Ferraz and the appointment of Domingos 
Oliveira’s Government, with Salazar as its true leader, meant a rupture 
with the Republic and the beginning of a personal and authoritarian 
regime. This would be the answer to the crisis of liberalism and 
parliamentary democracy, and also to the threats of the socialist revolution 
(Oliveira, 1992, p. 15). 
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The suppression of new republican military revolts in 1931, 
gave way to a general hardening of the dictatorship and to the 
reinforcement of the anti-liberal and anti-parliamentary stream. Eleven 
months later, Salazar would claim government leadership. After his 
appointment as Finance Minister during Vicente de Freitas’ government, 
he gained support from most of the catholic reactionary faction, and began 
to take all levels of power, generating around himself movement of 
unconditional followers.  After having belonged to the governments of 
Vicente de Freitas, Ivens Ferraz and Domingos de Oliveira, Oliveira 
Salazar became Chief of Government on 5 July 1932. He would only 
interrupt those functions 37 years later, on 27 September 1968, due to his 
health condition. 
2. The Constitutional Project 
2.1. The Essential Lines of the Constitutional Project 
The military dictatorship established in 1926 decisively 
overthrew the Constitution of 1911. Although it was maintained in theory, 
several dictatorial decrees altered fundamental aspects of the State 
organisation. Decree No. 11,711, of 9 June 1926 dissolved the Congress 
of the Republic. Still in that same year, the Decrees No. 11,789, of 19 
June and No. 12,740, of 26 November, gave the functions of the Chief of 
Government to the President of the Republic. In 1928, Decree No. 15.063, 
of 25 February, established the direct election of the President, whose 
term of office would be five years. Decree No. 15,248, of 24 March, 
expressly repealed the 1911 Constitution provision regarding the 
President’s election. Decree No. 15,331, of 9 April, defined the 
President’s attributions and Stated the terms of his honour commitment. 
Finally, Decree No. 18,570, of 8 July, approved the Colonial Act, which 
replaced Title V of the 1911 Constitution, on the administration of the 
overseas provinces (Santos, 1990, p. 92). 
In spite of being only a Finance Minister, Salazar appointed 
himself with the task of expressing the doctrinaire basis of the regime and 
the Constitutional future of the dictatorship. Fernando Rosas (1994, pp. 
198-202; 1996, pp. 198-203) synthesises the essential lines exposed by 
Salazar’s Constitutional project on the New State (Estado Novo) into five 
fundamental parameters: a) The refusal of democratic liberalism; b) 
corporative nationalism; c) a strong State; d) economic and social 
interventionism; and e) colonial imperialism.  
2.2. The Constitutional Draft 
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In October 1931, the Home Minister announced the way to 
‘Constitutional normalcy’, which would be achieved through the approval 
of an electoral legislation, a new Administrative Code and the reform of 
the Constitution. On 22 December, through Decree No. 20,643, the 
Government established a National Political Council (Conselho Político 
Nacional) in order to give an opinion on the foundations of the 
Constitutional system that needed to be created (Santos, 1990, p. 282). 
This Council, led by the President of the Republic, included the Head of 
Government, the Home Minister, the President of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, the Attorney General of the Republic and eleven persons 
appointed by the President. One of these was Oliveira Salazar, who had a 
decisive influence on the choice of the other council members (Almeida, 
1999, pp. 107-108; Urbano, 1998, p. 103; Nogueira, 2000a, pp. 132-133).  
The Council had a heterogeneous composition, but its members, 
though representing different sensibilities, all supported the dictatorship.  
One of their main advisory functions was to assess the Constitutional draft 
of the Republic. That text would be introduced by a task force coordinated 
by Oliveira Salazar himself, including university professor Fezas Vital, 
the young jurist Marcello Caetano, Salazar’s future successor in the 
government’s leadership many years later (Almeida, 1999, p. 108),51 and 
Quirino de Jesus, a politically discreet person who has been considered 
the true inspirer of Salazar’s Constitutional project. 
The National Political Council met for the first time on 5 May 
1932 to give their opinion on the draft, published in the press on 28 May, 
and opened a public debate that lasted until February 1933. However, with 
the press censorship, which drastically restricted fundamental freedoms, 
the effective decapitation of republican resistance and worker movements 
due to the repressive waves from previous years, the debate was restricted 
to the dictatorship’s many factions: the liberal conservatives, the radical 
right wing, and Salazar’s supporters defending the proposed draft (Rosas, 
1996, p. 198). 
According to the proposed draft, the Head of State, who was 
directly elected for a seven-year term of office, and was responsible only 
to the Nation, centralised executive power with the widest responsibilities. 
He could dissolve the Parliament, promote Constitutional revisions, 
appoint and remove the Head of Government and ministers without any 
parliamentary interference. The Government would only be politically 
                                                 
51 On the relationship established between Salazar and Caetano during the working up of 
the Constitutional draft, see Caetano (1977, pp. 52-53). 
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responsible to the President and it would be completely independent from 
Parliament. The Head of Government had the huge power of 
countersigning all the Presidential Acts under the penalty of their 
inexistence, thus creating a bicephalous presidentialism. The role of 
Parliament would be minimal, given that even at the legislative level it 
would only have the responsibility of approving the general elements of 
the legal systems. 
Meanwhile, the conservative liberals had drawn a true counter-
draft of the Constitution under the authorship of General Vicente de 
Freitas, who was the Head of Government during the dictatorship’s initial 
years. He addressed his draft to Óscar Carmona, and proposed a strong 
and stable government system, which would make disorder impossible, 
but would absolutely respect the democratic principle of government and 
which would not sacrifice any individual freedoms. As for the passage of 
the Constitutional text, Vicente de Freitas contested the plebiscitary 
option. The Government should only make an Electoral Law for the 
election of a Constituent Assembly, and introduce its draft to the 
Assembly once elected. (Santos, 1990, p. 284). 
Vicente de Freitas wanted to give his draft directly to Carmona, 
but Salazar prevented him from doing that by convincing the President to 
pretend to be ill. Salazar received the document on 8 February 1933. The 
press published the text on 12 February 1933, and added an unofficial 
note from the Government refuting its arguments. Meanwhile, the author 
was discharged on that same day from the post of President of the 
Administrative Commission of Lisbon. 
The final proposal, made by a commission named by the 
Government, of which Fezas Vital, the Justice Minister Manuel Rodrigues 
and the Colonies Minister Armindo Monteiro took part, included some of 
the conservative liberals’ proposals.  In spite of everything, they still 
maintained some influence near Carmona. The draft, published by Decree 
No. 22,241 of 22 February, was to be submitted to a plebiscite.  In its final 
version, it accepted the direct election of the 90 members from the 
National Assembly. The possibility for presidential reelection was 
approved, as well as the obligatory presidential enactment of vetoed Acts, 
which was confirmed by a two-thirds majority. (Rosas, 1996, pp. 205-206; 
Urbano, 1998, pp. 104-105). 
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3. The Plebiscite on the 1933 Constitution 
3.1. The Procedure 
On 21 February 1933, Decree No. 22,229 scheduled the 19th of 
March as the day of the national plebiscite to approve the Political 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. According to its provisions, the 
draft would be published as a supplement of the official journal (Diário do 
Governo) on 1 March 1933, and it would be distributed by the municipal 
authorities to all parishes and posted in public places until 12 March. 
Participation in the plebiscite was compulsory for the heads of family 
registered in the electoral census of 1932. 
The draft Constitution would be passed if the majority of 
electors voted affirmatively. However, the ‘heads of family’ who had not 
voted would have their votes considered as affirmative ones unless they 
showed proof that one of the following circumstances had prevented them 
from voting: a) death of any relative in one of the three days previous to 
the plebiscite; b) disease that had disabled him from attending; c) absence 
from the municipality during the previous seven days. 
Particularly significant was the way of expressing the vote. The 
ballot paper contained the following question: ‘Do you approve of the 
Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic?’ The voters who 
wanted to approve, simply had to give the paper without any answer. 
Those who wanted to reject it had to write ‘No’. 
In these terms, the results were not surprising. From the 
1,213,159 casted votes, 719,364 were considered as affirmative and 5,955 
were negative. The 487,179 abstentions (40.2%) were counted as 
affirmative votes (Santos, 1990, p. 285).  In the minutes of the Counting 
General Assembly we have the following data: registered voters 
(Mainland, Islands and Colonies): 1,330,258; votes Yes: 1,292,864; votes 
No: 6,190; blank votes: 666; absentee votes: 30,538.  The abstentions had 
already been counted as favourable votes (Almeida, 1999, p. 134). 
The passage of the Constitution through a plebiscite had direct 
effects on the President’s term of office. This was fixed for a seven year 
period [Article 72(§1)] and there was a transitory disposition (Article 137) 
which recognised the President’s functions. In that case, the term of office 
would last seven years from the date of his investiture. When the 
Constitution came into force, Carmona had completed five years of 
functions. Consequently, the passage of the Constitution meant the 
automatic extension of the presidential term of office by two years. 
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Salazar, who considered it difficult, or even impossible, to find someone 
in that period of time as qualified as General Carmona to exercise the post 
of President, assumed that option himself (Ferro, 1933, p. 136-137). 
3.2. Political Significance 
The plebiscite that approved the 1933 Constitution was not an 
expression of popular will, and did not even appear to be so. It was only a 
way to legitimise a Constitutional text granted by a dictatorial power that 
refused universal suffrage. It was also a way to legitimise political power 
that assumed its opposition to any devices inherited from democratic or 
liberal regimes. In Mário Soares’ words (1969, p. 78), the 1933 
Constitution was only a juridical mean to mask the previous dictatorial 
structure. 
The Constitutional draft did not result from any Constituent 
Assembly that had been designated for its drawing, as had happened with 
the liberal Constitutions of the Monarchy (1822, 1838) and the Republic 
(1911). The text was drawn under Oliveira Salazar’s direction, just as the 
Constitutional Charter of 1826 had been made under the direction of King 
Pedro IV. The plebiscite was being used to legitimise the title of a 
dictator.  
Interviewing Salazar about the dictatorship’s Constitutional 
future, António Ferro (1933, p. 136) asked: ‘will the Constitution be 
ordained by decree or by plebiscite?’ This question excluded all other 
possibilities, and implicitly admitted that the Constitution could plausibly 
be granted by dictatorial decree. However, Salazar admitted: ‘it will be 
submitted to a plebiscite. It would not be well accepted nor would it be 
fair to impose it to the country, without first hearing the people on such an 
important statute that will regulate our political and social life’. Take note 
of the significance this has coming from someone who always chose his 
words carefully. The plebiscite was not made in order for the people to 
decide, but only so that they could be heard. 
In spite of Salazar’s well-known monarchic militancy during the 
First Republic, he did not want to restore the Monarchy. Nevertheless, 
several demonstrations of esteem and sympathy were exchanged between 
Salazar and the former King Manuel II, who was exiled in England. The 
refusal to restore the Monarchy can be explicable by several reasons. 
First, because the dictatorship, which resulted from the military coup of 
1926, never assumed itself against the Republic, but rather against its 
deviations. Second, because the dictatorship’s Governments always 
maintained a significant weight of republicans. Third, because the social 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  130 
 
support needed for regime survival included the conservative factions, 
who were against monarchic restoration (Marques, 1998, p. 429). Fourth, 
because the support for Salazar’s increased personal power was given by 
President Carmona, who was chosen by the dictatorship. Fifth, because 
the dictatorial statute that Salazar gave to himself as Head of Government 
could hardly compatible with the existence of a Monarch who was jealous 
of their prerogatives. 
Therefore, the formal maintenance of republican institutions 
served Salazar’s goals perfectly. The premature death of Dom Manuel II, 
in 1932, without any direct descendants, obliterated the monarchic hopes 
of reestablishment and allowed Salazar to consider the monarchic idea as 
having lost its ‘acting force’ and to accept the idea of Republic (Marques, 
1998, p. 430). The death of Dom Manuel II allowed Salazar to consider 
the subject as settled.  However, there is nothing to prevent us from 
supposing that he had not already decided on the matter. 
Nonetheless, the dictatorship needed a Constitution in order to 
provide a Constitutional for the so-called New State, in other words, to 
grant a formal Constitution. Without a King and without a Constituent 
Assembly, the solution would have to be something that conferred the 
dictator an apparent legitimacy.  Vital Moreira (2004, p. 408) qualifies the 
1933 Constitution as a sort of Constitutional Charter granted by Salazar. 
In the event, the way chosen to grant it, the plebiscite, was, no more than a 
farce. 
The option for a plebiscite of this nature was in agreement with 
Salazar’s doctrinaire conceptions. While refusing the liberal, democratic 
and parliamentary basis of the State, Salazar rejected any possibility for 
free or competitive elections.  He did not even recognise each individual 
citizen’s right to vote, but only considered them as representatives of the 
family, which was the basic unit of the society. The goal of the plebiscite 
was not to submit a Constitutional draft to the popular verdict, but rather 
to release it from that verdict. 
In fact, the plebiscite was carried out in total absence of civic 
freedoms, including the forbiddance of expression of any opposing 
tendency and press censorship. Debate was restricted to the factions of the 
dictatorship, with confrontations among them being also badly tolerated.   
The plebiscite was on a single text, and it was inconceivable to 
the regime that any alternative could be submitted to the electorate.  
Electoral registration and all electoral operations were completely 
controlled by the Government. There was never any possibility for 
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independent scrutiny of the plebiscitary process. On the day of voting, an 
appeal from Carmona, encouraging approval of the draft, was dropped 
over Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra by airplane. (Almeida, 1999, p. 134). 
In Luís Barbosa Rodrigues’ reference to the plebiscite of 1933 
(1994, pp. 122-126), he considers its qualification as a ‘national 
plebiscite’ to be incorrect. It was not national because the inclusion of the 
colonies was doubtful, and it was not a plebiscite because its topic was 
neither an election nor a recall, and that point is decisive for the author to 
distinguish between a referendum and a plebiscite. If the first question is 
undisputed, the second one is not. In fact, the idea that a plebiscite must 
always be an election or recall is not true. There are hundreds of pages 
written by outstanding authors trying to distinguish plebiscite and 
referendum without convincing results.52 However, even if we consider 
that distinction to be correct, it is also true that the plebiscite of 1933 
functioned politically as a legitimacy title for Salazar and it also had the 
formal effect of extending Óscar Carmona’s presidential term of office. 
On the other hand, Rodrigues does not think it is ‘controversial’ 
to qualify that plebiscite as democratic, regardless of fact that the 
submitted text that was drawn up by a restricted group, the vote was 
compulsory, the abstentions had been counted as affirmative votes, and 
because there was a smashing majority of affirmative votes. The author 
finds similar cases in democratic contexts. In his view, the ‘difficulty’ in 
considering the 1933 vote as democratic resulted from the reduction of the 
pluralism to the minimum, and from the fact that the freedoms were very 
restricted and in some cases suspended. These facts, taken together, and 
connected with the brief, abbreviated and insufficient publicity of the draft 
proposed in a country with a high illiteracy rate, with a discriminatory 
voting procedure, and the limits of its secret nature, all allowed for the 
author to think that the democratic nature of the plebiscite was 
‘controversial’.  This seems like an understement: the facts adduced by the 
author should be more than enough put the anti-democratic nature of that 
plebiscite beyond question. 
The Portuguese plebiscite of 1933 was, after all one, of a 
handful of plebiscites held in Europe by fascist dictators, giving formal 
legitimacy to their absolute powers. That plebiscite was similar to the 
Italian and German fascist plebiscites held between 1929 and 1938. Until 
its fall on 25 April 1974, the dictator did not use the plebiscite again. But 
                                                 
52 On the conceptual difference between referendum and plebiscite see among many 
others, Miranda (1996a, pp. 234-235); Canotilho (1998, pp. 284-285); Duarte (1987, pp. 
206-207); González (2005, pp. 8-9); Butler & Ranney (1978, p. 4); Denquin (1976). 
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that single act in 1933 was a very clear sign of how the dictatorship 
viewed electoral processes.   This comtempt for democracy was to be 
revealed again in several electoral farces during the following decades. 
The plebiscite of 1933 also contributed to a long-term suspicion of 
referendums amongst the Portuguese left wing, and attitude that was to 
persist for many years to come. For a long time, there was a feeling of 
reluctance, or even of distrust, of referendums as an expression of the 
popular will. 
3.3. The Constitution of the New State 
In the event, the 1933 Constitution was passed.53  According to 
Vital Moreira (2004, p. 409), the final text of the Constitution was little 
more than an enshrinement of the ideas expressed by Salazar in 1930. It 
formally maintained some institutions from the 1911 Constitution, and 
contained some secondary influences from the Constitutional Charter of 
1826, from the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and from the North 
American presidential system.  However, it was largely the original 
product of its creator. 
Vital Moreira (2004, p. 417) points out that Salazar’s political 
system, just as it was shaped historically, is not fully reflected in the 
formal Constitution. The truth is that, the doctrinaire conceptions of the 
Head of Government prevailed more than the Constitution: the abolition 
of the opposition, and the strongly anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-
parties and anti-parliamentary features, which assumed unequivocally 
fascist aspects in the thirties. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (1992, p. 63) 
referred to the 1933 Constitution as a ‘semantic Constitution’ that was 
largely ignored in day-to-day political and governmental practices. 
In the power system, the President had a formal supremacy. He 
was elected through a direct vote (until 1959) for a seven-year term of 
office.  He could be reelected. He appointed the Chief of Government 
(Presidente do Conselho de Ministros) and the ministers.  He summoned 
the National Assembly, and could give it constituent powers, and dissolve 
it in name of the highest interests of the nation. The majority of his acts 
had to be countersigned by the responsible ministers or by the whole 
government (Miranda, 1981, p. 259).  As Vital Moreira refers, in theory, 
this scheme could have been a presidential system, but this is not how the 
system developed in practice.  The Head of Government actually occupied 
                                                 
53 On the Constitution of 1933, see Moreira, V. (2004, pp. 405-454); Canotilho (1998, pp. 
172-179); Miranda (1981, pp. 247-275); Sá (1994, pp. 158-164); Caetano (1956); 
Campinos (1978). 
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the main role in the government’s system and in the regime’s evolution. 
The Constitution laid down that the President appointed and discharged 
the Head of Government, but what really happened was the opposite. It 
fact, the Head of Government chose the President and decided on his 
‘reelection’ or removal (Moreira, 2004, pp. 420-421). 
The Parliament, Assembleia Nacional, was emasculated. In the 
beginning, it was comprised of 90 members,54 and it worked in sittings of 
three months a year. The Government was not politically responsible 
before the Assembly. Its legislative powers were scarce and assumed by 
the Government. Besides, only members appointed by the National Union 
constituted the Assembly. It was unthinkable that within it some deep 
divergence or a real diversity of opinions could be expressed. Only after 
1969 was there any controversy in parliamentary debates due to the 
existence of a ‘liberal wing’ in the National Assembly. 
There was a second chamber, named the Corporative Chamber 
(Câmara Corporativa) that had an auxiliary nature and advisory 
functions. It was composed of representatives of local authorities and 
social interests. Initially, its functions were limited to the expression of 
opinions on the legislative initiatives introduced in the National 
Assembly. Later, in parallel with the undermining of the Assembly’s 
legislative powers, the Corporative Chamber started to give legislative 
suggestions directly to the Government, thus becoming an instrument that 
reduced the role of the directly elected Assembly (Moreira, V., 2004, pp. 
427-430). 
Gomes Canotilho (1998, pp. 173-174) synthesises three essential 
marks of the political system: a) A strong executive, independent from the 
legislative body; b) a legislature without partisan divisions, limited to the 
formulation of the general foundations of legal systems and to the 
ratification of Government executive laws; c) a directly elected Chief of 
State that is only held responsible before the Nation, and who could 
appoint or freely discharge the Head of Government. This political 
structure had enough elements to develop either a presidential system or a 
chancellor’s regime. The direction followed was the latter. 
To underline the identification between the regime and Salazar, 
Vital Moreira (2004, pp. 430-431) reminds us that Salazar was appointed 
to lead the Government for the third and last time in 1936. He maintained 
his functions without interruption until 1968. Several Presidents died, 
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were removed or re-elected, the ministers succeeded, Ministries were 
created and extinguished, and the National Assembly was recomposed 
regularly. However, there was never a need to formally reinState Salazar 
as Chief of Government – not even after presidential elections. 
4. The Referendum in the Constitutional Revision of 1935 
4.1. The Constitution and the Referendum 
The 1933 Constitution did not contain, in its original text, any 
provision about the national referendum. However, the position of the 
local referendum remained quite similar to the terms in the 1911 
Constitution. In Title VI, on political and administrative circumscriptions 
and local authorities, Article 126 laid down that special laws will regulate 
the organisation, along with the functioning and responsibilities of 
administrative bodies, with the administrative life of local authorities 
under the government agency’s supervision. It also States that their 
deliberations could be submitted to referendum. Besides the evident and 
drastic limitation of the local powers’ autonomy, due to Government 
interference, the regulation for the local referendum was sent to the 
Administrative Code, in terms that we shall see further ahead. 
The national referendum would be enshrined in the 
Constitutional revision of 1935. In the text passed in 1933 the provision 
on the Constitutional revision laid down that the Constitution would be 
reviewed every ten years, and the National Assembly whose mandate 
included the revision time would have constituent powers (Article 133). 
However, the revision could be advanced five years, if approved by two 
thirds of the National Assembly [Article 133(§1)]. However, the Chief of 
State could also, if the common good  was imperiled, after hearing the 
Council of State and through decree signed by all ministers, determine the 
elected National Assembly’s constituent powers and could review the 
Constitution on subjects appointed in that same decree (Article 134). 
These were the general rules. However, Article 138 of the Constitution lay 
down that the first National Assembly would have constituent powers. 
4.2. The Government’s Draft 
In early 1935, during the first legislature of the National 
Assembly, the first revision of the 1933 Constitution took place. 
According to the draft introduced by the Government, a new Article 
134(2) gave the President of the Republic the power to submit the 
amendments to the Constitution regarding legislative function, to a 
national plebiscite. The approved amendments would come into force as 
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soon as the definitive result from the plebiscite was published in the 
official journal (DSAN, 8, 23 January 1935, p. 71). According to the draft 
preamble, this right given to the President was in agreement with the 
plebiscitary origin of the Constitution, and with the principle that 
sovereignty resides in the Nation. The idea was to avoid a situation where 
only a single body exercised sovereign powers − the National Assembly – 
and would be capable of changing the Constitution. 
The Corporative Chamber had an opinion on that proposal and 
Fezas Vital reports that the question is not to establish a general rule for 
all Constitutional matters but only to avoid that the National Assembly 
could prevent, through its own exclusive will, a reform which touched its 
power, restricting it, or that touched the privileges of their members, thus 
decreasing them.  
Therefore, the Corporative Chamber understood the advantage 
of the proposal and considered that its inception would prejudice neither 
the national sovereignty principle nor the plebiscitary origin of the 
Constitution. But the opinion added, significantly, that, ‘the given 
adhesion does not mean, however, the acceptance as a principle of the 
national sovereignty dogma or the appeal to plebiscites. Such a subject 
was not in question.’ (DSAN, 8 − Supplement, 4 February 1935, p. 33). 
Meanwhile, the 1935 Constitutional revision provided another 
chance for a plebiscite due to a proposal introduced by Manuel Fratel 
(Lobo, 2004, pp. 672-673). The proposal referred to the power to initiate 
legislation (Article 97) and suggested that if the Assembly passed a bill, 
introduced by a deputy, and sent it to the President for enactment, the 
procedure would not follow if the Government declared it as 
inconvenient. In that case, if the Assembly insisted,55 the President would 
hear the Council of State, and definitively decide on its enactment or 
rejection within 15 days (DSAN, 8, 23 January 1935, p. 95). 
The proponent’s idea, according to his own explanation, would be 
to put the President in a referee position (DSAN, 74, 22 February 1935, p. 
343) for eventual divergences between the Assembly and the Government, 
which was in fact very implausible. In either case, if the Government were 
against a bill passed by the Assembly, the President would have an 
absolute right to veto. Therefore, the President and the Assembly together 
                                                 
55 According to the Article 98(§ unique), of the Constitution, the bills which had not been 
enacted by the President of the Republic would be submitted again to Parliament and, if 
they were approved by a two thirds majority, the Chief of State could not refuse the 
enactment. 
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could prevail against the Government, but the Assembly could never 
prevail against the Government and the President. It was a proposal that 
sought to further depreciate the role of Parliament as a legislative body. 
The Corporative Chamber was once again called to give its 
opinion and had Fezas Vital as the reporter. It supported the idea that the 
President should have an absolute right to veto on all the bills passed by 
the Assembly, even in the case of an initiative by the Government. If the 
President had unrestricted powers to dissolve Parliament, he could always 
use that extreme solution to solve any disagreement. That solution should 
be exceptional, but it would be a consequence of presidential supremacy 
(DSAN, 14 − 2nd Supplement, 15 February 1935, p. 5).  
However, the Corporative Chamber foresaw an exception that 
would change the presidential powers if the bill passed. That could happen 
in theory, given that the National Assembly elected in 1934 had 
constituent powers. In that case, the Corporative Chamber proposed that 
when the vetoed bill concerned the Constitutional responsibilities of the 
President, it should be submitted to a national plebiscite within 30 days, 
and the Constitutional changes would come into force if they were passed 
as soon as the definitive result of the plebiscite was published in the 
official journal. Manuel Fratel disagreed. He considered that giving the 
President the absolute right to veto did not mean giving him a role as a 
referee but as a tyrant. In addition, he expressed his disapproval the 
‘abuse’ of the plebiscite (DSAN, 17, 22 February 1935, p. 343). 
4.3. The Corporative Chamber Draft 
Cancela de Abreu (Rolo, 2004, pp. 85-88) introduced the 
Corporative Chamber’ proposal in the National Assembly. The bills 
passed in the National Assembly would be sent to the President to be 
enacted within 15 days. If the President, after first consulting the Council 
of State, thought that the highest interests of the country were not served 
by the enactment, he could refuse it. However, when that bill regarded the 
Constitutional responsibilities of the President, it should be submitted to a 
national plebiscite within 30 days, and the Constitutional amendments, if 
passed, would come into force soon after the publication of the definitive 
result of the plebiscite in the official journal. That proposal was rejected, 
as well as Manuel Fratel’s original proposal (DSAN, 17, 22 February 
1935, p. 345). Finally, it is important to note that, in the 1935 
Constitutional revision, there was an isolated voice, that of Antunes 
Guimarães, who considered that any deep changes of the Constitution 
should be submitted to a national plebiscite because that was how the 
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Constitution had originally been passed (DSAN, 17, 22 February 1935, p. 
345). 
4.4. The Proposal Passed 
The outcome of the Constitutional revision of 1935 was the right 
given to the President of the Republic to submit the Constitutional 
amendments referred to in the legislative function or their bodies to a 
national plebiscite, when the common good demanded it, after first 
consulting the Council of State and through a decree signed by all the 
ministers. Jorge Miranda (1996, pp. 247-248) States that the idea was to 
prevent the Assembly, which was responsible for the Constitutional 
revision, from paralysing any reform that changed its own responsibilities. 
It was not acceptable that other bodies of the State were submitted to the 
will of the Assembly regarding the change of their structure and 
responsibilities while the Assembly could not be changed by another will. 
Parliament could not be resistant to the President. In that case, the 
President could transfer the final decision to the voters.  
Maria Benedita Urbano (1998, p. 106) considers that this option 
reflected the anti-parliamentary attitude of the regime. Insofar as Oliveira 
Salazar’s ideas went forward, it was intolerable that the Constitutional 
revision was, in practice, under the Parliament’s exclusive responsibility. 
From that point of view, it was particularly worrying that the 
Constitutional future of the New State depended, as a whole, on the 
National Assembly. It was unacceptable that a directly elected organ 
could increase its own responsibilities through the Constitutional revision, 
even though elections to that body were not free and fair. 
This possibility was never applied in practice, and that the 
plebiscite was never held. The reasons for the indifference regarding this 
plebiscite, according to Maria Benedita Urbano (1998, p. 107) were the 
reduced powers of the President relative to the Head of Government, the 
understanding that Parliament would never be a true obstacle to the New 
State purposes, and the fear that a plebiscite could awaken the 
opposition’s protest. 
Therefore, the revisions of the 1933 Constitution were never 
submitted to popular verdict, in spite of the approval of provisions 
regarding the legislative function. They were all passed by the National 
Assembly alone, without any popular consultation. 
 




5. The Local Referendum in the Administrative Code of 1936-1940 
5.1. The Establishment of a Local Government 
The military dictatorship established in 1926 abruptly ended the 
local governmental system of the Republic. On 13 July 1926, Decree No. 
11,875 dissolved all administrative bodies. The administrative 
commissions appointed by the new power were a precious instrument to 
support the New State construction. Ten years later, the New State 
approved its administrative law (Oliveira, 1996b, pp. 304-305). The 1933 
Constitution laid down in Article 126 that special laws regulated the 
organisation, functions and responsibilities of the administrative bodies, 
with the administrative life of local authorities subject to the supervision 
of Government agents, and their deliberations being submitted to 
referendum. The Administrative Code would consequently have the 
Constitutional incumbency to regulate the organisation, functions and 
responsibilities of administrative bodies, which were the municipal 
authorities (câmaras municipais), the parish authorities (juntas de 
freguesia) and the province authorities (conselhos de provincia),56 and to 
regulate the terms in which their deliberations could be submitted to 
referendum. 
The Administrative Code, passed by Executive Law No. 27,424, 
of 31 December 1936, was initially introduced as a trial. The definitive 
version came into force in 1940 through Executive Law No. 31,095, of 31 
December. This code broke with the liberal administrative tradition and 
divided the mainland territory into municipalities (concelhos), constituted 
by parishes (freguesias) and grouped into districts and provinces. The 
municipality was at the centre of the administrative division (Oliveira, A. 
C., 1993, p. 36).  Therefore, the resident citizens no longer elected the 
municipal authorities. They were composed of a president and a vice-
president appointed by the Government, and by city councillors 
(vereadores), who were elected by the Municipal Council (Conselho 
Municipal) for four-year terms of office (Article 36). This last body 
gathered twice a year and reproduced the corporative structure of the 
regime. Its members were the Mayor (presidente da câmara) and other 
                                                 
56 The Constitution of 1933 and the Administrative Code created the provinces and did not 
recognise the districts as local authorities. The experience was over in 1959, with the 
abolition of the provinces, replaced by the districts (Oliveira, A. C., 1993, p. 36). 
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representatives chosen by the parish authorities, the trade unions,57 the 
patronage, the professional Orders and other corporative structures. 
5.2. The Local Referendum 
The Bill of Authorisation to Legislate allowed the Government 
to pass the Administrative Code, which was introduced to the National 
Assembly on 19 December 1935. It laid down that the deliberations from 
the parish authorities, which concerned the by-laws or regulations, the 
acquisition or alienation of real eState goods and the concession of 
servitudes on parish goods, should be submitted to referendum or 
oversight approval (DSAN, 57, 20 December 1935, p. 131). The 
Corporative Chamber, in its Opinion reported by Fezas Vital, proposed 
that only the onerous acquisition of goods be submitted to referendum 
(DSAN, 75 − Supplement, 8 February 1936, p. 25). On the session of 21 
February 1936, Albino dos Reis proposed that the free acquisition of 
goods also be submitted to referendum if it involved any duty to the parish 
authorities. The proposal was passed (DSAN, 86, 22 February 1936, p. 
642). 
Therefore, the Authorisation to Legislate established that would 
be submitted to referendum or oversight approval, as laid down in the 
Code, the parish authorities’ deliberations which concerned by-laws or 
regulations, the onerous or free acquisition of real eState goods with 
duties, along with their alienation, and the concession of servitudes on 
parish goods (DSAN, 87, 6 March 1936, p. 7). Thus, Administrative Code 
of 1936 established that certain deliberations from the parish authorities 
were not fully effective on their own.  
The mayor should approve by-laws in general, along with: a) the 
making, interpretation and revocation of by-laws on the fruition of goods, 
pastures and any fruits from the common area that is exclusive to the 
parish or some of its residents; the plantation of forests, groves and cutting 
of wood in parish lands; the fruition and use of public waters under 
parochial administration; b) the regulations needed for the parish 
administration; c) the acquisition of movable properties and real eState 
goods needed for the junta’s services and the alienation of those that are 
dispensable; d) the concession of servitudes on parish goods; e) the 
onerous or free acquisition of real eState goods with duties; f) the request 
to create new municipalities. 
                                                 
57 The trade unions were obviously under the regime’s control and mandatorily led by 
people it confided in.  
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In order for them to come into full effect, they should be passed 
by: a) a parish council composed by seven members appointed by the 
mayor or, in Lisbon and Oporto, by the civil governor, in first order 
parishes; b) a parish assembly composed by the president and other 
members of the junta and by every head of family 40 and over in the third 
order parishes outside of towns; c) by local referendum in third order or in 
second order parishes placed in towns. 
Such deliberations needed the approval of the majority of the 
heads of family, through referendum, which would be carried out on a 
Sunday or Holiday (Article 187) designated by the mayor upon request by 
the president of the parish authority [Article 208 (2)]. The act would be 
chaired by the mayor or a city councillor (Article 187). The posters, which 
were placed on public spaces at least 15 days before, had to contain the 
question submitted to referendum in clear and exact terms (Article 186). 
Each head of family with the right to vote went to  a ballot box with a 
paper ‘yes’ or ‘no’ written on it. These words could be, however, replaced 
by conventional signs in the posters since they were well known to 
illiterate voters. After the vote, the mayor proceeded to the scrutiny, with 
the presence of the parish priest, a primary school teacher and two old 
heads of family, chosen by the mayor (Article 187). 
It is notable that the Constitution of 1933 and the Administrative 
Code kept the local referendum nominally as it existed during the 
Republic, but drastically reduced its sphere of action. According to the 
centralist and anti-democratic characteristics of the regime, all of the local 
government bodies, with the exception of the parish authorities, were 
directly or indirectly appointed by the central government. No decision 
from those bodies could be subject to a local referendum. Only some 
deliberations from parish authorities could be submitted. Therefore, the 
only body that was formally elected by the population58 was also the only 
one whose deliberations could be submitted to referendum. 
For Marcello Caetano (1991, p. 234), who was surely the real 
author of the 1936-1940 Administrative Code, the Code of 1936 still tried 
to revitalise the local referendum introduced by the Constitution of 1911, 
but even that attempt was frustrated.  Consequently, the Code of 1940 
completely removed the possibility for a local referendum. In the version 
of 1940, the mayor had to approve the deliberations that could be 
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the choice of anybody who did not have the regime’s confidence. 
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submitted to referendum according to the 1936 version.59 It remains a 
vague succedaneum, which was the organic referendum exercised by 
municipal and provincial councils60 on certain deliberations from 
municipal and province authorities (Articles 55 and 318).  As mentioned 
by Ricardo Leite Pinto (1988, p. 68), an instrument that was potentially 
democratic and decentralising became a typical instrument of centralism 
that obeyed to an authoritarian and anti-democratic political philosophy. 
6. The Constitutional Revisions without a Plebiscite 
In the first legislature of the New State, the National Assembly, 
which assumed constituent powers, passed five laws for Constitutional 
revision61 including numerous Amendments to the Constitution.62 
However, the common denominator for these revisions was the reduction 
of the National Assembly’s responsibilities contrasting with the 
Government’s and Corporative Chamber’ reinforcement. Jorge Miranda 
(1981, pp. 264-266) classified this period by using a common expression 
by Marcello Caetano. He called it ‘parliamentary ratification’ of the 
Constitution, having in mind that its approval had not been made by any 
Constituent Assembly (Moreira, 2004, p. 413). 
The end of World War II gave rise to the regime’s first serious 
crisis. Germany’s defeat increased Salazar’s concerns about the 
dictatorship’s survival after the war, and he was alarmed by the fall of 
many friendly fascist regimes. In addition, there was a strong internal 
social struggle led by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which had, 
by then, reorganised in secrecy and assumed a decisive role in wanting to 
overthrow the dictatorship. Salazar, at this point, moved in three 
directions: approach the allied field, avoid conspiracies in the army, and 
repress workers’ strikes. (Rosas, 1994, pp. 353-369). 
At the end of the war, there were antifascist demonstrations all 
over the country on 7 and 8 May 1945. This generated perplexity in the 
regime’s ranks. Salazar counterattacked with a Constitutional revision, a 
                                                 
59 See Article 253(18)§ 1-2. The proposal to create new municipalities would be sent by 
the parish authority to the provincial authority, and then to the civil governor and finally to 
the Government (Article 8). 
60 The district councils replaced the provincial councils in 1959. 
61 Law No. 1885, of 23 March 1935; No. 1910, of 23 May 1935; No. 1945, of 21 
December 1936; No. 1963, of 18 December 1937 and No. 1966, of 23 April 1938. Law 
No. 1900, of 21 May 1935, modified the Colonial Act (Miranda, 1981, p. 265). 
62 Respectively: Law No. 1885, 44 amendments; Law No. 1910, one amendment; Law No. 
1945, three amendments; Law No. 1963, 13 amendments; Law No. 1966, three 
amendments (Miranda, 1981, p. 264). 
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new electoral law, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the call for 
legislative elections and the change of the National Union ruling classes 
(Rosas, 1994, p. 377). 
The Constitutional revision made through Law No. 2009, of 17 
September 1945 had, as its most important change, the establishment of 
parity between the Government and Parliament regarding their legislative 
responsibilities, which formally inscribed in the Constitution something 
that had already been practiced (Miranda, 1981, p. 267). The Government 
started to legislate by executive-law in normal situations and not only in 
the case of urgency or public need. It is true, however, that the 
Government was the only judge of what would be considered an urgency 
and public need. According to the Corporative Chamber’ Opinion, 
reported again by Fezas Vital, the Constitutional revision adjusted the 
Constitution to the political realities of the past. The National Assembly 
had, in practice been an exceptional legislative body, the Government 
being the primary source of legislation under normal circumstances 
(DSAN, 176 − Supplement, 16 June 1945, p. 13).  
This proposal was opposed by Antunes Guimarães (Caldeira, 
2004) who called for a plebiscitary approval of the Constitution. The 
Nation had not decided on a decrease of the National Assembly’s 
legislative functions through a plebiscite. For that reason, if the Nation’s 
best interests showed the opportunity to change the legislative function, 
the suitable thing to do would be to follow Article 135(2) of the 
Constitution and submit the amendments to the Constitution regarding the 
legislative function or their bodies to a national plebiscite. Those 
Amendments would be effective after the publication of the results of the 
plebiscite in the official journal (DSAN, 187, 4 July 1945, pp. 718-720). 
The reply came from the President of the Assembly, José 
Alberto dos Reis, who alleged that the plebiscite foreseen in Article 
135(2) of the Constitution would not be suitable for the normal revision 
process made by the National Assembly in the fixed terms. That regime 
was only suitable for the exceptional procedure of a revision made by the 
Assembly or through national plebiscite, or out of the regular periods, 
through presidential initiative as laid down in Article 135. However, 
Antunes Guimarães insisted, to no avail, that in decreasing the legislative 
responsibilities of the Assembly, which had been awarded through 
plebiscite in 1933, the President should consult the Nation (DSAN, 190, 7 
July 1945, p.768).   
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The next Constitutional revision occurred in 1951, immediately 
after Carmona’s death, through Law No. 2048, of 11 June 1951. It 
established that all candidates to the presidential election should offer 
warranties of respect and fidelity to the Constitutional principles, with 
such political suitability being verified by the Council of State (Miranda, 
1981, p. 267). Even so, the regime was unable to avoid a wave of strong 
opposition in 1958, which supported the candidacy of General Humberto 
Delgado. Massive electoral fraud gave the presidency to the regime’s 
candidate, Américo Thomaz.  Following a Constitutional revision of 1959, 
made through Law No. 2.100, of 29 August, the citizens would no longer 
elect the President, whose choice, by a restricted electoral assembly 
(Almeida, 1999, p. 592) became an administrative act (Santos, 1990, pp. 
319-320). 
After the replacement of Salazar by Marcello Caetano in 1968, 
the hopes of liberalisation were disappointed. However, in the elections of 
October 1969, now considered a milestone in the road to freedom 
(Carvalho, 2000), the opposition tested whether the ‘liberalisation’ was 
genuine by organising a powerful campaign against the regime. Knowing 
that the National Assembly elected in 1969 would have Constitutional 
revision powers, the socialist Mário Soares (1969, pp. 193-208) 
introduced in the 2nd Republican Congress held in Aveiro from 15 to 18 
May 1969, a thesis on the 1933 Constitution and the democratic evolution 
of the country. In that speech, Soares proposed two referendums, both 
with Constitutional consequences. 
Soares argued that, bearing in mind that the time and the 
political circumstances left the 1933 Constitution outdated, the new 
National Assembly should have undergone a deep Constitutional revision. 
The elections should have prompted a far-reaching debate about the main 
problems of the Nation. Such a debate should lead to a direct consultation 
of the Nation, under the form of referendums, on two crucial points of the 
collective life: the overseas policy and the corporative orientation of the 
economic life (Soares, 1969, pp. 207-208). The 1933 Constitution defined 
the Portuguese State as a unitary and corporative Republic. This 
determined relations between the mainland and the overseas. Give 
Europe’s economic evolution, Soares argued that it was time to frame of a 
new overseas policy and abandonment the corporative experience, which 
was exhausted. Thus, Soares proposed two referendums: to define the 
overseas policy, and to put an end to the corporative State. The result of 
the referendums would settle the options of the National Assembly for the 
Constitutional revision. 
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As was expected, the 1969 elections were not free. The final 
Constitutional revision of the regime happened in 1971, through Law No. 
3/71, of 16 August. In spite of this being the most extensive and debated 
revision of the 1933 Constitution, almost nothing essential changed 
(Miranda, 1981, pp. 268-269). A Draft Amendment to the Constitution 
introduced by Francisco de Sá Carneiro and other members of a liberal 
wing of the Assembly, who defended the evolution of the dictatorship in a 
liberal way, was not even accepted for discussion (Miranda, 1981, p. 269). 
The only ‘popular consultation’ held during the dictatorship was 
the plebiscite of 1933, which gave formal legitimacy to the fascist 
Constitution. Besides that sham of a referendum, the regime never 
seriously considered holding any type of direct consultation, not even in 
the case of Constitutional revisions. 
On the other hand, given the inexistence of public freedoms, the 
prohibition of any opposition and the systematic practice of electoral fraud 
by the authorities, the democratic opposition, mainly led by the 
Communist Party, never thought of the referendum as a worthy objective 
in its political struggle. The exceptions were the proposal mentioned by 
Mário Soares in 1969, and in consideration of the colonial problem. In 
fact, some sectors of the opposition considered the referendum as a way to 
change the Portuguese colonial rule, and this could have been achieved 
even inside the regime’s ranks, as we will see further ahead.    
For now, what is important is that on 25 April 1974, the Armed 
Forces Movement, ‘crowned the long years of resistance and reflected the 
deepest feelings of the Portuguese people by overthrowing the fascist 
regime.’63 Actually, through a resolute and well-planned military action, 
quickly supported by a formidable popular movement, almost half a 
century dictatorship was overthrown, thus opening the way for the 
construction of a democratic polity in Portugal. 
                                                 
63 Preamble of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic passed on 2 April 1976. 
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Part III 
The Referendum on the Portuguese Colonial Problem 
 
Chapter 1 
The Last Phase of the Portuguese Colonial Rule 
1. The Portuguese Colonial Problem 
Between the plebiscite regarding the 1933 Constitution and the 
fall of fascism in 1974, all proposals for referendums discussed possible 
ways of resolving the colonial problem. After World War II, the concepts 
of self-determination and independence reached the rest of the world, and 
were enshrined in the UN Charter of 1945. The development of anti-
colonialist ideas in the international community soon led to concrete 
results, with the first decolonisation processes verified in Asia and among 
Near and Middle East Arab countries (Silveira, 1992, p. 73).  Bandung’s 
Conference, which took place in Indonesia in 1955, would constitute a 
decisive event for widening the anti-colonialist movement. The 29 Afro-
Asian countries, which took part in the Conference and had recently 
become independent, reaffirmed their condemnation of colonialism as a 
social process against people’s rights. They established a platform of 
active solidarity towards the struggles for independence by populations 
under colonial rule. 
In Africa, the situation developed very quickly from then on. In 
1956, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan became independent. One year later, it 
was Ghana’s turn. After the independence of Guinea-Conakry in 1958, 
which was decided by referendum, the liberation of French colonies 
accelerated. In 1960, 17 African countries achieved independence (14 
former French colonies, two British and one Belgian). 
Portuguese colonial rule therefore faced an increatingly 
unsimpathetic international framework. The regime, still based on the 
Constitutional revision of 1951, which declared that colonies were 
overseas provinces, argued that Portugal did not have colonies, only 
provinces in several continents. This theory convinced nobody. Above all, 
after the approval of UN General Assembly Resolutions No. 1514 (XV) 
entitled ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples’ and No. 1541 (XV) which considers the overseas 
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provinces as Non-Self Governing Territories, respectively in 14 and 15 
December 1960, the isolation of Portugal in the United Nations became 
evident (Silveira, 1992, pp. 74-77; Nogueira, 2000b, pp. 170-173). 
In the early fifties, Indian Union concerns regarding the 
territories of the ‘Portuguese State of India’ became clear. By early 1950, 
questions had been raised in the Indian Parliament about the future of 
Goa, which worried the Portuguese Government. On 6 February 1950, 
Vasco Garin, the Portuguese representative in Delhi, mentioned, in a 
communication to Lisbon, that the Prime Minister of India, in reply to a 
parliamentary question, said that his Government had no doubt that Goa 
would become Indian territory (Gaitonde, 1987, p. 58). 
On 27 February 1950, the representative of India in Lisbon, 
Atchut Menon, having been given instructions to discuss the future of the 
Portuguese colonies in India formally with the Portuguese Government, 
was clearly told by the Foreign Minister Caeiro da Mata that the 
Portuguese Government would not discuss or negotiate questions related 
to the sovereignty of their territories with a foreign government (Gaitonde, 
1987, p. 59). On that same day, the Government of Delhi sent a note to 
Lisbon, which Garin refused to accept, referring namely to the ‘popular 
feeling in those territories for a union with the new and free Republic of 
India’. In June the Portuguese Government replied by refusing to discuss 
that question (Gaitonde, 1987, pp. 60-63). 
In 1954, Indian pacifist volunteers formed the Satyagraha 
movement and occupied the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Haveli 
(Gaitonde, 1987, pp. 81-91). In 1955, they marched on Goa. The 
Portuguese authorities reacted by resorting to violence. The result was a 
massacre, with 22 protestors shot dead and 225 wounded (Gaitonde, 1987, 
pp. 92-109). 
Portugal, which had been admitted into the UN, continued to 
challenge the Indian Union in the International Court of Justice, asking for 
recognition of the right of access to the occupied enclaves. On 12 April 
1960, the International Court of Justice declared that a) Portugal had a 
right of passage between Daman and the Dadra and Nagar-Haveli 
enclaves; b) there was no right of passage for the Portuguese Armed 
Forces; c) India had not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from 
Portugal’s right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and 
goods in general (Gaitonde, 1987, p. 126). Consequently, the decision had 
no practical effect (Rosas, 1994, p. 515). 
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Meanwhile, the other colonies began to stir. In 1951, the 
Portuguese authorities brutally repressed uprisings in the fields of Sao 
Tome and Principe. In 1956, protests by workers in the north of Angola, 
and the strike of the trimmers of Lourenço Marques (nowadays Maputo), 
resulted in the death of several dozen. In 1959, there was a massacre of 
strikers in the harbour of Bissau. In January 1961, cotton plantation 
workers from northern Angola went on strike.  The armed forces killed 
hundreds in villages, which they razed as they went.   
Also in the 1950s, separatist organisations started to appear in 
the Portuguese colonies (Silveira, 1992, p. 79; Moreira, 1992, p. 33): In 
1954, there was the MING (Movement for the National Independence of 
Guinea), which later changed into the PAIGC (African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde). In the same year, the UPA 
(Union of the Peoples of Angola), later known as the FNLA (National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola), was founded. In 1956, there was the 
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). In 1959, the 
MANU (African National Union of Mozambique) which, in 1962, joined 
with the UNAMI (African National Union for Independent Mozambique) 
and the UDENAMO (National Democratic Union of Mozambique) which 
gave place to the FRELIMO (Front of Liberation of Mozambique). 
The armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism had its 
starting point on 4 February 1961, with the attempt to assault the jails of 
Luanda by the MPLA. On 15 March, the UPA, with strong supports in 
Congo and with North American complicity, massacred hundreds of 
settlers and their families in northern Angola, forcing a rapid dislocation 
of Portuguese military forces. On 14 April, after defeating General 
Botelho Moniz’s attempt at a coup d’état, Salazar proceeded to a deep 
ministerial recast that, in his words, had a single reason: Angola (Silveira, 
1992, pp. 86-87; Fernando, 2005, pp. 149-166). 
A turning point came in 1961, when the colonial war began in 
Angola. On 17 December, the Indian Union invaded the territories of Goa, 
Daman and Diu, and the ‘Portuguese State of India’ came to an end. In the 
following years, the war spread to Guinea-Bissau (beginning of 1963) and 
Mozambique (September 1964). Until the regime’s fall in 1974, the 
foreign and internal policies were dominated by a never-ending and 
desperate military and political struggle to coninue and support the 
regime’s colonial paradigm in the face of growing national and 
international opposition (Rosas, 1994, p. 516). 
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2. The Alleged Referendum on the ‘Portuguese State of India’   
2.1. The Events     
On 17 December 1961, the Indian Union attacked the territories 
of Goa, Daman and Diu. The small and badly armed Portuguese military 
forces stood there, had no realistic means of defence. This military 
invasion put Salazar’s tactics in ruins. However, he remained defiant in 
defence of the ‘Portuguese State of India’. He accepted no discussion of 
Portuguese sovereignty on those territories (Rosas, 1994, p. 514).64 
For Salazar, discussing Portuguese sovereignty in the ‘State of 
India’ would mean creating a precedent for the other colonial territories. 
The Portuguese Government was realistic about the difficulties inherent in 
defending the territory militarily, but its tactics were to prevent Nehru 
from falling unless there was a military invasion (Rosas, 1994, pp. 512-
513).   
In April 1956, in an article published in Foreign Affairs, Salazar 
argued that, in the case of Goa, there were only three possible resolutions, 
one of them violent and the other two essentially peaceful. The violent 
decision would be for the Indian Union to undertake integration by force. 
Regarding the peaceful solutions, one would be for the Indian Union to 
ignore Goa. The third scenario, and the only genuine solution to the 
problem, would be to open negotiations regarding situations where 
proximity and neighbourhood seated risks or were likely to cause friction 
(Salazar, 1956, pp. 172-173).   
Contrary to Salazar’s expectations, the Indian Union invaded the 
territories. Portuguese diplomats had tried to head off this development 
through diplomatic efforts in the United States and Great Britain. In 
Washington they asked the United States to maintain its previous 
opposition to the use of force by the Indian Union, and in London they 
appealed to the historical alliance between both countries (Nogueira, 
2000b, p. 315).   
The position from the Government of Lisbon did not allow the 
scarce Portuguese troops in India to leave the territory. In case of attack, 
they not surrender. Their resistance would give the Portuguese 
Government time to obtain diplomatic support, which set an example 
regarding of the fate of the remaining overseas territories. On 14 
                                                 
64 On the process that led to the fall of the ‘Portuguese State of India’, see Stocker (2005); 
Gaitonde (1987) and Morais (1995). 
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December 1961, a few days before the invasion, Salazar wrote to General 
Vassalo e Silva, commander of the Portuguese troops in India, saying that 
he foresaw neither the possibility of a truce nor Portuguese soldiers being 
taken prisoner. They would either be victorious or dead (Nogueira, 2000b, 
p. 238). 
The invasion began on 17 December 1961.  With only 3,500 
men, Portuguese troops were clearly outnumbered. They had no Air Force 
and only one ship.  The invaders had 45,000 men.  Despite Salazar’s 
orders, surrender was the only realistic option. 
The Portuguese Government immediately appealed to the United 
Nations, hoping to obtain a Resolution from the Security Council that 
authorising a cease-fire and sending international observers to the 
territory. However, the proposal was defeated by a Soviet Union veto. In 
fact, only Brazil and Spain explicitly supported the Portuguese position. 
Despite indignant Portuguese diplomacy, neither the United States nor 
Great Britain went beyond a rhetorical condemnation of the events 
(Stocker, 2005, p. 238).  The international environment was unfavourable 
to the Portuguese colonial pretensions, and that heavily influenced the 
position of the Kennedy Administration. As for Great Britain, it preferred 
not jeopardise its relationship with India, a former British colony which 
had become a member of the Commonwealth and was emerging as a 
power in the Asian continent. 
2.2. The References to an Eventual Plebiscite   
After the annexation of Goa, Daman and Diu, some international 
press referred to the possibility of having a plebiscite to allow the people 
of the ‘Portuguese State of India’ to decide their destiny. Some of them 
even referred that as a suggestion from Portugal. Franco Nogueira (1979, 
p. 42) briefly referred to the idea of a plebiscite as a solution to the 
problem of the other Portuguese colonies. Although he did not support the 
idea of a plebiscite, he argued that the Goan people prefereed to be ruled 
by Portugal rather than India. Some international press, writing in favour 
of the Portuguese Government’s position, also mentioned that hypothesis, 
as we can see in a recollection of comments published then by the 
National Secretariat for Information (SNI, 1962). Two days before the 
invasion, on 15 December, the newspaper Ya, published in Madrid, 
referred to Portugal giving the population of Goa, some 600,000 people, 
the opportunity to decide on their future through a plebiscite. However, 
the Indian Union refused that proposal knowing that they wanted to 
remain as a part of Portugal (SNI, 1962, p. 262).  
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Soon after the invasion, other newspapers in a few countries, 
referred to the same idea, for example: in Spain (on 20 December, El 
Correo Gallego (SNI, 1962, p. 282) and on 30 December, El Español 
(SNI, 1962, p. 34)); and in the United States, on 18 December, the New 
York World Telegram and Sun (SNI; 1962, p. 147). Some newspapers 
mentioned the plebiscite in the abstract, without referring to any concrete 
proposal in that sense. On 13 December, Gazette de Lausanne, from 
Switzerland, considered that the best way to solve the problem would be, 
theoretically, through a supervised referendum.  Nonetheless, this would 
not serve the purposes of either Salazar or Nehru, who could not allow it 
for Goa when he refused it for Kashmir (SNI, 1962, p. 98). 
The Sonntags-Illustrierte of 17 December, also from 
Switzerland, found it interesting that Nehru never allowed the people of 
Goa to decide through a plebiscite about whether to continue linked to 
Portugal or to integrate India. This was due to the fact that he didn’t trust 
the people of Goa and he could not continue to deny the right of self-
determination to the inhabitants of Kashmir (SNI, 1962, pp. 204-205). 
Soon after the invasion, on 6 January 1962, the Télégramme de Brest 
speculated that Portugal would have accepted a referendum without any 
doubt, but Nehru, doubting the outcome of the result, did not want it (SNI, 
1962, p. 373).    
2.3. The Proposal that Never Existed   
It is important to establish whether any proposal was actually 
made to the population of Goa, Daman and Diu for a plebiscite so that 
they could decide on integration in the Indian Union, the maintenance of 
Portuguese sovereignty or, by chance, self-determination. We evidently 
referred to an eventual Portuguese proposal, which from India would be 
out of the question. The published references regarding the Indian Union 
always point out to the peremptory refusal of any negotiation concerning 
the future of the ‘Portuguese State of India’. The newspaper La Suisse, 
from Geneva, wrote on 19 December 1961 that the Secretary General of 
the UN, Mr. U. Thant, offered his good offices for a negotiation.  
Howeever, Nehru answered stating that it was impossible to have ‘any 
negotiation with a country still based on the concepts of the 16th century 
and colonial conquest through force’ (SNI, 1962, p. 99).   
The press unanimously reported the Indian Union’s peremptory 
refusal of the very idea of a plebiscite. Nevertheless, was there actually a 
proposal for a plebiscite? The already mentioned references, from some 
Spanish and North American press sources, are worth very little. It is 
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known that the Portuguese Government initiated a propaganda campaign 
to make its case at an international level, securing the services of a North 
American agency and making an enormous effort so that the press echoed 
its positions and condemned the Indian Union’s action (Stocker, 2005, pp. 
216-241).  Some press referred to a Portuguese proposal without saying 
where, how and when such a proposal would be carried out. El Correo 
Gallego referred to ‘information that we possess’ as the source of the 
news; other newspapers referred to a ‘suggestion’; others mentioned the 
abstract idea without referring to any proposal. 
Ambassador Franco Nogueira, the future biographer of Salazar 
who was, at the time, Foreign Minister, mentions that the proposal was 
considered, without saying when, how and by whom. A significant fact as 
to the inexistence of a concrete proposal is that, among the dozens of news 
pieces collected in the SNI publication, few of them referred to that 
hypothesis. However, the cited press spoke, in full detail, about the 
diligences made by Portugal at the United Nations and with other States, 
including the Portuguese proposal for a ceasefire and the sending of 
international observers to the territories. Still more significant is the 
absolute inexistence of references to any proposal of a plebiscite in the 
Portuguese press at that time.   
Luís Nuno Rodrigues (2002, pp. 141-142) refers to more 
concrete evidence that Portuguese ‘support’ for a plebiscite was part of a 
public relations campaign, rather than a true suggestion. During the early 
years of Kennedy’s Administration, the North American positions in the 
United Nations tended towards the defence of the principle of self-
determination. It was a difficult moment for the diplomatic relations 
between Portugal and the United States. At that time, Franco Nogueira 
met with the Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington, hoping to 
obtain a public Statement from the US Government that opposing the 
eventual attack from the Indian Union in Goa. Nogueira did not obtain 
that Statement, and was asked by Rusk if Portugal would be willing to 
‘test’ the question of self-determination in Goa if the Indian Government 
raised the subject. He answered negatively and asked if the modality was 
an ‘international plebiscite’ or if it was made under the auspices of the 
United Nations. 
It is true that the United States saw a referendum on the statute 
of the Portuguese territories in India as a possible solution. P. D. Gaitonde 
(1987, pp. 61-62) refers to two interesting facts. When, in a note to Lisbon 
dated 27 February 1950, the Government of India said that the ‘popular 
feeling in those territories is for union with the new and free Republic of 
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India’, part of the Indian press believed that the meaning of the Indian 
note was a proposal for a plebiscite in Goa. The newspaper Hindustan 
Times of 20 March even claimed that diplomatic sources in Lisbon 
believed that the Indian note had been largely dedicated to the discussion 
of a proposal for a plebiscite in Goa. This was quickly denied by the 
Government of India. The second fact is that, on 23 March, a letter from 
Ambassador Garin to Lisbon refers to the Ambassadors of Brazil and the 
US in Delhi, even though the mere suggestion of a plebiscite on 
Portugal’s part would scare away the Indians. Henderson, the US 
Ambassador, suggested that the plebiscite should take place within six 
months, be conducted by the UN, and that neither India nor Portugal 
should carry out any propaganda. Garin’s reaction was that any plebiscite 
would be contrary to the Portuguese Constitution (Gaitonde, 1987, p. 61).   
Actually, the Portuguese Government never introduced any 
proposal of a plebiscite to the populations of Goa, Daman and Diu. In 
1954, when the Indian Union occupied the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-
Haveli, the proposal from the Portuguese diplomacy on 8 August of that 
year was to send impartial observers to the territory. These would be 
chosen among representatives from countries that maintained diplomatic 
relations with both countries [MNE, 1967 (II) pp. 66-68]. 
Even with the invasion of Goa by the Indian Union imminent, 
the only proposal given by the Portuguese diplomacy was on 8 December 
1961. It recommended the sending of international observers, but was 
refused by the Indian Government [MNE, 1967 (IV) pp. 79-80].  A 
telegram sent by Salazar to the interim Secretary General of the United 
Nations on 15 December 1961 referred to that exact proposal [MNE, 1967 
(IV) p. 181].  Even after the invasion, on 18 December, when the 
Portuguese Government asked for a summons at the United Nations 
Security Council, it only requested the condemnation of the aggression 
committed by the Indian Union troops, a ceasefire, and their immediate 
withdrawal from the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu [MNE, 1967 (IV) 
p. 230].  Moreover, the proposal introduced to the UN Security Council 
by the US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, on behalf of the United States, 
Great Britain, France and Turkey, and vetoed by the Soviet Union, did not 
refer to any other demands.   
It is clear that neither the Portuguese Government, nor any of its 
allied States, presented any proposal for a plebiscite to the population of 
Goa, Daman and Diu. The references by some of the press in a few 
countries seemed to come only from the international press campaign 
launched by the Portuguese Government after the occupation. 
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Nevertheless, even without any concrete proposal for a plebiscite, it is 
important to establish whether the Portuguese Government ever pondered 
on the hypothesis of the plebiscite as a solution to maintain the 
‘Portuguese State of India’. 
2.4. The Referendum as Hypothesis Excluded 
It is true that the idea of a referendum was considered in 
Portugal. General Humberto Delgado admitted to it on 5 October 1960 in 
Brazil, when he introduced a Colonial Plan for the Portuguese opposition. 
Delgado proposed to submit to a plebiscite the Constitution of a Federal 
Republic of the United States of Portugal as well as the Constitution of 
each the States that would integrate it. The ‘Portuguese State of India’ 
would be among them (Delgado, 1974). 
However, the most concrete testimony comes from Francisco da 
Costa Gomes. At the end of 1950s, by which time the Indian Union’s use 
of force had been anticipated, the Under-Secretary of State of the Army, 
Costa Gomes, future President after the 1974 Revolution, visited the 
territories.  He realised that an invasion was inevitable in the near future, 
and expressed that conviction to Salazar, proposing a plebiscite as a 
solution, without any illusions as to the result. As Costa Gomes himself 
later explained (Cruzeiro, 1998, p. 65), he returned from India with two 
proposals: to reduce the military forces and to move forward with a 
plebiscite for the Indian populations.   
Costa Gomes had verified the null hypotheses of military 
defence of the territories in the case of an invasion by the Indian Union, as 
well as the scarce hypotheses of maintaining Portuguese sovereignty in 
the case of consultation by the populace.  He understood, therefore, that 
the transfer of those territories’ sovereignty to the Indian Union would be 
unavoidable within a very short period. The question was how to avoid an 
invasion, and to engineer an honourable political exit. Either way, it 
would be an exit. Salazar refused the proposal peremptorily, explaining 
that a plebiscite in India would set a precedent for every other colony, 
which would be entirely unacceptable (Cruzeiro, 1998, p. 81); [Santos, 
2006 (I) pp.128-131].   
Salazar’s position is not surprising. It was the Portuguese 
Government’s consistent position. On 9 January 1954, a Brazilian 
journalist asked the Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Cunha, in a press 
conference in Rio de Janeiro, if Portugal would accept a plebiscite in Goa. 
He answered smilingly with a question: ‘What answer would Brazil give 
if anybody proposed a plebiscite in Rio de Janeiro so that the population 
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decided on whether they wanted to continue or not being Brazilian?’ 
[MNE, 1967 (II) p. 236].   
Salazar clearly expressed his position in a speech uttered on 30 
November 1960 before the National Assembly. He Stated that the unity 
between Portugal and its overseas provinces was not a political or 
juridical fiction, but a social and historical reality, which did not hold 
alienations or abandonment. As for the juridical figures of plebiscite, 
referendum, and self-determination, these did not fit within its structure 
either (DSAN, 179, 2 December 1960, p. 87). After the invasion of Goa, 
Daman and Diu, Salazar addressed a long speech to the National 
Assembly on 3 January 1962.65  He referred to the positions taken by the 
Portuguese Government from the beginning of the debates with the Indian 
Union, the diplomatic measures taken at the United Nations and other 
States, and the positions taken by each of the States with whom Portugal 
maintained closer diplomatic relations. However, Salazar never referred to 
any proposal, intention or hypothesis of ever holding a plebiscite (Salazar, 
1962). 
We know therefore that the Portuguese Government never 
intended to submit its sovereignty over the ‘Portuguese State of India’ to 
any plebiscite, and never introduced any proposal or suggestion in that 
sense. So, how can we understand the references made to it? The 
references by some of the press, given their scarce credibility, seem to 
result from the information war that usually follows political and military 
conflicts. The news that Portugal would have suggested a referendum or 
that that hypothesis would have been plausible, would have the purpose of 
making the Indian Union responsible for having  refused to listen to the 
population. The Indian Union would have appeared in the eyes of 
international public opinion as contradicting the self-determination 
principle, i.e. denying the people’s right to choose its own destiny through 
a democratic means.   
Franco Nogueira’s references were also explicable. In his book 
Diálogos Interditos (Forbidden Dialogues), he refers to the hypothesis of 
a plebiscite for the African territories. Nogueira (1979, p. XLII) also wrote 
that when Goa was faced with this hypothesis, the Indian Prime Minister, 
Nehru, declared that he would not tolerate the Portuguese in Goa although 
the people of Goa wanted that. 
                                                 
65 In all truth, the Speaker of the Assembly read the speech, given that Salazar was aphonic 
due to the commotion that the events in India had caused him. 
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On this point, Nogueira merely reStates what he had affirmed 
before the General Assembly of the UN on 18 October 1962. On that 
occasion, Nogueira accused the Prime Minister of India of refusing any 
negotiation, and of having declared any plebiscite as unacceptable, 
probably – Nogueira said – because he knew that the result would be 
unfavourable to him, and (alluding to Kashmir) also because he would not 
want a plebiscite in any other place of the Indian subcontinent [MNE, 
1967 (IV) p. 437). 
It is true that the Indian Union peremptorily refused Portuguese 
sovereignty on Indian territories and did not accept any discussion of the 
matter, much less consideration of a plebiscite. It is also true that the 
Indian Union maintained the same position regarding its disagreement 
with Pakistan regarding Kashmir. It is still true that, on 6 September 1955, 
Nehru affirmed before the High Chamber of the Indian Parliament (Rajya 
Sabha) that he was not willing to tolerate the presence of the Portuguese 
in Goa, even though he acknowledged that the people of Goa would 
welcome a continued presence. According to the Indian Prime Minister, 
the people of Goa should resolve the integration of Goa in the Indian 
Union, but the presence of a foreign colonial potency in Goa was 
unacceptable.66 
Althouth Portuguse dipolomats seized on Nehru’s comments, 
the truth is that Nehru was being accused of refusing something that 
nobody proposed and nobody wanted. The Portuguese Government did 
not want a referendum because of the precedent it would set, and the 
Indian Union did not want or need a plebiscite to achieve their aims. 
3. The Positions Regarding the Colonial War   
3.1. The American Position and Its Internal Effects   
The Portuguese Government’s difficulties at the international 
level began in earnest in the early 1960s. On 15 December 1960, the 
General Assembly of the UN began a historical turn with the Declaration 
that Granted Independence to the Colonial Countries and its Peoples. It 
also specified that the Portuguese colonies were among those territories 
considered as Non-Self Governing. In that same year, Prime Minister 
MacMillan also initiated a change in direction in British politics.  Newly 
elected presidents in Brazil and the United States, Jânio Quadros and John 
F Kennedy, began to keep their distance from the colonial policies 
                                                 
66 The Portuguese diplomacy profusely used these declarations reproduced in the Times to 
prove the Indian refusal of any negotiation [MNE, 1967 (II) p. 493]. 
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practiced by Salazar’s Government (Rosas, 1994, pp. 517-518; Pinto, 
2001, p. 16).   
This new situation even had repercussions inside the regime and 
gave rise to an attempted coup d'état, led by the National Defence 
Minister, Botelho Moniz, with the support, if not under the inspiration, of 
the United States Embassy in Lisbon.  On 17 February 1961, Botelho 
Moniz met the ambassador of the United States in Lisbon, Charles Burke 
Elbrick, and told him that he, and other key actors in the regime, had 
decided to compel Salazar to liberalise his policies, both in the mainland 
and overseas (Nogueira, 1979, p. 208).  On 6 March, Botelho Moniz and 
Elbrick lunched together and the Ambassador told the Minister that he had 
received instructions from Washington to conduct a steady diligence in 
order to force Salazar to change his African policy (Antunes, 1991).   
That diligence took place on 7 March. The Ambassador met 
with Salazar and informed him of the new position of the United States. 
President Kennedy considered that the self-determination and 
independence of the African countries would be the most effective way to 
obstruct the road of the USSR. He also affirmed that decolonisation was 
unavoidable, and corresponded with the ideals of freedom and the defence 
of human rights. The situation in Angola could create a very embarrassing 
situation in the UN, and the United States could not support the 
Portuguese position. The US Administration thought that the Portuguese 
Government should make a public and formal Statement announcing 
reforms and accepting the self-determination and independence of 
Angola. The USA would guarantee Portugal the financial support needed 
to reward the consequences of that independence (Nogueira, 1979, p. 210; 
Rosas, 1994, pp. 533-534). 
Salazar refused to comment, sending only his regards to 
President Kennedy (Nogueira, 1979, p. 211).  On 13 March, the United 
States voted against Portugal for the first time in the United Nations 
Security Council. On 15 March, the UPA, supported by US services, 
carried out deadly attacks in the north of Angola (Rosas, 1994, p. 534).    
The events in Angola, and the loss of the United States’ support, 
caused consternation in some sectors of the regime. Botelho Moniz wrote 
a harsh letter to Salazar, and had two long meetings with him on 28 and 
29 March. Moniz proposed political changes ‘in the continuity’ and 
considered that the situation of the Armed Forces was grievous and on the 
verge of becoming unsustainable. Afterwards, he shared the letter with the 
Higher Military Council and met with the commanders of military 
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regions, having openly proposed Salazar’s dismissal as head of 
government (Rosas, 1994, pp. 534-535). On 5 April, Moniz met with the 
President of the Republic, having repeated the same arguments and 
proposals. Salazar therefore had ample time to consider how best to 
resassert his authority, and on 13 April, with President Thomaz’ support, 
he dismissed Botelho Moniz from the post of Defence Minister. The 
attempt had failed (Rosas, 1994, p. 536).   
The American position towards Portugal during the Kennedy 
Administration softened over time.  This reflected internal disagreements 
between those who supported the right to self-determination in the African 
territories, and those who prioritised Portugal’s role as an ally in the cold 
war, particularly with regard to use of the Portuguese military base in The 
Azores (Pinto, 2001, p. 18; Rodrigues, 2002, pp. 171-181). It is clear that 
the initial position of the Kennedy Administration against the Portuguese 
position in the United Nations changed gradually in 1962. This change 
was due, above all, to the strategic importance of the American Base in 
The Azores. The Portuguese Government used negotiations on the 
Agreement that allowed the Americans to use the military base, which 
ended in 1962, to compel the United States to moderate its position 
towards Lisbon’s colonial policy (Rodrigues, 2006a).   
From 1961 to 1965, Washington made several proposals on the 
Portuguese colonial politics, which were systematically refused by 
Salazar. All of them raised the potential use of a referendum.  At the start 
of 1962, Paul Sakwa, Deputy Director of the CIA, made the 
‘Commonwealth Plan’. Based on the idea that Portugal could never win 
the colonial war, the United States should force a non-communist 
decolonisation. Angola and Mozambique should become independent 
within eight years. The plan foresaw the creation of political parties in 
1965, elections and referendums in 1967, and full independence in 1970.  
According to these American plans, Portugal should receive 
economic help, which would double its per capita income in five years 
(Fernando, 2005, p. 230).  If Salazar refused, the author of the report 
proposed that he be overthrown by a group of military officials close to 
the USA. In March 1962, the National Security Council approved the 
plan, excluding the overthrow of Salazar.  However, the need to renew the 
agreement for the use of the base in The Azores, where 75% of the 
military air traffic from the USA to Europe and the Middle East passed, 
led the Kennedy Administration to change its position in a favour of the 
Portuguese Government (Pinto, 2001, pp. 18-19).   
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3.2. Salazar’s Supposed Admission of a Plebiscite 
       Regarding the Overseas    
   3.2.1. A ‘Solemn and Public Act’   
On 31 July 1963, the Security Council of the United Nations 
passed Resolution S/5380, regarding the territories under Portuguese 
Administration, with abstentions from the United States, Great Britain and 
France. The resolution affirmed that Portugal’s policies were contrary to 
the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council; deplored the attitude of the 
Portuguese Government; and determined that the situation in the 
territories under Portuguese Administration was seriously disturbing 
peace and security in Africa (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 502).67 
On 12 August 1963, Salazar (1967, pp. 287-335) gave a long 
radio and television speech about the overseas policy. In general, it was a 
speech without great or substantial news (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 421; 
Almeida, 1999, pp. 700-707). However, Salazar uttered an enigmatic 
Statement at the end. Without ever doubting the feelings the Portuguese 
had concerning the defence of the Nation’s integrity, he saw an advantage 
in pronouncing a ‘solemn and public act’ on the Government’s overseas 
policy (Salazar, 1967, p. 335). That Statement gave rise to speculation 
about this solemn and public act. It could be a referendum, a 
demonstration, or a special session of the Parliament.  Many other 
scenarios were possible. No explanation was forthcoming from official 
sources (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 509).   
Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister at that time, has since 
revealed that he suggested the announcement of a plebiscite or 
referendum, which would involve the whole Nation, to Salazar. There 
would be no doubt about the results given the electoral weight of the 
mainland, and it would be difficult for other western States to deny the 
political and legal value of a plebiscite.  Inferferences from the UN would 
need to be rejected, since they would insist on opposing their own terms.  
However, it would be possible for the Portuguese to offer governments 
and independent journalists the chance to send unofficial observers.  
According to Nogueira, Salazar welcomed the idea in the initial version of 
his speech, but developed researvations at the last minute, thus changing 
                                                 
67 See full text of the UN Resolution at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/200/53/IMG/NR020053.pdf?OpenElement 
[accessed on 28 April 2011]. 
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the word ‘plebiscite’ to ‘solemn and public act’, without defining it 
(Nogueira, 2000b, p. 509).  On 27 August 1963, the regime promoted a 
demonstration in Lisbon that supported the Government's colonial policy. 
   3.2.2. George Ball’s Initiative     
On 29 August, George Ball, Under Secretary of the Department 
of State, arrived in Lisbon as an emissary from President Kennedy.  His 
purpose was to discuss the overseas issue with the government in Lisbon. 
This visit happened after a meeting in the White House between Kennedy 
and Franco Nogueira, in which the North American President admitted to 
a possible agreement on the overseas based on the self-determination 
principle (Amaral, 1994, pp. 30-32). In meeting with Franco Nogueira, 
Ball proposed that Portugal accept self-determination. According to the 
USA, this principle involved the consent of people through a valid 
political process. Freitas do Amaral (1994, p. 30) understands this as 
meaning that the people in the colonies had the right to declare if they 
wanted to remain linked to Portugal or become independent countries 
through an individual and secret vote. Ball was convinced that the self-
determination process of the colonies was inevitable, and that Portugal 
would not have window of ten years to try to find a solution that 
safeguarded their interests. 
Franco Nogueira did not accept to fix any term, but suggested a 
plebiscite in which the entire population would participate. On 30 August, 
Salazar received George Ball.  According to Freitas do Amaral (1994, pp. 
31-32) he restrained Franco Nogueira’s impulses avoiding discussion of 
self-determination or a plebiscite, and refusing to yield on anything 
substantive.   
A few days later, George Ball returned to Portugal and received 
a memorandum on the Portuguese position from Franco Nogueira on 6 
September (Amaral, 1994, pp. 61-67). In that document, the Portuguese 
Government rejected the concept of self-determination as understood by 
the United Nations. It was only admitted as a multiform concept expressed 
through successive acts, which proved the adhesion and consent of the 
governed peoples to the State and government structures. Moreover, the 
memorandum excluded any idea of dates or terms, and affirmed that the 
Government could consider a plebiscite or referendum, in a short term. 
However, that plebiscite should have a national scope and it should be 
held under Portuguese Constitutional conditions (Amaral, 1994, p. 37; 
Rodrigues, 2002, p. 298, Nogueira, 2000b, pp. 514-519). In other words, 
the plebiscite would be a fraud, as were all other electoral acts held in 
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Portugal during the dictatorship. Freitas do Amaral (1994, p. 39) considers 
this position as ‘a huge retreat’ in the talks. Everything that had been 
admitted as possible – self-determination, plebiscite, process with phases 
or sequences that could lead to a purpose – was expressly subordinated to 
an essential condition: that nothing questioned the territorial integrity of 
the Portuguese State as unitary and multi-continental.   
   3.2.3. The Expectation of a Plebiscite   
Meanwhile, during that month of September 1963, anticipation 
grew in Portugal about the meaning of the ‘solemn and public act’ 
mentioned by Salazar. Some sectors from the opposition understood it as a 
plebiscite. Cunha Leal and other personalities from the liberal opposition 
even sent a letter to Salazar mentioning his speech dated 12 August and 
pleading for an urgent referendum.  This would give the Portuguese 
people the opportunity to be consulted on the overseas policy as a free 
people (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 523). 
The extreme right of the regime tried to respond immediately.  
The director of the newspaper Diário de Notícias, Augusto de Castro, 
wrote an article under the title ‘A Plebiscite?’ saying that a plebiscite 
would be indispensable to give up, revoking inalienable rights, but would 
never maintain unquestionable rights: ‘We can submit doubts to a 
plebiscite and turn them into certainties, but we cannot submit certainties 
to a plebiscite and turn them into doubts. We cannot submit God to a 
plebiscite. We cannot submit Honour to a plebiscite. We cannot submit 
the Motherland to a plebiscite’ (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 523).  However, 
Salazar refused to authorise publication of the article, explaining his 
reasons in a letter sent to the author on 24 September 1963. Although he 
agreed with the doctrine defended in the article, he thought that the timing 
was inappropriate (Nogueira, 2000b, p. 524). He preferred to maintain 
ambiguity.   
14 October 1963 marked the beginning of talks between 
Portugal and the African States, which were chaired by the UN Secretary-
General, U Thant, in New York. In a memo about those conversations, the 
Portuguese Government affirmed the possibility of holding a plebiscite, 
which would consult the whole Portuguese Nation on overseas policy.  
The results would be considered definitive and beyond further debate. 
(Nogueira, 2000b, p. 534).   
The conversations in New York were inconclusive.  The 
Portuguese Government did not really want a plebiscite, and no African 
countries would accept the terms suggested by the Portuguese. However, 
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in Portugal, the press omitted any allusion to a plebiscite or to that 
position from Portuguese diplomacy. In either case, the expectation had 
reached its end. Salazar had made his decision, if indeed there ever was a 
time where he had been undecided.  
On 21 October, the US Department of State sent a memo to 
Lisbon to follow up the talks with George Ball in the previous month. 
This document warned that military strength could not stop the African 
nationalist forces, and that it would not be possible to have another ten 
years to prepare for a self-determination process that attracted the 
moderate African leaders’ support (Amaral, 1994, pp. 69-83).  Salazar 
answered on 29 February 1964, expressing his total disagreement 
(Amaral, 1994, pp. 85-98).   
   3.2.4. Real Hypothesis or Mere Simulation? 
The question that comes to mind is whether this was a real 
hypothesis or mere simulation. The truth is that the possibility for a 
referendum on the colonial policy stirred some Portuguese political 
sectors between August and the beginning of October 1963. It is important 
to fully State the several positions in that respect.   
Inside the regime, Franco Nogueira affirms to have defended the 
plebiscite with a pledge. That act should include the whole Nation, and 
should not put to sub-units or be used to undermine the unitary State. 
Salazar did not accept even that idea, but fed the ambiguity, allowing 
Nogueira, as Foreign Minister, to discuss the terms of a possible plebiscite 
for some time in the UN.  However, even Franco Nogueira would come to 
consider that possibility as unrealistic. According to him, further 
developments in the UN and Afro-Asian surroundings demonstrated that 
the United Nations and the African Governments would consider any 
plebiscite, irrelevant since they were not held under conditions that were 
compatible with their ideals or procedures. (2000b, p. 509). As for the 
support from western nations, Nogueira (1979, p. XLII) concluded that it 
would be just provisional and would be rejected as soon as the UN’s 
unavoidable rejection was verified.  
The regime’s extreme right wing was strongly opposed to the 
idea that Salazar’s speech could mean the acceptance of a plebiscite, as 
was revealed in the article by Augusto de Castro. Although it was never 
published, it had certainly been written with the intention of interpreting 
the dictator’s thought and echoing a doctrine that had his approval. 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  162 
 
In the opposition field, some non-communists defended the 
plebiscite. These included Cunha Leal, who wanted the speech of 12 
August 1963 to admit the possibility of a referendum, and also the 
socialist Mário Soares (1969, pp. 61-62), who would even reaffirm the 
idea in a text written in 1966 concerning the 40 years of the dictatorship.68  
Nevertheless, knowing, as everybody did, Salazar’s thought and political 
practice, nobody in the opposition would have had illusions about the 
likelihood of the plebiscite taking place, even under the corrupted rules of 
the false elections of that time. 
In his text, Mário Soares (1969, p. 71) suggests that, at the 
beginning of the colonial war the Government considered the referendum 
as a hypothetical idea, but the idea ran its course. According to Soares 
(1974, p. 452), Salazar moved away from the idea because he knew 
perfectly well what the result of a popular consultation would be if done 
with seriousness. In spite of demanding unanimous support from the 
Nation, he was not confident that such support existed. Therefore, he 
substituted the referendum with a ‘spontaneous demonstration’ of support 
for his policy. This interpretation is shared by Almeida Santos [2006 (I) 
pp. 216-217], who writes that the ‘plebiscite’ was made with a 
demonstration of support officially organised by the regime. Unlike 
Freitas do Amaral, Almeida Santos considers that there was no retreat in 
Salazar’s position, and that any appearance of a change in position was 
merely a result of his usual rhetorical abilities. 
The communist leader, Álvaro Cunhal, had the same opinion. In 
his book Rumo à Vitória (Road to Victory), written in 1964, he expressed 
the idea that, when Salazar spoke of the possibility of a national 
consultation on the overseas policy, some people thought he was 
suggesting a ‘plebiscite’ of the same type of his ‘elections’.  Not so. In 
Cunhal’s view, it was only a fascist demonstration (Cunhal, 1974, p. 127).     
For the purposes of this research, it is irrelevant whether Salazar 
left the question of a referendum hanging because he was genuinely 
undecided, or if he played along with the idea for tactical reasons.  The 
second scenario is more likely. In the explanation given to Augusto de 
Castro about the prohibition of the article, Salazar affirmed his agreement 
with the doctrine espoused in the article, which excluded the plebiscite for 
reasons of principle. Therefore, there was no room for indecision. Simply, 
the article would not be opportune at that moment for tactical reasons. 
                                                 
68 According to Mário Soares (1969, p. 37) this was a text that was nothing more than a 
draft written in May 1966 when the Government was preparing the celebrations for the 
40th anniversary of the regime, and which was confiscated by the political police. 
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It does not seem plausible that Salazar could truly want a 
plebiscite, even the results would be innocuous. It is true that the colonial 
problem divided the opposition. It is also true that the regime could have 
manipulated the process, perpetrating an electoral fraud in the usual 
manner, or prohibiting and repressing the action of the opposition, as 
always, or even falsifying the results as had been done in the presidential 
elections of 1958. However, Salazar also knew that the national and 
international political situation in the early 1960s was not the same as that 
of the 1930s. The regime had not fully recovered from the deep 
disturbances of 1958 to 1962. The opening of a plebiscitary process in 
those circumstances would give the most coherent opposition forces the 
opportunity to make their case. The dictatorship would win the plebiscite, 
without any doubt, but the results would be contested, both in Portugal 
and abroad. Therefore, it does not seem likely that Salazar would 
seriously consider running such serious risks for such an uncertain 
political reward.   
As for the reasons behind the prohibition in Augusto de Castro’s 
article, it seems clear that the publication of that article at that moment did 
not suit Salazar for tactical reasons. In the internal level, it was suggested 
that the idea of a plebiscite on the colonial policy would be enough to 
create division in the opposition between those that sustained such an idea 
and those that had no illusions about Salazar’s intentions.  At the 
international level, it is important to remember that the Portuguese 
diplomacy led by Franco Nogueira continued to be open to the idea of a 
plebiscite during the ongoing talks with the US Department of State. 
Salazar did not want any plebiscite, but he wanted control the timing of 
when his position became clear. 
3.3. The Last US Attempt: the Anderson Plan   
In the spring of 1965, during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, 
Admiral George Anderson, Ambassador in Lisbon, introduced the last 
American initiative to solve the Portuguese colonial problem.69  In spite of 
the previous refusals, the United States remained interested in persuading 
the Portuguese Government to accept a programmed and controlled plan 
for the decolonisation of Portuguese overseas territories.  With that in 
mind, the US Administration made a final attempt, introducing a proposal 
to the Government of Lisbon, known as the ‘Anderson plan’ (Rodrigues, 
2006b, p. 101).   
                                                 
69 On the Anderson Plan, see Samuels & Haykin (1979); Pinto (2001); Rodrigues (2004); 
Rodrigues (2006). 
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The plan was introduced to Franco Nogueira on 2 September 
1965. According to the report from the Portuguese Foreign Minister, 
mentioned by Luís Nuno Rodrigues (2004, pp. 106-107), Portugal would 
have to set an exact date for a large-scale plebiscite that would be entirely 
free, open, and under international observation. At the same time, the 
Portuguese Government committed itself to increase its efforts in the 
social, economic and political levels of the overseas populations in order 
to better understand their situation. The African countries would commit 
themselves to not allowing the use of their territories as base of terrorism 
or attacks against Portuguese territories. The United States and other 
NATO countries would agree to use their influence over the moderate 
African countries so that they respected that commitment, with the USA 
guaranteeing the open condemnation of any violation of such an 
agreement or commitment.   
When Anderson introduced this plan, Franco Nogueira 
immediately Stated his objections to the plebiscite, given the conditions 
needed for its recognition by the African countries. It would be necessary 
to remove all the armed and police forces from the Portuguese territories, 
whose presence would be considered as an obstacle to the freedom of the 
voters. Portugal would also be required to authorise access to the 
territories to the UN and to recognise leaders of the liberation movements 
in individual African colonies, which would require an amnesty. Finally, 
since the UN would certainly demand a democratic process, it would be 
necessary that the Portuguese Government granted total freedom to the 
political parties inspired by any foreign government (Rodrigues, 2004, p. 
107).   
These objections pointed, from the very beginning, to a refusal 
by the Portuguese Government, who would never accept those conditions. 
An acceptable plebiscite to the United Nations and the African countries 
would be inherently unacceptable to the Portuguese Government. On the 
other hand, it would not be realistic to think that the US diplomacy could 
impose a plebiscite under different conditions. Still, Franco Nogueira 
promised to introduce the plan to Salazar.   
In his memoirs, Franco Nogueira (1986, p. 142) makes a brief 
reference to the Anderson plan, which clearly showed how little 
importance he attributed to it:  
‘Lisbon, 3 September - (…) Anderson came, with his eternal 
plan to solve our overseas problem. What does it consist of? In 
holding a plebiscite (in the terms demanded by the UN, it is 
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clear); in an agreement with the Africans to end the ‘guerrilla’ 
(that supposes our declaration of intentions for independence); in 
international help to develop the territories. Doing this or giving 
the overseas their independence is the same. I don't know if 
Anderson is ingenuous, or if he takes me for being ingenuous. I 
did not exalt myself with the plan: I told him without blinking that 
I would study it.’  
On 22 October 1965, George Anderson had the opportunity to 
introduce his own plan to Oliveira Salazar. He did not reject it 
immediately, but left his objections clear (Rodrigues, 2004, p. 108).  In 
the official answer, given in March 1966, Franco Nogueira explained to 
George Anderson that it would be unthinkable for Portugal to make any 
public declaration admitting that the last objective of its policy in Africa 
was self-determination.   
Actually, neither the Portuguese nor the Americans gave great 
importance to the Anderson plan. The Secretary of State Dean Rusk did 
not even refer to it when he met Franco Nogueira in October 1965 (Pinto, 
2001, p. 26). Moreover, after the formal rejection of the plan, George 
Anderson concluded himself that in the immediate future, there little 
possibility that the Portuguese Government would change its attitude 
regarding the African provinces. He even considered that there was no 
advantage in precipitating any trouble, unnecessarily, in the relations 
between the United States and Portugal (Rodrigues, 2004, p. 108).   
In fact, the beginning of the Vietnam War and the support the 
Portuguese Government gave to the US position in that conflict ended any 
hesitation from the United States regarding their support of Portuguese 
colonialism. Actually, the only hesitation was at the very beginning of 
Kennedy’s presidency, between 1961 and 1962 (Guimarães, 2006; 
Maxwell, 1995, pp. 50-55).   
3.4. The Divisions Inside the Opposition   
   3.4.1. The Situation Up To the 1950’s 
When the colonial war emerged, only the Portuguese 
Communist Party recognised the colonised people’s right for 
independence.  In PCP’s 3rd Congress, the first illegal one, which was 
held secretly between 10 and 13 November 1943, the future leader Álvaro 
Cunhal (2007, pp. 145-235), drew a report that contributed to the exact 
communist definition of the national-colonial problem. According to 
Cunhal (2007, p. 185), the communists recognised the colonial people’s 
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right to constitute their independent States, although the people from the 
Portuguese colonies, which were undeveloped under all aspects, were not, 
under the present circumstances, able to to assert independence on their 
own. 
In 1957, when PCP held its 5th Congress, the situation had 
substantially changed. There had been widespread decolonisation since 
the end of the World War II, and the UN had passed resolutions on the 
right of self-determination for the people of colonised territories.  In 
Portugues colonies, liberations movements were building momentum with 
communist support. The Declaration was approved, which proposed that 
the necessary conditions should be created in the Portuguese colonies to 
allow them to obtain their freedom and independence, notwithstanding 
any the changes in the political situation in Portugal (PCP, 1981, p. 142). 
At that time, the other opposition groups did not question the 
legitimacy of the Portuguese presence in Africa. Cunha Leal (1957, p. 39), 
in articles published in the daily newspaper Diário de Lisboa, in June 
1954 and on 23 October 1957, defended the application of a confederation 
to the State of India and to extend it progressively to other colonies 
(Correia, 1994, p. 45). 
In Humberto Delgado's electoral campaign in 1958, the question 
was not mentioned. However, Delgado, later in exile in São Paulo, 
recognised the right of the colonised people to self-determination. He also 
sought a Federal Republic of the United States of Portugal and proposed 
plebiscites to approve the Constitution of the federal State and each of the 
States that would integrate it.   
   3.4.2. Humberto Delgado's Plan   
Humberto Delgado (1974, pp. 331-337) introduced this plan on 
5 October 1960, pointing to the 50th anniversary of the Republic, on behalf 
of the Independent National Movement (MNI) that he had founded on 18 
June 1958.  What Delgado defended after all, in spite of proclaiming the 
recognition of the right to self-determination, was a federalist solution that 
would create the Federal Republic of the United States of Portugal. The 
federation would include the federal State, composed by continental 
Portugal, adjacent islands and territories too small to have the same statute 
of other colonies, and five other States: Guinea (including Cape Verde), 
Angola (including Sao Tome and Principe), Mozambique, India and East 
Timor. 
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More than a plebiscitary proposal to solve the colonial problem, 
this plan corresponded to Delgado’s aspirations for the Constitutional 
future of the country once the dictatorship had been overthrown by a coup 
of force. The solution for the colonial issue was the federalist way. The 
situation in Africa in the early sixties allowed him to believe that the 
struggle for independence could soon come to the Portuguese colonies. 
Delgado’s plan was very far from being anti-colonialist. Except for the 
plebiscite, this plan had much in common with the federalist theories that 
had echoed inside the regime.70 In fact, the concreteness of the right to 
self-determination did not prioritised over the creation of sederative 
States, and there was no idea of independence. 
This plan expressed a conception not far from Delgado’s idea 
that the regime would have to fall by a coup of force. The overthrowing of 
the dictatorship would occur through a military attack made by small 
groups of men armed with imported weapons, along with a lightning raid 
against other neighbouring corps, and finally with a mass insurrection 
(Delgado, 1974, pp. 339-340).71 After power had been taken, the 
Constitution of the federal State and the Constitutions of the federated 
States would be approved through plebiscites.  
The plan was light on details. How would such plebiscites take 
place? Who would make the drafts of the Constitutions? Who would have 
the right to vote? The plan said nothing. It was, after all, a proposal that 
was as inconsistent as the projects of military coups that would 
supposedly make it possible. 
   3.4.3. The Programme for the Democratisation 
             of the Republic 
On January 1961, the liberal opposition worked out the 
Programme for the Democratisation of the Republic (1961). In matters 
concerning the colonies it only included unambitious proposals of 
administrative decentralisation, without daring to refer to independence, 
self-determination or even autonomy (Correia, 1994, p. 49).    
                                                 
70 The federalist theories were defended inside the regime namely by Manuel José Homem 
de Melo (1962) in a book published in 1962, Portugal, Ultramar e o Futuro (Portugal, the 
Overseas and the Future) and by Marcello Caetano, who supported the existence of a 
federation of three States: the Mainland, Angola and Mozambique, in a consultation 
concerning the revision of the overseas provinces’ governmental system (Nogueira, 2000b, 
p. 395). 
71 The illusions as to the possibility of overthrowing the dictatorship by a coup of force led 
the General to fall into a trap perpetrated by agents of the political police. The police 
attracted him to Spain, near the Portuguese border and murdered him on 13 February 1965.  
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However, events in Angola at the start of 1961, between the 
Programme’s inception and its publication in May, forced the inclusion of 
a final addition on the overseas policy. Reaffirming the principles 
proclaimed before, the Programme expressed disapproval of the 
internationally condemned processes, considering the problem to be 
essentially political. It concluded the need to meet in peace, and never at 
war, along with a dialogue among the population and a guarantee of all 
rights. The Communist Party criticised that position (Cunhal, 1975, p. 88) 
and its Secretary-General Álvaro Cunhal (1976, p. 50) later recognised 
that the colonial question created a real problem for the ability of the anti-
fascist forces to unify, given that, unlike the PCP, the republican, liberal 
and socialists defended colonial or neo-colonialist positions.  
For the legislative elections of November 1961, the Programme 
for the Democratisation of the Republic reappeared with a small 
addendum. It cautiously advanced the idea of a referendum for the self-
determination of the colonial peoples. This idea would collide with the 
traditional ideas from some oppositionists coming from the First Republic, 
mainly supporters of colonialist ideals, who began to leave the movement 
(Moreira, 1992, pp. 26-27). 
Nevertheless, during the 1961 legislative elections, the 
opposition candidates introduced the colonial problem in electoral debates 
for the first time. They blamed the Government for the colonial war, 
which, they argued, had resulted from overly rigid colonial policies. They 
claimed that the recognition of the colonies’ right to self-determination as 
a way to peacefully solve the conflict in Africa. However, they proposed 
that the Government submit its African policy to a democratic referendum 
so that the Portuguese people could pronounce themselves on the subject 
(Silveira, 1992, p. 96).  
   3.4.4. The Idea of the Referendum   
In the book Portugal Amordaçado (Portugal Gagged) Mário 
Soares claimed that the opposition consistently agitated for a referendum 
on the African policy since 1961. This was preceded by a period of public 
discussion, when all political forces could debate the problem freely and 
bring their respective solutions to public appreciation (Soares, 1974, p. 
452). 
That was the position of Mário Soares. In 1966, in the draft of a 
Statement concerning the 40 years of the New State, he deplored that the 
regime had never allowed a wide debate on the colonial problem and that 
the country had never had the possibility to give its opinion on it (Soares, 
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1969, pp. 61-62). Consequently, he proposed a referendum on the 
overseas policy within the time limit of six months, preceded by a wide 
and explanatory national debate (Soares, 1969, p. 71).   
This proposal for a referendum never had the support from the 
opposition as a whole. The Communist Party defended the right of the 
colonised people to self-determination and independence at that time. 
Thus, it would not make sense to decide on the future of those people 
through a referendum that ignored them, and gave the decisive weight to 
the mainland. Furthermore, the referendum, as proposed, would 
presuppose the existence of political freedom which did not exist. 
Therefore, the proposal had two fundamental goals: to embarrass the 
regime, making its refusal of any democratic consultation of the people 
evident; and to take advantage of the opportunity to demand it once again. 
On the other hand, that proposal was aimed at concealing a fudged 
position on the resolution of the colonial problem.   
4. The Colonial Issue under Marcello Caetano’s Government 
4.1. Caetano’s Strategy and the Opposition 
Marcello Caetano’s choice for the Government’s leadership in 
September 1968 took place with some expectation on the colonial policy, 
given his support for federalist theories in the early 1960’s. However, the 
integrationist wing, which prevailed in the regime, did not allow any 
velleity in that respect. In his first speech before the National Assembly 
on the colonial policy as Chief of Government, on 27 November 1968, 
Marcello Caetano (1974, p. 50) affirmed to having considered all the 
aspects of overseas defence, having concluded that the position followed 
by Portugal ‘could not have been any other’.  
In the 1969 elections, the colonial issue divided the opposition. 
According to Cunhal (1976, p. 50), Mário Soares and his friends were 
opposed to the approach of a colonial war through the democratic 
movement. They supported the formula ‘no to abandonment, no to war’ 
and ‘progressive autonomy’. They also refused to sign documents that 
recognised the right to complete and immediate independence of the 
people from the Portuguese colonies at international conferences.  Lino de 
Carvalho (2000, p. 38) refers to the effort made at the National Meeting of 
Electoral Democratic Commissions on 15 June 1969, with the opposition 
still united in attempts to find a common formula. Thus, the Common 
Action Platform adopted a moderate formula that only proposed the 
peaceful and political resolution of overseas wars, based on the 
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recognition of the right to self-determination, and preceded by a wide 
national debate. 
In three electoral constituencies, (Lisbon, Oporto and Braga), 
the Portuguese Socialist Action  (ASP), led by Mário Soares, decided to 
take part in the elections out of the Electoral Democratic Commissions 
(CDE), creating the CEUD. The division among the opposition due to the 
emergence of the CEUD meant different visions on the colonial problem. 
For the CDE, in spite of different visions within it, the end of the war 
would inevitably have to pass through the recognition of the right to self-
determination and independence (Ferreira, 1970, pp. 363-369). The 
CEUD, in its manifesto on the overseas problem, assumed positions that 
are more ambiguous. It refused to abandon the colonies and referred only 
to the will to find peace through dialogue (Ferreira, 1970, pp. 431-435). It 
is important to remember that, a few months before, Mário Soares had 
introduced a thesis supporting the idea of a referendum on the overseas 
policies at the Republican Congress in Aveiro. According to him, this 
would precede the Constitutional revision that the National Assembly 
should carry out. 
In the elections of 1969, Marcello Caetano promised a policy of 
progressive autonomy to the colonies that could lead to a federal type 
solution in the future (Silveira, 1992, p. 99). Pezarat Correia (1991, pp. 
44-46) separates Caetano’s position from the federalist thesis, considering 
it an intermediate solution that accepted a progressive autonomy 
associated to a central State. However, the truth is that Caetano gave up in 
of the face of opposition from the regime’s radical wing. The 
Constitutional revision of 1971 was part of that strategy, transforming the 
colonies into ‘States’, without any substantial change of their statute 
(Silveira, 1992, p. 101).  
After the 1969 elections, the youth radicalised their attitude 
towards the Colonial War. The opinion movement against the war became 
a focal point in the struggle against the dictatorship. The immediate and 
complete independence of the territories submitted to Portuguese 
colonialism became the central aim of this political action. The opposition 
also converged around this viewpoint. In a meeting in Paris the 
Communist and the Socialist Parties signed a joint Statement proclaiming 
the end of the colonial war as a common objective. They also had 
negotiations in mind which would give complete and immediate 
independence to Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (Cunhal, 1976, 
pp. 50-51). From July 1969 to May 1973, the UN Security Council 
adopted 16 Resolutions condemning the Portuguese Government’s 
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colonial policy (MacQueen, 2006, p. 103). In the Democratic Opposition 
Congress from 4 to 8 April 1973, the end of the colonial war appeared in 
the Final Declaration (1973, p. 149) as the first of immediate objectives to 
follow through with the united action of democratic forces. Moreover, in 
the elections of 1973, with the opposition united around the CDE, the 
contestation of the colonial war was a central political aim. 
4.2 Portugal e o Futuro: António de Spínola’s Proposal  
A few months before the fall of fascism, from within the regime 
and still concerning the resolution of the colonial problem, General 
António de Spínola, Deputy Chief of the General High Staff of the Armed 
Forces and former military commander in Guinea-Bissau, published a 
book entitled Portugal e o Futuro (Portugal and the Future). This book, 
published on 22 February 1974, had significant public impact and 
proposed the referendum as a solution to the colonial issue.  
António de Spínola had supported a federalist solution to the 
colonial problem since the early 1960s. In the beginning of the 1970s, as 
he had direct knowledge about the military situation in Guinea-Bissau, he 
concluded that there was no military solution for that problem. Thus, on 
18 May 1972, as Governor-General of Guinea, he opened direct talks with 
the President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor. Senghor’s proposal, which 
Spínola transmitted to Lisbon, involved starting an immediate phase of 
internal autonomy. This would last at least ten years, followed by a 
popular consultation, which would probably lead to independence in the 
frame of a Portuguese-Afro, or a Portuguese-Afro-Brazilian community 
(Spínola, 1978, pp. 26-27). 
On 26 May, Marcello Caetano prohibited the talks, arguing that 
there was no legal basis for questioning the unity of the State. Then, 
Spínola (1978, pp. 28-40) sent a last appeal to the Chief of Government 
on 28 May. He was sure that wasting this opportunity would result in an 
endless war or a disastrous end. Spínola proposed the pursuit of talks 
based on the following points: 1) the guarantee of an administrative 
autonomy in the frame of preparing African staff; 2) the progressive 
participation of the people of Guinea in the administration of their 
interests; 3) The acceptance of the principle of free option for the Guinean 
people regarding their political statute through the usual form of public 
consultation, after a minimum ten year term (Spínola, 1978, p. 38).    
On 30 May, Marcello Caetano definitively rejected the 
continuation of the talks. According to the Chief of Government, the talks 
ceased due to the refusal of any direct contact with PAIGC as they would 
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create a precedent that would be followed in other colonies, thus 
jeopardizing the overseas defence. Caetano (1974, p. 191), preferred 
military defeat in Guinea to an agreement with the ‘terrorists’, which 
would open the way to other negotiations in other territories.72   
On the same day he entered into office as Deputy Chief of the 
General High Staff of the Armed Forces, Spínola informed Caetano of the 
publication of his book within a few days. The Head of Government 
demonstrated his displeasure and reminded him that a military in exercise 
of functions could not emit political opinions without superior permission. 
However, General Costa Gomes had given the superior permission, as 
Chief of the General High Staff of the Armed Forces. In Spínola’s 
foreword, he considered that the colonial war had become the first 
national problem, and criticised the overseas issue as having been reduced 
to extreme positions which introduced the dilemma of eternising the war 
or betraying the past. 
Spínola’s proposal (1974, p. 56) did not consider popular 
consultation as something untouchable. He considered that the pure and 
simple rejection of public consultation, under certain pretexts, is the 
absolute denial of the Constitutional concept of sovereignty that the 
Nation is based on. To reject the popular referendum with the pretext of 
the people’s lack of preparation would be the same as recognising the 
people’s lack of preparation for citizenship.  
The author referred to possible objections to his proposal: as the 
war was motivated by odd interests, the referendum would always be 
questioned, no matter how honest it had been; and there would be no 
advantage in it being held. For him, the referendum is not only made 
when there is an advantage in that, but it was fundamentally the answer to 
an imperative. Secondly, he did not fear consulting the will of the people 
who lived under the Portuguese flag, because the indestructible strength of 
the Portuguese understanding would have to be based on the respect of 
that will. He was convinced that the free world would militantly be on the 
Portuguese side when, after a period of appropriate preparation, the 
referendum for the Portuguese Africans revealed their unequivocal will to 
remain Portuguese under a statute of their free choice (Spínola, 1974, pp. 
57-58). 
                                                 
72 However, the Portuguese newspaper Expresso revealed that on 26 and 27 March 1974, 
there was a secret meeting in London between a Portuguese Government emissary and a 
PAIGC delegation in order to achieve a cease-fire and begin the formal talks for 
independence [Castanheira (1994) cited by Garcia (2003, p. 77)]. 
The Last Phase of the Portuguese Colonial Rule   173 
 
It is clear that Spínola’s purpose was to avoid the colonies’ 
independence. According to his own words, the problem resides in 
promoting the self-determination of overseas populations and integrating 
them in the Portuguese Republic, which would be easy in a framework, 
other than the current one (Spínola, 1974, p. 148). 
To reach that purpose, Spínola (1974, pp. 206-207) proposed a 
programme with three points: 1) clarify the situation of Portugal as a 
multicontinental country, with autonomous States in Europe, Africa and 
Asia; 2) accelerate the autonomy and administrative decentralisation 
processes, with the effective transfer of responsibilities to local 
institutions; 3) introduce the results of the referendum to the world which 
would be done after the time fixed for the widening of autonomy. 
Spínola’s position was not identical to the most reactionary 
sectors of the regime, but it was equally different in the ideas of self-
determination and independence that the opposition defended. Spínola’s 
position was close to the federalists, extolling an autonomy solution of a 
federal type. 
Besides the military problem, another subject that was difficult 
to overcome was the international isolation of the Portuguese authorities. 
The referendum proposal sought to appease world public opinion, and 
especially that of its traditional allies. The Government should control the 
whole referendum process, defining how and when it would be held and 
taking the necessary measures to win.  
Spínola did not ignore that a fair referendum would demand 
democratic conditions that existed neither in the mainland nor in the 
colonies. The seriousness of a referendum would demand a 
democratisation of the regime, which Spínola did not propose. After all, 
he intended to obtain with the referendum, the same that Marcello 
Caetano had thought to obtain with the Constitutional revision of 1971: 
the acceptance of a regional autonomy that would be a false solution to 
maintaining the colonial domain intact. 
Spínola’s proposal was actually far from representing a rupture 
with the regime. He simply did not ignore the difficulties, acknowledging 
that the regime was facing an inevitable defeat. However, the regime’s 
ranks found themselves in a hard situation because the recognition of 
imminent defeat came from the Deputy Chief of the General High Staff of 
the Armed Forces, thus opening a breach that was difficult to hide. 
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The impact of Spínola’s book was not due to the concrete 
proposal for a referendum. Norrie MacQueen (1997, p. 101) remembers 
that the fundamental concept of the book was peculiarly similar to the 
ideas of the ‘Anderson plan’, introduced to Salazar by the US Ambassador 
in the mid 1960’s. However, what gave the book its true political charge 
was the author’s identity and the moment of publication. 
Most significantly, for the first time, a high military commander 
publicly recognised that there was no military solution for the colonial 
war. Portugal e o Futuro added more fuel to the flames that had already 
been burning. It fed the popular and democratic protest against the 
colonial war and the captains’ movement that was then in an advanced 
phase of preparation for the revolutionary military coup that would 
quickly take place. The worries of the book ran separately, but paralleled 
the growing professional discontentment of the Armed Forces officers 
(MacQueen, 1997, p. 103). 
4.3. Marcello Caetano’s Reaction 
Caetano reacted with a speech uttered in the National Assembly, 
by his request, on 5 March 1974 (DSAN, 34, 6 March 1974, pp. 705-710). 
It led to a debate on the colonial policy, which ended with the approval, 
unsurprisingly, of a motion supporting the Government’s position. In that 
speech, Marcello Caetano referred to the plebiscite proposal on the 
colonial policy in contusing terms, refusing it, obviously. 
His first argument was the delay of the African people to accept 
the principles of European democracy.  In other words, for people that in 
their majority did not go beyond the tribal organisation stage, democracy 
did not make sense. Moreover, the popular consultation according to the 
individualistic formula - one man (or one woman), one vote – would be a 
parody of direct democracy. The application of this argument to the 
colonised people was at least curious given that not even the Portuguese 
residents in Europe could aspire to the principles of European democracy. 
Would they be, like the Africans, in a tribal organisation stage? 
His second argument was that, under the conditions demanded 
by the United Nations, the referendum would result in certain loss. A 
referendum, held under Portuguese initiative and authority, would be 
worth nothing for the enemies of Portugal, and the United Nations, it 
would only recognise the legitimacy of the results according to their 
desires. For Caetano, the referendum, just as Spínola extolled, would be 
unviable, for the simple reason that the United Nations would never 
accept it. Neither the liberation movements, nor the United Nations, 
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would recognise a referendum controlled by the Portuguese authorities 
that was able to prejudice the self-determination and independence 
principles that were internationally recognised. That conclusion seems 
realistic. Nobody would accept the referendum proposed by Spínola. 
Meanwhile, the regime was deeply isolated, internally and externally. To 
conclude this debate, the Overseas Committee presented a motion 
supporting the Government’s policy ‘on overseas defence and 
valorisation’, which was passed on 8 March. 
Having the support from the President and the National 
Assembly, Caetano needed to guarantee the military support, which had 
been shaken by the positions of Spínola and Costa Gomes. That would be 
the next step. On 14 March 1974, a Military Chiefs delegation, jokingly 
known later on as the ‘rheumatic brigade’, declared their support for the 
Government’s overseas policy. Costa Gomes and Spínola were absent, 
and consequently, dismissed. Two days later, and inspired by Spínola, 
there was the first military attempt to overthrow the regime, which was 
unsuccessful. The revolution would come the following month, by the 
hand of the Captains’ Movement, which would be successful this time 
around.  
On 25 April 1974, António de Spínola received power directly 
from Caetano’s hands, and became leader of the National Salvation Junta 
(Junta de Salvação Nacional). A few days later, he became the 
provisional President of the Republic. He then attempted to direct an 
overseas policy based on the conceptions exposed in the Portugal e o 
Futuro. However, the dynamics of the revolution and the unstoppable 








The Idea of Referendum in the Decolonisation Process   
1. The MFA Programme and Spínola’s Position 
Although the central purpose of the military coup of 25 April 
1974 was to put an end to the colonial war, the Armed Forces Movement 
had no clear plan in that respect. Keeping in mind that the Nation had to 
provide a definition for its foreign policy, the Provisional Government 
needed to follow three guidelines: 1) the recognition that the solution for 
the overseas war was political and not military; 2) the creation of 
conditions for a frank and open debate on the overseas problem at a 
national level; 3) the release of the basis for an overseas policy towards 
peace.   
That solution was a compromise. The manifesto on ‘The 
Movement, the Armed Forces and the Nation’, approved in a MFA 
meeting in Cascais on 5 March 1974, in spite of the opposition from the 
Air Force representatives, assumed that ‘the solution for the overseas 
problem should consider the incontrovertible and irreversible reality of the 
strong desire the African people had for self-government’ (Correia, 1991, 
p. 55).   
Pezarat Correia (1991, pp. 55-56) points out that, on the eve of 
the 25th of April, an informal text titled ‘MFA Protocol’ appeared. It was 
not signed and remained anonymous with the intent of avoiding definitive 
political measures in relation to the overseas problem, until the 
Constitution of powers by the vote of the Nation had gone through. 
According to this document, the MFA should not accept the solution to the 
overseas problem in the following twelve months.   
In its original version, the MFA Programme declared the clear 
recognition of the right to self-determination, and the fast adoption of 
measures towards the administrative and political autonomy of the 
overseas territories, with effective and clear participation of the 
autochthonous populations, along with the convenient measures for a fast 
re-establishment of peace. However, General Spínola achieved the 
suppression of those references on the night of the 25th to the 26th of April 
after an arduous discussion. Such actions would become a feature of the 
decolonisation process in the following months (Correia, 1991, pp. 56-57; 
Ferreira, 1993, p. 55).   
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In his first meeting, on 27 April, with elements from the 
MDP/CDE,73 SEDES74 and the Monarchic Convergence, Spínola 
introduced his idea of self-determination under the Portuguese flag 
through a plebiscite.  His plans presupposed a certain cultural level of the 
people that did not yet exist, and the overseas elites were not prepared for 
such. He simply ignored the liberation movements (Correia, 1991, p. 58).   
The Programme of the First Provisional Government, (Executive Law No. 
203/74, of 15 May) executed the principles of the MFA Programme, and 
recognised that the solution to the overseas war was essentially political. 
Therefore, its purpose was to lay a new policy towards peace, including 
the peaceful and permanent coexistence of all residents, and the creation 
of conditions for a frank and open debate on the future overseas. 
2. The Colonial Issue During the First Months of the Revolution  
Among the emerging political forces in April 1974, there was no 
unanimity as to the solution for the overseas problem. The only point of 
consensus was the recognition that the colonial policy of the previous 
regime had led to a dead end and must now be rejected. 
The liberation movements that had taken up arms for 
independence did not accept any other solution except their prompt 
recognition. Among the Portuguese political forces, the PCP argued 
passionately for the recognition of the right of the people from the 
Portuguese colonies to self-determination and immediate independence. 
The socialists had also developed the same view, having abandoned the 
idea of referendum proposed by Mário Soares in 1966 and 1969. The joint 
Statement by PS/PCP in September 1973 took a clear anti-colonialist 
position, assuming the end of the colonial war. They also advocated 
negotiations whose goal was the complete and immediate independence of 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (Cunhal, 1976, p. 50).   
General Spínola kept his position, expressed in the ‘Portugal and 
the Future’, that the solution to the overseas problem should be through a 
plebiscitary consultation. According to Pezarat Correia (1991, p. 61), 
some isolated positions wanted plebiscites in each of the colonies, but 
they intended to postpone the decolonisation problem until after the 
elections had been held and a Constitution designed in the mainland. In 
                                                 
73 The MDP/CDE was the party created from the former Democratic Opposition (CDE). 
74 The SEDES (Economic and Social Development Association) was a liberally inspired 
group that was created during Marcello Caetano’s Government. The founders of the 
PPD/PSD parties would emerge from this association.  
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this manner, they could recover the dead ‘MFA Protocol’, without 
explaining how they would solve the problem of war and until then the 
liberation movements would not interrupt the hostilities.   
From the very beginning, these cleavages marked the Portuguese 
revolutionary process. Freitas do Amaral (1996, pp. 165-166) talks about 
a meeting, as early as 4 May, between the MFA and both existing and 
nascent political parties. Amaral himself would later found the Centre 
Democratic and Social Party (CDS), which was based on Christian 
Democratic ideology.  Elements of the former liberal wing, including 
founders of the PPD, were also in that meeting. They argued that 
commitments in the MFA Programme regarding overseas territories had to 
be respected. This meant listening to the will of the Portuguese people, 
and to the views of African people under Portuguese administration, 
preferably through a referendum.  
Álvaro Cunhal replied that for the communists, all those 
solutions and methods were deeply unrealistic. The federalist theory and 
the referendary method came too late. What the United Nations Charter 
imposed on Portugal was decolonisation, which was only possible through 
the negotiation of a cease-fire with the liberation movements that had 
struggled against Portuguese colonialism. This had to be progressed as 
quickly as possible. Portugal had no option but to concede full 
independence to the colonial territories without imposing conditions.   
Álvaro Cunhal (1976, pp. 106-107) also describes the 
divergences during that time, distinguishing three different factions in the 
organs of political and political-military power. One of them, extolled by 
Spínola, the Prime-Minister Palma Carlos and Sá Carneiro, wanted to 
continue the war until an agreement on the future plebiscite could be 
obtained. Others, including some socialist leaders and MFA members, 
conceded formal independence but wanted to delay the process in order to 
keep Portugal’s dominant positions and prevent the revolutionary 
movements that had driven the liberation fight from ascending to power.   
Finally, a third orientation, supported by the communists and the most 
left-wing civil and military sectors, wanted an immediate end to the war, 
negotiations with the revolutionary movements that had driven the 
liberation fight, the acceleration of the process and the recognition of full 
independence with the governments based on those movements.   
António de Almeida Santos [2006 (I) p. 325], Minister of Inter-
territorial Coordination (new designation for the Overseas Minister) of the 
First Provisional Government, has since recognised that the calendar fixed 
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in the MFA Programme for the beginning of the decolonisation process 
was unrealistic. It presupposed that the liberation movements would lay 
down their arms with the acceptance of the simple Statement of the self-
determination principle, which would be based on the popular 
consultations in the territories, excluding direct negotiations among them.  
However, the liberation movements refused to subject their revolutionary 
legitimacy to the vote. Besides, as Almeida Santos reminds us [2006 (I) 
pp. 326 and 567], the liberation movements closely followed 
developments in Lisbon. They could see that, to some extent at least, 
António de Spínola and the MFA were divided on the decolonisation. 
Therefore, Spínola pled that the beginning of the decolonisation process 
should occur after the democratic legitimisation of the new power in 
Portugal (about a year and a half later), and that popular consultations in 
each territory would require the participation of all society, not just of the 
liberation movements.   
3. Law No. 7/74, of 27 July 
This indecisiveness would last until the publication of Law No. 
7/74, of 7 July, legislation that openly contradicted Spínola‘s position. 
Article 1 of Law No. 7/74 recognised that the principle solution to 
overseas wars was political and not military (…). It also implied that 
Portugal recognised the people’s right to self-determination, in agreement 
with the United Nations Charter. Article 2 recognised the right to self-
determination, with all its consequences, including the acceptance of the 
independence of the overseas territories. Finally, Article 3 entrusted the 
President, after first consulting the Junta de Salvação Nacional, the 
Council of State and the Provisional Government, to practice the acts and 
to conclude the agreements referring to the exercise of the right 
recognised in the previous articles.   
Law No. 7/74 re-established the commitment to the 
decolonisation of the MFA Programme in its original version. The Law 
did not propose any explicit procedure for the exercise of self-
determination that could lead to independence. However, the proposal for 
truces in preparation for referendums, which were essential in Spínola’s 
project, was not mentioned anywhere (MacQueen, 1997, p. 118). The Law 
did not legislate against the possibility of plebiscites in any territories, but 
it opened the door for a decolonisation process without any referendum.   
Three main factors determined the approval of Law No. 7/74. 
The first was the disagreements between forces in Portugal that supported 
different solutions to the colonial problem. Those who pled the immediate 
recognition of the right to self-determination and independence were the 
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winners of that confrontation. The divergences regarding the 
revolutionary decolonisation process was at the core of both Palma 
Carlos’ resignation from the post of Prime Minister in July and António 
de Spínola as President of the Republic in September 1974. The second 
factor was the fast evolution of the military situation in the overseas 
territories. The liberation movements refused any cease-fire without solid 
guarantees recognising their right to independence. Meanwhile, the 
Portuguese soldiers peremptorily refused to fight, and threatened to 
recognise independence themselves if the Government of Lisbon did not 
do so. The third factor was the international pressure for self-
determination and independence which remained strong throughout this 
period (Ferreira, 1993, pp. 56-60).     
In Quase Memórias, Almeida Santos [2006 (I) pp. 264-267] 
reveals some irregularities in the process of enacting and pulishing Law 
No. 7/74. For example, the President did not sign the first version, which 
did not contain Article 3, published on 19 July 1974. The definitive 
version published on 27 July, already had that provision, which was 
proposed by Almeida Santos as the Minister in charge of overseas issues. 
The Council of State passed the original drawing of Law No. 7/74 during 
its meeting on 8 July 1974. On that same day, the Council considered and 
rejected the Prime Minister’s plan, known as the ‘Palma Carlos coup’. 
That approval was the main reason why Palma Carlos resigned from the 
post of Prime Minister. As he explained later, the Council of State had 
passed a statute that would issue the immediate independence of the 
overseas territories. The Prime Minister decided to resign because he 
disagreed in delivering the colonies independence without a popular 
consultation, and he did not accept to step back, ‘for not wanting to die as 
traitor of the Motherland’ (Osório, 1988, p. 96).   
If it is an undoubted fact that Law No. 7/74 contradicted 
Spínola’s intentions as to the decolonisation process, his speech as 
President of the Republic, on the day it was published, 27 July, is very 
surprising.  On 15 May 1974, Spínola (1976, p. 36) affirmed, in his 
investiture speech as President, that the destiny of the Portuguese overseas 
would have to be resolved democratically by all of those who consider 
that territory as their own. On 16 May, during the installation of the First 
Provisional Government, he affirmed his disagreement on a solution 
negotiated only among factions that had a doubtful or imperfect 
representativeness, believing instead that the African and European 
populations of Africa should freely and consciously choose their own 
destiny. Therefore, he insisted on the preparation of a popular consultation 
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that would be impartial and open to all monitoring (Spínola, 1976, pp. 47-
48). On 11 June, during the installation of Angola and Mozambique’s 
Governors, Spínola insisted on his decolonisation programme, which 
contained four points: a) the re-establishment of peace; b) fast 
reconstruction and development; c) the implantation of wide democratic 
participation schemes and a fast regionalisation process of the political, 
economic and social structures; and d) popular consultation as the final 
formula to fulfill those principles (Spínola, 1976, p. 88).   
However, on 27 July 1974, Spínola (1976, p. 148) supported the 
approved text without any reservations in his speech. He considered that 
the law gave the necessary Constitutional legitimacy to immediately begin 
the decolonisation process of the Portuguese overseas territories.  As he 
later explained, he accepted the law as inevitable, but consciously agreed 
with it, because at that historical moment it was still the only opportunity 
that could create a community of Portuguese expression formed by 
independent countries or associated States according to the free will of the 
people. As Spínola explained (1978, p. 262), he enacted the law without 
holding the popular referendum that he wanted, but with the full 
conviction that it represented the widespread will of the Portuguese 
people. He also sought to avoid being overtaken by events, in the hope of 
still being able to control them in time. 
It was therefore a retreat by the General, which he assumed as 
inevitable. He had a minority in the MFA and was alone in the Council of 
State. He no longer had a Prime Minister, who was dismissed in the 
meantime, he could trust and he faced a demand for the immediate end to 
the colonial war, in Portugal and among the troops in the territories that 
refused to fight and fraternised with the fighters of the liberation 
movements.  Actually, he did not have a choice. If he did not accept Law 
No. 7/74, he would have had to resign. In the event, his hopes of 
controlling events were unrealistic.  At the end of September he resigned 
from his position as President.  
César de Oliveira (1993, p. 149) argues that the alternative 
defended by Spínola demanded four conditions that did not exist: a) the 
liberation movements should accept popular consultations, stop the war 
and organise themselves in the colonial territories by daylight; b) the 
Portuguese political forces, mainly those who took part in the Provisional 
Government should agree with Spínola’s positions; c) the Armed Forces, 
particularly in the colonies, should assure conditions for that process 
militarily; d) the MFA should be in agreement with Spínola’s proposals. 
However, none of these conditions had any truth.   
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4. The Unfeasibility of Popular Consultations in Guinea-Bissau 
    and Mozambique   
4.1. Guinea-Bissau   
When the Portuguese Revolution broke out, the Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau had already been proclaimed unilaterally on 24 September 
1973, and it had been recognised by 82 countries. Political defeat was 
already a reality, and the military defeat was imminent. For the PAIGC the 
only acceptable solution was recognition of its independence by the new 
Portuguese authorities.   
The talks with the PAIGC on Guinea-Bissau’s independence 
began in Dakar just one day after the installation of the First Provisional 
Government. At that moment, Spínola still considered it possible for a 
plebiscite to be held in Guinea and even decided to send thousands of 
photos with his face to the territory for distribution. However, nobody 
distributed them [Santos, 2006 (I) p. 98]. 
In the meetings before Law No. 7/74, the Portuguese delegations 
had no mandate to recognise independence. The orders from Spínola 
regarding Guinea consisted in negotiating with the PAIGC, followed by a 
defensive war effort until the signature of a cease-fire agreement, and 
giving continuity to the political process of self-determination, in order to 
hold a popular consultation (Spínola, 1978, p. 274). 
Thus, the meetings in Dakar on 17 May, in London on 31 May, 
and in Algiers on 13 June, ended in a deadlock.75  Meanwhile, events 
continued to develop in Guinea.  On 1 July, an MFA assembly with 800 
soldiers passed a motion demanding the immediate and clear recognition 
of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau by the Portuguese Government. In 
addition, they demanded the immediate reestablishment of talks with the 
PAIGC. They no longer wanted to negotiate the right to independence, but 
only the transfer of powers (Ferreira, 1993, p. 61).   
Law No. 7/74 unblocked the situation, and the round of talks 
that began in Algiers on 22 August finished four days later with the 
agreement that the Portuguese recognition of Guinea-Bissau’s 
independence would occur on 10 September 1974.76 The Junta of National 
                                                 
75 For details on these talks told by Mário Soares see Avillez, (1996, pp. 297-305).  
76 On Guinea-Bissau’s decolonisation process, see Ferreira (1993, pp. 60-61); Pinto (2001, 
pp. 67-69); Santos [2006 (II) pp. 7-53]; MacQueen, (1997, pp. 129-142), Avillez (1996, 
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Salvation, the Council of State and the II Provisional Government 
unanimously passed the Algiers Agreement signed on 30 August. Spínola 
ratified it as the only possible solution (Spínola, 1978, p. 285).    
4.2. Mozambique 
In Mozambique, FRELIMO, the only liberation movement that 
led the armed struggle, not only did not stop the military operations, and 
instead intensified their efforts.  They knew Spínola’s federalist theories 
and disagreed with them. On 27 April 1974, a FRELIMO leadership 
declaration hailed the Portuguese democratic forces and the return of 
democracy to Portugal. However, they warned that the end of the war 
could only be possible with the recognition of the right of the people of 
Mozambique to independence, led by the FRELIMO Party, as their 
authentic and legitimate representative [Santos, 2006 (II) p. 59].   
Just as it had happened in Guinea, the process of decolonisation 
in Mozambique was also delayed until the publication of Law No. 7/74. 
Regardless of a strong embrace between the Portuguese Foreign Minister, 
Mário Soares, and the leader of FRELIMO, Samora Machel, when they 
first encountered each other in Lusaka, on 5 June 1974, the war did not 
stop on the ground. The Portuguese delegation did not have the mandate 
to accept FRELIMO’s three claims, which were: a) the recognition of the 
right of the people of Mozambique to complete and total independence; b) 
the acceptance of the sovereignty transfer from Portugal to FRELIMO; c) 
the recognition of FRELIMO as the unique and legitimate representative 
of the people of Mozambique (Antunes, 2004, p. 354).    
On 11 June, Governor-General Henrique Soares de Melo was 
charged with implementing an overseas policy based on the people’s self-
determination through universal suffrage (Spínola, 1978, pp. 297). 
However, while FRELIMO intensified the operations, the Portuguese 
soldiers refused to fight. On 23 July 1974, the Governor-General of 
Mozambique sent a telegram to Lisbon reporting that the regional 
commissions of the MFA in two districts threatened to impose a unilateral 
cease-fire if they did not establish a global agreement for the cease-fire by 
the end of that month. On that same day, the Coordinating Commission of 
the MFA of Mozambique informed by telegram that there were only two 
alternatives: the immediate recognition of the right to independence, or 
independence resulting from a military collapse [Santos (II) pp. 62-63].   
                                                                                                               
pp. 297-305).  For the full text of the Algiers Agreement see Miranda [1978a (II) pp. 1019-
1024]. 
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As in Guinea-Bissau, Law No. 7/74 allowed the situation to be 
solved. Until then, during the exploratory contacts with FRELIMO, the 
Portuguese representatives suggested the idea of a popular consultation, 
which was refused by the delegation from Mozambique.77  However, by 
the end of July, the Minister and outstanding member of the MFA, Melo 
Antunes, went to Dar-es-Salaam and between 30 July and 2 August, he 
dealt with a document which contained the basic concepts and the main 
lines of the agreement that would be formally negotiated between 15 and 
16 August at the same location (Antunes, 2004, pp. 356-359); [Santos, 
2006 (I) pp. 345-350]. Thus, the idea for a referendum continued to be 
rejected. Portugal immediately recognised Mozambique’s right to 
independence and FRELIMO as the unique partner in that process 
(MacQueen, 1997, p. 178).   
Spínola (1978, p. 304) is said to have refused the acceptance of 
the final document from the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, maintaining his 
position that the people of Mozambique should choose the political and 
social regime freely and democratically, and that FRELIMO should agree 
to the consultation of  the population on their future, with that consultation 
being supervised by international observers. The final agreement for the 
independence of Mozambique, obtained in Lusaka on 7 September 1974, 
refused Spínola’s intentions.78  Almeida Santos refers to another attempt 
to convince the partners of the mutual convenience to hold an election or 
referendum that would give legitimacy to the transfer of power, in the 
conviction that FRELIMO would win it without any doubt. Obviously, the 
delegation from Mozambique invoked the precedent of the agreement 
with the PAIGC. Besides, they considered that such a consultation would 
give an opportunity to the last hour parties and to those who wanted an 
independence of a Rhodesian type since they had the political and military 
support for that. Nevertheless, the decisive argument was that the 
insistence on the popular consultation would lead to the continuation of 
the war. [Santos, 2006 (II) p. 89]. 
Spínola ratified the Agreement after its unanimous approval by 
the Council of State. As he explained, with the full conscience of a 
military collapse, that was the only solution to avoid national shame, 
which would have been even worse (Spínola, 1978, p. 306). According to 
                                                 
77 Besides the meeting of Lusaka, Almeida Santos [2006 (II) p. 82] refers to the occurrence 
of a secret and inconsequent encounter in Amsterdam in which he took part.  
78 See the text of the Lusaka Agreement in Miranda (1978a, pp. 1024-1028). 
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the Agreement of Lusaka, the independence of Mozambique was 
solemnly declared on 25 June 1975.79 
5. The Troubled Process in Angola 
5.1. From the 25th of April to the Alvor Agreement 
The case of Angola was different. In Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique, the exclusiveness of the PAIGC and FRELIMO as 
representatives of the people was undoubted and the idea of a popular 
consultation was peremptorily rejected in both cases. The situation in 
Angola was more complex, given the existence of three movements with 
political and military implantation on the ground and with international 
support from several entities.  
When the Revolution of the 25th of April, 1974 broke out in 
Portugal, the military situation in Angola was not as desperate as in 
Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique, partly due to the division and rivalry 
among the liberation movements. Even so, the Portuguese Armed Forces 
had about 65,000 military in the territory. The political confrontation 
between General Spínola and the MFA about the decolonisation was 
particularly strong regarding Angola. After his plans for Guinea and 
Mozambique had been defeated, Spínola was determined to retain control 
of the negotiations with Angola (Maxwell, 2006, p. 213). 
On 10 August 1974 the Junta de Salvação Nacional produced an 
official report on the decolonisation of Angola, proposed by Spínola and 
re-stating his thesis. Once the cease-fire was obtained, a provisional 
coalition government would be constituted.  This would represent not only 
the liberation movements, but also the diverse ethnic groupings of the 
State of Angola, including the white ethnic group. That government would 
be in charge of making an electoral law based on the principle of ‘one 
man, one vote’, and have in view the election of a constituent assembly 
for a direct, universal and secret vote, before October 1976. That 
Assembly would elaborate the Constitution of the new State and define 
the links to maintain with Portugal (Correia, 1991, p. 86; Spínola, 1978, 
pp. 444-445). 
                                                 
79 On Mozambique’s independence process see Ferreira (1993, pp. 64-69); Pinto (2001, 
pp. 72-75); Santos [2006 (II) pp. 55-109]; Avillez (1996, pp. 307-313) and MacQueen 
(1997, pp. 157-193).  
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Until his resignation on 28 September, Spínola actively tried to 
regulate the Angolan decolonisation process. On 15 September, he met 
privately with Mobutu in Cape Verde. The strategy of Zaire’s President, 
considered the strong man of the United States in the area, was to strongly 
support the FNLA. The private understanding between Spínola and 
Mobutu stayed secret, but according to Kenneth Maxwell, they had the 
common desire of neutralising, and if possible eliminating, the MPLA 
(Maxwell, 2006, p. 213). 
A few days later, on 22 September, Spínola reaffirmed his will 
to take responsibility personally for the decolonisation process in Angola. 
On 25 September, he promoted a meeting in Lisbon with persons linked to 
the political and economic life of Angola, excluding the liberation 
movements, in which he reasserted his purpose of assuring a relevant role 
for the Portuguese settlers in the decolonisation process [Santos, 2006 (I) 
pp. 358-361]; (Correia, 1991, pp. 88-89). Three days later, on 28 
September 1974, he left the Presidency. Meanwhile, the MFA moved in 
Angola, and on 18 September 1974, about 500 officials gathered in 
Luanda recognised that the movements that had struggled against the 
colonialist regime had to lead the decolonisation process (Ferreira, 1993, 
p. 71; Correia, 1991, p. 93). 
5.2. From the Alvor Agreement to Independence 
The problem, however, was the need for a mutual understanding 
among the three Angolan movements. A summit was held between the 
Portuguese authorities and the three liberation movements to find an 
agreement for the decolonisation of Angola.  This took place in Portugal, 
in Alvor (Algarve), on 15 January 1975. The Alvor Agreement established: 
a) the recognition of the liberation movements – the FNLA, MPLA and 
UNITA − as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola; b) 
the recognition of the right of the people of Angola to independence; c) 
the recognition of Angola as one indivisible unit, within its present 
geographical boundaries, with Cabinda in that context being defined as an 
unalienable part of Angolan territory; d) the solemn proclamation of 
independence and full sovereignty of Angola on 11 November 1975; e) 
the establishment of a High-Commissioner and a Transitional Government 
until independence. 
During the transition to independence, the Portuguese State 
would be represented by the High-Commissioner, and the Government of 
Transition would be chaired and driven by a collegial Presidency 
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composed of three elements (one from each liberation movement), with 
the remaining members chosen in equal proportion by Portugal and the 
three movements (Correia, 1991, pp. 125-128). Until October 1975, the 
Government of Transition would organise elections for the Constituent 
Assembly of Angola. Only the three liberation movements would be 
allowed to present the candidates and a Central Commission, also 
reporting to these three movements, would make practical preparations for 
the elections.80 
António Almeida Santos [2006 (I) p. 395 and (II) pp. 174-176] 
has recently revealed that, when he participated in Alvor meetings as a 
Minister of the Portuguese Government, it was clear that the tripartite 
Presidency was unworkable.  The election of a legislative assembly would 
not be possible with the voters divided between three liberation 
movements, each one with its own Army. With this in mind, he took the 
initiative of summoning an informal talk with the leaders of the three 
movements, where he suggested the possibility of a rotating President, 
Prime Minister and Chief of the High-Staff of the Armed Forces. The 
elections would be delayed until these arrangements had been formalized.  
Meanwhile, the Constitution for the new State of Angola would be 
approved by referendum. 
The purpose of this suggestion was to avoid a scenario where the 
legislative elections descended into conflict. The three liberation 
movements would conjointly draw a draft of the Constitution to be 
submitted to referendum. However, Agostinho Neto insisted that any deal 
must be ratified by MPLA’s political bureau, which preferred the solution 
of the Agreements. 
Soon after the Alvor Agreements, the FNLA took advantage of 
its military superiority in the north of Angola to attack the positions that 
the MPLA had taken in Luanda. As it developed, the civil war became 
general and international, with the FNLA and UNITA receiving support 
from the United States, Zaire and South Africa, and the MPLA gaining its 
support from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Congo-Brazzaville 
(Ferreira, 1993, p. 76). 
In June 1975, at the height of the civil war, Almeida Santos 
made a proposal to review the Alvor Agreements. He called for a conflict 
resolution provision, which could be interpreted as giving him the power 
to mediate a negotiation process between the Portuguese Government and 
the liberation movements. 
                                                 
80 The Alvor Agreement text is available in Miranda (1978a, pp. 1032-1041). 
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In synthesis, he proposed that: a) the electoral platform for a 
draft of the Constitution made by the three movements be substituted and 
submitted to referendum; b) this referendum would not count the vote 
according to parties; c) the new Constitution would assure the 
Constitutional legitimacy of the new regime and it should be provisional, 
temporary and transitory; d) a definitive draft would be submitted to an 
opportune popular consultation, by plebiscite or the election of a 
Constituent Assembly [Santos (II) pp. 176-178]. 
That plan received a positive reception from the Government 
and the President of the Republic in Portugal, but it did not obtain the 
support of the Angolan liberation movements. On 22 August, with war 
now becoming entrenched in Angola, the V Provisional Government 
declared the Alvor Agreement as suspended through Executive Law No. 
458-A/75 (Miranda, 1978a, pp. 1042-1043). 
At the end of October 1975, the military force of Zaire, 
supported by United States and Portuguese mercenaries, invaded the north 
of Angola in support of the FNLA. From the south, another attack was 
carried out by a combination of extreme-right Portuguese, South African 
troops, and a diverse group of people that included UNITA, auxiliary 
forces of the FNLA and dissidents of the MPLA (Correia, 1991, pp. 154-
160). As Kenneth Maxwell wrote (2006, p. 231), it was the rest of the old 
Spínola-Mobutu plan in action. However, having received the aid from 
Cuban troops and weapons from the Soviet Union, the MPLA resisted in 
Luanda and, from there, proclaimed Angola’s independence on 11 
November 1975 (Correia, 1991, pp. 166-170). 
6. Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe 
6.1. Cape Verde 
In Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, where there was no 
colonial war, independence was obtained through the commitment of the 
election of constituent assemblies. This procedure was considered to be a 
form of hearing the popular will. In either case, the processes were 
different. 
Cape Verde’s circumstances were unique because of its strong 
links with Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, the PAIGC fought for the independence 
of both territories. Its founder, Amílcar Cabral, although born in Guinea, 
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had family roots in Cape Verde. Besides, the main leaders of the PAIGC 
were from Cape Verde.81 
Despite avoiding a colonial war, Cape Verde was at the table of 
the first negotiations between the Portuguese Government and the PAIGC.  
The PAIGC accepted Portugal’s proposal to separate both processes. In 
any case, the Algiers Agreement on Guinea-Bissau’s independence 
contained two provisions concerning Cape Verde. In the first, the 
Portuguese State reaffirmed the right of the people of Cape Verde to self-
determination and independence, according to United Nations resolutions, 
having in mind the General Assembly Resolution A/2918 (XXVII), of 14 
November 1972, which recognised the PAIGC as the only and genuine 
representative of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde (Ferreira, 1993, p. 
62) In the second, the Portuguese Government and the PAIGC considered 
that Cape Verde’s independence, in the frame of the decolonisation of 
African territories under Portuguese rule, was essential for a lasting peace 
and a sincere cooperation between the Portuguese Republic and the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau. 
On 7 August 1974, while speaking about the induction of Cape’s 
Verde Governor, António de Spínola (1978, p. 165) reaffirmed the view 
that the independence of that territory should be resolved by having a 
referendum. However, the PAIGC used its strong influence in the 
territory, organising mass demonstrations with the aim of gaining 
independence. On 14 September 1974, when Spínola landed in Cape 
Verde for meeting with Mobutu, hostile demonstrators were waiting for 
him, and his visit to the capital of the territory was cancelled [Santos, 
2006 (II) pp. 233-234]. In his place, Minister Almeida Santos made the 
visit, and took the opportunity to suggest that a referendary consultation 
be made to the people of Cape Verde. He also floated the idea that a 
constituent assembly should be elected, which would be entrusted with 
drawing up a Constitution for the future State. He even approached that 
question with a member of the PAIGC leadership, Silvino da Luz, who 
pronounced against the referendum without excluding the idea of the 
constituent assembly [Santos, 2006 (II) p. 235]; (Lopes, 1996, p. 377). 
While the talks with the PAIGC about independence remained 
inconclusive because the Portuguese Government refused to recognise this 
movement as its only partner in Cape Verde, the Portuguese Armed 
Forces in the territory acted decisively with the purpose of ending the 
process quickly. They sent an ultimatum to the Government of Lisbon 
                                                 
81 See detailed information on the overall process that led to the independence of Cape 
Verde in Lopes (1996).  
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giving only a few days to transfer the sovereignty of Cape Verde to the 
PAIGC. Otherwise, they would make it locally [Santos (II) pp. 247-248]; 
(MacQueen, 1997, p. 147). 
Under that pressure, Almeida Santos and Pedro Pires82 found a 
solution that would be acceptable to both parties. According to the 
Portuguese Minister’s proposal, if the PAIGC accepted a popular 
consultation, not necessarily a referendum, but possibly the direct and 
universal election of a constituent assembly that approved the sonstitution 
of the new State of Cape Verde and defined its political future, everything 
would be easier [Santos, 2006 (II) p. 249]; (Lopes, 1996, p. 403). The 
leadership of the PAIGC accepted the proposal, opening the way to the 
quick independence of Cape Verde, on 5 July 1975. 
6.2. Sao Tome and Principe 
In Sao Tome and Principe, the independence process was 
formally similar to that of Cape Verde. Both archipelagos had something 
in common: the fact of not having had colonial wars and the election of a 
constituent assembly. However, the processes that led to independence 
were different. 
Sao Tome and Principe had a memory of repression. In 1953, 
the colonial authorities had cruelly repressed a social movement that 
refused to work in the cocoa plantations. In that massacre, known as the 
Batepá massacre, more than a thousand natives from Sao Tome were 
murdered. 
In 1960 the CLSTP (Commitee of Liberation of Sao Tome and 
Principe) was founded and recognised by the African Unity Organisation 
in 1962 as a legitimate representative of the people of the archipelago. In 
1972, the CLSTP changed its name to the liberation movement, MLSTP 
(Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe). When the Portuguese 
revolution broke out in 1974, the leaders of the MLSTP were in exile in 
Gabon (Ferreira, 1993, p. 63). 
On 28 August 1974, the Secretary General of MLSTP, Manuel 
Pinto da Costa, sent his first message to the people of Sao Tome and 
                                                 
82 Pedro Pires was an outstanding member of PAIGC leadership, from Cape 
Verde, and one of the leading negotiators of Guinea-Bissau’s independence. He 
was Prime Minister of Cape Verde between 1975 and 1991 and President of the 
Republic from 2001 to 2011. 
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Principe, via Radio Gabon. His goal was the full independence and the 
opening of negotiations between MLSTP and the Portuguese Government, 
with a view to the decolonisation of the territory (Cruz, 1975, pp. 84-90). 
On 12 October 1974, in a meeting in Sao Tome, the officials of the 
Portuguese Armed Forces declared MLSTP as the only interlocutor for the 
negotiations aimed at independence [Santos, 2006 (I) pp. 342-343]. 
On 26 November, the Portuguese Government and the MLSTP 
signed the Agreement. In that document, published on 17 December 1974 
(Miranda, 1978a, pp. 1028-1032), the Portuguese Government reaffirmed 
the right of the people of Sao Tome and Principe to self-determination and 
independence and recognised the MLSTP as the sole interlocutor and 
legitimate representative of the people of Sao Tome and Principe. The 
High-commissary appointed by the Portuguese President and a 
Transitional Government chosen by the MLSTP had to prepare the 
election for 7 July 1975, and establish a representative assembly of the 
people of Sao Tome and Principe, endowed with sovereign and 
constituent powers, with the main function of declaring independence and 
drawing the future Constitution of the State (Cruz, 1975, pp. 101-107). 
The achievement of this agreement was difficult. During the 
negotiations, the MLSTP insisted on independence with an automatic 
transfer of powers, with the argument that no other result would be 
acceptable to Gabon. However, an unexpected alliance among the 
Portuguese delegation, the Algerian Government, and the observers from 
the PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA, saved the agreement. All of them were 
interested in contradicting Gabon’s intentions, which were francophone 
and committed with neo-colonialism (MacQueen, 1997, p. 150). The 
months before the independence were still troubled by divergences inside 
the MLSTP (Cruz, 1975, pp. 109-159; MacQueen, 1997, p. 151), but the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly took place on 7 July and the act of 
the official declaration of independence of the State of Sao Tome and 
Principe took place on 12 July 1975.83 
7. The Special Case of East Timor 
7.1. From the Portuguese Revolution to the 
       Indonesian Invasion 
                                                 
83 On the process of independence of Sao Tome and Principe, see Cruz (1975); Ferreira 
(1993, pp. 63-64); Pinto (2001, pp. 71-72); Santos [(II) pp. 263-289]; MacQueen (1997, 
pp. 147-152). 
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The territory of East Timor is part of Timor Island. The western 
part of the island has belonged to Indonesia since this country became 
independent from The Netherlands. Before the 1974 Portuguese 
Revolution, there were no significant autonomist movements there. 
East Timor was not a priority for the decolonisation process 
when the 25th of April Revolution broke out. In the beginning of May, the 
Governor of the territory asked the JSN for instructions, having received 
the indication to proceed in agreement with the principles of the MFA 
Programme, considering the local conditions and trying to avoid 
damaging the relationship with Indonesia (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 25-26). 
Indonesia’s official position did not demand the annexation of 
East Timor. That territory was not part of the Dutch colonial inheritance, 
so Indonesia did not have any territorial claim. However, there was a 
movement in that country that wanted to integrate East Timor into 
Indonesia (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 27-28). 
In June 1974, the claim for a referendum in East Timor appeared 
in Indonesia. It was to be held in March 1975. Regarding the possible 
outcomes, only independence would be opposed by Indonesia (Riscado et 
al, 1981, p. 28). 
However, the political groups began to organise themselves in 
East Timor. The first to appear was UDT (União Democrática de Timor), 
which supported the right to self-determination with some connection to 
Portugal. After July 1974, there were three different factions in this 
movement: a) those who defended the situation before the 25th of April, 
and were against the referendum; b) those who defended an autonomy 
that was strongly connected to Portugal; c) those who defended the 
transition to independence in the frame of a community led by Portugal. 
Consecutively, the ASDT (Acção Social Democrata Timorense) 
appeared, followed by the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor 
Leste Independente), an anti-colonialist movement that wanted 
independence, and had a revolutionary faction that opposed the 
referendum. Finally, there was the APODETI, which defended integration 
into Indonesia and the referendum (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 31-33).  
On 19 October 1974, the Minister Almeida Santos [2006 (II) pp. 
297-298] visited the territory and set out the several possibilities for its 
future. He viewed total independence with some scepticism due to the 
economic weakness of the territory, but floated the idea of a connection to 
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Indonesia. The other possibility was maintaining a connection to Portugal, 
which he saw then as the most probable solution. However, the people of 
the territory should choose the solution by vote. The Portuguese 
Government would ensure that the people of East Timor could freely 
choose their country’s destiny (Pires, 1981, pp. 22-23). 
For that purpose, Almeida Santos announced the methodology to 
follow by the Portuguese Government. A law would be published to 
legalise the local political parties. Next, an electoral law based on the 
principle of ‘one man, one vote’ would be published and an electoral 
registration process would be carried out. After a period for debate and 
confrontation between the different positions, a popular consultation 
would be held under a wider surveillance, including UN observers. The 
vote could be either a plebiscite or the election of a constituent assembly. 
Almeida Santos [2006 (II) pp. 298-299] said he would prefer the second 
option. 
On 3 December 1974, before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, Minister Almeida Santos renewed the Portuguese 
intention of holding a referendum to freely determine the will expressed 
by the people of East Timor. The Portuguese Government would respect 
the result of that referendum, but the Minister maintained his scepticism 
about the viability of independence [Santos (II), p. 317]. 
In the beginning of December, the Portuguese Government sent 
a draft of organic statute to the territory. The FRETILIN did not accept it. 
The UDT accepted it and proposed a referendum for July 1975. The 
APODETI thought that the statute was dispensable and wanted a 
referendum in October 1975 (Pires, 1981, p. 39). Meanwhile, the signs of 
Indonesian interference in East Timor’s political process, supporting 
APODETI, became clear. This movement was divided between those who 
simply supported the annexation of the territory to Indonesia and those 
who admitted such an option if taken by referendum (Pires, 1981, p. 43). 
On 25 January 1975, the UDT and FRETILIN created a coalition 
for independence, having as its main purposes: a) achieving total 
independence; b) the rejection of APODETI; c) the rejection of integrating 
another foreign power; d) the recognition of Portugal as the only 
interlocutor; e) the formation of a Transitional Government through 
negotiations among the Portuguese Government, FRETILIN and UDT 
(Pires, 1981, p. 44).  
In February 1975, it was rumoured that Indonesia might be 
preparing an invasion of the territory. However, on 18 February, the 
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UDT/FRETILIN coalition established direct contacts with the Government 
of Lisbon, proposing namely the election of a constituent assembly to 
decide the future of the territory within two years (Pires, 1981, pp. 48-49, 
77-78). 
In the framework of the negotiations on the decolonisation of 
Timor, a summit in Macau was scheduled for 15 June. However, on 27 
May 1975, after a visit of some of their leaders to Indonesia, the UDT 
decided to break the coalition with FRETILIN, invoking the prevalence of 
the hard line at this movement. With the break of the coalition, the 
FRETILIN refused to take part in the meeting in Macau, from which 
resulted Law No. 7/75, of 17 July, which approved the organic statute of 
the territory. 
As laid down in Law No. 7/75, the future of Timor was 
committed to a popular assembly, representative of the people of the 
territory, elected by a direct, secret and universal vote. The election should 
be on the third Sunday of October 1976. Independence would be 
proclaimed on the third Sunday of October 1978 (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 
157-170). 
However, in August 1975, the situation became worse in the 
territory as tensions increased between the UDT and the FRETILIN. On 11 
August, the UDT attempted to take power by a military coup, having 
occupied some military barracks and taking control of the Police in Dili. 
The aim was to ban the FRETILIN, to annul the Agreements of Macau and 
to establish negotiations with the Portuguese Government for 
independence under its control (Pires, 1991, pp. 181-231). 
Before the absence of military reaction from the Portuguese 
authorities, the natives of Timor, who were the majority of the military 
contingent in the territory, began to occupy the respective barracks, on 17 
August, and declared their support of the FRETILIN. In a few days, this 
movement began a counteroffensive and took control of almost the entire 
territory. The Governor and the military of Portuguese origin, were only 
able to secure their own defence, and took refuge in the neighbouring 
island of Atauro (Riscado et al, pp. 173-214; Pires, 1981, pp. 228-248; 
Pires, 1991, pp. 233-265). 
In open Timorese civil war, the President of the Republic asked 
Almeida Santos, who was no longer in the Government, to try to broker 
peace between the UDT and the FRETILIN. However, the contacts with 
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Australia, Indonesia and the United Nations had no remarkable results 
[Santos, 2006 (II) pp. 370-380]. 
From Atauro, Almeida Santos tried to convince the FRETILIN 
to release 23 Portuguese prisoners and to accept the popular consultation 
foreseen in the Agreement of Macau, which would be supervised by 
observers from Portugal, the United Nations, Indonesia and Australia. 
FRETILIN, which clearly controlled the territory, agreed to release the 
prisoners, but refused the referendum. 
On 28 November 1975, the FRETILIN, which controlled almost 
all of the territory, proclaimed the independence of the Democratic 
Republic of East Timor. At the same time, the UDT and APODETI 
declared the integration into Indonesia (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 217-243, 
253-257; Pires, 1981, pp. 287-315). A few days later, on 7 December 
1975, Indonesia invaded the territory of East Timor, annexing it by force 
and sparking a genocide that sacrificed about 200,000 lives. 
During the very day of the invasion, the Portuguese Government 
decided to break diplomatic relations with Indonesia and to appeal to the 
United Nations to obtain the end of the military intervention of that 
country. It also asked for a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict 
that would proceed with the decolonisation process under its aegis. 
7.2. The Resistance Against the Occupation 
Soon after, on 12 December 1975, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations approved the Resolution 3485 (XXX) with 72 votes for, 
10 against and 43 abstentions.84 On 22 December, the Security Council 
approved the Resolution 384 (1975) requesting the Secretary General to 
urgently send a special representative to East Timor and to follow the 
implementation of the Resolution.85 
On 29 December 1975, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations appointed Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi as special 
representative. His first visit to the territory occurred between 20 and 22 
                                                 
84 Available at: 
 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/98/IMG/NR000198.pdf?OpenElement 
[Accessed 19 May 2011].     
85 Available at: 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/782/32/IMG/NR078232.pdf?OpenElement 
[Accessed 19 May 2011]. 
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January 1976, without authorisation to visit areas under control by the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor. After that visit, the special 
representative reported to the Security Council that there was a common 
acceptance that the people of Timor should be consulted about their 
future, but that the consultation element was divergently interpreted. The 
Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor suggested a 
referendum based on the principle of ‘one man, one vote’, to take place 
after the withdrawal of all Indonesian forces and their replacement by an 
international force, offering a choice between integration into Indonesia or 
independence with FRETILIN. The Portuguese Government was in favour 
of a referendum after the withdrawal of the Indonesians and the arrival of 
an international force, but it thought the people of East Timor should 
decide on their own on the process of making that referendum, possibly in 
agreement with Law No. 7/75. The Provisional Government, which 
exercised power in the territory, declared that the people had already 
exercised their right to self-determination and considered East Timor as 
part of Indonesia (Riscado et al, 1981, pp. 225-226). 
On 22 April 1976, the Security Council approved Resolution 
389, demanding the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Indonesia.86 That 
Resolution had the abstentions of Japan and the United States of America. 
During the next month, the ‘Provisional Government’ considered that any 
referendum concerning the future of East Timor to proclaim the 
integration into Indonesia was not necessary. On 17 July 1976, the 
Indonesian Parliament proclaimed East Timor as the 27th province of 
Indonesia (Teles, 1999, pp. 383-385).  
Year after year, from 1976 up to 1982, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations approved Resolutions on East Timor. However, 
insofar as the occupation persisted, the favourable votes had a tendency of 
reducing and the votes against increased (Pires, 1991, p. 370). The 
recognition of the occupation by the United States in October 1977 and by 
Australia in January 1978, certainly contributed to that. 
However, the Indonesian occupation ended after about 25 years. 
The Indonesian withdrawal had four main reasons. The first was the 
resistance of the Timorese people towards the occupation. The second was 
the diplomatic action of Portugal and other CPLP countries that never 
stopped raising the issue of East Timor in all the international 
                                                 
86 Available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/294/77/IMG/NR029477.pdf?OpenElement 
[Accessed 19 May 2011]. 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  198 
 
organisations where they had the possibility of doing it. The third was the 
constant lobbying of human rights organisations, and of several 
personalities that, with their testimonies, highlighted the issue of East 
Timor to international public opinion. Finally, in the final years of the 20th 
century, the political evolution in Indonesia created conditions where the 
country could accept its withdrawal from the territory. 
7.3.  The Claim for the Referendum 
After a long process of resistance and international solidarity, 
the claim for a referendum, which allowed the Timorese people to choose 
between independence and integration into Indonesia, reappeared near the 
end of the 1980s. On 4 July 1988, the Political Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament adopted a draft resolution on East Timor exhorting 
the European Council and the European Commission to take initiatives in 
order to organise a referendum [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I), p. 61]. 
On 16 April 1989, the Bishop of Dili, Ximenes Belo, addressed 
a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, 
requesting the accomplishment of a referendum to hear the people as to 
their future [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I), p. 158]. This proposal by Dom 
Ximenes Belo was a matter of debate in several forums and received a lot 
of international support. On 16 August 1989, in the meeting of the UN 
Special Committee of 24 on Decolonisation, representatives of other 
countries, namely Australia, Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom, 
supported the Portuguese positions, suggesting a plebiscite under the aegis 
of the UN to define the future of East Timor [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I), p. 
198]. 
In October 1989, the commander of the armed resistance, 
Xanana Gusmão (1994, pp. 73-74), wrote a letter in the mountains of 
Timor, expressing his total support of Bishop Ximenes Belo’s proposal. A 
referendum should have presupposed: a) the cessation of hostilities; b) the 
adoption of international juridical mechanisms to verify, control and make 
the process possible; c) the respect for the supreme wishes of the people 
of East Timor, expressed in free and democratic conditions. If, in those 
conditions, the people of East Timor accepted the integration into 
Indonesia, Gusmão declared his willingness to lay down arms. 
In the beginning of July 1990, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
Ali Alatas, during a visit to Japan, received an appeal to referendum, from 
the Japanese Coalition ‘Free East Timor’ [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I) p. 315]. 
On 11 August 1990, the representative of the International Pax Christi 
near the UN, who intervened in the Committee on Decolonisation, 
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formally requested a referendum in East Timor under the auspices of the 
UN [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I) p. 327]. On 8 February 1991, the international 
organisation ‘Parliamentarians for East Timor’ sent an appeal to Perez de 
Cuellar for a referendum in East Timor as requested by the Bishop of Dili 
[Cardoso et al, 1991 (I) p. 390]. On 27April 1991, in Portugal, Ximenes 
Belo reaffirmed his proposal. The Governor of East Timor, Mário 
Carrascalão, who considered the referendum in the territory as completely 
out of question for the Government of Jakarta, refused the idea [Cardoso 
et al, 1991 (I) p. 430]. 
On 15 September 1991, the representative of the resistance 
abroad, José Ramos Horta, defended a referendum in Timor at the same 
time of the legislative elections in Indonesia in 1992 [Cardoso et al, 1991 
(I) p. 514]. During that same month, the European Parliament passed a 
report drawn by the British MP Derek Prag, saying that the European 
Community should press Indonesia to accept a free referendum in East 
Timor, under the supervision of the UN [Cardoso et al, 1991 (I) p. 517]. 
On 12 November 1991, the images of a massacre perpetrated by the 
Indonesian Army, in Santa Cruz’s cemetery in Dili, during the funeral 
homage to Timorese resistants murdered days before, gave a new 
international dimension to the Timorese issue and weakened Indonesia’s 
position. 
  7.4. The 1999 Referendum and the Re-Establishment 
         of Independence 
In May 1998, Indonesian dictator Suharto stepped down after 32 
years in office, and was replaced by B. J. Habibie, who brought a new 
attitude to the issue of East Timor. In June 1998, Indonesia informed the 
Secretary General of the United Nations and Portugal of its intention to 
give a wide autonomy to East Timor, with Jakarta retaining only the 
control of foreign affairs, external defence, and some aspects of monetary 
and fiscal policy. In August, the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and 
Indonesia began talks on a possible autonomy, leaving aside the question 
of the final status of East Timor. Indonesia viewed autonomy as a final 
solution. Portugal considered it as a transitional arrangement pending the 
eventual exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-
determination (UN, 2000, p. 6). 
On 27 January 1999, President Habibie announced that, if the 
people of East Timor did not agree to be part of Indonesia based on the 
autonomy plan in discussion, they could separate from Indonesia. The 
Secretary General of the United Nations and Portugal welcomed that 
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declaration (UN, 2000, p. 7); [AR, 1991 (I) pp. 503-505]. By admitting 
the separation from Indonesia as the ‘second option’ if the Timorese 
rejected the proposed autonomy, Habibie gave a unique opportunity to 
solve the problem of East Timor. 
On 7 and 8 February 1999 the Ministers Jaime Gama of Portugal 
and Ali Alatas of Indonesia agreed that the autonomy plan should be 
presented to the East Timorese people as a choice of the final solution. 
Accepting Indonesia’s proposal for autonomy would mean permanent 
integration within Indonesia. A rejection of the proposal would represent 
an irreversible step towards independence (UN, 2000, p. 8). 
On 10 and 11 March the two Foreign Ministers agreed that there 
should be a direct ballot in which all East Timorese of voting age, both 
those living in and outside East Timor, would accept or reject a status of 
permanent autonomy from Indonesia. On 5 May 1999, Portugal and 
Indonesia signed three agreements in New York: the Constitutional 
framework for autonomy as submitted by Indonesia, an agreement 
regarding the modalities for the popular consultation and a broad 
agreement on security arrangements (UN, 2000, p. 9; Teles, 1999, pp. 
392-396). 
The main agreement requested that the Secretary General put the 
proposed Constitutional framework to the East Timorese people for their 
acceptance or rejection. In case of their acceptance, Indonesia would 
initiate the Constitutional measures to implement the autonomy 
framework, and Portugal would initiate the procedures necessary for 
removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories 
before the UN General Assembly. If the East Timorese rejected the 
proposed autonomy, Indonesia would take the Constitutional steps to 
terminate its links with East Timor. In this event, Indonesia, Portugal and 
the Secretary General would agree on the arrangements for a peaceful and 
orderly transition towards independence (UN, 2000, p.10). 8 August 1999 
was set as the ballot date for the popular consultation. 
The agreement on security arrangements gave Indonesia the 
responsibility to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence and 
intimidation during the popular consultation. Meanwhile, the political and 
military sectors of Indonesia, who refuted the possibility of independence, 
supported the creation of pro-integration militias in the territory.  Even 
before the agreements of 5 May 1999, and more intensively after that, 
they spread violence and intimidation against pro-independence activists 
(Martin, 2001, pp. 56-59). 
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On 7 May 1999, the UN Security Council, through Resolution 
1236, requested the Secretary General to provide detailed plans for the 
popular consultation and establishment of a mission in the territory. On 22 
May, the Secretary General proposed the establishment of the UN Mission 
in East Timor (UNAMET) to the Council, which would carry out its tasks 
objectively and impartially. The UNAMET would cooperate with the 
Indonesian authorities, but it would only accept instructions from the 
United Nations. There were 200 registration centres inside the territory, 
for registration and polling, and 13 external voting centres (five in 
Indonesia, four in Australia, and one each in Portugal, Mozambique, 
Macau and the United States). For the polling, the registration centres 
were subdivided into 700 polling stations. UNAMET accredited more 
than 2,000 observers. In order to ensure complete transparency of the 
consultation process, the Secretary General created an independent 
Electoral Commission with three eminent jurists. 
The planning operations would take place between 10 May and 
15 June. The public information programme and voter education would 
extend from 10 May to 5 August. Preparation and registration was set for 
between 13 June and 17 July. The exhibition of lists and a period for 
challenges as well as decisions on challenges and complaints would 
extend from 18 to 23 July. There would be a political campaign from 20 
July to 5 August, followed by a two-day cooling off period.  Polling day 
would be 8 August (UN, 2000, pp. 14-15). 
The lack of security in the territory, because of the violence and 
intimidation actions made by the militia against independence, having in 
many cases the complicity and the support of Indonesian military forces, 
delayed the registration process. Because of that situation, the UN 
Secretary General, in his report dated 22 June, postponed the ballot date 
for two weeks (UN, 2000, p. 28). In 29 June and 4 July, pro-integration 
militia attacked an UNAMET office and a humanitarian convoy. After 
that, there were strong protests and heavy international condemnation 
against Indonesian authorities, requesting the immediate end to the 
violence. 
The registration process, initially planned to begin on 13 June, 
began on 16 July. This delay required a new postponement of the ballot 
date to 30 August. In spite of the violence and intimidations, which 
continued even during the registration process, 451,796 Timorese enrolled 
for the popular consultation. 
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On 30 August 1999, 446,953 East Timorese (98.6% of all those 
registered) cast their ballots within and outside the territory. The counting 
of the ballots, centralized in Dili, began at 6 a.m. on 31 August and 
finished at 6 p.m. on 4 September. At 9 a.m., the Special Representative 
of UN Secretary General, Ian Martin, read out the results in Dili. The 
Secretary General simultaneously informed the Security Council of the 
result in open session in New York. 94,388 (21.5%) Timorese accepted 
the special autonomy proposed. 344,580 (78.5%) rejected it. 
The security situation in East Timor deteriorated rapidly after 
the ballot. The violence of the militia intensified, not just against the 
Timorese population (forcing hundreds of thousands of people to abandon 
their houses and to take refuge in the mountains or in West Timor) but 
also against the staff and offices of the UNAMET. The situation 
deteriorated to such an extent that, on 8 September, the United Nations 
decided to relocate their mission to Darwin, Australia. 
Meanwhile, on 6 September, the Security Council sent a mission 
to the Indonesia Government to relay its concerns about the post-ballot 
violence. The mission arrived in Jakarta on 8 September. Strongly pressed 
by the United Nations, and under the threat of being held responsible for 
crimes against humanity (UN, 2000, p. 49), Indonesia finally accepted the 
Constitution of a multinational force to intervene in the territory. On 12 
September, the Security Council authorised the creation of the 
International Force East Timor (INTERFET) under the command of 
Australia, which entered in the territory on 20 September. 
On 19 October, Indonesia formally recognised the result of the 
popular consultation. On 25 October, the Security Council, through 
Resolution 1272 established the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). On 31 October, Indonesia’s 
last troops left the territory. On 1 December, Xanana Gusmão returned to 
East Timor. On 20 May 2002, the Democratic Republic of East Timor was 
formally restored (Martin, 2001). 
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Chapter 1 
The Constitutional Referendum 
1. Palma Carlos’s Proposal (1974) 
1.1. The Circumstances 
In June 1974, a proposal for a Constitutional referendum 
introduced by the Prime Minister of the First Provisional Government, 
Adelino da Palma Carlos, resulted in the first political crisis of the 
Portuguese democracy, and culminated in his resignation. Adelino da 
Palma Carlos was a civilian, a legal academic and an opponent of the 
dictatorship.  Considered to be a liberal conservative, he was chosen by 
the President of the Republic, General Spínola, to lead the First 
Provisional Government. The military Junta of National Salvation, which 
was entrusted to assume power on the night of 25 April 1974 by the MFA 
Coordinating Council that led the military coup, approved the 
Government’s Programme by Executive Law. 
Besides the compromised nature of the Government, which 
united people with different conceptions and perspectives as to the 
revolutionary process, it soon became obvious that the Government was in 
the epicentre of a confrontation between General Spínola and the MFA 
Coordinating Council. They diverged deeply over decisive questions 
about the revolutionary process, such as the democratisation of the 
country and the solution to the colonial problem. 
The clash between Spínola and the MFA became evident in 
several public addresses by the President of the Republic, who did not 
hide his dissatisfaction over the country’s direction. These disagreements 
were reflected inside the Government. After the first three weeks, 
misunderstandings were rife. (Osório, 1988, p. 93). 
On Spínola’s insistence, Palma Carlos proposed to change Law 
No. 3/74, which defined the provisional Constitutional structure based on 
the MFA Programme, in order to modify the balance of powers between 
the Government and the President. The purpose of the Prime Minister was 
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to accomplish the Presidential election as quickly as possible and to hold a 
referendum to approve a Provisional Constitution giving the Chief of State 
and the Executive the power needed to execute some of the provisions of 
the MFA Programme (Osório, 1988, p. 95). 
Armed with Palma Carlos’s proposals, Spínola chaired a 
meeting of the MFA Coordinating Council, which was attended by 
ministers and members of the Junta of National Salvation. With the 
support of the ministers Sá Carneiro and Vasco Vieira de Almeida, he 
introduced a catastrophic description of the political and economical 
situation of the country. In addition to that, he violently attacked the MFA 
Coordinating Council and proposed that the Constitutional referendum 
and the direct election of the President of the Republic take place 
simultaneously on 3 October 1974. The election of the Constituent 
Assembly would take place until 30 November 1976. 
On behalf of the Coordinating Council, Colonel Vasco 
Gonçalves contradicted Spínola’s thesis, leading to a violent exchange of 
words. According to Vasco Gonçalves (Cruzeiro, 2002, pp. 82-84), the 
meeting ended with a draw: Spínola did not reinforce his powers and the 
Coordinating Council maintained its positions. 
On 4 July, the Council of Ministers discussed the national 
political situation, having had a general discussion on that theme [Santos, 
2006 (I) p. 298]. On 5 July, Palma Carlos introduced two documents to 
the President. The first was an appraisal of the MFA Programme, and the 
second was a draft amendment to the Constitutional law No. 3/74. On that 
same day, and upon Spínola’s request, he went to the Council of State to 
introduce those documents and submit them to his appraisal.87 
On 7 July, the MFA Coordinating Council, gathered in Lisbon 
and expressed its rejection of Palma Carlos’s plan. On 8 July, the Council 
of State unanimously rejected those proposals. On 9 July, Adelino da 
Palma Carlos announced his resignation to the Council of Ministers 
(Osório, 1988, pp. 241-249). 
1.2. The Reasons 
In the document on the MFA Programme, Palma Carlos 
enunciated the main problems that he believed prevailed in the Portuguese 
situation: the social indiscipline, the short term risk of degradation of 
                                                 
87 Both documents are published in Osório (1998, pp. 101-119) and 
Miranda [1978a (II) pp. 1153-1168]. 
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economic life, and the subsistence of the colonial war (Osório, 1988, pp. 
102-104). Palma Carlos considered that the MFA Programme was 
outdated, since it was inadequate, and lacked ideas to alleviate the 
economic and social disturbances or solve the problem of the colonial 
war. In his opinion, only the President of the Republic and the 
Government were able to remove such obstacles (Osório, 1988, p. 106). 
There was a question of timing. The MFA Programme left the 
decision on essential matters up to the Constituent Assembly, which had 
been elected until 31 March 1975 and had a deadline of 180 days to draft 
the Constitution. There would hardly be a democratic and legitimate 
Government before the beginning of 1976. For Palma Carlos, it was not 
possible to wait so long to take essential decisions, so he believed that the 
election should take place as soon as possible (Osório, 1988, pp. 106-
108). There were three main possibilities to choose from. The first was the 
immediate election of the Constituent Assembly. The second was the 
immediate election of the President of the Republic. The third was to 
instantly hold a referendum based on a concrete proposal to overcome the 
crisis. 
Palma Carlos readily excluded the first hypothesis.  Firstly, it 
was not possible to hold elections in short term because the public 
administration had not been replaced, the balance among all the political 
parties had not been established, and the country was in the middle of an 
economic crisis that would be worsened by a dramatic electoral campaign. 
The second idea was excluded because the Constituent Assembly could 
not be elected while the overseas problem was not solved, regarding the 
representation of those territories in the Assembly. And finally, legitimate 
democratic elections would require an electoral law, a law on political 
parties, and the law on the electoral registration (Osório, 1988, pp. 109-
110). 
Palma Carlos considered the proposal for the President’s 
immediate election to be justified, since the current President was the only 
person capable of obtaining the support of the great majority of the 
Portuguese people and had enough prestige to promote decolonisation. 
However, a President needed a Constitution. Otherwise his election would 
be a mere attribution of the supreme power to a certain chief, which 
reminded of the ‘elections’ of Óscar Carmona in 1928 and Sidónio Pais in 
1918. For that reason, he proposed simultaneous elections on the 
referendum on a provisional Constitutional draft that replaced Law No. 
3/74 (Osório, 1988, p. 110). 
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Palma Carlos concluded his explanation by refuting comparisons 
with the sad memory of the 1933 plebiscite, pointing out the provisional 
nature of the draft. The provisional Constitution could be submitted to 
referendum in the overseas territories, and the improvisation of the 
electoral operations would become less of a concern (Osório, 1988, p. 
111). In either case, the passing of the Constitution would necessarily 
involve the delay of the Constituent Assembly’s election for a few 
months, which would, in turn, delay the making of the definitive 
Constitution. 
1.3. The Contents 
Palma Carlos proposed that, up to 31 October 1974, there would 
be a referendum in order to pass a draft of the Provisional Constitution of 
the Portuguese Republic. This Constitution would come into force with 
the definitive Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly foreseen in 
the MFA Programme. 
The Provisional Government would submit the draft of the 
Provisional Constitution to the Council of State by 31 July, in order for it 
to be passed by 31 August.  The Provisional Constitution would be 
enforced until the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly was 
approved by referendum, which had to be before 30 November 1976.  
In the Constitutional referendum, the citizens were asked to give 
a straight yes/no answer to the following question: ‘do you approve of the 
Provisional Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, which allows the 
President of the Republic and the Government to solve the serious 
national problems of our time and which will be enforced for a limited 
period until the approval of the definitive Constitution?’ Together with the 
Constitutional referendum, the Portuguese people would choose the 
President of the Republic by universal, direct and secret suffrage.  
1.4. The Reactions 
Palma Carlos’s proposal was opposed by the MFA Coordinating 
Council and the left wing of the Junta, led at that time by Costa Gomes. 
Among the political parties, the Communist Party (PCP) was strongly 
against it and the Socialist Party (PS) clearly distanced itself from it. 
Support came from Spínola loyalists and from the Popular Democratic 
Party (PPD). It is true that the PPD did not officially support Palma 
Carlos’s plan, but the ministers from this political area resigned in 
solidarity with him. The PPD leader, Sá Carneiro, actually had a real and 
direct involvement in Palma Carlos’s operation, by openly showing his 
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participation in the MFA Assembly on 13 June, where he exposed a 
catastrophic picture of the country’s situation (Cunhal, 1976, p. 141; 
Cruzeiro, 2002, p. 82). Costa Gomes (Cruzeiro, 1998, p. 235) and 
Almeida Santos [2006 (I) p. 295] even expressed the conviction that Sá 
Carneiro would have been the true initiator of the so-called ‘Palma Carlos 
coup’. 
The reception of Palma Carlos’s proposal by the Council of 
State was not good. Diogo Freitas do Amaral (1996, p. 211) States that the 
Council unanimously approved the proposal that sought the reinforcement 
of the Prime Minister’s powers, giving way to Law No. 5/74, of 12 July, 
but also unanimously refused the other proposals, including the 
Constitutional referendum. The day after Palma Carlos resigned. 
However, he still achieved support from the ministers Sá Carneiro, 
Magalhães Mota, Vasco Vieira de Almeida and Firmino Miguel, along 
with the socialist Raul Rego in the beginning. The latter, however, knew 
the positions of his comrades Mário Soares and Salgado Zenha, and 
changed his position, which gave rise to bitter recriminations from the 
Prime Minister and to a sour exchange of words between them (Amaral, 
1996, p. 336). 
Almeida Santos [2006 (I) p. 300] points out that the communist 
leader, Álvaro Cunhal, was one of the first ministers to express his 
position in the Council of 9 July, having refused to follow Palma Carlos, 
in both the motivation or the resignation. Concerning that, Cunhal (1976, 
p. 140) wrote that Spínola was the true abetter of the Palma Carlos coup. 
The scheme was simple. The Council of State would give full powers to 
General Spínola through the Prime Minister, who had no influence 
besides the position that he carried out during his incumbency. Within 
three months there would be an electoral masquerade to confirm the 
General as President, who was no longer appointed by the MFA, but 
chosen through ‘universal suffrage’, having therefore ‘legitimacy’ against 
the MFA to assume full powers. A Provisional Constitution that would 
postpone the elections for the Constituent Assembly for November 1976 
would also be approved. 
Carlos Brito (1999), then member of the PCP leadership, wrote 
about the event 25 years later and reaffirmed his conviction that the coup 
consisted in an attempt to change the powers that the MFA had delegated 
to the President, by plebiscite. This would give absolute powers to 
General Spínola and neutralize the MFA. He also says that when the 
Political Commission of the PCP obtained knowledge about the 
presentation of Palma Carlos’s proposal in the Council of State, it 
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requested meetings with its civil members to advise them on the dangers 
of that plan. 
The socialist ministers also showed their opposition to the 
proposal. Salgado Zenha said, ‘it is known how a dictatorship begins, but 
never when it ends’. Mário Soares considered the President’s premature 
election as wrong, inconvenient and contrary to the MFA Programme, and 
that the approval of a Provisional Constitution by referendum would set a 
serious and undesirable political precedent [Santos, 2006 (I) p. 300]. 
Mário Soares (Avillez, 1996, p. 335) says that Palma Carlos 
explained his plan to him one month after the Government’s formation, 
but that he disagreed with it. Without a Constitution, it would be 
necessary to have legislative elections prior to the popular mandate, which 
allowed for the legitimate drawing of a new Constitution. It should be the 
new Constitution that determines if the President of the Republic would 
be directly or indirectly chosen by the people. Soares considered that 
everything was set out for a plebiscite for President Spínola, and the 
disastrous example of Sidónio Pais was still in mind. The legitimacy 
gained from presidential elections would inevitably suffocate the political 
parties. 
The Counsellor of State, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, had a very 
surprising position, given his political proximity to Spínola and Palma 
Carlos. His refusal would have contributed to the unanimity of that body 
against the proposal. As he explains (Amaral, 1996, p. 211), if the 
proposal had been approved, the MFA would be dissolved, Spínola’s 
personal authority would be greatly reinforced, and the regime would be 
defined in practice as an ‘almost-presidentialist’ Gaullist type, with the 
aggravated circumstance of the lack of a parliament to scrutinise it, 
something that De Gaulle always maintained. Furthermore, the election of 
the deputies would be postponed for a year and half, also postponing the 
drafting of the new Constitution for an equal period of time. 
Freitas do Amaral (1996, p. 211) based his opposition on three 
ideas: first, the balance of powers in the Council of State condemned and 
refused the proposal. Second, neither the PS nor the PPD were publicly 
and clearly committed to it. Finally, the proposal would lead to a military 
presidential system, and Freitas do Amaral favoured a civil parliamentary 
system. 
António de Almeida Santos explains that the MFA and the 
emerging political forces could hardly accept the proposal because of 
eight reasons: 1) the appeal to the Constitutional referendum was 
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susceptible to suspicion in a country still traumatised by the soit disant 
referendum on the 1933 Constitution. 2) The resistance to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
referendum − as referendums should be − was understandable given the 
length and complexity of the question. 3) The formulation of the question 
clearly induced a certain answer. 4) The Government was an interested 
party, because the reinforcement of its powers was in question, and the 
Council of State, with military majority, was an interested party too. 5) 
The referendum was able to arouse reserves as a normal form of 
exercising the sovereignty of the Nation, side by side with the elections, in 
a country without any tradition in that domain. 6) The President would be 
the only sovereign organ legitimated by a universal, direct and secret 
suffrage, thus giving him the legitimacy that would arouse the fear of 
personal power. 7) The transitory period would finish in a reasonable 
forecast, in the second half of 1977, which would be enough time for the 
imagined crisis, thus justifying emergency measures. 8) The fundamental 
basis of the MFA complaint was that the scheme would undermine its 
proclaimed role as the ‘engine of the revolution and warranty of the 
political unit’, leaving it out of the programmed system. The MFA was not 
ready to leave the political scene so early. 
Palma Carlos’s proposal did not obtain doctrinaire supports 
either. Luís Barbosa Rodrigues (1994, pp. 128-129) points to the 
disagreement of the proposal with the MFA Programme that gave the 
fullness of the constituent power to the Constituent Assembly. Before the 
making of the definitive Constitution, the referendum would limit the 
powers of the Constituent Assembly. The terms proposed for the 
referendum did not give the voting any guarantees of authenticity. The 
previous presidential election would give way to a presidential system. 
Finally, the proposal, when interconnecting the referendum and the 
presidential election effects, was like a plebiscitary vote of confidence 
towards the President and the Government (Duarte, 1987, p. 236). 
1.5. Critical Analysis 
The relationships between General Spínola and MFA were 
always difficult. Spínola was not a man from the MFA and his 
appointment as President of the Junta of National Salvation on the night of 
25 April 1974 resulted much more from his own initiative than from the 
spontaneous will of the Movement. No wonder, then, the divergences 
between the General and the MFA Coordinating Council had been 
expressed early on in the meeting that lasted the whole night, from the 25th 
to the 26th of April. From that moment and until Spínola’s resignation 
from the position of President on 28 September, the revolutionary process 
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and decolonisation remained on a collision course. The Palma Carlos coup 
was the first serious incident of that confrontation. 
The main purpose of Palma Carlos was to reinforce the powers 
and the legitimacy of the President before the MFA. For that very reason, 
the first priority was the direct election of the President at the same time 
as the referendum on a Provisional Constitution, thus changing the terms 
of the MFA Programme significantly. At stake was more than the 
chronological order of the elections. The proposal was essentially for a 
plebiscite on Spínola, with the intention of imposing a conception of the 
revolution and decolonisation process that was different from the MFA’s. 
In fact, according to Palma Carlos (Osório, 1988, p. 96), 
decolonisation was the decisive question for his resignation as Prime 
Minister. The only proposal by Palma Carlos that was accepted by the 
Council of State allowed the Prime Minister to choose the governmental 
cast. However, on the very same day, the Council of State passed a 
diploma that allowed for decolonisation without consulting the indigenous 
populations, which Palma Carlos considered unConstitutional. This meant 
the immediate recognition of the independence of the overseas territories. 
It was clearn from the start that Palma Carlos’s attempts to 
exorcise the ghosts of referendums past would raise more questions than 
they answered. The ghost of the ‘elections’ of Sidónio Pais in 1918 and 
Óscar Carmona in 1928 could be exorcised by simultaneously holiding a 
Constitutional referendum and a presidential election, so that the election 
was not seen as a mere attribution of the supreme power, although limited, 
to certain chief. The referendum argument, however, awakened another 
ghost: the Constitutional plebiscite of 1933. In an attempt to reassure 
people that the ‘sad memory of that referendum’ (in Palma Carlos’s 
words) would not be repeated, Palma Carlos pointed to the provisional 
nature of the draft to approve. The argument was not strong given that, 
according to the draft of the Provisional Constitution, the definitive 
Constitution, which the Constituent Assembly would approve, should also 
be submitted to referendum. However, despite the arguments, the question 
around Palma Carlos’s proposal was above all the option between Spínola 
and the MFA. 
Despite Palma Carlos’s attempts to exorcise the ghosts, the truth 
is that they were unavoidably present in the plebiscitary nature of the 
operation. The analogy with the presidential elections of 1918 and 1928, 
and with the Constitutional referendum of 1933, was the fact and it was 
not bearable in a country just freed of a dictatorship that had been 
‘legitimated’ in that way. Furthermore, since there was no electoral law or 
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electoral registration made in democracy, the electoral operations would 
be commanded by the rules of 1946, with an electoral universe that was 
democratically unsatisfactory.  
On the other hand, the delay of the Constituent Assembly 
election until the end of 1976 would contradict the aim of the political 
implantation of the emerging parties. These would be delayed to affirm 
themselves in the political scene in contrast to the legitimating degree 
afforded the President. The proposal came out to a military presidential 
system worsened by the lack of a parliament that could scrutinise it. 
1.6. The Consequences 
The immediate consequences of the refusal of Palma Carlos’s 
proposal were the resignation of the Prime Minister and some ministers, 
and the appointment of a new Prime Minister with the MFA’s confidence, 
Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, and six military ministers. President António 
de Spínola’s political position came out frankly weakened. The dynamics 
of the revolutionary process changed, and the decolonisation process 
would be unblocked with the publication, a few days later, of Law No. 
7/74, of 27 July. António de Spínola resigned by the end of September 
1974 and the election of the Constituent Assembly took place on 25 April 
1975. 
2. The Proposals for a Referendum on the 1976 Constitution 
During the drafting of the Constitution by the Constituent 
Assembly elected on 25 April 1975, there was a proposal to submit its text 
to referendum once approved. On 30 December 1975, the PPD introduced 
a proposal for a Constitutional referendum to the Council of the 
Revolution88 having in view the renegotiation of a Platform of 
Constitutional Agreement established between the MFA and the political 
parties on 11 April, preceding the election of the Constituent Assembly 
(Miranda, 1981, pp. 300-305). After the events of 25 November 1975, 
which defeated the military left and changed the course of the 
revolutionary process, the members of PS, PPD and CDS in the 
Constituent Assembly started to defend the renegotiation of the Platform 
of Constitutional Agreement. For that purpose, they paralysed the debate 
on the organisation of the political power. On its side, the Council of the 
Revolution proposed the renegotiation of the Platform on 11 December. 
                                                 
88 The Council of the Revolution was a military sovereignty organ which replaced the 
Junta of National Salvation and the Council of State after a failed attempt of coup d’état 
led by Spínola on 11 March 1975. 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  212 
 
The First Platform foresaw in point (C.3) that the President 
should enact the new Constitution, made and approved by the Constituent 
Assembly, after first consulting the Council of the Revolution. As an 
alternative, the PPD proposed the submission of the new Constitution to 
popular referendum within the 15 days of approval by the Constituent 
Assembly. In case of rejection, the provisional Constitutional laws would 
remain in force, attributing constituent powers to the next Parliament, 
which would be chosen by 25 April 1976 (Miranda, 1976, p. 153). 
The PPD disagreed with the enactment of the Constitution by 
the President of the Republic after first consulting the Council of the 
Revolution. According to the reasoning of the proposal, the Constituent 
Assembly was the only sovereignty organ endowed with democratic 
legitimacy, and only the people who chose it could judge the results of its 
work. The enactment of the Constitution by the President, appointed 
according to criteria of revolutionary legitimacy, was a deviation of the 
democratic principles and traditions, which made popular consultation on 
the acceptance or rejection of the Constitution so indispensable (Miranda, 
1976, p. 153). 
On 9 January 1976, António de Sousa Franco, a member of the 
PPD leadership, justified the proposal when referring to the Party’s 
Programme in an article published in the newspaper O Jornal. He 
defended the principle that the referendum was obligatory to approve laws 
that revised the Constitution, according to the principle that consituent 
power should be exercised by the people. In the Constituent Assembly, 
the parliamentary leader of the PS, José Luís Nunes, strongly criticised 
that article in the session of 14 January 1976. According to him, the PPD, 
unhappy with the democratic and progressive provisions voted for by the 
Constituent Assembly, intended to demand a plebiscite on the 
Constitution and, in case of refusal, to trample the will of the Portuguese 
people and to impose a provisional Constitution drawn behind the 
people’s backs (DAC, 104, 15 January 1976, pp. 3359-3360). 
Several PPD deputies replied to José Luís Nunes’s speech. Jorge 
Miranda89 denied that the referendum was antidemocratic in nature and 
refused any comparison between the PPD proposal and the plebiscite on 
the 1933 Constitution. In 1933, there was no Constituent Assembly, nor 
were there electoral campaigns, parties, public life, pluralism or freedom 
of expression. The opposition had been persecuted in 1933. In 1976, none 
of this was true (DAC, 104, 15 January 1976, pp. 3361-3362). In response, 
                                                 
89 Jorge Miranda, outstanding Professor of Constitutional Law, was PPD deputy in the 
Constituent Assembly. 
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José Luís Nunes said that the differences between the situations in 1933 
and in 1976 gave more reasons to refuse a referendum than to defend it. In 
1976, there should be no referendum precisely because there was a 
Constituent Assembly (DAC, 104, 15 January 1976, p. 3364).  
In articles published in the newspaper Diário de Notícias on 16 
and 24 February 1976, Jorge Miranda (1976, pp. 153-167) referred in 
detail to the topics raised by the PPD’s proposal. Miranda thought that the 
PPD proposal contained two different aspects. He supported it in terms of 
motives, but disagreed with the contents mainly because of its foreseeable 
consequences. As to the first aspect, Jorge Miranda thought that the 
proposal did not deserve the accusations received. He considered the 
referendum a democratic device, giving several examples in favour of that 
idea, and he saw the PPD proposal as an alternative to the First Platform 
of Constitutional Agreement. Jorge Miranda explained that, for the PPD, 
the aim was to defend the Constituent Assembly from the interference of 
any other body because, at that moment in Portugal, no other was 
representative in nature.  
However, Jorge Miranda argued that a referendum would be an 
unnecessary inconvenience. The proposal was unnecessary because the 
Council of the Revolution, in the renegotiation of the Platform of 
Constitutional Agreement stopped referring to the enacting of the 
Constitution by the President of the Republic after first consulting itself. 
Therefore, the PPD proposal had achieved its purpose (Miranda, 1976, p. 
159). 
Jorge Miranda also considered the Constitutional referendum to 
be inconvenient. He immediately thought that the proposed timing – 15 
days after the voting by the Constituent Assembly – was excessively 
short. He considered it to be more desirable to hold any referendum at the 
same time as the legislative elections. Here, the assembly could choose 
the constituent powers if the Constitution was rejected.  
In case of rejection, the country would suffer serious damage for 
several reasons. Firstly, the country would continue to be ruled by 
provisional governments, and two years after the 25 April, the country 
needed definitive institutions. Secondly, the refusal of the Constitution 
would question the historical commitment obtained in the Constituent 
Assembly as well as the sorely reached balance of powers (Miranda, 
1976, p. 161). On the other hand, in case of approval, there would be no 
advantage in submitting it to referendum, and there would be the 
inconvenience of understanding that the popular approval would represent 
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the acceptance of all and each of the Constitutional provisions, preventing 
its further modification (Miranda, 1976, p. 162). Despite his disagreement, 
Miranda (1974, p. 112; 1976, p. 160) thought that the referendum was 
legally possible, since the Council of the Revolution, as the heir of the 
Junta of National Salvation, or even the Constituent Assembly, had 
changed the provisional Constitutional law for that purpose. 
Writing in 1981 on this same subject, Jorge Miranda (1981, p. 
300) rectified his opinion, considering it unlawful that a Constitutional 
law approved by the Council of the Revolution could impose any form of 
referendum. He did not accept that the decisions of the elected Constituent 
Assembly should be precarious and dependent on popular approval. The 
Constituent Assembly should be sovereign. 
In 1996, Jorge Miranda (1996a, p. 251) synthesised the reasons 
for the refusal of the PPD proposal. It was too late to organise the 
referendum; it could reduce the Constituent Assembly’s authority; and 
there was fear of the possible consequences. In fact, the rejection of the 
Constitution would extend the Provisional Government's inconveniences 
with serious costs; and an approval would crystallise some Constitutional 
solutions, making its revision in the future more difficult (Urbano, 1998, 
p. 112). 
3. The Proposals for Constitutional Revision by Referendum 
3.1. The Doctrinaire Drafts of the Constitution 
None of the Constitutional drafts introduced by the political 
parties in the Constituent Assembly included the Constitutional 
referendum.90 However, if that was the position of the parties, the same 
did not happen with the doctrinaire drafts which were openly presented by 
their authors, who where individually held responsible. Thus, two experts 
in Constitutional Law, Jorge Miranda and Francisco Lucas Pires, 
introduced their own drafts of the Constitution. 
In April 1975, Jorge Miranda published his own draft of the 
Constitution (Miranda, 1975), which would eventually form the basis of 
the PPD draft. However, the Political Commission of the Party did not get 
to pronounce on it, and the Platform between the MFA and the Parties 
rejected much of its content. He never introduced his draft in the 
                                                 
90 This did not happen with the parties without parliamentary expression. The Programme 
of the Popular Monarchic Party (PPM) approved in 1974 proposed the referendum on the 
Constitution and the Constitutional amendments drawn by the Constituent Assembly. This 
party did not have, however, any representative in the Constituent Assembly. 
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Constituent Assembly. Article 315 of the draft, under the epigraph of the 
‘people’s deliberation’, established that any amendment to the 
Constitution approved by the Parliament would be submitted to 
referendum between 60 and 90 days after the final parliamentary vote.  
Lucas Pires’s (1975) draft was published in essay form, and was 
requested by the leader of the CDS, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, as a 
contribution to the draft which the Party intended to present. Freitas do 
Amaral explains in the foreword (Pires, 1975, pp. 5-6) that the ideas 
proposed by Lucas Pires could not be totally integrated in the CDS draft 
due to the commitments assumed by this party when signing the Platform 
of Constitutional Agreement with the MFA. 
In this essay, Lucas Pires recommended caution in the 
Constitutional revision process. He considered the referendum to be an 
exceptional device of defence of Constitutional order when threatened. In 
his words (Pires, 1975, p. 160), Constitutional law cannot be in equal 
terms with ordinary law and the separation between constituent power and 
constituted powers is one of the no less important forms of separation of 
powers. It was a warranty that the revision procedure would only take 
place in case of the defence and accommodation of the Constitution to 
new situations. 
This decision of promoting the Constitutional revision in 
defence of the Constitutional order could be made in one of two ways: 
either by the Parliament, through a two-thirds majority or by referendum, 
with a proposal by the Chief of State (Pires, 1975, p. 160). That decision 
of the Chief of State could be made after a popular initiative, that is, if he 
was addressed with a significant number of requests asking for a 
plebiscite (Pires, 1975, p. 109). One should note that this proposal referred 
to the decision of making the Constitutional revision and not the revision 
process itself. 
Maria Benedita Urbano (1998, p. 119) points out that this 
Constitutional referendum is different from the typical or classic model of 
consultation. In fact, would not allow the people to sanction a draft of 
Constitutional amendments, or even to ratify a new Constitution.  The 
people could only decide, in principle, whether or not a Constitutional 
revision or a new Constitution should be made. In the case of the 
Constitutional referendum in Switzerland, the people can decide not only 
whether or not to proceed with a Constitutional change, but also have a 
say on the Constitutional subject in question. Lucas Pires did not explain 
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reasoning in this respect. In any case, the Constituent Assembly did not 
consider any of these proposals. 
3.2. The Referendum against the Constitution 
   3.2.1. The Sá Carneiro Strategy 
As the 1976 Constitution emerged from and reflected the 
economic, social and political changes of the revolutionary process that 
began in April 1974, it soon became obvious that the Portuguese right-
wing political forces assumed the purpose of replacing the Constitution or 
deeply changing its ideological sense, as an essential part of its strategy. 
In the Constituent Assembly, the CDS was the only party that voted 
against the Constitution. However, in spite of having voted in favour of 
the Constitution on 2 April 1976, the PPD/PSD took the leadership of a 
resolute action seeking to radically change the content of the Fundamental 
Law. The referendum assumed a very relevant role in that struggle. 
On 7 November 1977, one month before the fall of the First 
Constitutional Government led by the socialist leader Mário Soares, 
Francisco de Sá Carneiro resigned from the leadership of the PSD due to 
his disagreement with the political line of the majority of the National 
Political Commission. Sá Carneiro defended a stronger opposition of the 
PPD/PSD towards the PS Government and Ramalho Eanes, the President 
of the Republic who had in the meantime been elected. In his declaration 
vote before the PSD Political Commission, which left him in minority, Sá 
Carneiro [1989 (V) p. 21] advanced, for the first time, the idea that the 
Party needed to begin thinking about Constitutional revisions and the 
election of a new President of the Republic. 
At the PPD/PSD Congress in Oporto on 28 and 29 January 
1978, Sá Carneiro (1978, p. 66) explained the reasons for his resignation 
and approached the fundamental subjects that the Party must face. They 
were the structure of the State, the economic and social system, the 
Constitution, the President of the Republic, the Council of the Revolution, 
and the political role of the armed forces. He warned that it was necessary 
to consider Constitutional revisions and the election of a new President 
(Carneiro, 1978, p. 55). In that Congress, Sá Carneiro was not a candidate 
to lead the Party, but he was the head of all the lists to the National 
Council. At the end, he abstained from voting on the approved motion. 
Sousa Franco continued as President of the National Political 
Commission. 
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In text written a few days later, Sá Carneiro (1978, p. 55) 
criticised the Party for following an excessively moderate line towards the 
Government. Sá Carneiro (1978, pp. 13-15) defended that the opposition 
assumed by the PSD should be extensive to the President of the Republic, 
which he accused of being co-responsible for the governmental situation 
of the country and for playing the lead role of a type of presidential 
militarism. He believed that the PSD Congress fell short of the criticism 
that the presidential action imposed. Two factions were then visible inside 
the PSD. Sousa Franco and the National Political Commission supported a 
closer position towards the PS Government and a peaceful relationship 
with the President of the Republic. Sá Carneiro defended a radicalisation 
of positions against the Government, President Eanes and the Constitution 
(Manalvo, 2001, p. 76). 
In a strategy to return to the Party’s leadership, Sá Carneiro 
began to take public positions that diverged from the Political 
Commission, and he maintained his attacks against the PS, Eanes and the 
MFA. At the same time, he invoked the urgency of a Constitutional 
revision before the foreseen date (1980), through referendum [Carneiro, 
1978, p. 77; 1989 (V) p. 178]. The confrontation peaked in Vimeiro, on 2 
April 1978, during a lunch with PSD militants who invited him to speak. 
In his speech, Sá Carneiro [1989 (V), pp. 201-207] assumed the purpose 
of changing the Constitution through referendum. His argument was that, 
if the Constitution did not foresee the referendum, it did not exclude it. 
His proposal was for a referendum on the need for a Constitutional 
revision, and the holding of early elections.  
On 3 April, in a radio interview, Sá Carneiro [1989 (V) pp. 181-
197] Stated his strategy more precisely. There would be advanced 
elections to the Assembly of the Republic.  The campaign should mainly 
discuss the Constitutional revision. If the result of the elections led to a 
conclusion that most of the Portuguese people, or a great percentage of the 
Portuguese people, wanted a premature revision of the Constitution, a 
referendum should be held. 
The leftist Parties in the Parliament immediately criticised Sá 
Carneiro’s proposal. The communist MP Jorge Leite considered the 
proposal for referendum to be part of a vast operation to endanger the 
stability of the democratic system and the Constitution (DAR, 56, 5 April 
1978, p. 2030). On his side, the parliamentary leader of the PS, José Luís 
Nunes, considered that the innovation of the referendum to be a 
permanent coup d'état, since the Constitution did not allow it (DAR, 58, 7 
April 1978, p. 3149). 
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In an article published in the newspaper A Capital on 15 April 
1978, Jorge Miranda (1980, pp. 208-210) replied to the argument that 
even though the Constitution did not foresee the referendum, it did not 
exclude it either. As he explained, any jurist knows that the rule in public 
law is competence and not freedom. The State can only practice acts 
allowed by law, and the only body with power of Constitutional revision 
was the Parliament. On the other hand, the referendum was not included 
among the institutions considered by the Constitution.  
Given the opposition of the founder of the Party, the Political 
Commission elected at the PPD/PSD Congress was unable to weather the 
political turbulence that resulted.  It resigned at the National Council of 15 
April 1978. In that meeting, Sousa Franco clarified the divergences of the 
Political Commission from the Sá Carneiro line regarding some 
fundamental points. Sousa Franco refuted the idea that the Party should 
oppose the President of the Republic, and he did not demand the 
premature revision of the Constitution, with or without a referendum. In 
his view, the Constitutional revision should respect the Constitutional 
rules in terms of both time and procedure. In other words, such a revision 
should only take place after the beginning of the II Legislature, on 15 
October 1980, and with a two-thirds majority, therefore excluding the 
referendum (Franco et al, 1978, pp. 21-46). 
On 3 June 1978, 43 deputies and some other outstanding 
members of the Party, in solidarity with the National Political 
Commission, signed a document named Undelayable Options (Opções 
Inadiáveis). They assumed the strategy of proposing a Constitutional 
revision at the right time, and by the procedure established in the 
Constitution. A premature revision, with or without a referendum, would 
be a break with the assumed commitments and a violation of the 
Constitution (Franco et al., 1978, p. 68). The defeat of these conceptions 
in the VI PPD/PSD Congress, which took place in Lisbon on 1 and 2 July 
1978, provoked a division that gave rise to the emergence of a new party: 
the Independent Social Democrat Action (ASDI). 
At that Congress, Sá Carneiro definitively assumed the 
leadership of the PSD. In its conclusions, the claim for a premature 
revision of the Constitution appeared directly, including the implicit idea 
of submitting the future revision to the electorate. The Constitutional 
revision would take place in 1980, but the participation of the PSD in the 
Government before new elections would be dependent on the commitment 
of the PS, the CDS and the President of the Republic with a programme 
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that contained fundamental proposals for the future Constitutional revision 
that would be submitted to the electorate (PSD, 1978, p. 18). 
On 9 December 1978 the III Congress of the CDS took place, in 
which Lucas Pires (1979, p. 20) assumed his support for the referendum 
and considered it as a form of democratically granting a new Constitution. 
However, he supported it carefully, without ignoring that the referendum 
could be a double-edged sword. The referendum might save Portugal’s 
fledgling democracy, but it might equally send the country back into a 
dark zone. 
   3.2.2. Sá Carneiro’s Draft – Uma Constituição para os 
            Anos 80 
On 1 January 1979, Francisco Sá Carneiro published his own 
draft of the Constitution with the title “Uma Constituição para os Anos 
80” (A Constitution for the 1980s), having in view the Constitutional 
revision after the legislative elections of 1980. He gave up the idea of a 
premature revision, but argued that a referendum on Constitutional 
revisions was necessary. (Carneiro, 1979, p. 15). 
According to Sá Carneiro’s (1979, p. 178) proposal, the passing 
of amendments to the Constitution did not require a two-thirds majority, 
since the absolute majority of the deputies in full exercise of their office 
would be sufficient. However, laws passed in parliament revising the 
Constitution should be submitted to a referendum within 60 to 90 days of 
the final voting. 
In an article published in the Portuguese newspaper Jornal de 
Notícias, on 22 January 1979, the Constitutionalist and communist MP, 
Vital Moreira (1980, pp. 43-44), argued that Sá Carneiro’s idea of 
changing the Constitution before 1980 and/or by plebiscite, was an 
unConstitutional coup d'état. In Constituição e Revisão Constitucional, 
(Constitution and Constitutional Revision) published in 1980, Vital 
Moreira noted that Sá Carneiro’s draft seemed to abandon the idea of a 
premature revision by plebiscite.  He explained that ‘relative contention’ 
with three factors. The first regarded the need to maintain internal order 
within the PSD. The second factor was the need to attract the support of 
the PS for an agreement on the Constitutional revision. Finally, there 
would be another reason of a tactical order: that draft would be the first 
phase of a great revision of the Constitution, with the second phase only 
being possible with an absolute majority (Moreira, 1980, p. 51). 
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In an interview to the Portuguese Broadcasting on 22 January, 
Sá Carneiro [1989 (VI) pp. 7-13] retreated from the idea of a premature 
Constitutional revision, noting the PS and PCP’s opposition to that 
proposal. He considered, however, that the Constitution should contain 
flexible devices that allowed revisions to be made by Parliament with a 
two-thirds majority, provided the Constitutional revision laws were 
submitted to a referendum. 
The retreat from the demand for a referendum to advance the 
revision was also justified by the political lull and decrease in tension 
resulting from the collapse of the PS government and the installation of a 
non-partisan government. Indeed, President Eanes had designated Mota 
Pinto as Prime Minister.  Being close to the PSD, he moderated Sá 
Carneiro’s position, and was expected reinforce the PSD positions in the 
field of the Government. In those conditions, the Constitutional revision 
could wait until the 1980 legislative elections [Carneiro, 1989 (VI) pp. 8-
9]. 
   3.2.3. The Pressures on the President of the Republic 
Nobody in the PSD ignored that fact that the Party was unlikely 
ever to reach the two-thirds majority needed to review the Constitution. 
Thus, its political strategy for the Constitutional revision would have to 
involve the President. Therefore, attention turned to President Eanes and 
the 1980 presidential election. 
In the beginning of March 1979, an esteemed PSD member, 
Carlos Macedo, in an interview to the newspaper Tempo, launched a 
challenge on the President. According to him, the alternative to breaking 
the deadlock in the country would result in anticipated legislative 
elections, followed by a referendum for Constitutional revision on the 
president’s initiative. It would only be possible to think about the PSD 
supporting the re-candidature of Ramalho Eanes in 1980 if he agreed to be 
part of that plan. This is how the PSD returned to the idea of the 
premature revision, which had apparently been laid aside by Sá Carneiro. 
On 9 March 1979, Vital Moreira (1980, pp. 77-85) published an 
article in the newspaper O Jornal denouncing the campaigns to make the 
President of the Republic play a decisive role in the Constitutional 
revision, ideas that were promoted by rightist political forces. According 
to Moreira, those political sectors, conscious that they would not have the 
necessary support in the 1980 elections to force the Constitutional revision 
according to their perspectives, were trying to harness the democratic 
legitimacy of the President to those ends (Moreira, 1980, p. 78). There 
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were two ways to force presidential intervention. One of them would 
consist in demanding that the President start a premature Constitutional 
revision by referendum. Another one would consist in linking the 
presidential elections of 1980 to the Constitutional revision, with the 
President choosing the bearer of a Constitutional revision project 
(Moreira, 1980, p. 78). 
Two variants would still stand out. For some, the President 
should propose a new draft of the Constitution, which would then be taken 
to referendum, as in 1933 or in Palma Carlos's project. For others, the 
referendum could only change the Constitutional revision procedure, in 
terms of the time and the form of revision, in order to eliminate the need 
for a two-thirds majority and abolish limits on revision. For Vital Moreira 
(1980, p. 79), both outcomes would be flagrantly unConstitutional. In a 
Constitutional State, the only forms of expression and political decision 
with legitimacy were those foreseen in the Constitution, and the 
referendum was not among them. There was already a system for revision 
in the Constitution, and disrespecting this would be a Constitutional break. 
Furthermore, the President of the Republic had no Constitutional powers 
to call a referendum (Moreira, 1980, p. 80). 
The Socialist Party took a position on that subject in Parliament 
through a political declaration made by Jaime Gama on 13 March 1979 
(DAR, 37, 14 March 1979, pp. 1263-1265), which criticised the 
referendary wave that tried to change electoral calendars and legitimise 
forms of Constitutional revision by all means. These proposals were 
entirely illegitimate and contrary to the democratic regime. In the 
parliamentary sittings that commemorated the 5th anniversary of the 
Constitution, all the left parties criticised the idea of a Constitutional 
referendum, which they considered a counter-revolutionary coup d'état 
under the cover of a pseudo Constitutional revision.91  
On 18 April 1979, some campaigners, mostly from the PS, 
including two former ministers of the First Constitutional Government, 
António Barreto (Agriculture Minister) and José Medeiros Ferreira 
(Foreign Minister), signed and published the Manifesto Reformador 
(Reformer Manifesto), (Barreto et al., 1979). They explicitly proposed 
that the referendum be an extraordinary method of popular consultation, 
in order that the people had the opportunity to pronounce on the 
parliamentary capacity to freely review the Constitution. 
                                                 
91 In that sense, see the speeches by Salgado Zenha (PS) and Manuel Gusmão (PCP), 
(DAR, 45, 3 April 1979, pp. 1597 and 1589). 
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Their exact purposes were: a) to hold a referendum that allowed 
the members of Parliament to freely review the Constitution, before or 
during the new parliamentary elections; b) to dispute those elections to 
overcome the prejudices and obstacles created by the current political 
forces, which were neither capable of governing Portugal, nor able to 
establish the necessary democratic majority; c) to increase the powers of 
the President of the Republic (Barreto et al., p. 15). 
In that same month of April 1979, Sá Carneiro began to express 
concern about the leading presidential role in the political system. The 
government in power, led by Mota Pinto, had been appointed by the 
President’s initiative, and occupied the same political area of the PSD. 
Moreover, the 43 PSD deputies who subscribed the Opções Inadiáveis 
document decided to leave the Party and assumed the status of 
independent deputies, in disagreement with the party’s decision to vote 
against the Budget of State proposed by the Government. 
Sá Carneiro reacted with an interview carried in the newspaper, 
Tempo, on 11 April 1979.  He accused the Inadiáveis, Mota Pinto and the 
President of the Republic of intending to found a new, presidentially 
inspired party.  He finished by demanding early elections [Carneiro, 1989 
(VI) pp. 125-141]. On 28 April 1979, at a PSD rally in Faro (Algarve), he 
accused Eanes not just of intending to create a new party, but also of 
planning to call a referendum unilaterally. He wanted a referendum, but 
only if the Assembly of the Republic approved a referendum law and if 
the parliamentary majority decided to call a referendum [Carneiro, 1989 
(VI) pp. 159-165].  
In the Assembly of the Republic on 2 May 1979, Sá Carneiro 
gave a speech explaining his tactics. The referendum would be openly 
unConstitutional and undemocratic if the President of the Republic 
decreed it unilaterally. Therefore, the Assembly of the Republic should 
approve a referendum law and initiate a referendum in that framework. 
The responsibility of the President of the Republic would be to enact both 
acts (DAR, 54, 3 May 1979, p. 1893; Carneiro, 2000, pp. 330-345). 
On 6 May 1979, at a PCP rally in Almada, Álvaro Cunhal 
(1980, pp. 84-85) took a position on the Constitutional referendum, 
expressing his Party’s vehement opposition on three counts. First, the 
Constitution did not admit the referendum. Second, the reactionary forces 
wanted the referendum, not as a democratic consultation of the Portuguese 
people, but for an unConstitutional revision of the Constitution. And third, 
the referendum would defraud the popular will if handled by forces 
without any democratic scruples. 
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   3.2.4. The Democratic Alliance Project 
The VII PSD Congress on 20 June 1979 charged the party 
leadership with establishing contacts with the CDS and the PPM, aiming 
towards a cooperation agreement that expressly supported the idea of a 
referendum. In Sá Carneiro’s closing speech, he affirmed that, in the case 
of an impasse, the referendum could be a democratic tool, unblocking and 
clarifying with a view to moving forward in the future. Nobody could 
deny the people’s right to express their own sovereignty, ensuring the 
future of freedom, justice and progress. However, the referendum could 
be used as an act against, or for, democratic institutions. The Party would, 
therefore, study a bill to be introduced in the Assembly of the Republic so 
that the Parliament could approve a referendum law, allowing an eventual 
referendum in consonance between the Parliament and the President 
[Carneiro, 1989 (VI) pp. 225-232]. 
Meanwhile, after the dissolution of the Assembly of the 
Republic and the calling of intercalary elections for 2 December 1979, the 
PSD, the CDS, and the PPM constituted an electoral coalition named 
Democratic Alliance (Aliança Democrática).92 According to Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa (1983, pp. 583-584), the programme of the Democratic 
Alliance argued for a deep Constitutional revision in order to change the 
economic system, to subordinate the armed forces to civilian power, and 
to reduce the powers of the president within the government's system. The 
programme argued that the referendum was a Constitutional means of 
revising the Constitution, and sought to surpass the deadlock between 
president and parliament, and provide the mandate needed for the 
Constitutional revision. 
In the elections of 2 December 1979, the AD obtained an 
absolute majority, although by a narrow margin, in the Assembly of the 
Republic.  They constituted the VI Constitutional Government with Sá 
Carneiro as Prime Minister. The Government’s programme included the 
approval of a referendum law.  
Sá Carneiro defended that idea, based on the principle that 
anything that is not forbidden by the Constitution is implicitly allowed 
[DAR (I) 4, 12 January 1980, p. 52). Several deputies of the opposition 
disputed the juridical foundations of that idea. José Tengarrinha (MDP) 
considered it clearly unConstitutional [DAR (I) 4, 12 January 1980, p. 59]. 
                                                 
92 See the text of the AD Agreement, in Carneiro [1989 (VI) pp. 311-312]. The subscribers 
of the “reformer manifesto” took part of the coalition in places given by the PSD. 
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Veiga de Oliveira (PCP) considered it improper of a jurist to defend such 
an idea, when the Constitution says in its Article 3 that the sovereignty 
shall be single and indivisible and shall lie with the people who shall 
exercise it in the forms provided for in the Constitution [DAR (I) 4, 12 
January 1980, p. 63]. On behalf of the PS, Vítor Constâncio considered 
that the proposal heralded a rupture in the institutional framework [DAR 
(I) 6, 17 January 1980, p. 189]. 
In defence of the proposal, Luís Beiroco (CDS) tried to separate 
the referendum law from the Constitutional revision, arguing that the use 
of the referendum to review the Constitution was not the same as using a 
referendum to change the Constitution itself. In his opinion, it was 
important to utilise an instrument to discover directly citizens' opinion on 
fundamental subjects of community life and the organisation of the State 
[DAR (I) 5, 16 January 1980, p. 148]. 
The attempt to move the question away from Constitutional 
revision did not persuade the opposition, which did not forget that Sá 
Carneiro’s purpose was the approval of a referendum law as the first step 
of a Constitutional revision by referendum. In that sense, José Tengarrinha 
(MDP/CDE) said that the approval of the referendum law was only 
understandable when related with the purpose of changing the 
Constitutional order [DAR (I) 7, 18 January 1980, p. 253]. José Luís 
Nunes (PS) pointed out that the AD majority only intended to introduce a 
referendum law in order to use the unConstitutional referendum to 
illegally review the Constitution [DAR (I) 7, 18 January 1980, p. 289]. 
At the end of the debate, the communist leader, Álvaro Cunhal, 
described the attempt to introduce a referendum as a great subversive 
operation that would destroy the democratic regime. In addition to what 
has been mentioned about Article 3 beforehand, Article 111 (which is now 
108) established that the political power shall lie with the people and shall 
be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution did not 
admit the referendum, and the attempt to introduce it by ordinary law was 
clearly unConstitutional. If the sovereign organs could act according to 
the principle that the Constitution allows everything that it does expressly 
not forbid, then this would lead to illegality, free will and despotism [DAR 
(I) 7, 18 January 1980, p. 266]. The socialist leader Mário Soares also 
refuted the theory that everything that was not expressly prohibited in the 
Constitution was permitted.  Such a doctrine could never be accepted in 
Public Law and, at the time the Constitution had been drawn up, the PPD 
had expressed no such idea [DAR (I) 7, 18 Jan. 1980, p. 272]. 
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In the debate of a confidence motion presented by the 
Government, on 18 January 1980, Borges de Carvalho (PPM) appealed to 
Natural Law to justify the Constitutionality of the referendum. If the 
referendum was unConstitutional by the light of the Constitution, it was 
the Constitution that was unConstitutional and not the referendum. 
According to Natural Law, there were principles beyond any Constitution 
[DAR (I) 8, 6 June 1980, p. 304]. 
The idea that the Constitutional referendum would follow from 
Natural Law was not a new idea. Vital Moreira argued that the proposed 
referendum denied the idea of a Constitution. The Constitution, and the 
very idea of a Constitution, was born precisely to limit the absolute State, 
and to restrict what it could do. In his view, the Constitutional State could 
act only in the forms prescribed by the Constitution [DAR (I) 8, 6 June 
1980, p. 317]. 
   3.2.5. The Bills of the Referendum Law 
The Reformers Group introduced the first Bill of the referendum 
law on 6 June 1980. Bill No. 501/I [DAR (II) 69, 6 June 1980, pp. 1140-
1142] proposed an optional Constitutional referendum, if the 
Constitutional revision did not obtain the two-thirds majority in 
Parliament. The President of the Republic could also summon a 
referendum if requested by the Assembly of the Republic, or if there a 
minimum of 100,000 electors signed a petition. 
The PS and the PCP appealed the admissibility of the Bill, [DAR 
(II) 71, 14 June 1980, p. 1214-(2)] arguing that it was unConstitutional. 
They based their case on three points.  First, the Constitution established a 
framework of representative democracy that excluded the referendum. 
The people exercised political power in the forms provided by the 
Constitution, and the referendum was not one of those forms. Second, the 
bill gave powers to sovereignty organs that were not foreseen in the 
Constitution. Article 113(2) provided that the formation, composition, 
responsibilities, power, and modus operandi of the bodies that exercise 
sovereign power shall be those laid down by the Constitution. Third, the 
admission of the referendum as a form of Constitutional revision collided 
with the Constitutional provisions that regulated that process (Articles 286 
and followings). The Assembly of the Republic only acquired revision 
powers in the II Legislature, and the changes required a two-thirds 
majority of all the members present, more than an absolute majority of all 
the members in full exercise of their office. 
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On 21 June, the Government introduced the Bill of 
Authorisation to Legislate No. 365/I [DAR (II) 74, 21 June 1980, p. 1284] 
to define the legal status of the referendum. The PS appealed to its 
admissibility essentially based on the same arguments [DAR (II) 76, 25 
June 1980, pp. 1311-1312]. These initiatives were not considered due to 
the lack of parliamentary time in the brief I legislature, which ended on 27 
June 1980.     
3.2.6. The Doctrinaire Debate 
The debate about the legitimacy of changing the Constitution by 
referendum was particularly intense during 1980. The political sectors that 
defended this option increased their efforts to find a juridical base for it.  
In 29 May 1980, the Instituto Democracia e Liberdade, 
(Democracy and Freedom Institute), linked to the CDS, organised a 
workshop on the Constitutional revision, which invited several jurists 
from the political sphere of AD, including Barbosa de Melo, José Miguel 
Júdice and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. They supported the legitimacy of 
changing the Constitution by referendum, without respecting the 
Constitutional provisions related to the Constitutional revision. The idea 
was that the referendum would be a display of the original constituent 
power. The question would not be to review the Constitution but to make 
a new one. 
In No. 15 of Democracia e Liberdade published by the Instituto 
Democracia e Liberdade in June 1980, Afonso Rodrigues Queiró, 
Professor of Administrative Law at Coimbra University, considered it 
heresy to say that the exercise of sovereignty was regulated and limited by 
the Constitution (Queiró, 1980, p. 29). According to him, the people were 
entitled to modify their institutions (Queiró, 1980, p. 25). The Professor 
thought it illegitimate to limit the exercise of sovereignty by the people to 
the forms foreseen in the Constitution. The Constitution, in the terms of 
the classic thought of Rousseau and Siéyès, cannot rule the future action 
of the constituent power. It is the sovereign constituent power of the 
people, which could not be fettered by written provisions, approves, 
sustains and gives the Constitution its validity. It is not the Constitution 
that sustains, checks competences or fastens limits to the constituent 
power. The conclusion was that the Constitutional provisions did not 
constitute a limit to the freedom of the constituent legislator (Queiró, 
1980, pp. 24-25). 
As to how to exercise constituent power, Afonso Queiró 
considered the deliberative constituent referendum to be legitimate 
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because the referendum was pure and simple and did not precede any 
resolution from the Parliament or from a Constituent Assembly. The 
referendum was besides and above the Constitution. The popular instance 
had the supreme power and could express it directly, without the 
representatives' intervention. The fact that the referendum is not 
established in the Constitution was not an obstacle because, according to 
the author, the people are before and above the written positive 
Constitution (Queiró, 1980, pp. 30-31). Afonso Queiró recognised that the 
referendum held dangers. To prevent those dangers, to the referendary 
process would need to begin with a legislative process laid down in the 
Constitution, to regulate the popular initiative process in the constituent 
domain, and to observe whenever that initiative was taken in the future. 
That law should regulate the right of initiative, the characteristics of the 
drafts submitted to the electorate, the time of their presentation, the entity 
responsible for receiving them, as well as the scrutiny form (Queiró, 1980, 
p. 32). 
Finally, the author considered that it would be totally 
illegitimate for the President of the Republic or the Council of the 
Revolution to pronounce on the Constitutionality of an Assembly of the 
Republic decree regulating the referendary process in order to change the 
Constitution, since the Constitution did not foresee the referendum. The 
author believed that any sovereignty organ was entitled to oppose an 
eventual expression of the will of the people, in defence of the 
Constitution in force. The President of the Republic could only exercise a 
political veto, but the Assembly of the Republic could confirm its vote 
with the absolute majority of its members in full exercise of their office, 
and he could not refuse that enactment. 
There was still one obstacle, which was the need of a two-thirds 
majority from Parliament to surpass the political veto of the President of 
the Republic on subjects regarding the electoral acts provided by the 
Constitution. However, not even this fact deterred the author. According 
to him, the referendum was not an electoral act provided for in the 
Constitution, simply because the Constitution did not sustain the 
referendum (Queiró, 1980, p. 34). 
After all, Afonso Queiró’s aim was to create a Constitutional 
doctrine in agreement with the political conveniences of the moment. The 
goal was to move away from the Constitution in force. In order to do that, 
it was necessary to find a juridical foundation, which in this case meant 
refusing the legitimacy of the constituent power and placing the 
referendum, as an expression of popular will, above it. Through a 
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referendum, the people could move beyond the written Constitution. 
However, with the lack of devices already instituted to regulate the 
referendum procedure, the author appealed to the Constitution after all. 
The only recognised usefulness of the Constitution was to supply the 
necessary devices to dig its own grave. 
The same is true of the removal of an eventual presidential veto. 
According to the author, the President of the Republic could not invoke 
the Constitution to prevent an unConstitutional referendum, but he should 
be able to use the political veto within the limits of the Constitution. That 
is to say that the President could not invoke the Constitution in defence of 
Constitutional order, but he must act in accordance with it when using his 
own powers. Regarding electoral laws, the political veto could only be 
over-ruled by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, the author 
argued that, since the referendum was not foreseen in the Constitution, it 
could not be considered an electoral law in Constitutional terms, and thus 
could be over-ruled by an absolute majority. Curiously enough, it was in 
the Constitution that the author founded that thinking. Therefore, the 
validity of the Constitution was intermittent. It would be completely 
irrelevant where it contradicted the purposes of the author, but perfectly 
legitimate where the author sought to liquidate the current Constitutional 
order. 
In the same edition of Democracia e Liberdade, Marcelo Rebelo 
de Sousa and Margarida Salema did not go so far regarding Constitutional 
subversion by referendum. They considered that the referendum did not 
respect the established rules of Constitutional revision, but it would not be 
of a matter of Natural Law either, because the option of semi-direct 
democracy, in disfavour of direct democracy or representative democracy, 
does not flow from Natural Law. They even recognised that the common 
understanding in the doctrine was that the permission of the referendum 
depended on the Constitution (Sousa & Salema, 1980, p. 50). 
   3.2.7. The AD Strategy 
The purpose of the AD was to achieve a referendum before the 
Constitutional revision, suppressing the material limits and some of the 
formal limits on the exercise of the Constitutional revision power. That 
presupposed a parliamentary majority in the elections of October 1980, 
the approval of a referendum law defining the juridical outlines of that 
institution, and the election of a President, by the end of 1980, who 
accepted such a purpose (Sousa & Salema, 1980, p. 52). 
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Therefore, Sá Carneiro chose General Soares Carneiro as the 
presidential candidate for the AD. He was not a consensual candidate. He 
was too right wing, even by AD standards, but Sá Carneiro bet his 
political future on that choice, establishing a link between his continuity in 
the Government leadership and Soares Carneiro’s victory (Manalvo, 2001, 
p. 89). 
In the words that closed his electoral manifesto, General Soares 
Carneiro clearly assumed the acceptance of Constitutional change by 
referendum. He thought that the President should have a decisive word in 
the Constitutional revision. If there was no consensus in Parliament 
regarding the essential points, he would call a popular referendum.  On 
that, he made his position quite clear (Carneiro, 1980, pp. 13-14). 
Soares Carneiro’s method of working towards the Constitutional 
revision was also clear. In the II Legislature, which started in October 
1980, the Constitutional revision was inevitable. As the elections were so 
brief, the anticipation of the revision was not possible. After the election, 
AD political forces should try to reach an agreement with the Socialist 
Party, since they could not realistically obtain a parliamentary majority of 
two thirds, necessary for a possible Constitutional revision, themselves. 
However, the General had demands as to the contents of the revision in 
some essential points. If these points were not achieved, he would call a 
referendum. 
As Article 286(4) of the Constitution denied the President the 
power to refuse the enactment of the Constitutional revision law, it is clear 
that Soares Carneiro’s intentions wildely exceeded the constutional 
powers of the President of the Republic. The President did not have the 
right to evaluate concretely the contents of the revision. Neither did he 
have the right to react to a lack of agreement with the PS. The conclusion 
is obvious. Soares Carneiro’s election would have given way to a 
referendum that would change the Constitution, if the Constitutional 
revision intended by the AD did not obtain the two-thirds majority in the 
Assembly of the Republic. Therefore, instead of defending and observing 
the Constitution,93 Soares Carneiro would have changed it fundamentally. 
The necessity to defend the Constitutional order mobilised 
opinions. In an interview given to the newspaper Portugal Hoje, published 
                                                 
93 The sworn of the President of the Republic in his installation before the Assembly of the 
Republic was the following: I swear by my honour to faithfully perform the office with 
which I am invested and to defend and observe the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic [Article 130(3) of the Constitution]. 
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on 17 July 1980, the French Constitutionalist Maurice Duverger expressed 
a contusing judgement about the possibility of Constitutional referendum. 
He considered the referendum proposed by the AD as being no more 
democratic than the referendums used in countries with dictatorial 
regimes. On 29 July, in an interview with the same newspaper, Jorge 
Miranda (1983, p. 364) contradicted the legitimacy of the Constitutional 
referendum saying that the only way to review the Constitution was 
provided in Articles 286 and the Articles that followed. Anything different 
from that would be a coup d'état, a Constitutional rupture, or a new 
Constitution, but not a revision of the 1976 Constitution. 
From the side of the AD, José Ribeiro e Castro (1980, pp. 45-
48), an outstanding member of the CDS, exposed his plan in four phases. 
The first phase would be the AD victory in the legislative elections. That 
would assure the identification of the Portuguese people and their majority 
with the vision for a Constitutional revision. The second phase would be 
the drawing of a ‘declaration of rights’ by the AD, which would naturally 
become the central document of the revision and its fundamental inspiring 
centre. That document should contain the lines and the fundamental 
characteristics of the Constitution of 1981. The third phase would be 
Soares Carneiro’s victory in the presidential elections. As President, he 
would be able to decide on the referendum. The fourth and last phase 
would be the referendum that would approve the Constitution of 1981. 
   3.2.8. The Presidential Election of 1980 - The Decisive 
             Battle 
In the parliamentary elections of October 1980, the AD 
reinforced its absolute majority. The electoral result allowed it to govern 
alone but did not allow it to review the Constitution alone. Thus, the 
PSD’s purpose would only be possible with the commitment of the 
President of the Republic. This explains the declaration by Sá Carneiro the 
day after the elections, where he Stated that the AD victory would be the 
first ballot of the presidential elections. 
At the PSD National Council on 18 October 1980, Sá Carneiro 
[1989 (VII) pp. 365-372] defined the Party’s strategy. The PSD should try 
to achieve a consensus with the PS for the Constitutional revision. 
However, since consensus would be difficult to reach, the best way would 
be to pass a law on the referendum. With this law passed in the Assembly 
of the Republic and the Council of the Revolution, and therefore enacted 
by the President of the Republic, the PS would be capable of accepting a 
Constitutional revision agreement. 
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However, on 13 November 1980, the President of the Republic 
sent a message to the Parliament on the opening of the II Legislature, in 
which he made his opposition towards any Constitutional revision quite 
clear.  As far as he was concerned, the proposal did not follow the rules 
Constitutionally provided, and he peremptorily refused the Constitutional 
referendum [DAR (I) 1, 14 November 1980, p. 14]. This Statement, 
refusing the use of the referendum to impose a Constitutional change 
made by the President of the Republic who was already a candidate for re-
election, make it very clear what was at stake in the presidential election 
of December. The choice between Ramalho Eanes and Soares Carneiro 
was also, above all, a choice between the defence and the rupture of the 
Constitutional order. 
As expected, the debate raged with great intensity in the 
Assembly of the Republic during the first sessions of the II Legislature 
before the presidential election. In the debate of a motion of confidence 
presented by the Government, on 20 November, Almeida Santos (PS) 
affirmed his opposition to the referendum, not because it was good or bad, 
democratic or antidemocratic, but because the Constitution did not allow 
it [DAR (I) 4, 21 November 1980, p. 61]. 
On 21 November, Lucas Pires (CDS) defended the 
Constitutional referendum because the people are the first and last bastion 
of the human will in politics. The Constitutional revision was a 
responsibility of the Assembly, but the referendum could make sense 
against hegemonic attempts on the Constitution by some Parties [DAR (I) 
5, 22 November 1980, p. 31].  
On 25 November, Jaime Gama (PS) said that the revision of the 
Constitution should be based on Constitutional arguments rather than 
political blackmail. For the establishment of wider consensus – the two-
thirds majority – it would be necessary to discuss, negotiate and make 
reciprocal arrangements. The Constitutional arrogance of those who 
exhibited the systematic blackmail of the referendum should be 
substituted by a clear will of cooperation and dialogue with the opposition 
[DAR (I) 6, 26 November 1980, p. 153]. 
On 4 December 1980, Sá Carneiro died in a plane crash, and on 
7 December 1980 General Ramalho Eanes was re-elected President of the 
Republic, defeating General Soares Carneiro. That first week of 
December 1980 closed this chapter of Portuguese political life. The 
possibility to review the Constitution by referendum ended then. 
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   3.2.9. Critical Analysis 
Jorge Miranda (2003, p. 379) synthesised the arguments raised 
about the Constitutional referendum between 1977 and the end of 1980. 
For this author, the referendum sought: a) to solve the problem of the 
material limits of Constitutional revision by appealing to the people as 
holders of sovereignty to surpass them; b) to overcome an ideological 
deadlock that the Constitution would bring; c) to remove the rule of the 
two thirds majority for the approval of Constitutional changes; d) to make 
the revision possible even if they did not have the qualified majority 
required in the Assembly of the Republic. 
The legal arguments used to found that pretension were, in 
synthesis, the following: a) the people, in agreement with the democratic 
principle, would be above the Constitution and could change it without 
respecting the established rules; b) the referendum, as an expression of 
popular will, would belong to the Natural Law which, since it predated the 
Constitution, would provide a legitimate source of change; c) the fact that 
the Constitution did not foresee the referendum did not mean that it would 
forever be prohibited; d) the referendum would arise from the 
Constitutional principle of the direct and active participation of the 
citizens in public life; e) there were Constitutional referendums in other 
countries that lacked Constitutional provisions. These were even allowed 
in violation of Constitutional rules. 
According to Jorge Miranda (2003, p. 379), the weakness of 
those arguments was notorious before the general rules of interpretation 
and the basic rules of the western Constitutionalism. All public power has 
to be contained in juridical rules and, in that, representative and pluralist 
devices prevail over those of direct democracy. Actually, all those 
arguments were refutable and the defenders of the Constitutional order 
instituted in 1976 refuted them, based on the following arguments: 
a) It is correct to subordinate the exercise of power by the 
people to the forms and terms provided in the Constitution. 
In a democratic State based on the rule of law, the people 
can only exercise its sovereign power for those forms and 
terms, because the law also limits its power (Miranda & 
Medeiros, 2007, p. 299). 
b) The referendum did not come from Natural Law but from 
positive law. The contemporary democracy is not seated in 
the direct democracy, but fundamentally, in the 
representative democracy.  The referendum, as experience 
shows, can be a complement of representative democracy, 
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but it can be also an instrument in the hands of undemocratic 
regimes. 
c) The idea that everything that is not prohibited is permitted is 
only valid in the domain of private law, and not in public 
law, otherwise there would be the risk of falling into the 
domain of arbitrariness. In fact, there could be no 
referendum without the juridical definition of who had the 
power to summon it and which rules would be applied for its 
accomplishment. 
d) The active and direct participation of the citizens in public 
life does not necessarily presuppose the referendum. Once 
that principle was proclaimed, it fell upon the Constitution 
and the law to define the ways to operationalise it, which 
may or may not include the referendum. 
e) The defenders of the admissibility of the Constitutional 
referendum gave several examples of cases of referendums 
verified in other countries that contradicted Constitutional 
provisions, or were held without Constitutional provisions. 
The most commonly cited example was the referendum 
summoned by General De Gaulle on 28 October 1962 to 
achieve the Presidential election by universal suffrage. 
However, the French example of 1962 was not comparable 
with the Portuguese situation of 1976-1980 because, as Vital 
Moreira (1980, p. 81) pointed out, the Constitution in France 
allowed the legislative referendum, and the President was 
responsible for summoning it. In the Portuguese case, the 
Constitution did not admit any type of referendum. 
Furthermore, unConstitutional acts do not become 
Constitutional when they are practiced. Saying that the 
Constitution in Portugal could be ignored, and that a 
referendum could be held because such a procedure, 
although unConstitutional, had been done in other countries, 
is not indeed a legal argument. For the same reason, it is not 
valid to argue that, in previous historical moments in 
Portugal, Constitutional revisions were passed without 
respect for the Constitutional formalities. That is true, but 
those facts do not make them less unConstitutional. 
 
The conclusion is that the most important question was not a 
legal discussion, but a political attitude. The Constitutional revision was 
very clearly regulated in Articles 286 and the following of the 
Constitution. The revision could only happen in the II Legislature of the 
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Assembly of the Republic, which began in 1980. The changes of the 
Constitution would require a two-thirds majority of all the members in full 
exercise of their office. The President of the Republic could not refuse the 
enactment of the revision law. The revision laws would have to respect a 
group of principles granted in Article 290 of the Constitution, designated 
as material limits of the Constitutional revision. 
It was obvious that, regarding the Constitutional order, the 
Constitutional revision should observe such rules. However, as Jorge 
Miranda (2003, p. 379) reminds us, the problem was not a procedure to 
modify the Constitution, which presupposed the acceptance of their rules, 
but a process for its substitution. What was being questioned was the 
opposition to the Constitution and the rupture of the 1976 Constitutional 
order or, as Vital Moreira put it, the denial of the idea of a Constitution. 
3.3. The Constitutional Referendum after the 1980 
       Presidential Election 
   3.3.1. The 1982 Constitutional Revision 
      3.3.1.1. The Draft by B. Melo, C. Costa & V. Andrade 
The presidential election of 7 December 1980 made it clear that 
the Constitutional revision was in agreement with the established rules. 
The debate from now on would concern the draft amendments to the 
Constitution. 
In February 1981, three Professors from Coimbra University, 
António Barbosa de Melo, José Manuel Cardoso da Costa and José Carlos 
Vieira de Andrade, made a study for the base of the Democratic Alliance 
draft amendments to the Constitution (Melo et al, 1981). It was published 
under the title of Estudo e Projecto de Revisão da Constituição da 
República Portuguesa de 1976 (Study and Draft Amendments to the 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 1976). 
The section referring to the political power organisation, which 
was under Cardoso da Costa’s direct responsibility, proposed a wide 
Constitutional inception of the referendum with an extensive explanation 
on the deeply democratic nature of that institute. In this study, the 
referendum was conceived as a process or device that should intervene in 
special or even exceptional circumstances. These were characterised as 
follows: a) for a political impasse; b) for subjects whose magnitude and 
relevance justified that the responsibility of their decision was directly 
assumed by the people as a whole, or c) when it was be suspected, with a 
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minimum of likelihood and legitimacy, that the decisions taken by the 
representatives did not correspond to the feeling and common will of the 
citizens (Melo et al, 1981, p. 163). 
In this manner, they proposed the possibility of Constitutional 
referendum when, having a clear parliamentary majority in favour of 
changing the Constitution, that did not reach the two thirds majority 
needed to approve it. The authors invoked two facts in favour of their 
proposal. Firstly, the fact of it being a matter that respected the 
organisation or the rule of the community’s fundamental life, and 
therefore sufficiently important to justify the referendum. Secondly, the 
fact that the proposal for a referendum had the support of those who held 
major democratic offices: the majority of the Parliament and the President 
of the Republic, who would have the responsibility to call, after all, the 
referendum.  
Consequently, they proposed that the alterations should require 
passage by a two-thirds majority of all the deputies in full exercise of their 
office, just as the Constitution Stated. However, the President of the 
Republic could decide to call a referendum on these alterations if they had 
not obtained the required majority, and also if they had been approved by 
the absolute majority of all deputies in full exercise of their office (Melo 
et al, 1981, pp. 303-304). 
According to the authors' explanation, this provision opened a 
democratic escape valve for extreme situations which, even though 
exceptional, deserved Constitutional regulation. It would mean giving the 
same weight to the two-thirds majority on the one hand, and on the other, 
the sum of the will of the President of the Republic, the majority of 
Parliament and the majority of electors. 
      3.3.1.2. The AD draft 
The draft amendments to the Constitution introduced on 25 
April 1981 by the Democratic Alliance parties (PSD, CDS and PPM) 
followed the guidelines proposed in the draft, but with two main 
differences. The President of the Republic could summon the referendum 
after first consulting the Council of State (advisory body of the President 
of the Republic who created the draft proposed and the 1982 
Constitutional revision). The referendum could not have amendments to 
the Constitution that modified the balance of attributions and competences 
between the sovereignty organs or the provisions on the statute and 
election of their officeholders as subjects [AR, 1994 (I) p. 67]. 
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This proposal was strongly criticised in Parliament by José Luís 
Nunes on behalf of the PS, saying that the Constitutional referendum 
would simply break the stabiliser scheme of the Constitution of the 
Republic, which a majority could not change arbitrarily [DAR (II) 33 − 
Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 26]. This possibility would mean the 
subordination of the parliamentary system and the delivery of powers to 
the President, who could then subvert the semi-presidential system, 
transforming it into a presidential system tout court. 
Also on behalf of the PS, Luís Nunes de Almeida stressed that 
Constitutions were not necessary if simple majorities could change them. 
The ordinary law could rule everything. When the qualified majority was 
not obtained, the proposal for referendum would empty the sense of the 
word Constitution [DAR (II) 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 33]. 
      3.3.1.3. The Return to the Debate of 1980 
During the debate in the Ad-Hoc Committee of Constitutional 
Revision, the controversy before the 1980 presidential election threatened 
to resurface. Everything began with Jorge Miranda’s speech on 4 
November 1981, where he considered the proposal for a referendum by 
the AD as a confession that the proposal introduced before the presidential 
election was against the Constitution and would mean an institutional 
rupture [DAR (II) 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 28]. Before 
this Statement, Fernando Condesso (PSD) revisited the theory that the 
Constitution admitted the referendum even if it was not included in its 
provisions [DAR (II) 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 30] and 
Luís Beiroco (CDS), said that the explicit inclusion of the referendum in 
the Constitution, in quite strict terms that prevent any doubts or doctrinal 
divergences as to the cases in which it can be held, did not mean that the 
Constitution in force prohibited the referendum [DAR (II) 33 − 
Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 32]. These Statements caused a small 
storm. 
Luís Nunes de Almeida considered that, before such Statements, 
he saw the AD proposal for a national referendum in a different light. If 
the AD understood the referendum as legitimate even if it was not 
provided by the Constitution, the referendum proposed was only one form 
of referendum, thus admitting the legitimacy of other forms [DAR (II) 33 
− Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 33]. In the next meeting, on 5 
November, Nunes de Almeida (PS) and Vital Moreira (PCP) insisted on 
clarifying that point [DAR (II) 35 − Supplement, 6 January 1982, pp. 3-4]. 
Given that the Constitutional revision obviously needed the agreement of 
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the PS to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, the AD retreated from 
that position. Luís Beiroco (CDS) declared that the AD accepted the 
results of the presidential election, and took part in the works of the 
Constitutional revision. Francisco Sousa Tavares (PSD) said that the 
presidential election revealed that the will of the people did not align with 
the AD’s interpretation of the Constitution, and therefore the AD should 
abandon it definitively. Manuel Costa Andrade (PSD) was still clearer in 
affirming that, if the AD proposal were defeated, there would be no doubt 
that the Constitution did not allow the referendum [DAR (II) 35 
−Supplement, 6 January 1982, pp. 3-5). 
      3.3.1.4. The Ending in Plenary 
In the plenary sittings, the AD maintained its proposal of 
national referendum even if only symbolically. In the first article where 
that subject was raised (136), which related to the responsibilities of the 
President of the Republic, the AD proposed the inclusion of a new 
paragraph giving the President the power to call a popular referendum. 
That proposal obtained 98 yea votes (PSD, CDS and PPM) and 78 nay 
votes (PS, PCP, ASDI, UEDS, MDP/CDE and UDP). It did not have the 
two-thirds majority needed to pass [DAR (I) 116, 9 July 1982, p. 4874)]. 
This voting prejudiced the other proposals regarding the national 
referendum. 
Actually, the AD proposal of 1982 was justified by the symbolic 
loyalty to its history, making it obvious that there would never be a 
majority of two-thirds to approve it. The defeat of Soares Carneiro during 
the presidential election of 7 December 1980 had decided the question. 
The main questions for the PSD in the 1982 Constitutional revision, which 
needed the agreement of the PS, were the extinction of the Council of 
Revolution and the end of the transitional Constitutional period.  In order 
to achieve these important goals, they were prepared to drop their demand 
for the Constitutional referendum. 
   3.3.2. The Constitutional Referendum in the Subsequent 
Constitutional Revisions 
In the Constitutional revision of 1989, which approved the 
national referendum, there was no proposal for a Constitutional 
referendum. The same happened in the extraordinary revision of 1992.  In 
1994, a process of Constitutional revision began, but did not finish due to 
the absence of a global agreement between the PS and the PSD. Fifteen 
draft amendments were presented, but only one, personally presented by 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  238 
 
Pedro Roseta (PSD), proposed the Constitutional referendum (DAR, Off-
print 24/VI, 7 November 1994, pp. 135-137).  
In the 1997 Constitutional revision, the PSD again raised the 
proposal of Constitutional referendum, assuming it as a tradition of the 
Party (Magalhães, 1997). The proposal, introduced by Luís Marques 
Guedes in the Ad-Hoc Committee of Constitutional Revision, wanted the 
revision laws passed in the Assembly of the Republic to be subject to a 
binding consultation of the population before enactment as a way of 
democratically strengthening that change of the Constitution. He gave the 
example of the neighbouring Spain, where such a procedure exists (DAR, 
11, 26 June 1996, p. 189). The proposal also excluded the need to respect 
the material limits of the Constitutional revision. 
José Magalhães (PS) considered that proposal a less violent way 
of achieving the result wanted by Soares Carneiro in 1980. The 
Portuguese Constitution did not need any strengthening of legitimacy. 
Luís Sá (PCP) also expressed his opposition towards the proposal. The 
specification of material limits to the Constitutional revision and the 
request of a qualified majority for the revision were two basic lines of 
defence of fundamental democratic principles. The PSD proposal wanted 
to sweep away the first line. It was not a way to strengthen the direct 
democracy, but an instrument of Constitutional rupture (DAR, 11, 26 June 
1996, p. 193). 
The PSD’s insistence was weak. Barbosa de Melo soon 
recognised the unfeasibility of the proposal and did not want to waste any 
more time defending ‘a lost cause’ (DAR, 11, 26 June 1996, p. 194). 
Nevertheless, Vital Moreira (PS) gave three reasons for his opposition to 
the proposal. First, the Portuguese Constitutions, except for the ‘sad 
memory’ of the one in 1933, were drawn by constituent assemblies and 
reviewed by parliamentary assemblies. Second, it did not make any 
democratic sense to submit a law with 100 or 200 provisions to popular 
vote, mixing both essential and trifling questions. Each of the four or five 
million citizens would answer one question, not respecting the law as a 
whole but, probably, the provision that respected the conjuncture of his 
daily life most. Third, the referendum was against the Constitution, 
surpassing the material limits of the Constitutional revision. The 
Constitutional revision system requires that only a two-thirds majority can 
review the Constitution, once approved by a Constituent Assembly. It 
would be absurd that a relative majority of citizens, called to decide 
occasionally on the Constitutional revision, could defeat these changes 
after a required two-thirds of parliamentarians approved the amendments 
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to the Constitution, (DAR, 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, p. 195). The 
Committee refused the proposal in indicatory voting, with the PS and PCP 
nay voting, the PSD yea voting, and the CDS-PP abstaining (DAR, 14 − 
RC, 17 July 1996, p. 284). 
In the VI Constitutional revision, in 2004, the PSD and the CDS-
PP introduced unique draft amendments retaking the proposal for 
Constitutional referendum. In the terms of the proposal, a two-thirds 
majority would approve the amendments, which had to respect the 
material limits of the Constitutional revision,94 but the respective law 
could be submitted to referendum by deliberation of the Assembly of the 
Republic (Magalhães, 2004). 
The debate had no surprises or novelties, with the proposal being 
supported by Luís Marques Guedes and Gonçalo Capitão (PSD) and 
Diogo Feyo (CDS-PP) and being criticised by Alberto Martins (PS) and 
António Filipe (PCP). It was submitted to indicatory voting in the 
Committee, and the proposals had the yea votes from the PSD and the 
CDS-PP and the nay votes from the PS, PCP, BE and PEV.  
In the plenary sittings, the proposal to remove the exclusion of 
the Constitutional changes from the extent of the referendum had 86 nay 
votes (77 PS, 4 PCP, 3 BE, 2 PEV), 107 yea votes (92 PSD, 13 CDS-PP 
and 2 PS) and one abstention from CDS-PP [DAR (I) 78, 23 April 2004, 
p. 4282]. It did not obtain the qualified majority required. The proposal to 
allow the referendum on the Constitutional revision had 89 nay votes (76 
PS, 8 PCP, 3 BE and 2 PEV) and 108 yea votes (94 PSD and 14 CDS-
PP). It did not obtain the qualified majority [DAR (I) 79, 24 April 2004, p. 
4340). 
In synthesis, Portuguese democracy never accepted the 
Constitutional referendum. The principle according to which the 
Constitutional revision shall observe the limits established in the 
Constitution, either the limits of time (requiring the elapse of five years 
between each ordinary revision), or the formal limits (requiring the 
approval of every amendment by a two-thirds majority), or even the 
material limits, were never removed.  Despite the attempts of the right 
wing parties, mainly the PSD, to use the referendum as a way to carry out 
or ratify a Constitutional revision, the left wing parties, namely the PS and 
                                                 
94 The draft, however, proposed the removal of some of the most relevant material limits 
for Constitutional revision. 
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the PCP, always opposed those proposals, preventing the fulfilment of the 
majorities needed to review the Constitution in that sense. 
 




The Local and Regional Referendum 
1. Proposals to Introduce the Local Referendum Before 1982 
The Constitutional draft drawn by Jorge Miranda proposed, 
under the title ‘popular initiative’, that a number of citizens (not less than 
one-twentieth of those who voted the last election or referendum) could 
submit any deliberation of the local authority bodies to a referendum 
under the terms laid down by law (Miranda, 1975, p. 59). This idea 
reinStated, to a certain extent, the models for local referendums that came 
from the First Republic and the beginning of the 1936 Administrative 
Code. A significant number of citizens could submit the local authorities’ 
deliberations to referendum. 
Jorge Miranda’s proposal would have applied to all local 
authority deliberations. These would be provisional in nature, since they 
were dependent on an eventual referendum. In practice, the local 
referendum would be dependent on legal regulations.  It was not clear if 
the results of the popular initiative would be binding, or if their 
implementation would dependend on the decision of any State body. 
The same draft included two other forms of local referendum. 
The first was the creation or extinction of local authorities, as well 
alteration of their boundaries. The second was the organic statute of each 
municipality. The first case once again reinStated an idea that came from 
the First Republic, where the creation of new municipalities demanded a 
local referendum. Jorge Miranda’s draft included that possibility, but the 
proposal did not seem to consider that procedure as obligatory. The idea 
of approving the organic statute of the municipalities through referendum 
would have been impracticable in any case, since the Constitution foresaw 
no such document. In fact, the regime of the local authorities is 
established in general terms by the Constitution and by law, and is the 
same for all the local authorities at the same level. There are no individual 
documents specifying the regime of each one. Nonetheless, the 
Constituent Assembly did not discuss Jorge Miranda’s draft. 
The only proposal for local referendums introduced to the 
Constituent Assembly appeared in the PPD’s Constitutional draft. It 
proposed that the deliberations of the representative bodies of local 
authorities could be dependent on a resident citizens’ referendum and the 
Government’s approval. The PPD therefore revived the idea of the local 
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referendum as a way to limit the decision-making powers of the 
representative bodies. However, the 1976 Constitution did not allow the 
referendum by any means. 
On 6 June 1980, the subscribers of the Manifesto Reformador, 
which were elected in the AD lists, introduced the first Bill of Referendum 
Law. This initiative, which was essentially concerned with the 
Constitutional referendum, was deemed unConstitutional because the 
Constitution did not permit the referendum. The Assembly of the 
Republic did not consider the bill, which contained references to the 
regional and local referendums. 
2. The Local Consultations in the Constitutional Revision of 1982 
Soon after the legislative elections of October 1980, and before 
the first Constitutional revision, several theoretical works proposed 
making provision for the local referendum in the Constitution. Jorge 
Miranda’s draft published in 1980 included a provision under the title of 
‘direct local democracy’, which foresaw that the law could admit 
referendums on deliberations taken by municipal bodies. According to the 
author’s own note, this proposal had Article 66(4) of the Republican 
Constitution of 1911 as its antecedent. The idea was to test some forms of 
direct democracy at a local level, which, in his point of view, could be a 
useful experiment. (Miranda, 1980, p. 172). 
Three of the five draft amendments to the Constitution 
introduced to the Assembly of the Republic in 1981 proposed introducing 
local referendums: a) the Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 1/II, 
from the ASDI, which were set aside in favour of the FRS95 draft.  These 
proposed the inclusion of a new article in the Constitution and allowed 
popular consultations at a local level in the cases and terms established by 
law [DAR (Off-print 6/II) 26 June 1982, p. 26]; b) the Draft Amendments 
to the Constitution No. 2/II, from the AD, in the article on local 
authorities, provided that the law should determine the circumstances 
under which the referendum could take place at parish, municipality and 
regional levels when issues of important local interest were at stake [DAR 
(Off-print 6/II) 26 June 1982, p. 53]; c) the Draft Amendments to the 
Constitution No. 4/II, introduced by the FRS, proposed a new 
Constitutional provision that would allow, in the cases and terms 
established by law, popular consultations at a local level. These could be 
                                                 
95 The FRS was a coalition that included the PS, the ASDI and the UEDS from 1980 to 
1983. 
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held on matters that were the exclusive responsibility of the local 
authority bodies [DAR (Off-print 6/II) 26 June 1982, p. 90]. 
In the sub-committee’s preliminary consideration of the drafts 
there was no consensus between the PS and the PSD regarding these 
proposals, with the PCP adopting a supportive position, in principle, 
towards the FRS proposal. The first reading in the Ad Hoc Committee of 
Constitutional Revision (CERC) showed that the divergences put the AD 
on one side, and the PS and the PCP on the other.  Differences of opinion 
centred around three concerns. 
The first question whether the designation would be a 
‘referendum’ or a ‘popular consultation’. The PS preferred the expression 
‘popular consultation’ to distinguish it from the concept of referendum for 
known historical reasons. However, others thought the term ‘consultation’ 
was too vague. It was a wide concept that could vary according to the 
circumstances.96 Deputies of AD argued that a vague reference to ‘popular 
consultation’ was unacceptable, and that ‘popular consultation’ must take 
the form of a direct ballot.97  
The second divergence between the PS and the PSD was the 
extent of the referendum. This matter attracted much political debate. For 
the PS, consultations could only happen on matters under the exclusive 
auspices of the local authority bodies. The AD referred to questions of 
important local interest, which, according to Almeida Santos, could lead 
to a national referendum in practice through a juxtaposition of local 
referendums [DAR (II) 49 − 3rd Supplement, 5 February 1982, p. 1020-
(83)]. 
The third problem concerned the right to initiate local 
referendums. In the FRS proposal, the popular consultation must be called 
at the level of local authorities and by their own bodies, in the terms 
established by law. The AD proposal allowed local referendums to be 
called by the State, but only if their scope was local [DAR (II) 3rd 
Supplement, 49, 5 February 1982, p. 1020-(84)]. 
However, Vital Moreira still posited the question of whether or 
not there should be prior review of the Constitutionality and legality of the 
local referendum before it was called in order to prevent the use of the 
                                                 
96 In this sense, see Almeida Santos’s speech [DAR (II) 49 - 3rd Supplement, 5 February 
1982, p. 1020-(85)]. 
97 See Francisco Sousa Tavares’s speech [DAR (II) 49 - 3rd Supplement, 5 February 1982, 
p. 1020-(85)]. 
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referendum for aims not allowed in the Constitution or by law. It would be 
easier to prevent that possibility than face the results of an illegal or 
unConstitutional referendum. This idea received widespread acceptance 
[DAR (II) 49, 3rd Supplement, 5 February 1982, pp. 1020-(85-86)]. 
In an attempt to negotiate positions, Sousa Tavares declared the 
AD willing to accept the restriction of popular consultations or 
referendums regarding matters of exclusive responsibility to local 
authorities, since it was expressly Stated that the consultation should be of 
an electoral type [DAR (II) 49, 3rd Supplement, 5 February 1982, pp. 
1020-(87-88)]. The question was approached again in the meeting of 13 
January 1982, concerning the prior review of Constitutionality to institute 
in the framework of the creation of a Constitutional Court [DAR (II) 69 − 
Supplement, 20 March 1982, pp. 1288-(6-7)]. In the plenary sittings of 21 
July 1982, the AD and the FRS thrashed out the points of convergence and 
divergence between them [DAR (I) 124, 22 July 1982, pp. 5231-5235].  
On 26 July 1982, the Committee arrived at a text [DAR (II) 136 
− Supplement, 3 August 1982, pp. 2438-(1-3)], sent to the plenary on 29 
July for approval as Article 241(3)98 of the Constitution. It Stated the 
following:  
‘The local authority bodies may submit matters that are included 
within its exclusive responsibilities, in such cases and under such 
terms with effect as the law may lay down, to the direct 
consultation of the citizens registered to vote in the respective area 
in the form of a secret ballot.’ 
This provision had 152 yea votes, (PSD, PS, CDS, PPM, ASDI, 
UEDS and MDP/CDE), one nay (UDP) and 34 abstentions (PCP).99 
Article 213d established the Constitutional Court’s responsibility to 
conduct prior reviews of the Constitutionality and legality of direct 
consultations of citizens at a local level, with 34 abstentions (PCP and 
UDP).100 
                                                 
98 All references to articles of the Constitution follow the actual numbering at the time to 
which they referred. 
99 Concerning the declarations of vote, Amadeu Ferreira (UDP) considered that the direct 
consultations could pressure the local authorities, and Vital Moreira (PCP) reserved a 
definitive position for the moment when the law would define the concrete outlines of the 
popular consultations [DAR (I) 124, 22 July 1982, p. 5483]. 
100 The abstentions of the PCP in all the provisions regarding the responsibilities of the 
Constitutional Court were explained by reticences as to its creation and composition [DAR 
(I) 124, 22 July 1982, pp. 5484-5485]. 
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It is therefore important to systematise the Constitutional 
framework for local consultations, which came from the Constitutional 
revision of 1982 (Pinto, 1988, pp. 92-95; Bon, 1997, p. 467): 
1)  The responsibility to hold direct consultations of the 
citizens registered to vote belongs to local authority bodies. 
Citizens cannot make direct calls for referendums (the 
citizens’ initiative), but they can lobby local authority bodies 
to that purpose. 
2) The local authorities, in the terms of the Constitution, are 
municipalities (municípios), parishes (freguesias) and 
administrative regions (Article 238). The latter were never 
instituted for reasons that are explained [in chapter 5]. The 
Constitution therefore admitted direct consultations at parish 
and municipal levels. If the administrative regions foreseen 
in the Constitution had been created, direct consultations at 
regional level would have been permitted by the 
Constitution.  
3) The responsibility to promote local consultations would 
belong to the local authority bodies, in other words, to the 
deliberative bodies (assembleia municipal and assembleia 
de freguesia) and to the executive ones (câmaras municipais 
and juntas de freguesia), in accordance with their respective 
responsibilities.101 The responsibility to decide on the 
accomplishment of the referendum rested with the body 
responsible for deliberating on the subject under 
consultation, or in the case of shared responsibilities, to both 
(Pinto, 1988, p. 93). 
4) The right to vote should be given to the citizens registered in 
the area where the consultation was promoted. 
5) The general provisions of electoral law established in the 
Constitution (Articles 49 and 116), namely the personality, 
universality, equality and secrecy of vote, as well as the 
provisions regarding the electoral registration, election 
campaigns, duty to cooperate with the electoral authorities 
                                                 
101 Canotilho & Moreira [1993 (II) p. 39] expressed the opinion that only the deliberative 
bodies (the assemblies) could call local referendums. There seems to be no Constitutional 
basis that prevents the executive bodies of local authorities from calling local consultations 
on matters exclusively under their responsibility. 
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and correctness and validity of electoral acts, should apply 
to the local referendum. 
6) The prior review of the Constitutionality and legality of the 
consultation should remain in the Constitutional Court. 
7) The local consultations should concern matters included 
within the exclusive responsibilities of the local authority 
bodies that would call on them. The local consultations 
could not be held on subjects of relevant local interest not 
included in those responsibilities. 
8) The Constitution did not establish other boundaries as to the 
matters that could be the subject of consultation. Ricardo 
Leite Pinto (1988, p. 87) points out, however, that the acts 
that in the terms of the law had to be decided on by local 
authorities in the exercise of bound powers and the decisions 
that could not be revoked as well could not be submitted to 
local consultations, under the penalty of illegality. 
9) The Constitution was silent on whether the referendum 
would be binding or merely advisory, leaving such matters 
to be established by legislation. 
3. The Attempts to Legally Regulate Local Direct Consultations 
In the III Legislature, after the elections of April 1983, which 
gave place to a PS/PSD coalition Government, the first initiatives to 
legislate on local direct consultations were introduced. On 23 June 1983, 
the UEDS presented Bill No. 169/III [DAR (II) 10, 28 June 1983, pp. 424-
442].  On 15 March 1984, the CDS presented Bill No. 302/III [DAR (II) 
98, 16 March 1984, pp. 2500-2501]. Finally, on 21 March 1984, the PS 
and the PSD jointly presented Bill No. 306/III [DAR (II) 101, 22 March 
1984, pp. 2540-2545]. 
The debate on the general principles of all of the bills took place 
on 2 May 1984 [DAR (I) 99, 3 May 1984, pp. 4211-4241]. All of them 
were approved with yea votes from the PS, PSD, CDS, UEDS and ASDI. 
The PCP voted nay. The MDP/CDE and independent MP António 
González, elected within the PCP list, abstained. The ad hoc committee 
that was created to debate the bills in detail did not finish its work, given 
the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic in July 1985. 
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In the IV Legislature, which began in 1985 with a PSD relative 
majority, Deputy Lopes Cardoso, former leader of the UEDS, returned to 
the PS and introduced Bill No. 66/IV [DAR (II) 12, 7 December 1985, pp. 
385-390] while essentially maintaining the UEDS bill. The PS presented 
Bill No. 107/IV [DAR (II) 25, 23 January 1986, pp. 784-790] 
reintroducing the contents of the previous PS/PSD bill. The PSD, in turn, 
presented Bill No. 139/IV [DAR (II) 34, 22 February 1986, pp. 1416-
1421] containing some changes in relation to its previous position. The 
CDS presented Bill No. 146/IV [DAR (II) 36, 28 February 1986, pp. 1493-
1495) essentially reviving the initiative of the previous legislature. 
The general debate took place between 15 and 17 April 1986 
and ended with the approval of all bills with yea votes from PSD, PS, 
PRD, CDS, MDP/CDE and four independent MPs, and with nay votes 
from PCP [DAR (I) 55, 16 April 1986, pp. 2106-2113 and DAR (I) 57, 18 
April 1986, pp. 2164-2181 and 2193]. However, once again, the initiatives 
lapsed due to the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic in April 
1987, before the conclusion of the legislative procedure. 
4. The Idea of Local Referendums to Create Municipalities 
On 13 October 1983, the PS/PSD Government introduced 
Government Bill No. 45/III on the creation of municipalities [DAR (II) 38, 
14 October 1983, pp. 967-970]. The Government proposed that the 
creation of new municipalities should be organised through a direct 
consultation of the citizens. The civil governor of the respective district 
would schedule the consultation, and the process would follow, mutatis 
mutandis, the Electoral Law for the Assembly of the Republic. Then the 
Government would make the necessary regulation within the 30 day time 
limit. 
The political context of that proposal was defined by a fierce 
controversy over the creation of a new municipality in Vizela, which was 
bravely fought for by the local population, but that the Government 
wished to avoid. The idea of a local referendum as a precondition for 
creating new municipalities had implications not only on the creation of 
the municipality of Vizela, but also for the appearance of other proposals 
encouraged by that precedent. 
However, there was no law, at the time, on the application of a 
local referendum. Furthermore, the Constitutional system, according to 
which the local referendum could only be held on matters within the local 
government bodies’ exclusive responsibility, did not allow the pattern of 
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local referendum proposed by Government. The ultimate responsibility 
for the creation of a new municipality would always belong to the 
Parliament, as laid down in Article 249 of the Constitution. Thus, the 
proposal was strongly criticised in the parliamentary debate [DAR (I) 34, 
18 October 1983, pp. 1494-1499 and DAR (I) 35, 19 October 1983, pp. 
1505-1559], namely by the PCP members. The Government abandoned 
the idea. 
5. Law No. 49/90, of 24 August, on Local Direct Consultations 
In the V Legislature, after the elections of 19 July 1987, which 
the PSD won with an absolute majority, three parties introduced bills, 
including the CDS with Bill No. 86/V [DAR (II) 20, 11 November 1987, 
pp. 422-(3)-422-(5)], the PSD with Bill No. 200/V [DAR (II) 53, 4 March 
1988, pp. 1032-1037] and the PS with Bill No. 231/V [DAR (II) 68, 27 
April 1988, pp. 1280-1286]. The general debate on these bills took place 
on 20 May 1988. They were all approved with yea votes from the PSD, 
PS, PRD, CDS and PEV and with the abstentions from the PCP and 
independent MPs from the civic association of Democratic Intervention 
(ID), elected in the PCP lists [DAR (I) 91, 21 May 1988, pp. 3692-3703]. 
The legislative procedure ended on 25 May 1990, with the unanimous 
approval in the final overall vote of Law No. 49/90, of 24 August. The 
passing of the law finally happened eight years after its Constitutional 
inception. 
In synthesis, the enactment of Law No. 49/90, dated 24 August, 
had the following consequences: 
1) Local consultations could happen on matters that were the 
exclusive responsibility of the local authority bodies, 
excluding financial questions or other subjects that the local 
authorities were bound to decide on in the terms of the law. 
This also included matters that had been the subject of an 
irrevocable decision. The legislation excluded financial 
questions;102 those questions that had a legal imperative and 
should be resolved by local authorities; as well as those that 
had been previously resolved and whose decisions could not 
be revoked, namely those that created new rights. The 
phrase that referred to topics that were inappropriate 
                                                 
102 When Law No. 49/90, of 24 August was approved, the Constitutional Revision 
of 1989 had already enshrined the referendum at a national scope, and had also 
excluded the possibility of submitting financial questions to referendum.  
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consultation, which would indeed be unConstitutional, was 
not included. 
2) The local consultations should be binding, with the local 
authority obliged to respect their results. 
3) The deliberation on the holding of local consultations 
belonged exclusively to the deliberative bodies of the local 
authorities (parish and municipal assemblies). 
4) The proposals for the deliberative assemblies asking for 
consultations belonged exclusively to the executive bodies 
or to a third of their members. The citizens' initiative with 
respect to the local authority bodies was not accepted. 
5) Within eight days after deliberation, the chairperson of the 
local authority body should send an application to the 
Constitutional Court asking for a review of the 
Constitutional and legal conformity of the consultation. 
Once that conformity was verified, the president of the 
executive body of the local authority should set the date of 
the consultation within eight days, and the consultation 
should take place between 70 and 90 days after the date was 
set. 
 
6. From Direct Consultations to Local Referendums 
6.1. The Constitutional Revision of 1989 
Before the final approval of Law No. 49/90, there was the 
second Constitutional revision. In its draft, the PS proposed the adoption 
of the term referendums to replace the designation of local consultations 
[Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 3/V, DAR (Off-print 1/V) 31 
December 1987, p. 4428].  
Questions remained, however, about the precise meaning of the 
PS proposal regarding the effectiveness of the local referendum.  The 
expression ‘consultation’ remained in the text, and it seemed that the PS 
maintained that local consultations should only be advisory. However, in 
the same draft of the Constitutional revision, the PS proposed introducing 
the national referendum with binding effectiveness. Moreover, when the 
discussion took place on 22 July 1988 (Bill No. 231/V), the PS admitted 
that the binding effectiveness of local consultations had already been 
approved in general terms. 
 In the first reading of the draft amendments to the Constitution, 
the PS representatives, Almeida Santos and António Vitorino, maintained 
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that the subject remained open. In their opinion, the Constitutional text in 
force admitted both solutions since it sent the decision on the 
effectiveness of the local consultations to the law. The PS proposed the 
adoption of the word ‘referendum’, since it would be illogical for a 
national referendum to have a different designation than a local 
consultation. Almeida Santos also admitted that it would be illogical for 
the national referendum to be binding if the local referendum was not.  
The PS was therefore willing to consider the binding effectiveness of local 
referendums [DAR (II) 52 − RC, 26 October 1988, pp. 1667-1671]. Later, 
the PS withdrew their proposal [DAR (II) 92 − RC, 27 April 1989, p. 
2691). The PRD, created in 1985 and inspired by President Ramalho 
Eanes, proposed the elimination of local consultations, but was 
unsuccessful in this argument [Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 
9/V, in DAR (Off-print 1/V) 31 December 1987, p. 4480].  
6.2. The Failed Constitutional Revision of 1994 
In 1994, a Constitutional revision procedure failed, after few 
months of debates inside the Had Hoc Committee, for lack of agreement 
between the PS and the PSD. On that occasion, the PS proposed the 
further widening of the scope of local consultations. According to the 
Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 1/VI [DAR (Off-print 24/VI) 7 
November 1994, p. 17], the local authorities could hold direct 
consultations of their citizens on matters other than those of their 
exclusive responsibility. Consequently, the matters on which local 
authorities exercised some type of responsibility, although not exclusive, 
could be subject to local consultation. Therefore, in matters whose 
decision involved the local authorities and other bodies of the State 
(namely the Government), the local authorities could use local 
consultations to build pressure for a decision that suit their purposes, 
provided those purposes were supported by the result of the direct local 
consultation.  
Luís Fazenda, and independent MP from the UDP, who was 
elected from the lists of the PCP, proposed that local authority bodies 
could hold direct consultations on any matters that affected the population 
of their respective area [Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 13/VI, 
in DAR (Off-print 24/VI) 7 November 1994, p. 125]. In this version, the 
local authorities were able to promote popular consultations on matters 
outside their specific responsibilities, and use the popular consultations to 
show the popular sentiment of populations regarding decisions that might 
affect them. 
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6.3. The Legislative Procedure from 1996 to 1999 
During the VII Legislature, which began in 1996 with a relative 
majority by the PS, several parties introduced legislative initiatives on the 
subject of local consultations. On 21 March 1996, the PCP presented Bill 
No. 128/VII [DAR (II-A) 31, 28 March 1996]. On 13 November 1996, the 
PSD presented Bill No. 237/VII [DAR (II-A) 7, 29 November 1996, pp. 
101-102]. On 3 April 1997, the PS presented Bill No. 303/VII [DAR (II-
A) 33, 10 April 1997, p. 511]. On 4 April 1997, the CDS-PP presented 
Bill No. 304/VII [DAR (II-A) 33, 10 April 1997, pp. 511-513].  
A general debate took place on 9 April 1997 [DAR (I) 59, 10 
April 1997, pp. 2063-2070], and there was unanimous approval for all the 
initiatives [DAR (I) 60, 11 April 1997, pp. 2108-2109]. However, the 
legislative procedure did not follow. At that time, the fourth Constitutional 
revision was in progress. That procedure ended in July 1997 and brought 
some changes regarding local consultations. 
On 25 March 1999, the Government presented Government Bill 
No. 262/VII [DAR (II-A) 49, 31 March 1999, pp. 1336-1362] on the local 
referendum which sought the complete revocation of Law No. 49/90, 
having in mind the new Constitutional text. On 24 October 1999, all the 
initiatives lapsed due to the unexpected dissolution of the Assembly of the 
Republic.  
6.4. The Constitutional Revision of 1997 
The Fourth Constitutional Revision took place at the same time 
as the legislative procedure for local direct consultations, and introduced 
some changes in that regard. In doctrinal terms, Jorge Miranda (1996b, 
pp. 20-21) published a draft supporting the inclusion of the national and 
local referendum in the same Constitutional provision, leaving out the 
designation of local direct consultations. The local referendum could be 
held on matters not necessarily exclusive to, but within the responsibility 
of, the local authority bodies, and it could happen in neighbouring local 
authorities regarding the definition of the respective borders or the 
creation of a local authority. Besides this, the referendum could be held 
through the direct initiative of at least 5% of the citizens registered to vote 
in the respective territory. 
When the procedure for the Constitutional revision began in the 
Assembly of the Republic, the PS revived its proposal to widen the 
substantial scope of local consultations, having included in the Draft 
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Amendments to the Constitution No. 3/VII a new provision on that subject 
[DAR (II-A) 27, 7 March 1996, p. 484-(26)]. The Draft Amendments to 
the Constitution No. 8/VII, presented by the independent MPs elected in 
the lists of the PS, included the very same proposal [DAR (II-A) 27, 7 
March 1996, p. 484-(81)]. Finally, in the Draft Amendments to the 
Constitution No. 4/VII [DAR (II-A) 27, 7 March 1996, p. 484-(43)], the 
PCP proposed that the citizens initiate direct consultations in the territory 
where they were registered to vote, in the terms laid down by law. 
In the first reading of the drafts, the PSD announced its support 
for the PS proposal to enlarge the substantial scope of local consultations 
to matters that were not the exclusive responsibility of local authorities, 
and for the PCP proposal to admit the popular initiative of local 
consultations.103 Meanwhile, the chairman of the Committee, Vital 
Moreira, assumed the job of unifying the terminology by replacing the 
designation of popular consultations for local referendums [DAR (II − RC) 
61, 4 December1996, p. 1849]. 
On behalf of the PCP, Luís Sá agreed with both proposals, and 
considered the local consultations bound to the exclusive responsibilities 
of the local authorities to be practically useless. Because Portugal had 
restricted local autonomy, the most important subjects were not within the 
exclusive responsibilities of the local authorities.  Therefore, they were 
out of the referendum’s remit, pitting proposals for popular consultation 
against the judgement of unConstitutionality by the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore, the way to strengthen local popular consultations would be to 
extend the exclusive responsibilities of local authorities, or to allow the 
local consultations on matters that were not within their exclusive 
responsibilities [DAR (II − RC) 61, 4 December 1996, p. 1851]. 
In that phase of the debate, the PS, PSD and PCP accepted the 
adoption of the designation ‘local referendums’, to include the substantial 
scope of the local referendums on matters not included in the exclusive 
responsibilities of the local authorities, and to admit the popular initiative 
of a local referendum in the terms laid down by law. The PS proposal was 
also accepted, so the reference to the ‘local authority bodies’ was replaced 
by reference to ‘local authorities’, because the substantial scope of the 
                                                 
103 See the speech by Miguel Macedo (PSD) in CERC, on 3 December 1996 [DAR (II-RC) 
61, 4 December1996, p. 1850]. The PSD draft did not include any provision on the local 
referendum. However, the draft introduced by a group of PSD deputies, members of the 
workers tendency (TSD) included a proposal on it, which was later withdrawn [DAR (II-A) 
27, 7 March 1996, p. 484-(87)].   
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referendum should refer to the responsibilities of local authorities and not 
just the specific ones of each body. 
In the second reading, the PS and PSD introduced a specific 
proposal that was unanimously approved. It Stated that ‘in such cases, 
under such terms and with such effect as the law may lay down, local 
authorities may submit matters that are included within the responsibilities 
of the local authority bodies to referendum by those of their citizens who 
are registered to vote. The law may grant the initiative of registered 
electors.’ [DAR (II − RC) 116, 9 July 1997, p. 3405). This proposal was 
unanimously approved in the plenary sittings of 30 July 1997 [DAR (I) 
104, 31 July 1997, p. 4014]. 
7. Organisational Law No. 4/2000, of 24 August 
7.1. The Legislative Procedure 
In the VIII Legislature, the Assembly of the Republic considered 
three legislative initiatives on the local referendum. On 22 December 
1999, the Government revived its previous initiative, introducing 
Government Bill No. 8/VIII [DAR (II-A) 12, 6 January 2000, pp. 189-
216). The PSD presented Bill No. 85/VIII on 21 January 2000 [DAR (II-
A) 18, 2 February 2000, p. 369], and the PCP presented Bill No. 108/VIII 
on 23 February 2000 [DAR (II-A) 23, 3 March 2000, pp. 471-473]. 
All the initiatives sought to update the regime of the local 
referendum, having in mind the Constitutional text approved in 1997, 
even if they followed different methodologies. The Government proposed 
to draw up a law on local referendums ex-novo, thus adapting the regime 
of the national referendum approved by Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April and 
replacing Law No. 49/90, of 24 August, in its entirety. On the other hand, 
the PSD and the PCP proposed amendments to Law No. 49/90.104 
7.2. The Legal System Passed 
The result of the legislative procedure was Organisational Law 
No. 4/2000, of 24 August, which approved the legal system for the local 
referendum currently in force in Portugal (Rocha & Filipe, 2003, pp. 81-
132). The main changes were as follows. [Amaral, 2009 (I) pp. 606-614]: 
                                                 
104 On the differences among the proposals, see the report drawn for the Constitutional 
Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees Committee by António Filipe (PCP), [DAR (II-
A) 24, 15 March 2000, pp. 518-520]. 
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1 – Substantial scope 
The local referendum can occur on subjects of relevant local 
interest, which should be resolved by the local authority bodies of 
municipalities or parishes. Relevant topics must be included within their 
responsibilities, which can be either exclusive or shared with the State 
and/or with the autonomous regions [Article 3(1)]. 
Therefore, proposals submitted by local authorities could be 
decided by a local referendum. In that event, the deliberations of the local 
authority would be halted and the proposal sent to the Constitutional 
Court. If the Court declared the referendum valid and the referendum took 
place, the deliberations would resume after the refendum gave approval. 
(Article 5). 
The following matters were excluded (Article 4): 
a) Matters that are the exclusive responsibility of the 
sovereignty organs; 
b) Matters regulated by the legislative act or by the State 
regulation binding the local authorities; 
c) The options of the plan and the activities report by local 
authorities; 
d) Questions and acts of budgetary, tax-related or financial 
contents; 
e) Matters that have been the subject of an irrevocable 
decision, namely acts that are constitutive of rights or of 
legally protected interests, except in the cases where they are 
unfavourable to their addressees; 
f) Matters that had been the subject of a judicial decision that 
passed a definite judgement; 
g) Matters that had been the subject of a contract between the 
State and the local authority. 
2 – Effectiveness 
The referendum shall be binding on the local authority bodies if 
the number of voters exceeds half the number of registered electors 
(Article 219). If the result involved the production of an act on the 
question or questions submitted to referendum, the local authority that is 
responsible must approve it within 60 days (Article 221). During the same 
term of office, the local authority bodies cannot revoke or change its 
essential definition, and cannot approve any act opposed to the result of 
the referendum (Article 222). The drafts of the referendum whose answer 
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involved the continuity of a situation could not be renewed during the 
same term of office (Article 223). The disregarding of the result of the 
referendum by a municipal or parish assembly would be punished with the 
dissolution of that body, under the terms of the law (Article 220). 
3 - Initiative 
The initiative for the local referendum belongs to (Article 10): 
a) The members of municipal assemblies (assembleias 
municipais) or parish assemblies (assembleias de freguesia); 
b) The municipal or parish assemblies; 
c) The municipal authorities (câmaras municipais) or the 
parish authorities (juntas de freguesia); 
d) A minimum of 5,000 (or 8%) of the citizens registered to 
vote in the respective area. In the municipalities and parishes 
with less than 3,750 registered voters, the initiative has to be 
proposed by at least 300 (or 20%) of local citizens (Article 
13). 
 
The deliberation regarding the holding of the referendum is 
always the responsibility of the municipal assembly or of the parish 
assembly, depending on the circumstances of the case. It must occur 
within 15 days after the exercise, or the reception, of the initiative, in the 
case of a representative initiative, or within 30 days, in the case of a 
popular initiative. If the question submitted to referendum is not included 
within the responsibility of the municipal or parish assembly, and the 
initiative was not taken by the body of that responsibility, the deliberation 
needs the opinion of the latter, which shall be sent within five days of the 
receipt of the request (Article 24). 
4 - Other aspects 
Each referendum has only one subject matter [Article 6(1)]. No 
referendum can include more than three questions. It must be formulated 
with objectivity, clarity and precision. The answers can only be ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, and it is forbidden to suggest possible answers, either directly or 
indirectly. The questions cannot be preceded by any motives, preambles 
or explanatory notes (Article 7). 
It is acceptable to hold several referendums during the same day 
and in the same autarchy, since each is formal and substantially 
autonomous [Article 6(2)]. There cannot be simultaneous local 
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referendums on the same matter, and the local referendums cannot be held 
alongside regional or national referendums [Article 6(3)]. 
Any practice of an act related to the call or the accomplishment 
of a local referendum between the dates of general elections for the 
sovereignty organs, elections for the self-government bodies of the 
autonomous regions, local authority bodies, members of the European 
Parliament, or national or regional referendums are not allowed (Article 
8). The call or accomplishment of local referendums during a State of 
siege or a State of emergency, or before the installation or after the 
dissolution of elected local authority bodies, is also prohibited (Article 9). 
The chairperson of the deliberative body shall send the 
deliberation to hold a local referendum to the Constitutional Court within 
eight days, and the review of the Constitutionality and legality of the 
referendum ought to be held by the Court within 25 days (Articles 25 and 
26). If the referendum is considered Constitutional and legal, as soon as 
the chairperson of the deliberative body has been notified of the decision 
of the Constitutional Court, he/she shall notify the president of the 
executive body of the local authority within two days. A date for the 
referendum shall be set within the next five days. This should occur 
within 40 and 60 days (Articles 32 and 33). 
8. The Specific Experience of Local Referendums 
8.1. The Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
Between 1990 (when Law No. 49/90, of 24 August on local 
consultations came into force) and 2011, there were 27 deliberations from 
local authority bodies requesting the Constitutional Court (TC) to review 
the Constitutionality and legality of local referendums (see appendix 1 for 
a detailed description). The Constitutional Court declared the drafts of the 
local referendum unConstitutional and/or illegal in 23 cases. The TC 
permitted only four to be held. 
On 30 April 1991, a few months after Law No. 49/90 came into 
force, the Municipal Assembly of Peniche deliberated on a local 
consultation for the first time. The proposed purpose of the consultation 
was the creation of a new parish. 
In 1991, three deliberations on popular consultations were 
registered, but none were authorised by the TC. Only in 1998, after the 
Constitutional revision of 1997, did the local authorities take other 
deliberations that sought out local referendums: three in 1998, eight in 
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1999 and three in 2000. The two first referendums authorised by the 
Constitutional Court were deliberated in 1998 and 1999. This boom in 
local referendums subsequent to 1998 did not happen by chance. The 
referendum became increasingly important in the Portuguese political life 
after the first referendum of a national scope took place in 1998.  
Moreover, the Constitutional revision of 1997 had reformulated local 
referendums, seeking to make them more viable. After the introduction of 
Law No. 4/2000, of 24 August, which brought the legal framework up to 
date following the Constitutional changes of 1997, there were nine 
deliberations (two in 2004, one in 2006, two in 2008, one in 2009 one in 
2010 and two in 2011) but the Constitutional Court only admitted two of 
them. 
The parish assemblies took 14 deliberations and the municipal 
assemblies took 13. In geographical terms, more drafts were presented in 
the northern area. The local authorities in the northern part of the country 
presented 13 drafts, seven were presented in the central area, two in the 
surrounding areas of Lisbon, three in the southern areas and two in the 
autonomous regions.  
The initiatives in the assemblies were taken, for the most part, 
by the executive bodies (in 13 cases). 11 deliberations were taken by the 
initiative of the members of the assemblies themselves, and in three cases 
the deliberations omitted the authorship of the initiative. Despite the 
possibility of popular initiatives on local referendums after Law No. 
4/2000, this opportunity has not yet been taken up. 
As to the political majorities in the local authority bodies where 
the deliberations were taken, there is a significant variation. Eight of the 
13 deliberations taken at a municipal level, had its origin in the municipal 
assemblies of the PS majority (two in Viana do Castelo and two in 
Cartaxo); four in the PSD majority and one in the CDU (PCP/PEV 
coalition) majority. Four of the 12 parish assemblies105 that approved 
drafts for local referendums had a PSD majority, another four had a PS 
majority, one of them had a coalition between PS and CDS, another one 
had a CDU majority, and still another one had a majority that resulted 
from a candidacy promoted by a group of citizens that were not politically 
affiliated. 
                                                 
105 There were 14 deliberations. However, two of them were second attempts to promote 
the same referendum. 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  258 
 
As to the subject proposed for the referendums, six cases 
concerned the creation of parishes or the transfer of parishes from a 
municipality to another. Two cases discussed the creation of a protected 
area for environmental reasons.106 10 cases concerned the construction, 
the demolition or the location of several infrastructures: in Riba de Ave, 
the construction of a treatment plant for solid residues; in Serreleis, the 
construction of a playing field in a certain location; in Tavira, the 
demolition of an inoperative reservoir of water; in Portimão, the 
demolition of an old market for a boulevard with a green area; in Louredo, 
the location of a cross; in Barcelos, the trajectory of a highway; in Gaula, 
the retreat of industrial units; in Guarda, the localization of a hospital; in 
Costa da Caparica, the construction of houses and collective equipment 
on parish grounds; in Santa Cruz da Graciosa, the demolition of a 
bandstand; in Mirandela, the maintaining of a railway line. In Viana do 
Castelo, both deliberations entailed the integration of the municipality into 
an intermunicipal community. The three remaining cases referred to: 
choosing whether to hold a municipal holiday in Torres Vedras; the 
holding of bullfights and putting the bulls to death (in the arena) in 
Barrancos; and to proposals for a private company to operate a car park in 
Cartaxo. 
Finally, it is worth analysing the reasons why the Constitutional 
Court rejected 23 referendum drafts. The Constitutional Court declared 
that 10 proposals for local referendums were unConstitutional and illegal 
because their subject was not included within the exclusive 
responsibilities of the local authorities, thus infringing Article 241(3) of 
the Constitution and Article 2(1) of Law No. 49/90, of 24 August. These 
were the cases of a) the creation of parishes; b) the change of parishes 
from one municipality to another;107 c) the construction of a treatment 
plant for solid residues in the parish of Riba de Ave; d) the creation of the 
protected area of Corno do Bico;108 e) the bullfights with the bulls being 
put to death in Barrancos; f) construction on grounds belonging to the 
parish authority of Costa da Caparica in terms of a programme contracted 
                                                 
106 The protected area was the same in both parishes (Bico and Vascões, in the 
municipality of Paredes de Coura). These two cases gave way to four deliberations, given 
that after the declaration of unConstitutionality in the first attempt, both parish assemblies 
moved forward with new deliberations that obtained, nonetheless, the same result. 
107 See Appendix 1, the referendums proposed by the Municipal Assembly of Peniche, 
Parish Assembly of Arazede, Parish Assembly of Asseiceira, Parish Assembly of 
Caramos, Parish Assembly of Abação (S. Tomé) and Parish Assembly of Moita. 
108 See Appendix 1for the referendums proposed twice by the Parish Assemblies of 
Vascões and Bico. 
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between the municipal authority of Almada and the State (POLIS 
Programme). 
In Ruling No. 238/91, which refused a local consultation in 
Peniche about the creation of a new parish, Judge António Vitorino voted 
against the refusal and gave a dissenting judgement supporting the 
admissibility of that consultation. In his opinion, the Municipal Assembly 
of Peniche had the responsibility to deliberate on the process of creating 
that parish, even if only advisory in nature. Nothing should prevent the 
Assembly from consulting the population and deliberating on the 
agreement with the will expressed in the consultation. 
António Cândido de Oliveira (1993, pp. 276-277) also criticised 
this TC decision. This author agreed with António Vitorino and 
considered the position of the Constitutional Court to be too restrictive. In 
his opinion, the popular consultation should be admitted, not only on a 
subject that involved just one local autarchy, but also when it involved 
other autarchies or sovereignty organs. He believed that a local authority 
body had the exclusive responsibility to take a deliberation even if it was 
merely advisory. The Constitutional Court, when restricting the exclusive 
responsibility of the local authority bodies to local subjects, risked turning 
the local consultations into something useless. 
After the Constitutional revision of 1997, Article 240 of the 
Constitution Stated that the local authorities may submit matters included 
within the responsibilities of their bodies to referendum in the cases, terms 
and effects laid down by law. The reference to the exclusive 
responsibilities of the local authorities disappeared. In the case, for 
instance, of the creation of new parishes – whose procedure required the 
local authorities’ opinion by law – nothing should prevent them from 
submitting the exercise of that responsibility to referendum. The results of 
the referendum oblige the local authority to follow the popular will. 
However, as the Constitution left the regulation of that matter in the hands 
of the law, while Law No. 49/90, of 24 August was left unchanged, the 
cases, the terms and the effects of the local referendums remained the 
same. Although the Constitution allowed other solutions from 1997 
onwards, the law would have to specify them. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court declared some drafts for the referendum proposed even after the 
Constitutional revision of 1997 to be illegal, since it was considered that 
Law No. 49/90 was in full force despite that change.109 
                                                 
109 In this sense, see Ruling 390/98, of 26 May 1998. 
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In 12 cases, the reasons for the unConstitutionality and illegality 
of the referendums rested on the question or questions that would be 
submitted to the electorate. Article 7 of Law No. 49/90 Stated that the 
questions submitted to the citizens be formulated in terms that allowed an 
unequivocal answer in the simple affirmative or negative form. Article 9 
disposed that the proposals for local consultations should contain the 
questions to be submitted to the citizens. However, in some cases, the 
deliberations did not even include the questions.110 In other cases, the 
formulation of the questions did not have the necessary clarity to allow an 
unequivocal ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer.111 In three specific cases, the 
Constitutional Court did not allow the referendums because the respective 
deliberations did not specify their territorial scope.112 
Another reason for non-admission, invoked in two specific 
cases, was where author’s origin was unclear. This was essential because 
Article 8 of the law only gave legitimacy to the assemblies, the executive 
bodies of local authorities, and a third of the members of each of those 
bodies. Without any reference to the origin of the initiative, it was 
impossible to know if the authors of the proposal had the necessary 
legitimacy to present it.113 In the case of the local referendum proposed by 
the Municipal Assembly of Barcelos, one of the reasons for the non 
admission was that had been proposed by only one member of the 
Municipal Assembly. 
Two drafts for local referendums were not admitted because 
they were proposed during the session of the assemblies where the 
deliberations were taken, thus contradicting the rule of Article 6(2) of Law 
No. 49/90. According to that rule, the deliberation should be taken 
                                                 
110 See Appendix 1 for the questions regarding the Municipal Assembly of Torres Vedras 
on the municipal holiday; the Parish Assembly of Riba de Ave on the treatment plant for 
solid residues; the Municipal Assembly of Barcelos on the trajectory of Highway 
A11/C14; the Parish Assembly of Vascões on the protected area of Corno do Bico and the 
Parish Assembly of Bico on that same question.   
111 See Appendix 1 for the following referendums: the proposal by the Municipal 
Assembly of Portimão on the demolition of an old market; the Parish Assembly of 
Louredo on the localisation of a cross; the Parish Assembly of Moita on its change to the 
municipality of Marinha Grande; the Parish Assemblies of Vascões and Bico, in their 
second attempt for a referendum on the creation of the protected area of Corno do Bico; 
the Municipal Assembly of Viana do Castelo on the integration in the intermunicipal 
community of Minho Lima; the Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo on the concession to a 
private company to operate a car-park.  
112 See the cases of the proposals presented by the Municipal Assembly of Barcelos and by 
the Parish Assemblies of Vascões and Bico. 
113 See the proposals of the Parish Assemblies of Vascões and Bico. 
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obligatorily, in an ordinary or extraordinary session, within 15 days after 
the reception of the proposal.114 
Four proposals that were presented during Law No. 4/2000, of 
24 August were refused because they coincided with the electoral process 
for the European Parliament or for the President of the Republic. The 
Parish Assembly of Gaula deliberated about a local referendum on 1 
March 2004 and the Municipal Assembly of Guarda made the same on 5 
May 2004. The Constitutional Court refused these referendums, because 
the elections for the European Parliament had already been scheduled for 
the 13 June of that year. On 16 February 2009, the Municipal Assembly of 
Mirandela decided that a local referendum and the elections for the 
European Parliament should both occur on 9 June. On 29 September 2010 
the Municipal Assembly of Santa Cruz da Graciosa made a similar 
decision, proposing to hold both a referendum and presidential elections 
on 23 January 2011. All of these deliberations were refused as illegal. 
8.2. The Local Referendums Actually Held 
   8.2.1. Serreleis 
The first local referendum of the Portuguese democracy 
happened on 25 April 1999, in the parish of Serreleis, located in the north 
of the country, in the municipality of Viana do Castelo. The question 
submitted to the voters was the following: ‘Do you agree with the 
construction of a playing field for several sports behind the church of 
Serreleis?’ 
There were 947 citizens registered to vote, and 726 of them 
(76.66%) voted effectively. 351 citizens voted ‘yes’ and 366 voted ‘no’. 
Despite the tight margin, the negative answer prevailed and the parish did 
not build the playing field at that location. It is notable that the previous 
elections for the Parish Assembly of Serreleis had been won by a list of 
citizens outside of the parties, which obtained 64.03% of votes, against 
22.21% of PS votes and 11.85% of PSD votes, having voted 78.09% of 
the registered citizens.115 This unusually high turnout is evidence of high 
political motivation and a willingness to be mobilised to vote.  Both in the 
                                                 
114 See Appendix 1 for the proposals of the Parish Assembly of Caramos and the 
Municipal Assembly of Barcelos. 
115  The results to the Parish Assembly of Serreleis on 14 December 1997 were the 
following: registered – 940; voters – 734 (78.09%); group of citizens – 470 (64.03%); PS – 
163 (22.21%); PSD – 87 (11.85%). Electoral results available at: 
http://www.eleicoes.mj.pt [accessed 12 June 2011]. 
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local election and in the local referendum, there was a strong participation 
of the parish voters, much higher than the national average in local 
elections. This is significant because national participation in the elections 
for parish assemblies on 14 December 1997 was 59.86%. 
   8.2.2. Tavira 
There was another local referendum on 13 June 1999 at the 
municipality of Tavira with the following question: Do you agree with the 
demolition of the old water reservoir (inoperative) of Alto de Santa 
Maria?  20,948 citizens were registered to vote, and only 7,585 (36.2%) 
voted effectively. 2,671 citizens voted ‘yes’ (35.2%) and 4,122 citizens 
voted ‘no’ (54.4%). One should note that in the previous local elections 
for the Municipal Assembly of Tavira, on 14 December 1997, the turnout 
had been 66.58% of citizens. Consequently, the participation in the 
referendum did not meet expectations.116 
   8.2.3. Viana do Castelo 
Law No. 45/2008, of 27 August, on the intermunicipal 
association, proposed that the municipality of Viana do Castelo should 
integrate a wider intermunicipal community, the Intermunicipal 
Community of Minho Lima. A significant majority of the members of the 
municipal bodies of Viana do Castelo, including the President of the local 
authority, deeply disagreed with that legal purpose. However, the 
institution of the community required the approval of its statutes by the 
absolute majority of the municipal assemblies. 
Even before the passing of Law No. 45/2008 in the Assembly of 
the Republic, which happened on 11 July 2008, the municipal bodies of 
Viana do Castelo refused the integration of the Intermunicipal 
Community of Minho Lima. On 13 June, the municipal authority decided 
that, if Parliament passed the Law on the intermunicipal association, as 
had been proposed, the municipality of Viana do Castelo would propose 
holding a local referendum on that subject. 
When the law came into force, the Municipal Assembly passed a 
proposal for a local referendum aimed at refusing the integration of the 
municipality in the Intermunicipal Community. It was sent to the 
Constitutional Court, but wasn’t admitted for lack of an objective, precise 
                                                 
116  The results for the Municipal Assembly of Tavira on 14 December 1997 were the 
following: registered – 21,474; voters – 14,298 (66.58%); PSD – 7,176 (41.15%); PS – 
5,883 (33.42%); CDU – 893 (6.25%). 
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and clear question (see Appendix 1 and Ruling 524/2008 of the TC). The 
Municipal Assembly was then invited to reformulate the question, which 
it did on 5 November 2008. On 19 November, the TC admitted the 
referendum, which was scheduled for 25 January 2009. 
On 25 January 2009, the municipality of Viana do Castelo held 
its first local referendum with the following question: ‘Do you agree that 
the municipality of Viana do Castelo integrate the Intermunicipal 
Community of Minho Lima?’ From the 88,114 registered electors, only 
27,101 (30.76%) voted effectively. 9,934 voted ‘yes’ (37.80%) and 
16,347 voted ‘no’ (62.20%). The refusal of the integration in the proposed 
Community was clear, but the participation in the referendum was very 
low, particularly if we consider that in the local elections for the 
Municipal Assembly held on 9 October 2005, 51,450 electors exercised 
their right to vote, which means 64.89% of the registered citizens.117 
8.2.4. Cartaxo 
On 1 September 2011, the Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo, a 
municipality of PS majority in the centre of the country, unanimously 
passed a BE proposal to hold a local referendum on the intention 
expressed by the Mayor to privatise 620 parking places, scattered in the 
streets surrounding the centre, for a period of 30 years. That proposal was 
sent to the Constitutional Court, which judged it illegal because it lacked a 
clear and objective question.118 The process returned to the Municipal 
Assembly and new proposal was passed, reformulating the question in 
terms accepted by the Court. 
The referendum was made on 18 December 2011, with the 
following question: ‘Do you agree that the Municipal Authority of 
Cartaxo should sign a contract to grant exploitation of public park in 
covered parking, and over 620 parking places scattered in the streets 
surrounding the urban centre, for a period of 30 years to a private 
company?’ 
The turnout was incredibly low. From the 20,886 registered 
voters, only 2,629 (12.59%) took part in the referendum. 2,484 (95.32%) 
voted ‘no’ and only 122 (4.68%) voted ‘yes’. There were nine blank and 
                                                 
117 The results to the Municipal Assembly of Viana do Castelo on 9 October 2005 were the 
following: registered – 79,292; voters – 51,450 (64.89%); PS – 22,544 (43.82%); PSD – 
16,383 (31.84%): CDU – 3,706 (7.20%); CDS-PP – 2,534 (4.93%); BE – 2,478 (4.82%); 
group of citizens – 1,474 (2.86%). 
118 See the question in Appendix 1. 
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14 null votes.119 The option No, won easily, and the reason is easy of 
explain. In fact, during the process, the Mayor who had proposed to 
privatise the parking spaces, resigned before the referendum, and his 
successor gave up on the idea. On the day of the referendum, all the 
political groups of the Municipal Assembly supported the option ‘no’. 
Consequently, the privatisation process had no support and defeat was 
easy. The result was perfectly foreseeable, so the turnout was low. While 
the vast majority of local residents saw it as a waste of time and money, 
the opposition used the referendum as leverage whenever proposals to 
privatise parking were revived. 
9. The Constitutional Inception of the Regional Referendum 
9.1. The Concept of a Regional Referendum 
The first Constitutional revision, in 1982, allowed local direct 
consultations on matters of the exclusive responsibility of local 
authorities. In Constitutional terms, there are three layers of local 
authorities in Portugal: the parishes, the municipalities and the 
administrative regions. However, while the municipalities and the 
parishes, which already existed before the Constitution of 1976, were 
adapted to the new democratic Constitutional framework, and started to 
work in new terms with bodies being democratically elected and with a 
new board of responsibilities laid down by law, the administrative regions 
were never instituted. Regional referendums, in the sense of referendums 
at the level of the administrative regions, would have been permitted by 
the Constitution as types of local referendums if the administrative regions 
had been instituted. However, in the absence of a regional structure, the 
law only refers to local referendums at the level of the municipality and 
parish. 
After the 1997 amendments, the Constitution stipulated that the 
creation of administrative regions depends on regional referendums, 
which should be held simultaneously, at the national level, in each of the 
proposed regions. This referendum will be treated as a national 
referendum and discussed more fully in chapter 5. The referendum on the 
eventual creation of administrative regions, anticipated in the 
Constitution, has a national scope, in spite of its projection at the level of 
each region. It is a national referendum on the creation of the regions and 
not a referendum in the regions. 
                                                 
119 Results available on http://www.dgai.mai.gov.pt [accessed 3 March 2012]. 
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Therefore, the regional referendums treated in this chapter are 
those located at the level of the autonomous regions. The Portuguese 
Constitution of 1976 established the existence of two regions endowed 
with political and administrative autonomy and self-government bodies, in 
the archipelagos of Madeira and The Azores. Those referendums are not 
local ones, because the autonomous regions are not local authorities, but 
regional referendums in the sense of autonomic referendums, that is, each 
one is held in an autonomous region. 
9.2. Bill No. 501/I 
Although no type of referendum was permitted by the 1976 
Constitution,120 the subscribers of the Manifesto Reformador introduced 
Bill No. 501/I, on 6 June 1980, which sought to regulate the referendum. 
This was never discussed. That Bill included the idea of a referendum to 
approve the political and administrative statute of each of the autonomous 
regions. 
The Constitution of 1976 established a regime of political and 
administrative autonomy, taking into account the distinct geographic, 
economic, social and cultural characteristics of The Azores and Madeira 
archipelagos, and the historic traditions of autonomy of the island 
populations. The system of autonomy, which was deepened in subsequent 
Constitutional revisions, establishes the existence of self-government 
bodies in the regions (Legislative Assembly and Regional Government) 
and the political and administrative statutes of the regions. The drawing of 
the drafts of statutes is the exclusive responsibility of the regions’ 
legislative assemblies, but final approval defers to the Assembly of the 
Republic. 
9.3. The Constitutional Revision of 1997 
The subject of the referendum in the autonomous regions 
returned in 1994, with discussions over the fourth Constitutional revision. 
Then, two draft amendments to the Constitution, presented by PSD and 
PS deputies elected by the electoral constituency of Madeira, proposed the 
inception of the referendum at the level of the autonomous regions. 
                                                 
120 The draft of the Constitution from the CDS laid down that the Parliament, with two-
thirds of the full number of its members, could decide to submit any previously approved 
law to popular referendum of a national or regional scope, except those on tax-related 
issues. The proposal did not explain the regional level it referred to (autonomous regions 
or administrative regions). It is clear that the submission of laws to a regional referendum 
could only consider regional effects. This proposal, however, was not accepted.  
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That Constitutional revision procedure was never completed, so 
the matter of the regional referendum re-emerged in 1996. At that time, 
seven draft amendments to the Constitution proposed the inception of the 
referendum in the autonomous regions: Draft No. 1/VII from the CDS-PP 
(Article 233-A);121 Draft No. 3/VII from the PS (Article 235-A); Draft 
No. 5/VII from the PSD [Article 118(11)]; Draft No. 6/VII from the 
PSD/Madeira (Article 236-C);122 Draft No. 7/VII from the PS/Madeira;123 
Draft No. 9/VII from the deputies from the PSD members of TSD [article 
118 (6)(8)]; Draft No. 10/VII from PEV [Article 118(9)].124 
After a first reading happened in the CERC on 28 November 
1996 [DAR (II − RC) 60, 29 November 1996, pp. 1809-1818], which 
maintained the discussion on the main aspects unfinished, the PS and the 
PSD agreed on a formulation that they introduced together in the second 
reading on 3 July 1997 [DAR (II-RC) 114, 4 July 1997, pp. 3363-3364]. 
The plenary sittings of 30 July 1997 passed that proposal with the yea 
votes from the PS, PSD and CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP and 
PEV [DAR (I) 104, 31 July 1997, p. 4009].  
The formulation passed as Article 232(2) on the responsibilities 
of the Regional Legislative Assembly.  It Stated the following: the 
Legislative Assembly of each autonomous region shall be responsible for 
submitting a draft regional referendum by means of which the President of 
the Republic may call upon the citizens, who are registered to vote in the 
region’s territory, to pronounce themselves in a binding fashion on 
questions that are of importance and specific interest to the region. The 
provisions of Article 115 (on national referendums) shall apply to such 
referendums, mutatis mutandis. 
As for the power to decide on the referendum, the option that 
prevailed and was supported by the PS and the deputies of Madeira, gave 
this right to the President of the Republic. The PSD’s initial proposal to 
delegate that power directly to the Regional Legislative Assemblies was 
declined. The PCP declared its opposition towards any of the solutions, 
and defended the possibility, informally suggested by Vital Moreira, of 
                                                 
121 Article 233-A did not take part of the first version of the draft introduced by the CDS-
PP on 26 January 1996 [DAR (II-A) 21- Supplement, 1 February 1996), having been 
introduced later as addition on 4 March 1996.  
122 Subscribed by Deputies Guilherme Silva, Correia de Jesus and Hugo Velosa. 
123 Subscribed by Deputies António Trindade and Isabel Sena Lino. 
124 The Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 2/VII to No. 11/VII are published in 
DAR (II-A) 27- Supplement, 7 March 1996. 
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giving that power to the Representatives of the Republic125 in the 
autonomous regions [DAR (II − RC) 60, 29 November 1996, p. 1810]. 
The initiative to propose the referendum to the President of the 
Republic is an exclusive responsibility of the regional legislative 
assemblies. The Constitution does not establish who can initiate the 
procedure in the legislative assembly, since it is up to the law to decide 
this matter. It is obvious that the deputies and the parliamentary groups of 
the legislative assemblies of the autonomous regions must have that 
prerogative. Legislators should decide if that power must also be given to 
the regional governments, and if (and how) the popular initiative of 
regional referendum is admitted. The responsibility to legislate on 
regional referendums was the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly of 
the Republic, as it happens with the national and local referendums 
(Article 164b). The law on regional referendums must observe the form of 
organisational law [Article 166(2)]. 
The regional referendum can happen on subjects relevant to the 
regions’ specific interests. This delimitation of the subject demands some 
remarks. Unlike what happens at the level of the organs of sovereignty, in 
that both Parliament and the Government hold legislative responsibilities, 
at the level of the autonomous regions only the Legislative Assembly 
holds these responsibilities. Because the Constitution attributes the 
exclusive initiative of a referendum to the Legislative Assemblies of the 
regions, it unavoidably binds its extent. It would not make sense for the 
Legislative Assembly to propose a subject on which it could not legislate 
to the voters. Therefore, the regional referendum can only happen on 
matters whose decision is restricted to the regional legislative competence. 
As Jorge Miranda and Rui Medeiros (2007, p. 418) highlight, the popular 
consultation involves the power to legislate on the matter submitted to the 
electors.  Therefore, the holding of a referendum by the region is only 
understandable if, after the consultation, the regional bodies could act in 
accordance with the respective result. As a result, the scope of regional 
referendums is limited to their specific responsibilities. 
In the sixth Constitutional revision from 2004, which introduced 
profound alterations regarding the autonomous regions, the Constitutional 
regime of the local referendum remained the same. It was approved with 
only one abstention. There was also reference to the regional referendum 
in Article 115 of the Constitution, which refers to the referendum in 
general [DAR (I) 78, 23 April 2004, p. 4282]. Nonetheless, regional 
                                                 
125 The Representatives were at that time Ministers of the Republic. 
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referendums must be regulated by organisational law, as laid down in the 
Constitution [Articles 166(1) and 164b]. Even now, the Assembly of the 
Republic has not passed such a regulation, despite the Bills introduced by 
the PCP in June 2008 and October 2010. The only legal reference to the 
regional referendums appears in the political and administrative statutes of 
both autonomous regions. 
9.4. The Regional Referendum in the Statutes of the 
Autonomous Regions 
   9.4.1. Madeira 
The Political and Administrative Statute of the Autonomous 
Region of Madeira (Law No. 130/99, of 21 August) refers to the regional 
referendum in Article 9, which reproduced the Constitutional provision in 
essence: a) the referendum may happen on a question that is important 
and of a specific interest to the region; b) the right to propose belongs to 
the legislative assembly of the region; c) the decision to call the 
referendum belongs to the President of the Republic; d) the referendum 
has binding effectiveness; e) the right to vote is given to the citizens 
registered to vote in the region; f) the Constitutional provisions on the 
national referendum shall apply to the regional referendum, mutatis 
mutandis. 
   9.4.2. The Azores 
The Political and Administrative Statute of the Autonomous 
Region of The Azores, in the first version passed in the Assembly of the 
Republic [Decree No. 217/X, DAR (II-A) 121, 27 June 2008, pp. 6-130], 
included several provisions on the regional referendum. The 
Constitutional Court declared one of them unConstitutional, which 
referred to the initiative of citizens. In fact, the text proposed by the 
Legislative Assembly of The Azores and passed in Parliament established 
that the referendary initiative of the citizens should be subscribed by a 
minimum of 3,000 registered electors in the Region. The TC declared this 
rule to be formally unConstitutional. The autonomous regions did not 
have the power to vary the Organisational Law, which was laid down at 
the national level. (Ruling No. 402/2008). The President of the Republic 
vetoed the Statute before that decision. 
This question is fundamental from the Constitutional point of 
view. The Constitution provides that the law on referendums, besides 
being the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic, must 
assume the form of organisational law, which possesses superior force to 
The Local and Regional Referendum  269 
 
 
any laws made in the regions. Besides being discussed in detail, and voted 
on in the plenary session, they have to be approved in final overall vote by 
the absolute majority of all members in full exercise of their office. The 
political and administrative statutes of the autonomous regions must obey 
some formalities in their legislative process. The legislative assemblies of 
the regions are the only bodies that have the power to initiate the 
procedure to change their own governing statute, but in the end these acts 
do not assume the nature of organisational law.  
Therefore, the approval of provisions regarding the regional 
referendums inside the political and administrative statute is a formal 
unConstitutionality, because that legislative act does not assume the form 
of organisational law required by the Constitution. In addition, the 
introduction of draft amendments to the political and administrative 
statute of a region is the exclusive responsibility of the respective 
legislative assembly. If such matters were included in the statute, the 
legitimacy of the Assembly of the Republic to legislate on it without any 
proposal by the regional legislative assembly could be called into 
question. 
The final version of the Statute, after the expunction of the 
unConstitutional rules (Law No. 2/2009, of 12 January), permits the 
regional referendum as follows: a) the Legislative Assembly may propose 
regional referendums to the President of the Republic; b) the electoral 
universe includes the citizens registered to vote in the region; c) the 
regional referendum may ask questions that are of importance and specific 
interest to the region; d) the regional referendum shall be regulated by 
law; e) the right of initiative belongs to the deputies, parliamentary 
groups, Regional Government and groups of citizens; f) no draft to the 
referendum could involve an increase in the region’s expenditure or a 
decrease in its revenues as set out in the budget; g) draft referendums 
definitively rejected may not be resubmitted in the same legislative 
session; h) draft referendums that are not put up for vote in the legislative 
session in which they are submitted shall not require resubmission in the 
following legislative sessions; i) the government drafts shall lapse upon its 
resignation. 
Other aspects of legal regulation, besides the Constitutional text, 
may only be established by organizational law passed by the Assembly of 
the Republic. Without this law, it is not possible to hold regional 
referendums. 
9.5. Bills No. 545/X and 439/XI (PCP) 
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On 26 June 2008, the PCP introduced the first draft of an 
organisational law on regional referendums, which was Bill No. 545/X 
[DAR (II-A) 122, 28 June 2008). That initiative aims to implement the 
Constitutional commands regarding the regional referendum.  The 
legislative assembly of each autonomous region shall be responsible for 
submitting the drafts on regional referendums to the President of the 
Republic, who may call upon the citizens registered to vote in the region 
to pronounce themselves on questions that are of importance, and of 
specific interest to the region. The provisions regarding the national 
referendum shall apply to the regional referendum. 
The regional referendum can happen on matters in which the 
legislative assembly may legislate by regional legislative decrees, 
excluding the subjects under the strict responsibility of sovereignty organs 
and budgetary, tax-related or financial matters. The initiative in the 
legislative assembly belongs to the regional government, to parliamentary 
groups or to groups of citizens with at least 3,000 signatures. The regional 
referendum has to be submitted to the Constitional Court for a prior 
review of its Constitutionality and legality, which shall be demanded by 
the representative of the Republic in the region. If the TC considers the 
draft Constitutional and legal, the decision belongs exclusively to the 
President of the Republic. Nevertheless, the legislature ended before the 
discussion of the bill. 
In the XI Legislature, the PCP revived the initiative, introducing 
Bill No. 439/XI [DAR (II-A) 19, 21 October 2011, pp. 50-95] with the 
same contents. PCP groups in the Legislative Assemblies of Madeira and 
The Azores introduced similar initiatives.  They sought to pass them 
locally, introducing the idea of regional parliaments to the Assembly of 
the Republic. However, more than 15 years after the Constitution 
permitted regional referendums, none had ever been hald because of the 
lack of an organisational law that actually allowed them.  
 




The National Referendum 
1. The Attempts to Introduce the National Referendum: 1975-1989 
1.1. The Drafts of the Constitution 
   1.1.1. The Doctrinaire Drafts 
The doctrinaire drafts of the Constitution introduced to the 
Constituent Assembly contained allusions to the national referendum. The 
draft of the Constitution drawn by Jorge Miranda (1975) included several 
possible models for national referendums. These include: a) any law or 
executive law (except on financial matters) within 90 days after its 
approval or ratification by the Parliament if proposed by twenty percent of 
voters in the previous election or referendum; b) the general principles 
and purposes of the Plan; c) any law (except tax-related issues) proposed 
by two-thirds of the deputies in full exercise of their office. In case of 
rejection, the President of the Republic could dissolve Parliament within 
15 days after the counting of votes; d) international treaties that involved 
restrictions on sovereignty.  
The author did not formally introduce this draft to the 
Constituent Assembly and his party, the PPD, did not adopt it. It was, 
however, an example of a proposal of wide and ambitious scope for 
referendary processes. The referendum could happen on many themes, 
such as international treaties, the general purposes of the Plan, and laws in 
general; with the matter of taxes being the only exclusion (Urbano, 1998, 
pp. 115-118). Nonetheless, the popular initiative proposed was hardly 
practicable, given the high number of signatures required.  The first free 
elections in Portugal, in 1975, had 5,666,696 voters. Consequently, 
1,133,340 signatures would be needed to call a referendum. 
An essay written by Lucas Pires formed the basis of a future 
Constitutional draft for the CDS, and it included several possibilities for 
national referendum. Regarding the State’s foreign affairs, the author 
supported the need for an approval of any decision through a national 
plebiscite. This would include matters related to the international 
integration process or any privileged agreement with great powers, 
especially in the military domain. The integration would modify the 
contract of sovereignty that bounds the representatives, raising a new 
Constitutional dependence that needed the people’s agreement (Pires, 
1975, p. 106; Urbano, 1998, p. 118). 
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Lucas Pires (1975, p. 109) also supported the possibility of 
referendums on treaties or legislative acts according to the criterion of the 
President of the Republic. However, the Constitutional extent of this rule 
could be restricted to a certain number of matters in order to avoid the 
opportunism of its use as a super-survey, or the attraction of a plebiscitary 
democracy. 
Finally, regarding the national referendum, the author proposed 
– although in undefined terms – to give the President of the Republic the 
power to call a referendum to evaluate the trust of the voters towards 
himself. That power could represent, according to Maria Benedita Pires 
Urbano (1998, p.119), a way to exercise a scrutiny upon the Head of 
State, but it contained evident caesarism stains, and had obvious potential 
for the plebiscitary approach to be abused (Pires, 1975, p. 143). 
   1.1.2. The Drafts Introduced to the Constituent Assembly 
According to the CDS draft of the Constitution (DAC, 13 − 
Supplement, 7 July 1975, p. 14), Parliament could decide to submit any 
previously approved law to a popular referendum of a national scope, 
except tax-related matters, provided it had a two-thirds majority (Urbano, 
1998, pp. 113-114). The draft of the Constitution introduced by the UDP 
proposed to re-examine all the treaties and cultural agreements in the 
domain of the economy, culture and cooperation made by the fascist 
regime. It would submit them to a wide debate and popular examination, 
leaving it to the people to decide on their repeal, revision or confirmation 
(DAC, 13 − Supplement, 7 July 1975, p. 28). The draft did not explain, 
however, how to proceed with that re-examination.  
Despite these suggestions, the Constitution of 1976 did not 
include any type of referendum. 
1.2. The Attempts to Introduce the National Referendum 
        by Law 
The debate on the national referendum was revived after the 
elections of 2 December 1979, when the AD (PSD/CDS coalition) 
obtained an absolute majority. The programme of the VI Constitutional 
Government, led by Sá Carneiro, included the approval of a referendum 
law. However, that proposal sought, first and foremost, to open the way to 
the Constitutional revision by referendum. It is true that, in debates about 
the Government’s programme, Luís Beiroco (CDS) tried to separate the 
two issues, stating that the only thing under discussion was the 
introduction of a privileged instrument of direct consultation of the 
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popular will, which would enable the government to know the citizens' 
opinion on fundamental subjects related to the community's life or the 
organisation of the State (DAR [I] 5, 16 January 1980, p. 148). 
Nevertheless, nobody approached the subject in those terms, because 
everybody knew that Sá Carneiro’s main purpose was a referendum on the 
Constitution. 
It was, however, through the Parliamentary Group of the 
‘Reformers’ that the first bill proposing a national referendum (Bill No. 
501/I) appeared. However, the Bill was contested because it did not 
comply with the Constitution, and it was not discussed as a result. On 20 
June 1980, near the end of the I Legislature, the Government introduced 
Bill No. 365/I (DAR [II] 74, 21 June 1980), which requested authorisation 
to legislate in order to define the regime of the referendum. The left 
opposition impugned the Constitutionality of that Bill, and it was never 
discussed. The Bill did not include any mention of the regulation wanted 
by the Government. 
1.3. The National Referendum in the Constitutional Revision 
       of 1982 
   1.3.1. The Drafts 
In the book published in early 1980, Uma Constituição para os 
Anos 80 (A Constitution for the 1980s), Sá Carneiro advanced the 
guidelines for the Constitutional revision in the II Legislature. That draft 
gave the President of the Republic the responsibility to submit laws of 
Constitutional revision, laws of the Assembly of the Republic, executive-
laws of the Government, and the important issues concerning national 
interest to popular referendum. 
According to that draft, the laws of the Assembly of the 
Republic could also be submitted to referendum, by a two thirds 
deliberation of the deputies in full exercise of their office. This may be 
done before sending for enactment, or by request of the citizens in a 
number not less than 1/20 of the total number of voters, within 90 days 
after its publication in the official journal. The Government's executive-
laws, except the ones on tax-related matters, may be submitted to 
referendum through the citizens' request, in the same terms of the laws of 
the Assembly of the Republic. 
On 19 July 1980, Pedro Santana Lopes introduced a draft 
amendment to Sá Carneiro’s draft (Lopes & Barroso, 1980, pp. 173-224) 
that proposed three relevant modifications. In the political referendum, the 
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President of the Republic would remain responsible for calling it, but the 
Government could propose submitting important issues concerning the 
national interest to referendum. The author thought that, since the 
Government was responsible for leading the internal and foreign politics 
of the country, it could be convenient to establish the popular will before 
taking any measures of exceptional importance (Lopes & Barroso, 1980, 
p. 188). 
For the legislative referendum by parliamentary initiative, it 
would not be necessary to have a deliberation taken by a two-thirds 
majority of the members since the absolute majority would be enough. 
Santana Lopes (1980, p. 198) did not see any reason to prevent the 
parliamentary majority from asking for popular support of their measures 
when it would have enough power to approve them in Parliament. 
Moreover, he reduced the time limit needed for the decision about the 
legislative referendum from 90 days to 30. He thought that this period 
would be enough to evaluate the implications of any law, and that it would 
also save time. There was also the mere convenience that it would be 
possible to relight the debate on previously discussed subjects (Lopes & 
Barroso, 1980, pp. 221-222). 
The draft amendments to the Constitution personally published 
by Jorge Miranda (1980) excluded the national referendum and only 
included the possibility of local referendums. The change of position 
assumed by the author, in relation to his draft of the Constitution 
published in 1975 that contained referendum proposals at several levels, is 
easily explicable by the political evolution of the second half of the 1970s. 
The national referendum had been used as a weapon by right-wing forces, 
and particularly by the PPD/PSD against the 1976 Constitution, who 
sought to use it to press for a Constitutional rupture. That subject brought 
about a deep divergence between Jorge Miranda and the PPD/PSD, which 
led this professor and constituent deputy to leave that party and found the 
ASDI. In the appendix to his draft amendments to the Constitution, Jorge 
Miranda (1980, p. 210) explained his sympathy towards the referendum as 
a democratic method. However, he thought that the referendum had to be 
surrounded by very strong warranties, and that it could only be used safely 
in countries where democracy was consolidated, which was not the case in 
Portugal at the time. 
The work published in February 1981 by Professors Barbosa de 
Melo, Cardoso da Costa and Vieira de Andrade (Melo et al, 1981), which 
formed the base of the draft amendments by the AD, proposed two other 
The National Referendum   275 
 
 
types of national referendum that needed the decision of the President of 
the Republic: the political referendum and the legislative referendum. 
Regarding the political referendum, the President of the 
Republic could submit the decision on important issues concerning the 
national interest and transcendent political importance to popular 
referendum, when such an action was requested of him by the 
Government or by the Assembly of the Republic, through deliberation 
passed by the majority of members in full exercise of their office. 
According to the authors, the political referendum should be exceptional, 
and it should only take place in very special circumstances, as long as 
those circumstances were appraised by the President of the Republic and 
by the Assembly of the Republic or by the Government, as authors of the 
proposals. The authors were sought to avoid leaving the decision in the 
hands of a single sovereignty organ (Melo et al, pp. 185-186). 
As for the legislative referendum, any law approved by the 
Assembly of the Republic, except on budgetary or tax-related matters, 
would be submitted to popular referendum. It could be totally or partially 
repealed if requested by at least 100,000 citizen voters within six months 
after publication. 
According to the authors, the legislative referendum was a 
‘pouvoir démpêcher’ given to the citizens before the Assembly of the 
Republic. It was not an instrument of positive popular participation, but a 
way for citizens to act against parliamentary decisions that they disliked. 
The referendum would always have a sense of repeal, even if only 
partially. 
However, by not converting the referendum into an instrument 
of common use, the authors provided several conditions: a) a high number 
of proponents; b) the exclusion of budgetary and tax-related matters; c) 
the setting of a deadline to request the referendum (Melo et al, 1981, p. 
212). The holding of this referendum depended exclusively on the popular 
decision, and became obligatorily provided the proponents observed the 
Constitutional and legal conditions (Melo et al, 1981, p. 186). 
In relation to the legislative referendum, the authors did not 
follow Sá Carneiro’s draft in two specific points. They did not propose 
that the Assembly of the Republic could raise a legislative referendum 
before the sending of laws for enactment. If the parliamentary majority 
wanted to submit one of its own subjects to referendum, it should make 
the respective proposal to the President of the Republic. For that same 
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reason, the authors did not propose that the Government could submit its 
executive-laws to referendum, given that there would always be the 
possibility of the Assembly of the Republic pronouncing itself on them 
before any direct intervention of the citizens (Melo et al, 1981, pp. 212-
213). This draft still maintained that a referendum would be required 
before administrative regions could be created. 
By the end of January 1981, Diogo Freitas da Amaral introduced 
draft amendments to the Constitution from the AD parties (PSD, CDS and 
PPM), which he had written for the incumbency of the AD summit in 
December 1980. In that draft, the President of the Republic would have 
the responsibility of submitting decisions about any important issues of 
national interest to popular referendum, in the terms requested of him by 
the Government or by the Assembly of the Republic, through deliberation 
passed by the majority of members in full exercise of their office (Amaral, 
1984, pp. 21 and 123). 
The Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 2/II (DAR, Off-
print 6/II, 26 June 1981, pp. 31-58) finally introduced by the AD, followed 
Freitas do Amaral’s proposal, including the national referendum, in 
addition to the already mentioned Constitutional referendum and the local 
consultations. It would be a political referendum, which did not happen on 
routine legislation but on important issues concerning national interest, 
giving it an exceptional nature. The power of decision belonged 
exclusively to the President of the Republic, but the power of initiative 
belonged to the Government and to Parliament, by decision taken by the 
majority of the members in full exercise of their functions (Urbano, 1998, 
pp. 130-131). The Draft Amendments to the Constitution from the AD 
also provided that the actual institution of every administrative region 
would depend on a referendum in each respective area, a matter that will 
be discussed further ahead. 
   1.3.2. The Debates 
The first discussion on the proposals of the AD draft occurred in 
a subcommittee created within the CERC. On 16 October 1981, the 
proposal for national referendum had the total opposition of the PS, the 
PCP, the ASDI and the MDP/CDE (DAR, 6 − Supplement, 28 October 
1981, p. 78). The debate on the referendum in the first Constitutional 
revision was centred on the Constitutional referendum, which made any 
idea of introducing the national referendum unfeasible from the very 
beginning. However, the AD kept its proposal and tried, during the 
debates, to separate those two types of referendum. 
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During the meeting of the CERC, on 4 November 1981, Luís 
Beiroco (CDS) pleaded for the AD’s proposal, pointing out the safeguards 
that that proposal assumed. All sovereignty organs would need to agree 
before a referendum could be called, and ultimately leaving that power to 
the President of the Republic (DAR, 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, 
pp. 25-26). However, in that same committee meeting, several members 
of the PS and the ASDI harshly criticised the possibility of a national 
referendum (DAR, 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, pp. 26-32). 
The socialist José Luís Nunes assumed a radical position against 
the referendum and considered it a permanent coup d'état (DAR, 33 − 
Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 27), with the following arguments: a) 
to give the President of the Republic powers to call referendums would 
mean to give him institutional leadership over the Assembly of the 
Republic and the Government; b) the proposal placed the Assembly of the 
Republic and the Government at the same level regarding the referendum 
initiative, which meant that in case of disagreement, any one of those 
bodies could appeal to the President of the Republic and propose that he 
call a referendum; c) once the President of the Republic was granted the 
possibility to call a referendum, nothing could prevent him from calling a 
referendum despite the established rules; d) the definition of what could 
be considered an important issue concerning national interest and could 
later be submitted to referendum would be decided by the pressures on the 
street. 
Nunes concluded that the consequence of the introduction of the 
national referendum, as proposed by the AD, would be the refusal of the 
Constitutional rule that says that sovereignty shall lie with the people, who 
shall exercise it in the forms provided for in the Constitution. The 
referendum would bring total and complete legislative instability, in short, 
institutional chaos (DAR, 33 − Supplement, 23 December 1981, pp. 26-
27).  
In the plenary sitting of 8 July 1982, the AD only kept a proposal 
regarding the responsibilities of the President of the Republic (Article 
136), which included the responsibility to call referendums. That proposal 
was rejected, obtaining only 98 yea votes (PSD, CDS and PPM) and 78 
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nay votes (PS, PCP, ASDI, UEDS, MDP/CDE and UDP).  Therefore, it 
did not obtain the qualified two-thirds majority for its approval.126 
   1.3.3. The Conclusion 
The national referendum was not introduced to the Constitution 
by the Constitutional revision of 1982. The problem was not so much the 
regime’s proposal for a legislative referendum, or for the referendum on 
important matters concerning national interest, but fundamentally the 
threat of the AD’s proposal for Constitutional referendum. In the context 
of the AD’s absolute majority in Parliament, all the parties on the left were 
afraid of the abusive use of the national referendum to change the 
Constitution. Indeed, the Constitutional revision through a referendum 
was very much associated with the AD parties, and it was a source of 
controversy in Portuguese politics between the end of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s, causing major polarisation between left and right 
wing parties.127 
The way the debate was framed condemned the national 
referendum to a postponement that would only end the 1989 
Constitutional revision. With the exception of the radical opposition from 
the socialist MP José Luís Nunes, almost all the speeches against the 
national referendum in 1982 did not refuse the referendum as an 
instrument of direct democracy, or as a complement of a representative 
democracy. However, the idea that the referendum could be used to 
achieve antidemocratic and unConstitutional end, a double-edged sword, 
condemned it. Some of the arguments against the referendum in 1982, 
such as the institutional leadership of the President of the Republic, 
legislative instability, or the difficulty of defining what was an important 
issue concerning national interest, had faded in significance by 1989 
because the political context had changed. The problem in 1982 was that 
the national referendum was still inextricably linked with the consitutional 
referendum. It would be necessary to wait for the second Constitutional 
revision in 1989 so that everything could change. 
2. The National Referendum in the Constitutional Revision of 1989 
                                                 
126 See the declarations of vote from Luís Nunes de Almeida (PS), António Vitorino 
(UEDS), Luís Beiroco (CDS), Jorge Miranda (ASDI), Vital Moreira (PCP), Luís Coimbra 
(PPM), and Francisco Sousa Tavares (PSD) in DAR (I) 116, 9 July1982, pp. 4871-4874. 
127 Luís Nunes de Almeida referred in the meeting of 4 November 1981that what public 
opinion thought about the referendum did not have anything to do with the true concept of 
the referendum, but with that which the AD had been defending for two years (DAR, 33 - 
Supplement, 23 December 1981, p. 32). 
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2.1. The Antecedents 
The debate on the second Constitutional revision began long 
before 1989. The revision would be possible without the Assembly of the 
Republic assuming extraordinary powers of Constitutional revision by a 
four-fifths majority of the members in full exercise of their office. The 
right wing Portuguese parties, the PSD and the CDS, never accepted the 
Constitution of 1976, and as they were dissatisfied with the Constitutional 
revision of 1982.  They demonstrated their hope for an extraordinary 
Constitutional revision early on. The referendum had a secondary role in 
this context. The clearly assumed main purpose was a deep change of the 
part of the Constitution regarding the organisation of the economy, putting 
an end to the principle of the irreversibility of nationalisations that had 
been decided during the revolutionary period, and opening up the doors 
for privatisation of basic sectors of the economy. 
It is true, however, that the purposes announced by some parties 
as to the second Constitutional revision, independently of its moment, 
included the enshrinement of the national referendum. In the very 
beginning of 1984, the National Council of the PSD rejected a proposal by 
two of its members (Santana Lopes and Conceição Monteiro), who argued 
that the extraordinary revision of the Constitution must be a purpose of the 
party.  In their view, it was essential to change the economic part of the 
Constitution and the electoral system, and to introduce the referendum 
(Magalhães, 1989, p. 119). 
The CDS also proposed that the Assembly of the Republic 
assume extraordinary revision powers through Draft Resolution No. 
23/III, which was rejected on 12 June 1984 with nay votes from the PS, 
the PCP, the MDP, the UEDS and the ASDI and yea votes from the PSD 
and the CDS [DAR (I) 123, 14 June 1984, pp. 5261-5314]. In the next 
legislative session, the CDS introduced Draft Resolution No. 43/III, with 
the same purpose, and it was rejected on 23 May 1985 with the same 
result [Magalhães, 1989, p. 129; DAR (I) 84, 24 May 1985, pp. 3175-
3202]. Still before the second Constitutional revision, the PSD, the PS, the 
CDS and the PRD admitted the inclusion of the referendum among their 
purposes for the second Constitutional revision in their programmatic 
documents, although in different ways (Magalhães, 1989, pp. 196, 198, 
212, 241 and 252). 
2.2. The Draft Amendments to the Constitution 
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The Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. I/V from the 
CDS, opened the Constitutional revision procedure on 17 October 1987.128 
These included two types of national referendum, both decided by the 
President of the Republic: a) on important national matters when that was 
requested by the Government or by the Assembly of the Republic, through 
deliberation approved by the absolute majority of members in full exercise 
of their office; b) on the approval of international conventions that 
assigned the exercise of the Portuguese State’s responsibilities to an 
international organisation, if the respective approval in the Assembly of 
the Republic did not obtain the two-thirds majority, but still had 
affirmative votes from the absolute majority of members in full exercise 
of their office (DAR, Off-print No. 1/V, 31 December 1987, pp. 140-141). 
In terms of the Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 3/V 
presented by the PS, a) the power to call the referendum was not given to 
the President of the Republic, but to the Assembly of the Republic by a 
qualified majority; b) the referendum should have binding effect; c) the 
right of initiative belonged exclusively to the Government and to a fifth 
part of the members of Parliament, with the popular initiative being 
excluded; d) the referendum should not be directly about international 
agreements or legislative acts, but on matters upon which the Assembly of 
the Republic or the Government must decide by passing an international 
agreement or legislation; e) the referendum could not happen on a 
significant group of matters; f) temporary limits for calling and holding 
referendums were imposed; g) the Constitutional Court had the 
responsibility to review the Constitutionality and legality of the 
referendums. (DAR, Off-print No. 1/V, 31 December 1987, pp. 50 and 
56). 
According to the Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 
4/V, from the PSD, the President of the Republic could submit matters of 
great national interest and superior political importance to binding 
referendum, upon the Government's request or by deliberation approved in 
the Assembly of the Republic by the absolute majority of members in full 
exercise of their office. The budgetary and tax-related matters, and those 
whose purpose was to increase the State’s expenditure or decrease its 
income, could not be subject to a referendum (DAR, Off-print No. 1/V, 31 
December 1987, p. 63). 
The Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 9/V (PRD) was 
the most expansive as to the national referendum. It included a political 
                                                 
128 Regarding the Portuguese Constitution, once a draft amendment was introduced to the 
Constitution, any others also had to be introduced within 30 days. 
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referendum and a legislative referendum. In the first case, the President 
could submit a political decision of fundamental importance to 
referendum if this was requested by the Assembly of the Republic with a 
two-thirds majority. In the second case, the President of the Republic 
could submit to referendum any decree that he had received from the 
Assembly of the Republic to enact as law, or from the Government as 
executive-law emitted in the use of legislative authorisation of the 
Assembly of the Republic (DAR, Off-print No. 1/V, 31 December 1987, 
pp. 110-111). 
2.3. The First Reading in the CERC 
The first reading of the proposals happened in the CERC on 29 
July 1988. It was not a conclusive meeting, but it established some 
approaches as to how matters would proceed. The main divergence 
between the PS and the other parties that proposed the referendum (PSD, 
PRD and CDS) were the presidential responsibilities. The PS, unlike the 
other parties, did not give the President of the Republic the power to 
decide on the referendum, but only the right of veto on proposals that he 
had received.129 
Another divergence concerned the parliamentary majority 
needed to propose a referendum. The PS and the PRD supported the need 
for a two-thirds majority, while the PSD and the CDS considered that 
demand unnecessary.  They argued that an absolute majority of the 
members in full exercise of their office to be enough for that effect.130 The 
demand of a two-thirds majority was based on the idea that the 
referendum should not be an instrument of power utilised by a 
parliamentary majority against a minority Government, but a political 
instrument usable just when there was a wide consensus as to its 
necessity.131 There was some consensus as to the exclusion of 
referendums on some matters, such as the indispensability of the prior 
review of the referendum’s Constitutionality and legality, as well as the 
convenience of time limits to call and hold referendums.132  
                                                 
129 See speech by António de Almeida Santos in the CERC (DAR [II] 56 − RC, 8 
November 1988, p. 1800). 
130 See speeches by Rui Machete (PSD) and Nogueira de Brito (CDS) in DAR (II) 56 − RC, 
8 November 1988, pp. 1802 and 1813. 
131 See speeches by Miguel Galvão Teles (PRD) and Almeida Santos (PS), in DAR (II) 56 
− RC, 8 November 1988, p. 1803-1804. 
132 See speeches by Almeida Santos (PS), Miguel Galvão Teles (PRD) and Rui Machete 
(PSD) in DAR (II) 56 − RC, 8 November 1988, p. 1800-1805. 
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The PRD proposal for a legislative referendum, instead of the 
presidential veto, did not obtain any support. The proponent himself did 
not support it in a convincing way because Miguel Galvão Teles 
recognised the sensitivity of the proposal and he did not insist on it.133 
2.4. The PS/PSD Political Agreement  
On 14 October 1988, the PS and the PSD signed a political 
agreement for the second Constitutional revision.  In this document, they 
agreed to introduce in the Constitution the deliberative referendum on 
matters that should be the subject of common legislative acts or 
international agreements. The President of the Republic would call the 
referendum under the Government’s or Parliament’s proposal with 
deliberation taken by an absolute majority (Magalhães, 1989, p. 167). 
That agreement gave way to a joint PS/PSD proposal regarding the 
national referendum, which was discussed and passed in the CERC on 7 
March 1989 [DAR (II) 103, 15 May 1989, pp. 2922-2934]. This gave 
origin to the text passed in the plenary sitting of the 23 May [DAR (I) 86, 
24 May 1989, pp. 4239-4230]. 
2.5. The Constitutional Text Passed 
The text passed as the new Article 118 of the Constitution,134 
regarding the national referendum, Stated the following: 
1) In the cases provided for, and as laid down by the 
Constitution and law, following a proposal from the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government, the President 
of the Republic may decide to call upon citizens who are 
registered to vote in the Portuguese territory to directly and 
bindingly pronounce themselves through referendum.135 
2) The object of a referendum shall be limited to important 
issues concerning the national interest upon which the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government must decide 
by passing an international agreement or legislation. 
                                                 
133 See speeches by Miguel Galvão Teles, Rui Machete and Almeida Santos as to the 
legislative referendum in DAR (II) 56 − RC, 8 November 1988, pp. 1801-1803. 
134 In the Constitutional revision this text was passed as Article 112-A. In the final 
wording, it was numbered as Article 118. 
135 This provision had nay votes from the PCP. José Magalhães, in his explanation of the 
vote, affirmed that the PCP did not saw reasons to change the refusal of the introduction of 
the referendum in 1976 and 1982, but it voted for all of the cautions introduced to avoid 
plebiscitary perversions [DAR (I) 84, 20 May 1989, pp. 4123-4128]. 
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3) The referendum could not concern, namely, the alterations 
to the Constitution, the matters included in Articles 164 and 
167 of the Constitution and the issues and acts with a 
budgetary, tax-related or financial content.136  
4) Each referendum shall address only one matter. Questions 
shall be objectively, clearly and precisely formulated, in 
terms of yes or no answers, and shall not exceed a maximum 
number to be laid down by law. The law shall also lay down 
the other terms governing the formulation and holding of 
referendums. 
5) Referendums shall not be called or held between the dates 
on which general elections for sovereign organs, the self-
government bodies of the autonomous regions, local 
authority bodies and members of the European Parliament 
are called and those on which they are held. 
6) The President of the Republic shall submit all draft 
referendums submitted to him by the Assembly of the 
Republic or the Government, to a compulsory and prior 
review of their Constitutionality and legality. 
7) The provisions of Article 116(1), (2), (3), (4) and (7) shall 
apply to referendums, mutatis mutandis.137 
8) Draft referendums that are refused by the President of the 
Republic or by the electorate through negative answer shall 
not be resubmitted during the same legislative session, 
except new elections to the Assembly of the Republic, or 
until the Government resigns or is removed. 
In Article 170, on the power of initiative, the following 
provisions on the referendum were passed: a) the power to initiate 
referendums shall lie on members of Parliament, parliamentary groups 
and the Government (No. 1); b) no member or parliamentary group shall 
submit a draft referendum which, during the current financial year, 
involves an increase in the State’s expenditure or a decrease in its 
revenues as set out in the Budget (No. 3); c) draft referendums that are 
definitively rejected may not be resubmitted in the same legislative 
session, unless a new Assembly of the Republic is elected (No. 4); d) draft 
                                                 
136 This provision had the abstention from the PEV, because this party believed that there 
were too many matters that could not be the object of referendum. It defended, however, 
that international agreements, namely those regarding the integration of Portugal in the 
European Communities should be the object of referendum. See speech by Herculano 
Pombo in DAR (I) 84, 20 May 1989, pp. 4068-4069. Articles 164 and 167 established the 
matters that were the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic. 
137 Article 116 established the general principles of electoral law. 
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referendums that are not put to the vote in the legislative session in which 
they are submitted shall not require resubmission in the following 
legislative sessions, unless the legislature itself comes to an end (No. 5); 
e) draft referendums shall lapse upon the resignation or removal of the 
Government (No. 6); f) parliamentary committees may submit 
replacement texts without prejudicing the draft referendums to which they 
refer, unless they are withdrawn (No. 8). 
2.6. Remarks on the Constitutional System Passed in 1989  
The national referendum was one of the most important 
innovations of the second Constitutional revision. The system that was 
implemented had the following key features. 
The electoral universe included the citizens registered to vote in 
the national territory.  Therefore, Portuguese citizens registered abroad 
were excluded. The reason for that exclusion was to avoid important 
issues of national interest being decided by the large number of citizens 
who had lived abroad for a long time, and were therefore far removed 
from the problems of the country. However, the Constitution refers only 
to Portuguese citizens, keeping the door open for the eventual 
participation of foreign citizens living in Portugal who are originally from 
Portuguese-speaking countries. Article 15(3) of the Constitution allows 
that, through international agreement, and in reciprocal conditions, those 
citizens could have some rights that are not offered to other foreign 
citizens (Canotilho & Moreira, 1993, p. 531). 
The referendum has binding effect. Advisory referendums were 
excluded. According to Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira (1993, p. 
531), this meant that: a) it would not be possible to approve laws or 
international conventions that contradicted the decision of the referendum; 
b) the Assembly of the Republic or the Government would be forced to 
approve, within a reasonable time, the legislative act or the corresponding 
international convention that had been decided by the poll; c) the 
President of the Republic would not be able to use the political veto on 
legislative acts decided by referendum. Neither could he refuse to ratify 
nor sign international conventions designed to convert the results of the 
referendum into juridical rules.   
The exclusive responsibility for calling the referendum rested 
with the President of the Republic, following a proposal by the Assembly 
of the Republic or the Government.  Such a proposal had to be made in 
accordance with the terms laid down in the Constitution and by law. 
Referendums could not be called by popular initiative. 
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The President of the Republic had the final decision about 
calling the referendum. The presidential refusal could not be over-ruled, 
unlike the veto. If the Constitutional Court declared the draft resolution 
for referendum unConstitutional or illegal, that decision would be binding. 
The national referendum, as foreseen in 1989, was always optional. The 
decision to hold a referendum rested entirely in the hands of the 
sovereignty organs (Canotilho & Moreira, 1993, p. 530). 
The Constitution premitted referendums by the initiative of the 
Assembly of the Republic and the Government near the President, 
according to the responsibilities of each one. The Assembly of the 
Republic could not propose draft referendums on subjects of the exclusive 
responsibility of the Government.138 However, the Government, in 
cooperation with the President of the Republic, and without Parliament, 
could propose a referendum that would be binding on the Assembly of the 
Republic (Magalhães, 1989, pp. 91-92). Thus, a referendum to decide 
matters of exclusive responsibility to the Assembly of the Republic had to 
be promoted by the Assembly itself. However, the Government could 
introduce draft referendums on these matters to the Assembly of the 
Republic, but the final deliberation always belonged to Parliament. 
The parliamentary initiative was also subject to specific rules. It 
belonged to parliamentary groups or individuals, i.e. members of 
Parliament. They could not submit draft referendums that involved an 
increase in State expenditure or a decrease in its revenues, as set out in the 
Budget during that financial year. That limitation generally applied to 
parliamentary legislative initiatives, except for the Government's 
initiatives. Only the Government could introduce proposals to change the 
State Budgets approved. 
Draft referendums that had been definitively refused could not 
be resubmitted during the same legislative session,139 except where new 
elections to the Assembly of the Republic had been held.140 Similar to the 
situation with legislative initiatives, draft referendums that were not voted 
on in the legislative session in which they are submitted would not require 
resubmission in the following legislative sessions, unless the legislature 
                                                 
138 The exclusive responsibility of the Government to legislate only regards its own 
organization and working. 
139 The legislative session has the lasting period of one year and began on 15 October. 
Nowadays it begins on 15 September. 
140 This formulation would later raise the doubt about when in case of premature elections 
it would begin a new legislative session or if the previous one would be prolonged. The 
Constitutional Court was called to decide on that subject concerning a draft referendum. 
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itself ended. The draft referendums introduced by the Government would 
lapse upon its resignation or removal. As with legislative initiatives, the 
parliamentary committees could submit replacement texts of the proposals 
introduced to them. 
Parliamentary deliberation would not need absolute majority. 
Unless the Constitution specified otherwise, the general rule applied, i.e 
that a simple majority sufficed, with the abstentions not being counted for 
the result. 
The referendum would happen where important issues of 
national interest were at stake, upon which the Assembly of the Republic 
or the Government were required to assent to an international agreement 
or associated legislation. The referendum would not necessarily pertain to 
the Act itself (the passing of the law, the executive law or the international 
agreement), but would consider the issues included in those Acts. A 
negative referendum result would not necessarily prevent the approval of 
the Act, unless the subject submitted to referendum is essential required 
such approval. However, the content would need to be altered to 
correspond with the sentimet expressed by the voters. This provision, in 
addition to considering the referendum as being relatively exceptional 
(since it could only happen on important issues of national interest), 
forbids the referendum abrogative, given that it must always occur before 
the passing of the act to which it refers. This rule equally assured that 
voters would not be given the role of approving or rejecting general 
politics, issues of political leadershis or projects without concretely 
defined outlines (Magalhães, 1989, p. 92). 
The referendum could not be called to solve hypothetical or 
abstract questions, but could only concern concrete and existing subjects, 
normally included in pending legislative initiatives or in international 
conventions under negotiation or already adjusted and waiting for 
approval (Canotilho & Moreira, 1993, p. 532). The referendum was 
forbidden in the following cases: a) alterations to the Constitution, with 
the Constitutional referendum being expressly rejected; b) matters 
provided for in Article 164 of the Constitution,141 which referred to the 
political and legislative responsibilities of the Assembly of the 
Republic;142 c) matters provided for in Article 167 of the Constitution,143 
                                                 
141 Current Article 161. 
142 This provision made the referendum impossible on a) the political and administrative 
statutes of the autonomous regions; b)  the statute of the territory of Macau, which was 
then under Portuguese administration; c) the granting of generic amnesties and pardons; d) 
the laws on the Major Options of the National Plans and the State Budget; e) the contract 
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which are the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic to 
legislate;144 d) issues and acts with a budgetary, tax-related or financial 
content. Even when the Constitution excluded ‘namely’ these matters, it 
did not prevent the exclusion of other matters by law. 
The express exclusion of the Constitutional referendum implied, 
according to José Magalhães (1989, p. 92), other exclusions on related or 
connection matters, or regarding the indirect protection of the 
Constitution. An ordinary law, whose content was against the Constitution 
or Constitutionally bound, could not be submitted to referendum. The 
Constitution provided clear requirements on that question. Referendum 
questions could only address one matter, and should not exceed a 
maximum number of questions laid down by law. The questions should be 
objectively, clearly and precisely formulated, and should allow a ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ answer (Canotilho & Moreira, 1993, p. 534). 
                                                                                                               
and granting of loans and the engagement in other lending operations; f) the passing of 
treaties that address matters which are the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly of the 
Republic; g) the passing of  treaties that entail Portugal’s participation in international 
organisations, friendship, peace, defence, the rectification of borders or military affairs; h) 
the authorisation and confirmation of the declarations of State of siege or State of 
emergency; i) the authorisation to declare war or to make peace. As to the generality of the 
Constitutional doctrine, it does not make sense to think that the Constitution forbids 
referendums on all subjects referred in Article 164, given that the same article refers to the 
responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic to legislate on all matters (Canotilho & 
Moreira, 1993, p. 534).    
143 Current Article 164. 
144 This provision included the following matters: a) elections for officeholders of 
sovereignty organs; b) the  regime of referendum; c) the organisation, operation and 
proceedings of the Constitutional Court; d) the organisation of national defence, the 
definition of the duties derived there from and the basic general elements of the 
organisation, operation, re-equipping and discipline of the Armed Forces; e) rules 
governing States of siege and States of emergency; f) the acquisition, loss and re-
acquisition of Portuguese citizenship; g) the definition of the limits of territorial waters, the 
exclusive economic zone and Portugal’s rights to the adjacent seabed; h) political 
associations and parties; i) basic elements of the educational system; j) election of 
members from the self-government bodies of the autonomous regions; l) election of local 
government officeholders and other elections conducted by direct, universal suffrage, as 
well as elections for the remaining Constitutional bodies; m) status and role of the 
officeholders of sovereignty organs and local government officeholders, as well as the 
officeholders of the remaining Constitutional bodies and all those who are elected by 
direct, universal suffrage; n) inclusion of serious crimes capable of being equalled to 
essentially military crimes in the jurisdiction of military courts; o) rules for the creation, 
abolition and modification of local authorities; p) the regime of local referendum; q) 
restrictions on the exercise of rights by full-time military and militarised personnel in 
active service. 
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The Constitution also set time limits for the calling and holding 
of referendums, which could not happen between the dates on which 
elections for the President of the Republic, self-government bodies of the 
autonomous regions, local authority bodies and members of the European 
Parliament were called and the date on which those elections were held. A 
prior review of the Constitutionality and legality of any referendum was 
compulsory. The President of the Republic must send any draft 
referendum to the Constitutional Court and, in case of unConstitutionality 
or illegality, must refuse to call the referendum.  
The following general principles of electoral law are applicable 
to the referendum: a) suffrage is direct and secret; b) electoral registration 
is official, compulsory, permanent and single for all the elections held by 
direct and universal suffrage; c) campaigns are governed by the principles 
of freedom of propaganda, equality of opportunities and treatment of all 
options; d) public bodies must be impartial e) campaign accounts are 
submitted to scrutiny; f) citizens shall possess the duty to cooperate with 
the electoral authorities; g) the power to rule on the correctness and 
validity of the referendary process acts shall pertain to the courts. 
The legal regime of the referendum is provided by 
organisational law. That means that the passing of the referendum law 
requires the absolute majority of the members in full exercise of their 
office in the final overall vote, and the vote on the details shall occur in a 
plenary sitting. A prior review of its Constitutionality can be requested, 
not only by the President of the Republic, but also by the Prime Minister, 
or even by a fifth of the members of Parliament. The political veto by the 
President of the Republic can only be surpassed by a majority that is at 
least equal to two thirds of all members present and greater than an 
absolute majority of all members in full exercise of their office. 
Luís Barbosa Rodrigues (1994, pp. 152-153) synthesises the 
contribution of each party in the final drawing of the Constitutional rules 
passed in 1989. The object of the referendum (on legislative acts and 
international agreements), the time (before the approval of the acts), the 
limits and restrictions (for material, temporary, formal and organisational 
reasons), were from the PS draft. Giving the power of initiative to the 
Assembly of the Republic and the Government, the power of decision to 
the President of the Republic, and the option for a referendum to 
legitimise the majority through governmental or parliamentary initiative 
passed by a simple majority, came from the PSD and the CDS drafts. The 
prior and compulsory review of the referendum’s Constitutionality came 
from the PRD draft. 
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The unanimous approval of the national referendum in 1989 was 
a result of its very careful terms. As an instrument of direct democracy, 
the referendum maintained a secondary position to the principle of 
representative democracy (Canotilho & Moreira, 1993, p. 530). 
3. Organisational Law No. 45/91, of 3 August 
3.1. The Bills Introduced 
In 1990, the PS and the PSD introduced the first bills of 
organisational referendum law (Urbano, 1998, pp. 155-169). In February, 
the PS introduced Bill No. 473/V [DAR (II-A) 18, 17 February 1990, pp. 
781-802). In April, the PSD introduced Bill No. 515/V [DAR (II-A) 33, 18 
April 1990, pp. 1112-1140). Regarding those initiatives, there were some 
remarks on the Opinions drawn on behalf of the Constitutional Affairs, 
Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties Committee of the Assembly of the 
Republic.  
The Opinion on the PS bill, from Luís Pais de Sousa (PSD) 
mentioned the fact that the text of the bill did not clearly State the 
consequences of the declaration of unConstitutionality or illegality of the 
referendum by the Constitutional Court. According to that Opinion, the 
law should clarify the impossibility of holding the referendum in those 
cases [DAR (II-A) 44, 25 May 1990, pp. 1366-1367]. 
The opinion on the PSD bill, drawn by Alberto Martins (PS) 
hinted at four unConstitutionalities: a) that the President of the Republic 
was not obliged to ask for a prior review of the Constitutionality and 
legality of a draft referendum if it had been reformulated after being 
declared unConstitutional or illegal by the Constitutional Court; b) that 
electoral capacity should be given to all Portuguese citizens, and not just 
to citizens registered to vote in the national territory; c) that the President 
of the Republic could not exercise the political veto on a legislative act or 
international convention related to the questions submitted to referendum. 
The referendum should judge on concrete subjects put to the voters, and 
not on the legal form of how to interpret those answers at the legislative 
level; d) the lack of prior review of the legislative act or international 
convention reproduced, developed or materialised following an 
affirmative answer to a referendum. In that case, any law or convention 
that corresponded to the voters’ answer would be protected, even if it 
included unConstitutional rules [DAR (II-A) 44, 25 May 1990, pp. 1367-
1369]. 
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The bill from the PSD was widely inspired by a draft made by 
Jorge Miranda (1991) upon the Government’s request by the end of 1989, 
with only some differences (Urbano, 1998, pp. 162-163). Jorge Miranda 
a) clearly Stated which matters had to be excluded from referendum; b) 
extended the time limits to hold referendums, not allowing them within 
the six months after the election of the Assembly of the Republic; c) 
admitted only the participation of the citizens registered to vote in the 
national territory; d) broke up with the monopoly of the political parties in 
the campaign for the referendum, thus allowing specific campaign 
activities to be carried out by groups of citizens as well. 
3.2. The Legal System Passed 
On 24 May 1990, Parliament discussed and passed the general 
terms of the bills of organisational referendum law introduced by the PS 
and the PSD [DAR (I) 78, 25 May 1990, pp. 2595-2612]. The PSD, the PS 
and the PRD voted for both bills. The PEV voted for the PS bill and 
against the PSD bill. The PCP abstained on the PS bill and voted against 
the PSD bill [DAR (I) 78, 25 May 1990, pp. 2613]. The Constitutional 
Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties Committee proceeded to fuse 
both bills in a common text, which was approved in the final overall vote 
on 23 April 1991 [DAR (I) 67, 24 April 1991, p. 2278). The PSD, the PS, 
the PRD, the CDS and the independent MPs José Magalhães, Jorge Lemos 
and Herculano Pombo voted yea; the PCP and the independent MP Raul 
de Castro abstained. Law No. 45/91, of 3 August, introduced the national 
referendum to Portugal for the first time. 
The essential lines of the approved legal system were the 
following: 145 
1) Object - As to the object, the law (Article 2) reproduced the 
Constitutional text [Article 118(2)]: the object of a 
referendum shall be limited to important issues concerning 
national interest upon which the Assembly of the Republic 
or the Government must decide by passing an international 
agreement or legislation.  
2) Excluded matters - The following matters were excluded 
from the subject of referendums (Article 3): a) alterations to 
the Constitution; b) matters provided for in Articles 164 and 
                                                 
145 For more details on Law No. 45/91, of 3 August, see Urbano (1998, pp. 171-302); 
Rodrigues (1994, pp. 157-240); Suordem (1997, pp. 15-234). 
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167 of the Constitution,146 which referred respectively to the 
matters included in the political responsibilities and in the 
Assembly of the Republic’s exclusive responsibility to 
legislate; c) issues and acts with budgetary, tax-related or 
financial content; d) matters regarding the organisation and 
proceedings of the Assembly of the Republic, Government 
and Courts, and to the statute of the respective officeholders, 
as well as to the organisation and responsibilities of the 
Public Prosecutors Office and their public prosecutors. 
3) Delineation of responsibilities - Article 5 of the law 
delimited the responsibilities of the Assembly of the 
Republic and Government as to the respective drafts of 
referendum. The Assembly of the Republic can approve 
draft referendums a) on international convention whose 
matters are included in its partially exclusive responsibility 
to legislate; b) on international conventions not excluded 
from referendum that are submitted by the Government for 
approval; c) on any legislative matters not excluded from 
referendum. The Government, without prejudicing the 
Assembly of the Republic’s right of initiative, can propose 
directly to the President of the Republic referendums on a) 
international conventions whose approval is not the 
responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic or that had 
not been submitted to it; b) legislative acts on matters not 
included in the Assembly of the Republic’s exclusive 
legislative responsibility.  
4) Formulation of the questions - Each referendum can only 
consider a single matter (Article 6), and it cannot pose more 
than three questions [Article 7(1)]. The questions are 
formulated in terms of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. They must be 
objective, clear and precise without suggesting, directly or 
indirectly, a particular answer [Article 7(2)]. The questions 
cannot be preceded by any considerations, preambles or 
explanatory notes [Article 7(3)]. 
5) Temporary and circumstantial limits - No act related to 
the calling or holding of a referendum can be practiced a) 
between the dates on which general elections for the organs 
of sovereignty, self-government bodies of the autonomous 
                                                 
146 Current Articles 161 and 164. 
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regions, local authority bodies and Members of the 
European Parliament are called and those on which they are 
held (Article 8); b) within three months after a referendum 
(Article 8); c) during the forced States of siege or emergency 
(Article 9). 
6) The Assembly of the Republic’s initiative - The deputies, 
parliamentary groups or Government, can take the 
referendum initiative in the Assembly of the Republic 
(Article 10). The deputies and the parliamentary groups 
cannot submit draft referendums that, during the current 
financial year, involve an increase in the State’s expenditure, 
or a decrease in its revenues as set out in the State Budget 
(Article 11). The draft referendums that are not put to the 
vote in the legislative session in which they are submitted 
shall not require resubmission in the following legislative 
sessions, unless the legislature itself ends. The draft 
referendums definitively refused shall not be resubmitted in 
the same legislative session (Article 12). The approval is 
made with a simple majority, without counting the 
abstentions (Article 13). 
7) The Government’s initiative - The draft referendums from 
the Government are approved by the Council of Ministers’ 
Resolution (Article 15) and shall lapse upon the resignation 
or removal of the Government (Article 16). 
8) Prior review of Constitutionality and legality - Within 
eight days of the publication of the Resolution by the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government, the President 
of the Republic asks the Constitutional Court to conduct a 
prior review of the Constitutionality and legality of the draft 
referendum (Article 17). The Constitutional Court shall 
decide within the time limit of 25 days, which can be 
shortened by the President of the Republic in the case of 
urgency. If the Constitutional Court declares the 
unConstitutionality or illegality of the draft referendum, the 
President of the Republic shall not call the referendum, and 
must return the draft to the organ that passed it. The 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government can 
reformulate the draft, expunging it of the unConstitutionality 
or illegality. In those cases, the drafts should be resubmitted, 
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and reviewed afresh by the Constitutional Court (Article 
19). 
9) Calling or refusing the referendum - The President of the 
Republic decides whether to call the referendum within 
eight days of the publication of the Constitutional Court’s 
decision, provided it had not declared any 
unConstitutionality or illegality (Article 25). The decree of 
the President of the Republic should include the formulated 
questions and the date of the referendum, which should 
happen between the sixty and ninety days of the date of 
publication (Article 26). If the President of the Republic 
decides not to call the referendum, he should communicate 
that decision to the Assembly of the Republic in writing, 
setting out the reasons, or to the Government, in a written 
document explaining the refusal. The refused draft shall not 
be resubmitted in the same legislative session (Article 27). 
10) Electoral universe - The right to take part in referendums 
was given to the citizens registered to vote in the national 
territory, therefore excluding Portuguese emigrants (Article 
28). The right to vote of the citizens of other Portuguese-
speaking countries who lived in the national territory was 
also admitted. These citizens benefit from a special statute 
of equal political rights, as laid down by a reciprocal 
international agreement, since they are registered to vote in 
the national territory (Article 29). 
11) Campaigning for the referendum - The referendum 
involves an electoral campaign of 10 days (Article 38), the 
same terms as electoral processes, in order to allow the 
explanation and debate of the questions submitted to 
referendum [Article 31(1)]. The campaign is carried out by 
the legally constituted political parties, or by permanent 
coalitions, which declare their intent to take a position on 
the questions submitted to the voters (Articles 31 and 32) to 
the National Elections Commission (CNE) within 30 days of 
the referendum being called. 
12) Effectiveness of the referendum - The results of the 
referendum are binding on the Assembly of the Republic 
and the Government (Article 231), regardless of the number 
of voters, or the number of valid, blank or null ballot papers 
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(Article 232). If the affirmative answer wins, the Assembly 
of the Republic or the Government shall approve the 
corresponding international convention or legislative act 
within 60 days (Article 233). The President of the Republic 
cannot refuse the ratification of the international convention 
or the enactment of the legislative act, based on the part 
corresponding to the answers given in the referendum 
(Article 234). The Assembly of the Republic or the 
Government shall not approve international conventions or 
legislative acts, nor resubmit draft referendums, 
corresponding to the questions that had a negative answer 
from the voters in the same legislative session, except in 
cases of a new election of the Assembly of the Republic, or 
formation of a new Government (Articles 235 and 236).  
4. The Initiatives for Referendum from 1991 to 1993 
4.1. The Drafts Preceding Law No. 45/91, of 3 August 
The imminent approval of the referendum law inspired the 
appearance of several related initiatives in the beginning of 1991. Before 
the approval of the law on 23 April 1991, two initiatives for referendum 
were introduced in the Assembly of the Republic. The independent MPs, 
José Magalhães and Jorge Lemos, former members of the PCP, 
introduced Draft Resolution No. 77/V, on 5 February 1991, proposing a 
national referendum on the Portuguese Language Orthographic 
Agreement of the [DAR (II-A) 25, 9 February 1991, pp. 795-797]. 
The Draft for the Unified Orthography of the Portuguese 
Language was an international agreement drawn by delegations from 
Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and 
Sao Tome and Principe, in order to unify the orthography of the 
Portuguese language. Delegations from those States signed the agreement 
on 16 December 1990. In 1991, the Government announced the 
introduction of that Agreement to the Assembly of the Republic for 
approval with the intention that it should come into force on 1 January 
1994. Invoking the lack of a national debate on that Agreement, and 
coinciding with a strong public controversy surrounding some of its terms, 
José Magalhães and Jorge Lemos moved forward with the draft resolution 
for a national referendum that would pose the following question to the 
electors:  ‘Shall the Portuguese Language Orthographic Agreement, as it 
is written, be approved and ratified by the Portuguese organs of 
sovereignty?’  
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On 7 March 1991, also before the approval of Law No. 45/91, 
three independent MPs, Herculano Pombo, Valente Fernandes and Helena 
Roseta,147 introduced the second draft referendum, through Draft 
Resolution No. 80/V [DAR (II-A) 32, 16 March 1991, p. 918] which 
sought to submit the issue of nuclear power to referendum, placing voters 
with the following question: ‘Shall the installation of nuclear power plants 
for energy purposes be authorised in the national territory?’ 
Parliament never discussed these drafts. At the time of their 
introduction, there was no legal basis for holding referendums of a 
national scope. By the time the legal framework had been published, on 3 
August 1991, the Assembly of the Republic had already finished its term 
prior to the 6 October 1991 general election. 
The review of the Constitutionality of these draft referendums 
would have been interesting because the referendum was designed for 
considering important issues of national interest, upon which the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government should decide prior to 
passing an international agreement or legislation. Being sure that the 
object of the referendum should be issues, and not acts themselves, the 
Constitutionality of these draft referendums would be certainly have been 
contested. The question of the first was the approval and ratification of the 
Orthographic Agreement itself. As for the second, the question would be 
to know if the nuclear option was a subject that could be decided on by 
passing legislation. In both cases, the initiatives lapsed before they were 
scheduled for debate. 
4.2. The Drafts Introduced After Law No. 45/91, of 3 August 
In the VI Legislature, two draft referendums were introduced 
after the entry into force of the referendum law. On 8 April 1992, the PS 
introduced Draft Resolution No. 17/VI [DAR (II-A) 32, 11April 1992, pp. 
613-614]. The subject was the independence of the broadcasting stations, 
both public radio and television services. 
The dependence of the broadcasting stations, public radio and 
television services (RDP and RTP) on political power, and particularly on 
the Government, gave rise to a strong debate, and even to a message 
addressed to the Assembly of the Republic by President Mário Soares. In 
the VI Legislature, the second with a PSD absolute majority, the 
Government decided to introduce Government Bill No. 6/VI [DAR (II-A) 
                                                 
147 Herculano Pombo and Valente Fernandes became independent after their break with the 
PEV. Helena Roseta was an independent MP inside the Parliamentary Group of the PS. 
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9, 21 December 1991, pp. 196-203] on the statute of RTP, which turned 
that station into a limited company of public capital, with its managers 
appointed by the Government. The State, as the only shareholder, 
appointed all members of the board of directors. The opposition from the 
left, which had supported different options in their own bills, contested 
that option. The PCP, through Bill No. 36/VI [DAR (II-A) 10, 8 January 
1992, pp. 215-225], argued that four of the five members of the board of 
directors should be elected by a general council with 25 elements 
representing several entities, with the final board member elected by 
workers of the station. The PS, which introduced Bill No. 37/VI, [DAR 
(II-A) 10, 8 January 1992, pp. 225-232] supported that two of the 
members be appointed in General Assembly and that the remainder, 
including the president, be elected by an opinion council representing 
several entities. 
The discussion of these initiatives on the general principles 
occurred on 7 January 1992 [DAR (I) 18, 8 January 1992, pp. 412-434], 
and the voting took place on 9 January [DAR (I) 19, 10 January 1992, pp. 
412-434].  The Parliament passed the Government Bill148 and rejected the 
bills from the PS and the PCP.149 Meanwhile, the PS introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 17/VI proposing a referendum with the following 
question: ‘Shall the stations of public radio and television service, to 
ensure their independence from political power, namely from the 
Government and direct or indirect public administration, have their bodies 
constituted from opinion assemblies whose composition is plural and 
representative of several sectors from civil society?’ 
The debate on this draft took place on 28 April 1992. Leonor 
Beleza, on behalf of the PSD, strongly criticised the proposal, and totally 
disapproved of it. The main objections from the PSD were the following: 
a) the question was not important enough to be the subject of a 
referendum. It was long and imperceptible for the majority of electors, 
rested on an organisational and formal matter, and suggested the answer; 
b) that referendum subverted the primacy given by the Constitution to the 
representative democracy; and c) it was inopportune, because it would 
                                                 
148 The Government Bill had yea votes from PSD, CDS and PSN, and nay votes from PS, 
PCP and the independents João Corregedor da Fonseca (ID) and Mário Tomé (UDP), 
[DAR (I) 19, 10 January 1992, p. 458]. 
149 The PCP Bill had yea votes from the PCP and independent MPs, nay votes from the 
PSD and the CDS and abstentions from both PS and PSN. The PS Bill had nay votes from 
the PSD, yea votes from PS, CDS, PSN and Mário Tomé, and abstentions from the PCP 
and João Corregedor da Fonseca [DAR (I) 19, 10 January 1992, pp. 458-459]. 
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take place in the second week of July [DAR (I) 55, 29 July 1992, pp. 
1731-1736]. 
On behalf of the CDS, Narana Coissoró also disagreed with the 
proposal, taking into consideration that the PS wanted to nullify the voting 
already done on Government Bill No. 6/VI regarding the RTP statute, and 
to make its bill on the same subject reappear. It was rejected in the 
meanwhile [DAR (I) 55, 29 July 1992, pp. 1742-1743]. The PCP 
abstained, considering that the lack of independence of the broadcasting 
stations of public radio and television service was an actual and pertinent 
question, but disagreeing that a referendum was the appropriate response. 
It thought that the first national referendum demanded a careful reflection 
on the subject, an accurate formulation of the question and a suitable 
insertion in the country’s electoral schedule. Octávio Teixeira believed 
that the referendum proposed by the PS did not fulfil these requirements 
[DAR (I) 55, 29 July 1992, pp. 1744-1745). 
Thus, the draft was rejected, with yea votes from the PS and 
Mário Tomé, nay votes from the PSD, the CDS and the PSN, and 
abstentions from the PCP and Raúl de Castro (ID), [DAR (I) 55, 29 July 
1992, p. 1745]. The Government Bill regarding the statute of RTP passed 
in the final overall vote on 25 June 1992, with yea votes from the PSD and 
the CDS, nay votes from the PS, the PCP and independent MPs, and 
abstention from the PSN [DAR (I) 80, 26 June 1992, p. 2694). 
On 17 December 1992, the independent MP Mário Tomé (UDP) 
introduced the second draft referendum after the coming into force of Law 
No. 45/91. The subject was the creation of the administrative regions 
[Draft Resolution No. 42/VI, DAR (II-A) 14, 9 January 1993, p. 265] 
which will be treated further ahead. 
5. The National Referendum in the Constitutional Revision of 1997 
5.1. Antecedents 
   5.1.1. The Extraordinary Constitutional Revision of 1992 
The third Constitutional revision was extraordinary in nature. 
With the conclusion of the second revision in 1989, the subsequent 
ordinary revision could only take place, as laid down by the Constitution, 
in 1994. However, the signature of the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 
1992 created a Constitutional problem because some of its fundamental 
provisions were opposed to Constitutional rules. So, the procedure to pass 
the Treaty by the Assembly of the Republic, in order for its ratification by 
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the Portuguese State, was suspended until a Constitutional revision 
changed the rules of the Constitution. This prevented the European Union 
Treaty from coming into force in the Portuguese juridical order. 
On 11 June 1992, the Assembly of the Republic passed 
Resolution No. 18/92 with a four-fifths majority of the members in full 
exercise of their office, as demanded in article 284(2) of the Constitution, 
to assume extraordinary powers for Constitutional revision [DAR (I-A) 
135 − Supplement, 12 June 1992]. In that Constitutional revision 
procedure, the subject of the referendum had special importance because 
the draft amendments to the Constitution introduced by the PCP, the CDS, 
the PSN, and the independent Mário Tomé, sought precisely to alter the 
Constitution in order to allow a referendum on the ratification of the 
European Union Treaty. This matter will be treated further on.  
However, the CDS draft included, with regard to the 
referendum, provisions not bound to that particular subject, which had 
other implications for the general legal system of the national referendum. 
The Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 5/VI (DAR, Off-print 
12/VI, 9 October 1992, pp. 11-15) proposed a deep alteration to the 
ratification procedure of international treaties, suggesting a strong 
referendary component. The Constitution excluded the referendum on 
international agreements that addressed matters which are the exclusive 
responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic. These entailed Portugal’s 
participation in international organisations, friendship, peace, defence, the 
rectification of borders or military affairs, or others deemed fit by the 
Government to submit to the Assembly. 
The CDS draft eliminated the exclusion of these matters from 
the referendary scope, allowing the referendum on the ratification of 
conventions and international treaties, but with different legal 
frameworks. It would be obligatory for treaties that transferred 
responsibilities from the Portuguese State to an international organisation 
to be decided by referendum. The President of the Republic should submit 
the approval of such treaties to popular referendum, without any 
intervention of the Assembly of the Republic or the Government, and 
without any review of Constitutionality or legality by the Constitutional 
Court. Other treaties would be decided according to the general legal 
framework applying to referendums, provided in article 118 of the 
Constitution and by law. In addition, the CDS draft eliminated the adverb 
‘namely’ in the provision regarding the matters excluded from 
referendum, so that only the matters expressly excluded by the 
Constitution could be excluded by law.  
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This proposal was criticised in the debates of the CERC, above 
all for proposing the obligatory referendum on a series of international 
treaties that barely been proposed. Even treaties of mere cooperation 
between Portugal and other States could transfer the exercise of 
responsibilities of the Portuguese State to international organisations. On 
the other hand, the proposal deprived the organs of sovereignty of their 
decisive powers in relation to the referendum.150 
The CDS proposal was refused in the CERC session of 28 
October 1992, with nay votes from the PSD and the PS and yea votes 
from the CDS and the PCP and the abstention from the PSN [DAR (II) 11 
− RC, 29 October 1992, p. 173].151 In the plenary sittings of 17 November 
1992, the proposal by the CDS had 192 nay votes (132 PSD and 60 PS), 
20 yea votes (13 PCP, four CDS, one PSN and the independent João 
Corregedor da Fonseca), and one abstention from the independent Mário 
Tomé [DAR (I) 14, 18 November 1992, p. 455]. 
   5.1.2. The Failure of the Constitutional Revision in 1994 
In 1994, the Assembly of the Republic started to assume 
ordinary powers of Constitutional revision. With this in mind, the 
parliamentary groups and other individual deputies introduced 13 draft 
amendments to the Constitution. Seven of them included provisions on the 
national referendum (Suordem, 1997, pp. 39-49). 
The Draft Amendments in this case were the following: No. 
1/VI (PS), 2/VI (CDS), 3/VI (PSN), 8/VI (JSD), 9/VI (PEV), 10/VI 
(PCP), 13/VI (UDP), (DAR, Off-print 24/VI, 7 November 1994). 
However, the revisions failed due to a lack of agreement between the PS 
and the PSD, and the VI Legislature ended without Constitutional 
revision. The procedure was carried over to the next legislature, after the 
elections of 1995, which gave victory to the PS, with a relative majority. 
5.2. The Preparatory Works for the Constitutional Revision 
       of 1997 
   5.2.1. The Initiatives 
                                                 
150 See debates in the CERC session of 7 October 1992, namely the speeches by Nogueira 
de Brito (CDS), Jorge Lacão, José Magalhães and Almeida Santos (PS) and Costa Andrade 
(PSD), in DAR (II) 5 − RC, 8 October 1992, pp. 74-83. 
151 The PCP voted yea, considering that the main subject in discussion was the call for 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.  
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In 1996, the Assembly of the Republic received several civic 
initiatives in connection with the Constitutional revision (Magalhães, 
1997). Four of them included provisions regarding the Constitutional 
framework of the referendum. 
Professor Jorge Miranda (1996b) sent his contribution to the Ad 
Hoc Committee of Constitutional Revision (CERC) on 5 February. 
Miranda proposed a significant expansion of the material scope of the 
national referendum, and a triple system of calling a referendum (by the 
President of the Republic, Parliament or through the citizens’ own 
initiative). Isaías de Sousa sent a draft amendment on 23 February 1996 in 
which he proposed that referendums should be permitted by initiative of 
25,000 citizens. José da Silva Pereira proposed that a referendum should 
be held when requested by 100,000 citizens. The civic association Politics 
XXI, in the draft sent to the Assembly of the Republic on 4 March 1996, 
proposed a referendum by popular initiative of 50,000 citizens, who 
should sign a petition sent directly to the President of the Republic.  
The fourth Constitutional revision opened at the beginning of 
1996, with the introduction of the Draft Amendment to the Constitution 
No. 1/VII [DAR (II) 21 − Supplement, 1 February 1996), by the CDS-PP, 
which was followed by 10 other drafts. Nine of the 11 drafts introduced 
contained rules on the national referendum: No. 1/VII (CDS-PP), 2/VII 
(JSD),  3/VII (PS), 4/VII (PCP), 5/VII (PSD), 8/VII (independent MPs 
from the PS Group),152 9/VII (TSD), 10/VII (PEV), 11 /VII (ID). 
   5.2.2. The First Reading in the CERC 
At the start of the fourth Constitutional revision, both main 
parties (PS and PSD) agreed that the consideration of the draft 
amendments to the Constitution began with the proposals concerning 
regionalisation and the legal framework of the national referendum. The 
definition of the referendum’s legal framework was urgent, because the 
PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP, had previously agreed that the creation of 
the administrative regions should be preceded by a referendum, and 
because the possibility of submitting eventual alterations to the Treaty of 
the European Union to referendum was still in the open [DAR (II) 3 − RC, 
18 May 1996, p. 34]. For those reasons, with the first reading on the 
appreciation of the provisions concerning the creation of administrative 
regions being finished, the discussion of the proposals regarding the 
general legal system of the national referendum began on 18 June 1996. 
                                                 
152 Cláudio Monteiro, Jorge Goes and Maria do Rosário Carneiro. 
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In the session of 18 June 1996, there was a consensus against the 
Politics XXI and Jorge Miranda's proposals of joining the national and 
local referendum in the same Constitutional rule, given the special 
demands of the national referendum legal framework.153 As to the 
initiative for a referendum, there was a wide consensus on the approval of 
the popular initiative. The fundamental difference was whether initiative 
should be addressed to the Assembly of the Republic, as supported by the 
PSD and the PCP, or directly to the President of the Republic, as 
proposed by the PS, the PEV and the TSD. This latter solution would 
change an important aspect of the political system, reinforcing the powers 
of the President of the Republic, allowing him to call the referendum even 
against the opposition of the Assembly of the Republic and jeopardising 
the primacy of representative democracy.154 
The first reading was inconclusive as to the initiative for 
referendum. The CDS-PP was the only party that proposed a decision on 
initiating referendums that was exclusively presidential. The PSD and the 
PCP admitted the popular initiative addressed to the Assembly of the 
Republic. The PS admitted the popular initiative for referendum directly 
addressed to the President of the Republic, demanding however a higher 
number of signatures. The PSD believed that the Government should not 
have the power to propose referendums to the President of the Republic, 
owing such responsibility to be exclusive of the Assembly of the 
Republic. There was little consensus around the proposals [DAR (II) 10 − 
RC, 22 June 1996, p. 171). 
The proposals from the CDS-PP demanding an absolute 
majority for the deliberation of the Assembly of the Republic to propose a 
referendum was not accepted by the other parties. The same happened to 
the proposal from the TSD members, which demanded a two-thirds 
majority for that purpose.155 The proposal included in the PS and PCP 
drafts was unanimously accepted.  It Stated that the resolutions on 
referendums taken by the Assembly of the Republic or by the Government 
should only happen on matters included in the respective responsibilities, 
clarifying in the Constitution something that was already clear in the law 
[DAR (II) 10 − RC, 22 June 1996, pp. 175-176). 
                                                 
153 See speeches by José Magalhães (PS), Luís Marques Guedes (PSD) and Luís Sá (PCP), 
in DAR (II) 9 − RC, 19 June 1996, pp. 156-157. 
154 See the speeches by Luís Sá (PCP), Miguel Macedo (PSD), and Luís Marques Guedes 
(PSD), in DAR (II) 9 − RC, 19 June 1996, pp. 159-161. 
155 See speeches by Luís Marques Guedes (PSD) and Luís Sá (PCP), in DAR (II) 10 − RC, 
22 June 1996, pp. 173-174. 
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The next discussion was about a proposal from the CDS-PP to 
make a referendum obligatory for the approval of international treaties 
that sent any responsibilities from the organs of sovereignty of the 
Portuguese State to international organisations. This proposal had the 
purpose of compelling the approval of the treaty that changed the 
European Union Treaty to referendum. However, in spite of the 
availability declared by all the other parties to accept a referendum on that 
matter, the proposal was not accepted for two other reasons. The first was 
the disagreement on whether or not the referendum would be strictly 
compulsory (in spite of the agreement between the PS and the PSD on a 
compulsory referendum about the administrative regions), and the second 
was the fact that the proposal from the CDS-PP could be applied to an 
indefinite number of international agreements and not only to the Treaty 
of the European Union [DAR (II) 10 − RC, 22 June 1996, pp. 176-180]. 
The PSD’s proposal to allow emigrants' to vote in national 
referendums obtained explicit support from the CDS-PP and several 
objections from the PS. The question was not the principle, which the PS 
accepted, but its inception in unrestricted terms that gave the right to vote 
to emigrants in every national referendum [DAR (II) 10 − RC, 22 June 
1996, pp. 180-184]. 
In the next session, on 25 June 1996, the object of the 
referendum was discussed. The PS proposed that matters included in 
international treaties, except those concerning peace and the rectification 
of borders, could be the object of referendum. They also accepted the 
referendum on issues surrounding the educational system, in spite of their 
inclusion within the exclusive legislative responsibilities of the Assembly 
of the Republic. The PCP proposed only to make a referendum possible 
on the revision of the European Union Treaty. The PSD, in addition to 
allowing the Constitutional referendum and the referendum on decisive 
subjects of the treaties with Portuguese participation in international 
organisations, proposed that other issues could be the subjects of a 
national referendum. These matters included all those that were the 
exclusive legislative responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic, 
except those regarding national defence and military justice. However, the 
PSD cut the reference to the referendum on matters included in the 
political responsibilities of the Assembly of the Republic (Article 164), 
regarding those matters as unsuitable subjects for a referendum.156 The 
independent members of the PS Parliamentary Group moved forward with 
the widest proposal of the scope of the referendum, allowing it in almost 
                                                 
156 See speech by Luís Marques Guedes in DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 189-190. 
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all the matters included in the legislative responsibilities of the Assembly 
of the Republic.157 
As for the possibility that the acceptance of conventions and 
international treaties could be put to a referendum, the argument was 
between those who wanted to make the referendum possible only with 
regard to the constituent treaties of the European Union, and those who 
wanted to make that possibility extensive to other treaties. The PCP 
argued for the former scenario. The PS wanted to enlarge the scope of the 
referendum to the treaties and international conventions, only excluding 
those concerning peace and the rectification of borders. The PSD had a 
more moderate position in relation to treaties, accepting the referendum 
only on the decisive subjects of treaties regarding Portuguese participation 
in international organisations. Luís Marques Guedes considered that the 
possibility to submiting any international agreements to referendum would 
jeopardise the negotiation capacity of the Portuguese State at an 
international level [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 198-199). The 
debate gave rise to a consensus around the idea of widening the scope of 
the referendum to all the treaties regarding Portuguese participation in 
international organisations or their alterations. The possibility of 
enlargement remained in the open [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, p. 
199). 
Another subject was to know if the object of the referendum 
would be the treaties themselves or the issues included in them. The PSD 
proposed that only the decisive issues included in international 
agreements could be submitted to referendum, but the debate was not 
conclusive [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 200- 204]. 
On behalf of the JSD, Pedro Passos Coelho introduced a 
proposal to submit the compulsory or voluntary nature of military service 
to referendum [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 204-205). That 
proposal, however, did not obtain the official support of the PSD. That 
party, in spite of admitting to widen the scope of the referendum to 
matters that were of the exclusive legislative responsibility of Parliament, 
did not admit the referendum on the organisation of national defence.158  
As to the prior review of the Constitutionality of the referendum, 
the members of JSD proposed to deal with this issue last. The PSD 
proposed that the decision of the Constitutional Court should merely be 
                                                 
157 See speech by Cláudio Monteiro in DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, p. 191. 
158 See speech by Barbosa de Melo, in DAR (II) 11 - RC, 26 June 1996, p. 207. 
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advisory. As Barbosa de Melo explained, the PSD proposed the end of the 
prior review of Constitutionality of the acts submitted to the enactment of 
the President of the Republic. However, they thought that the prior review 
of the Constitutionality and legality of the referendum was justified. In 
this way, the result of that prior review should be legally binding, but if 
the Constitutional Court said that a referendum was against the 
Constitution, the President of the Republic would no longer have 
sufficient power to call that referendum [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, 
p. 209]. These proposals were not accepted by the PS and the PCP.159 
The next subject was the demand for minimum participation so 
that the referendum would be binding, which appeared in the drafts from 
the PS and the PSD. The PS linked that proposal with another one which 
foresaw the possibility of referendum by direct request of popular 
initiative.160 The reply to that possibility came from the PCP, having in 
mind the existence of a technical abstention of 10% or over, and the fact 
that that rule would penalise participating citizens, who would see their 
vote cancelled out by abstentions.161 
   5.2.3. The Second Reading 
The second reading concerning the proposals on the national 
referendum began before the first reading of the other matters, given the 
great weight that the referendum on regionalisation and the eventual 
referendum on the European Union Treaty assumed in the Constitutional 
revision process. On 16 and 17 July 1996, the CERC proceeded with the 
indicative vote of the proposals regarding Article 118 of the Constitution. 
The CERC rejected the proposals from the CDS-PP, a) so that the 
President of the Republic could call a referendum through his own 
initiative;162 b) so that the President was compelled to call the referendum 
when it was proposed by the Government or by the Assembly of the 
Republic through deliberation approved by an absolute majority of the 
members in full exercise of their office;163 c) so that the President of the 
Republic was compelled to submit the passing of treaties for the joint 
exercise of sovereign powers to national referendum, as provided in 
                                                 
159 See speeches by José Magalhães (PS) and Luís Sá (PCP) in DAR (II) 11 - RC, 26 June 
1996, p. 209. 
160 See speech by José Magalhães in DAR (II) 11 - RC, 26 June 1996, p. 211. 
161 See speech by Luís Sá in DAR (II) 11 - RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 213-214. 
162 Nay votes from PS, PSD and PCP and yea votes from CDS-PP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 
July 1996, p. 252]. 
163 Same voting. 
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Article 7 of the Constitution.164 The CERC also rejected the proposals 
from the PSD and the JSD, so that only the Assembly of the Republic, and 
not the Government, had the power to propose referendums.165 
As for the popular initiative of the referendum, the CERC 
rejected the proposal from the PEV to make it possible to have a 
referendum by direct initiative of citizens addressed to the President of the 
Republic, without specifying the number of subscribers needed for that.166 
The proposal from the PS stating that 100,000 citizens could address a 
draft referendum directly to the President of the Republic was approved, 
without obtaining the two-thirds majority needed to pass.167 
The CERC passed a proposal so that the citizens could propose a 
referendum to the Assembly of the Republic168 without any conclusion 
about the number of signatures required. The proposal from the PCP that 
the Assembly of the Republic had to decide on the popular initiative 
within the time limit of 60 days was not welcomed, having been 
reformulated as suggested by Vital Moreira, in order to establish the 
setting of a time limit for the law. It was approved, however, without 
obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority.169 The proposals from the PS 
and the PCP were approved unanimously. These included the referendum 
proposals passed by the Assembly of the Republic and by the 
Government, which had only matters regarding their respective 
responsibilities as the subject [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 259). 
The referendum law already contained such a rule. 
As for the electoral universe, the PS introduced a new proposal 
in order that Portuguese citizens who lived in Member States of the 
European Union could take part in referendums on matters concerning 
rule by the treaties referred in Article 7(6) of the Constitution, in other 
                                                 
164 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD and yea votes from the CDS-PP and the PCP [DAR 
(II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 283]. The CDS-PP reformulated the proposal, adding 
reference to Article 7 of the Constitution, through PCP’s suggestion, to make the yea votes 
from this party possible. 
165 Nay votes from the PS, the PCP and the CDS-PP and yea votes from the PSD [DAR 
(II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 283]. 
166 Nay votes from the CDS-PP, yea votes from the PEV and Vital Moreira (PS), and 
abstentions from the PS, the PSD and the PCP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 254]. 
167 Yea votes from the PS, nay votes from the CDS-PP and the PEV and abstentions from 
the PSD and the PCP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 254]. 
168 Yea votes from the PS, the PSD, the PCP and the PEV and nay votes from the CDS-PP 
[DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 255]. 
169 Yea votes from the PS, the PCP, and the PEV and abstentions from the PSD and the 
CDS-PP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 258]. 
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words, the agreements for the exercise of joint powers needed to construct 
and deepen the European Union [DAR (II) 14 − RC, 17 July 1996, p. 259]. 
That proposal opposed the PSD one, which called for a more general right 
to vote in national referendums for the Portuguese citizens. Both 
proposals were rejected.170 
As to the widening of the substantial scope of the referendum, 
proposals were rejected a) from the independent members of the PS 
Parliamentary Group, to add all the matters included in the exclusive 
legislative responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic (Article 167), 
without prejudicing the exceptions expressly foreseen in the 
Constitution171 b) from the PSD, to add all matters included in the 
exclusive responsibility of Parliament (Article 167) except for military 
ones [paragraphs d), e), m) and p)];172 from the CDS-PP, to include a legal 
framework for the creation, abolition and territorial modification of local 
authorities;173 the rules governing the financial relationships between the 
State and the autonomous regions, the statute of local authorities, 
including the local finances;174 c) from the JSD, to hold referendums on 
matters regarding the duties of national defence, with a view to a  
referendum on the compulsory nature of military service;175 d) from the 
independent deputies from the PS, to add all the matters included in the 
political and legislative responsibilities of the Assembly of the Republic 
(Article 164)  apart from the exceptions expressly foreseen in the 
Constitution.176 
The proposal from the PS to widen the scope of the national 
referendum in order to include the topic regarding the educational system 
                                                 
170 Nay votes from the PS and the PCP and yea votes from the PSD and the CDS-PP. The 
proposal from the PS had nay votes from the PSD, the PCP and the CDS-PP and yea votes 
from the PS [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 282]. 
171 Nay votes from the PSD, the PCP and the CDS-PP, and yea votes from the PS [DAR 
(II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 284]. 
172 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD, yea votes from the PSD and Cláudio Monteiro 
(independent from the PS) and abstentions from the CDS-PP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 
1996, p. 284]. 
173 Nay votes from the PS and yea votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP and Cláudio Monteiro 
[DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 284]. 
174 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD and yea votes from the CDS-PP and Cláudio 
Monteiro [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 285]. The CDS-PP supported the inclusion 
of these matters in the exclusive legislative responsibilities of the Assembly of the 
Republic. 
175 Nay votes from the PS, the PSD, the CDS-PP and the PCP and one yea vote from 
Cláudio Monteiro in the absence of the authors [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 285]. 
176 Nay votesfrom the PS, the PSD, the CDS-PP and the PCP, and one yea vote from 
Cláudio Monteiro [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 285]. 
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(Article 167i)177 and the proposal from the PSD to cut the word ‘namely’ 
in Article 118(3), so that only matters explicitly referred in the 
Constitution were excluded from referendum, were both passed.178 As for 
the referendum on treaties and international conventions, there were 
rejections a) from the CDS-PP, which made it possible to hold 
referendums on important issues concerning the national interest included 
in treaties and international conventions whose responsibility of approval 
belonged to the Assembly of the Republic (Article 164j);179 b) from the 
CDS-PP, so that the approval of treaties themselves should be the subject 
of referendum, since it gave international organisations some 
responsibilities of the sovereignty organs of the Portuguese State;180 c) 
from the PCP, for making it possible to hold referendums on treaties 
concerning the integration process in the European Union, in order to also 
allow the referendum on treaties in force in Portugal.181 
A proposal from Vital Moreira that synthesised the PS and the 
PSD proposals was passed. The PS proposed that the referendum could 
have as its subject ‘questions concerning matters’ that should be the object 
of conventions or treaties, while the PSD referred to ‘decisive issues’ of 
the treaties with Portuguese participation in international organisations. 
The synthesis would include a reference to ‘important issues concerning 
the national interest that should be the object of international agreements, 
pursuant to Article 164j, except when they concern peace or the 
rectification of borders’.182 Still regarding Article 118, the CERC rejected 
the proposals a) from the JSD, to eliminate the prior review of 
Constitutionality and legality of the referendum, and b) from the PSD, so 
that the prior review would give way to a mere opinion from the 
Constitutional Court.183 
   5.2.4. The PS/PSD Political Agreement  
                                                 
177 Yea votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP [DAR 
(II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 285]. 
178 Unanimously approved [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 302]. 
179 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD, yea votes from the CDS-PP and Cláudio Monteiro 
and abstentions from the PCP [DAR (II) 14 - RC, 17 July 1996, p. 287]. 
180 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD and yea votes from the CDS-PP and the PCP [DAR 
(II) 15 - RC, 18 July1996, p. 300]. 
181 Nay votes from the PS and the PSD, yea votes from the PCP and abstentions from the 
CDS-PP [DAR (II) 15 - RC, 18 July 1996, p. 301]. 
182 Yea votes from the PS and the PSD and nay votes from the CDS-PP and the PCP [DAR 
(II) 15 - RC, 18 July1996, p. 303]. 
183 Nay votes from the PS, the PCP and the PEV and yea votes from the PSD [DAR (II) 15 
- RC, 18 July1996, p. 303]. 
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On 7 March 1997, the leaders of the PS (António Guterres) and 
the PSD (Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa) and the respective parliamentary 
leaders (Jorge Lacão and Luís Marques Mendes) signed a political 
agreement for Constitutional revision in a public ceremony. This 
agreement was controversial and caused great turbulence within the 
Socialist Party. As a consequence, Vital Moreira left Parliament and the 
chairmanship of the CERC, and Jorge Lacão also felt compelled to resign 
from the post of parliamentary leader of the PS.184 
Regarding the referendum, both parties agreed a) to admit 
referendums by popular initiative addressed to the Assembly of the 
Republic; b) to make it possible to hold referendums on matters included 
in treaties to celebrate, specifically allowing a referendum on European 
issues; c) to allow the participation of Portuguese citizens registered to 
vote outside the national territory in referendums that address matters of 
specific concern to them.  To that effect, citizens registered up to 31 
December 1996 were immediately considered as voters, as well as those 
that came to be considered as having ties that effectively link them to the 
Portuguese community, by a law passed by a two-thirds majority. 
   5.2.5. CERC’s Work after the PS/PSD Agreement 
After the agreement for Constitutional revision between the PS 
and the PSD, the CERC resumed its work on 11 April 1997, passing the 
proposals a) from the PSD and the CDS-PP to include in Article 10, the 
referendum as one of the ways to exercise political power by the people, 
side by side with the universal, equal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage 
[DAR (II) 75 − RC, 16 April 1997, p. 2156]; b) from the PSD, with 
drafting improved in the CERC, to include within the powers of the 
members of Parliament (Article 159) the introduction of draft resolutions, 
namely for referendums, given that the deliberations of the Assembly of 
the Republic regarding the calling of referendums should assume the form 
of a Resolution [DAR (II) 104 − RC, 18 June 1997, p. 3082]; c) from the 
PS and the PSD, to introduce in Article 170 a reference to the popular 
initiative on referendums, given that, in that same rule, the possibility of 
legislative initiatives introduced by citizens was foreseen.185 
                                                 
184 Jorge Lacão substituted Vital Moreira as chairman of the CERC. For details on the 
negotiations of the agreement see Sousa (1997, pp. 49-62). 
185 Yea votes from the PS and the PSD, and abstentions from the PCP [DAR (II) 107 - RC, 
21 June 1997, p. 3142]. Luís Sá justified the PCP’s abstention for disagreeing with the 
indefinite terms foreseen in the citizens' legislative initiative. 
The National Referendum   309 
 
 
In the CERC session of 12 June 1997, the PS and the PSD 
introduced two new proposals for Article 118 as a consequence of the 
political agreement for Constitutional revision: a) to improve the drafting 
of No. 1, according to which the national referendum be called by 
decision of the President of the Republic, in cases provided for and as laid 
down by the Constitution and the law, following a proposal from the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government in relation to matters that 
fall under their respective responsibilities; b) to add a new item, according 
to which, the referendum may also be held by the citizens’ initiative when 
submitting a request to the Assembly of the Republic. Such requests shall 
be submitted and considered under the terms and within the time limits 
laid down by law.186 
In that session, José Magalhães (PS) introduced a single PS/PSD 
proposal in order to allow citizens living abroad to participate in national 
referendums, provided the citizens who resided abroad were properly 
registered to vote under the provisions of Article 124(2), and are called 
upon to take part in referendums that addressed matters specifically 
concerning them.187 Article 124(2) would concern the election for the 
President of the Republic, and it would establish that the right to vote of 
citizens living abroad would be ruled by law, in consideration of the 
existence of ties effectively linking them to the Portuguese community 
[DAR (II) 102 − RC, 12 June 1997, p. 3009]. 
Still regarding the possibility of residents abroad participating in 
national referendums, the PS and the PSD proposed that this should be 
included in the responsibilities of the Constitutional Court (Article 225). 
This would involve the prior review of Constitutionality and legality of 
the national, regional and local referendums, including the judgement of 
the requirements regarding the electoral universe. It was unanimously 
approved [DAR (II) 111 − RC, 28 June 1997, p. 3268]. 
5.3. The Constitutional Rules Passed 
The debate in the plenary sittings confirmed the positions taken 
by the several parties in the CERC. Thus, the proposals of the CDS-PP 
and the PCP regarding Article 118 were rejected, with the proposals in the 
CERC being passed by an indicative two-thirds majority. In addition to 
                                                 
186 The first proposal was approved unanimously. The second received the yea votes from 
PS, PSD and PCP, the nay votes from CDS-PP and the abstentions from PEV [DAR (II) 
102 - RC, 12 June 1997, p. 2992]. 
187 The proposal had the yea votes from PS, PSD and CDS-PP and the nay votes from PCP 
[DAR (II) 102 - RC, 12 June 1997, p. 3012]. 
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the introduction of an obligatory referendum on the institution of the 
administrative regions, which will be treated further ahead, the 
Constitutional revision of 1997 significantly altered the extent of the 
Constitutional rules of the national referendum.188 
The most important innovations introduced were as follows:189 
1) The inception of the referendum by the citizens' initiative 
addressed to the Assembly of the Republic. That request 
shall be submitted and considered under the terms and 
within the time limits laid down by law [Articles 118(2) and 
170(1)(3)]. 
2) The acceptance of referendums on matters regarding 
integration in the European Union, through the admission of 
referendums on important issues concerning national interest 
that should be the object of international agreement, except 
when they concern peace or the rectification of borders 
[Articles 118(5) and 164j)]. 
3) The passing of the rule according to which the referendum 
shall only be binding in the event that the number of voters 
exceeds half of the number of registered electors [Article 
118(11)]. 
4) The recognition of the citizens who reside abroad to have 
the right to vote in referendums that address matters of 
specific concern to them. The electoral universe includes the 
citizens registered abroad up to 31 December 1996 and 
those that are considered as having ties that effectively link 
them to the Portuguese community [Articles 118(12), 124 
and 297]. 
5) The attribution to the Constitutional Court of the 
responsibility to previously review requirements concerning 
the electoral universe of the referendum [Article 225(2)f)]. 
Although less significant, the plenary passed other provisions: 
6) Article 10 was amended to contain a reference to the 
referendum as one way of exercising political power by the 
people, providing that the people shall exercise political 
                                                 
188 On the Constitutional system passed in 1997, see Canas (1998, pp. 7-46) and Miranda 
& Medeiros [2007 (II) pp. 295-313]. 
189 The Constitutional revision of 1997 altered the numbering of some articles of the 
Constitution. Article 118 changed to 115, 124 to 121, 159 to 156, 164 to 161, 167 to 164, 
170 to 167, and 225 to 222. The above mentioned numbers were the previous ones. 
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power by means of universal, equal, direct, secret and 
periodic suffrage, referendum and the other forms provided 
for in the Constitution. 
7) Article 118(1) made it clear that the Assembly of the 
Republic and the Government could only propose draft 
referendums to the President of the Republic on matters 
included in the respective responsibilities. 
8) The cast of matters excluded from the referendum started to 
be categorical, due to the suppression of the adverb ‘namely’ 
in Article 118(3); 
9) The referendum on the bases of the educational system was 
allowed [Articles 118(4) and 167i)]. 
10) No. 6 of Article 118 (previously No. 4) was improved. It had 
the following drafting: each referendum shall only address 
one matter. Questions shall be objectively, clearly and 
precisely formulated, by soliciting yes or no answers, and 
shall not exceed the maximum number to be laid down by 
law. The law shall also lay down the other terms governing 
the formulation and holding of referendums. 
11) The introduction of draft resolutions, namely of referendums 
within the powers of MPs was included (Article 159b). 
The Constitutional revision of 1997, bringing more matters 
under the exclusive legislative responsibility of the Assembly of the 
Republic, consequently extended the matters excluded from the scope of 
the referendum. Since then, the Constitution excluded referendums on 
rules governing: a) the appointment of members of European Union 
bodies, with the exception of the Commission; b) the Republic’s 
intelligence system and State secrets; c) the drawing up and organisation 
of the budgets of the State, the autonomous regions and local authorities; 
d) the national symbols; e) the finances of the autonomous regions; f) the 
police forces and security services; g) the organisational, administrative 
and financial autonomy of the President of the Republic’s support services 
(Article 164p).190 
6. From the Constitutional Revision of 1997 to the Referendums 
    of  1998 
6.1. Antecedents 
                                                 
190 See the debates and voting in the plenary sittings in DAR (I) 94, 16 July 1997, pp. 3379-
3380; 95, 17 July 1997, p. 3461; 100, 24 July 1997, pp. 3754-3756; 104, 31 July 1997, pp. 
3997-3998 and 4005. 
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The Constitutional revision of 1997 revived already existing 
proposals for referendums, decisively influencing their work and 
determining, to great extent, their approved texts. The revision process 
was induced, since the very beginning, by the claim by the right wing 
parties that a referendum was necessary to institute the administrative 
regions.  This gave rise to a special regime for referendums on 
regionalisation. In addition, since 1992, several political forces, from the 
left to the right, demanded a referendum on Portuguese participation in the 
European integration process. 
In 1997, all the parties agreed to hold a referendum on European 
issues, with differences remaining on what issues should be submitted to 
referendum. On 20 December 1996, the PSD introduced Draft Resolution 
No. 38/VII in the Assembly of the Republic, asking for a referendum on 
the alteration of the law on abortion. Soon after the Constitutional 
revision, on 3 September 1997, by which time it looked certain that one or 
more referendums would be held in a short term, it was deemed urgent to 
pass legislation to adapt the never applied Law No. 45/91, of 3 August, to 
the new Constitutional rules of the national referendum. 
6.2. The New Organisational Referendum Law 
   6.2.1. The Introduced Initiatives 
On 6 October 1997, the PSD introduced the first initiatives to 
change the Organisational Referendum Law: Bill No. 416/VII, which was 
intended to adapt the current law to the new Constitutional rules [DAR (II-
A) 3, 17 October 1997, pp. 17-19], and Draft Resolution No. 66/VII, 
which established the requirements of the referendum from a popular 
initiative in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure [DAR (II-A) 3, 17 October 
1997, p. 59]. On the same day, 6 October 1997, the PSD introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 67/VII, asking for a referendum on the revision of the 
European Union Treaty. 
A few days later, on 9 October 1997, the socialist Government 
introduced Bill No. 145/VII to amend the Organisational Referendum 
Law [DAR (II-A) 3, 17 October 1997, pp. 30-58, corrected in DAR (II-A) 
18, 19 December 1997, pp. 243-244], based on a draft drawn by Luís 
Barbosa Rodrigues (1998) upon the Government’s request. On 11 
November 1997, the CDS-PP introduced Bill No. 429/VII [DAR (II-A) 
11, 15 November 1997, pp. 212-214]. 
   6.2.2. The Parliamentary Debate 
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On 19 November 1997, Barbosa de Melo drew an Opinion on all 
of the legislative initiatives introduced, [DAR (II-A) 13, 24 November 
1997, pp. 243-248] synthesising the main subjects in the debate: a) the 
rules for the popular initiative of the referendum, namely the minimum 
number of signatures required, the organisation of the proposing group 
and the rules of procedure; b) the prior review of Constitutionality and 
legality of the draft referendum, regarding the procedure and time limits 
for the Constitutional Court decision, the scrutiny of the electoral universe 
and the effects of that decision; c) the terms of recognition of the right of 
the citizens who reside abroad to vote in national referendums; d) the 
participation of the citizens' groups in the campaign for the referendum; e) 
the effects of the referendum in the cases of affirmative or negative 
answers; and  f) the special rules for the referendum on the institution of 
administrative regions. 
The debate on the legislative initiatives took place during the 
plenary sittings of 20 November 1997 [DAR (I) 16, 21 November 1997, 
pp. 614-638] and the voting was on the 27th. The PS, the PSD and the 
CDS-PP made the respective bills viable with mutual abstentions, while 
the PCP and the PEV voted against all the initiatives introduced by the 
other parties [DAR (I) 19, 28 November 1997, pp. 711-712). This position 
was essentially due to the rules regarding the referendum on the 
administrative regions, which was also under debate. That debate was 
based on options taken in the Constitutional revision, in spite of the PCP’s 
opposition. 
The detailed debate was held on 4 March 1998 [DAR (I) 44, 5 
March 1998, pp. 1470-1495].191 On that occasion, the understanding 
between the PS and the PSD as to the referendums to hold and their 
respective timings was already clear. Both parties agreed to propose to the 
President of the Republic the holding of a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion at the end of the first semester of 1998, and 
to hold referendums on regionalisation and European integration in the 
last quarter of that year. The perspective of those referendums, which 
were convenient to both parties, was very influential in the final solutions 
passed by law. 
The detailed debate followed the preparatory work of the 
Committee, and focussed on the proposals that the parties wanted to keep 
for the voting. The main divergences among the parties became very clear 
                                                 
191 As laid down in Article 168(4) of the Constitution, the detailed debate of the 
referendum law happens obligatorily during a plenary sitting. 
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at this point. The PS and the PSD agreed to remove the prohibition of any 
act to call or hold a referendum within three months of holding a 
referendum, as laid down in Article 8 of the law in force.  The PCP was 
opposed to this idea.192 The aim was to achieve a schedule in which the 
referendums could coincide in a short time, and to allow more than one 
national referendum to be held in the same day. 
The text passed the demand of 75,000 signatures for the popular 
initiative of the referendum. The PCP, which proposed 25,000, was 
against this proposal, which obtained favourable votes from the PS, the 
PSD and the CDS-PP.193 The initiative must explicitly enclose the 
question or questions to submit to the voters and the identification of the 
acts of procedure in the Assembly of the Republic. When there is no 
procedure for any act on which a referendum can happen, the popular 
initiative must enclose a draft on the matter submitted to the 
referendum.194 The proposals for shortening the time limits introduced by 
the CDS-PP were rejected, having just obtained the support of the PSD 
and its proponents [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, pp. 1475-1476]. 
The PCP and the CDS-PP strongly contested a last minute 
proposal from the PS and the PSD as to party participation in referendum 
campaigns. Law No. 45/91, of 3 August, in its Article 31(2), lays down 
that the political parties taking a position on the subjects submitted to the 
electors would carry out the campaign. According to the proposed 
alteration, the campaign would be carried out by the parties or coalitions 
that declared their intention to participate in the explanation of the 
subjects submitted to the electors. Thus, the parties would always have 
access to means of campaigning, namely on the radio and in television, 
even if they did not support any of the positions in question. The PCP and 
the CDS-PP contested such a possibility because, in their opinion, it could 
prejudice the conditions of equality that should be insured between the 
positions of yes and no.195 However, the reason for that proposal was 
precisely the internal division of the PS and the PSD as to the referendum 
on the decriminalisation of abortion. For that reason, the CDS-PP and the 
PCP proposals to maintain the rule then in force had the yea votes from 
                                                 
192 See speech by António Filipe (PCP) in DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 1471. 
193 The proposal from the PCP was rejected with nay votes from the PS, the PSD and the 
CDS-PP and yea votes from the PCP and the PEV [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 1474]. 
194 The PCP and the PEV voted against these demands [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 
1474]. 
195 See speeches by António Filipe (PCP) and Jorge Ferreira (CDS-PP) in DAR (I) 44, 5 
March 1998, pp. 1476-1479. 
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the PCP, the CDS-PP and the PEV and nay votes from the PS and the 
PSD [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 1480]. 
The same question arose concerning the participation of citizen 
groups in the referendum campaign because the proposed formulation was 
identical. In other words, 5,000 citizens could constitute a group to 
intervene in the campaign, bearing in mind that they would take part in the 
explanation of the subjects submitted to referendum, even without a 
concrete position on these subjects. The proposals from the PCP and the 
CDS-PP were rejected, having had yea votes from these parties and the 
PEV and nay votes from the PS and the PSD. The proposal passed with 
diametrically opposed votes [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 1481]. 
The proposal for Article 243 concerning the duty of the 
Assembly of the Republic in the case of a negative answer also had the 
PCP’s disagreement. The Government bill initially Stated that the 
Assembly of the Republic or the Government could not approve an 
international convention or legislative act corresponding to the questions 
that had garnered a negative answer with binding effectiveness in the 
same legislative session, except with the election of a new Assembly of 
the Republic or new a Government. However, in the final drafting, the PS 
recalled the reference to the same legislative session. Therefore, in the 
case of a negative answer in the referendum with binding effectiveness, it 
would be possible to legislate on the same subject only after a new 
election of the Assembly of the Republic or new referendum with an 
affirmative answer. This allowed for a fresh referendum. The PCP 
assumed the Government's original proposal, which was rejected. This 
proposal had yea votes from the PCP and the PEV and nay votes from the 
PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP. The proposal that passed had an opposite 
voting [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 1485]. 
Another divisive subject was the allocation of the broadcasting 
time. According to the proposal passed, the broadcasting time would be 
divided into two blocks. One block was divided equally among the parties 
or coalitions with current parliamentary representation. Another block was 
divided between the parties without parliamentary representation, and the 
citizen groups constituted for that effect. In the case of referendums from 
popular initiatives, the author of the citizen group’s initiative shares the 
first block of broadcasting time in the same position of the parties with 
parliamentary representation. The PCP contested this proposal, arguing 
that the broadcasting time should be distributed equally between the two 
opposing positions (yes and no), with the broadcasting time for each 
position distributed equally among the parties, coalitions and citizen 
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groups that supported it. The proposal had yea votes from the PS, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP and the PEV. The proposal 
from the PCP obtained the opposite voting [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, p. 
1492]. In the final overall vote, the legal framework for the new 
Organisational Referendum Law had yea votes from the PS, the PSD and 
the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP and the PEV [DAR (I) 44, 5 
March 1998, p. 1492]. 
   6.2.3. Organisational Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April 
The main innovations in the new referendum law 
(Organisational Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April) were the following:196 
1) The passing of a special legal system on the institution of 
the referendum on administrative regions, which will be 
treated ahead [Articles 1(2) and 245 to 251]. 
2) The widening of the material scope of the referendum with 
the admission of referendums on matters until then 
excluded, like a) the bases of the educational system; b) 
important issues concerning the national interest such as  
the object of international agreement except when they 
concern peace or the rectification of borders; c) the 
organisation of the courts and the organisation and 
responsibilities of the Public Prosecutors Office and their 
Public Prosecutors; d) the organisation and procedures of 
the Assembly of the Republic and the Government (Article 
3).197 
3) The prohibition of passing initiatives for the referendum 
between the dates on which general elections for the 
sovereignty organs, the self-government bodies of the 
autonomous regions, local authority bodies and Members of 
the European Parliament are called and those on which they 
are held (Article 8). 
4) The elimination of the prohibition to call or hold a 
referendum within the first three months after a referendum 
(Article 8). 
                                                 
196 For the referendum’s legal system after Organisational Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April, 
see Canas (1998, pp. 7-46) and Mendes (2006). 
197 The matters referred in c) and d) were expressly excluded by paragraph d) of Article 3,  
Law No. 45/91, of 3 August. As the Constitutional cast of the excluded matters became 
categorical with the elimination of the adverb ‘namely’ in Article 115(4) of the 
Constitution, that paragraph was removed, which can raise problems (Canas, 1998, pp. 12-
13).   
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5) The admission of the referendum by popular initiative in the 
following terms: a) the initiative shall be written; b) 
addressed to the Assembly of the Republic; c) subscribed by 
at least 75,000 citizens registered to vote; d) containing the 
full name and identity card number of all of them;198 e) as 
well as the question or questions to submit to referendum, 
with the indication of the acts under consideration in the 
Assembly of the Republic; f) when no act for referendum in 
being considered, the popular initiative shall include a draft 
regarding the subject of the referendum; g) within the time 
limit of two days the President of the Assembly of the 
Republic asks the responsible committee for an opinion on 
the initiative, setting a time limit for that; h) once the 
opinion is received, he admits the initiative or orders the 
representative of the citizen group to be notified in order to 
improve the text within 20 days; i) once admitted, the 
initiative is sent to the responsible committee; j) the 
committee hears the representatives of the proposing 
citizens for the explanations necessary to understand and 
formulate the questions; k) within the time limit of 20 days, 
the committee draws the draft resolution and addresses it to 
the President of the Assembly for scheduling; l) the draft 
resolution shall be scheduled for one of the 10 following 
plenary sittings; m) the initiatives that are not voted do not 
lapse with the end of the legislature, with the procedure 
restarting in the next one (Articles 10 and 16 to 22). 
6) The compulsory nature of the Resolutions of the Assembly 
of the Republic and the Government proposing referendums 
to contain the questions to ask and the definition of the 
respective electoral universe, with this being the object of 
prior review by the Constitutional Court [Articles 12(2), 24 
and 26]. 
7) Extending the time limit given to the President of the 
Republic to decide on whether to the call the referendum 
from eight to 20 days after the decision of the Constitutional 
Court verifying the Constitutionality and legality of the 
draft (Article 34). 
                                                 
198 The Assembly of the Republic may request the administrative check from public 
administration by simply authenticating signatures and identifying the subscribers. 
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8) The possibility of changing the day of the referendum in 
case of dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic or 
dismissal of the Government [article 35(3)]. 
9) The possibility of participation by citizens residing abroad, 
including citizens registered up to 31 December 1996 and 
those that come to be considered by law as having ties that 
effectively link them to the national community [reference 
to Articles 121(2) and 297 of the Constitution].199 
10) The campaign for the referendum is carried out by a) the 
political parties or coalitions (directly) or through citizen 
groups or entities designated by them; b) groups of at least 
5,000 citizens that declare the purpose of taking part in the 
explanation of the subjects submitted to referendum 
(Articles 39 to 41). 
11) The proposal for broadcasting times to be distributed in an 
equalitarian way between the supporters of the ‘yes’ and the 
‘no’ camps was defeated. One block of broadcasting times 
would be distributed among the parties represented in the 
Assembly of the Republic, which is jointly attributed to the 
parties that take part in a coalition. Another block would be 
distributed among the other parties and the citizen groups. 
In the case of a referendum of popular initiative, the author 
of the citizen group’s initiative shares the first block in the 
same conditions of the parties or coalitions with 
parliamentary representation (Article 61). 
12) The referendum would only be binding in the event that the 
number of voters exceeded half of the number of registered 
electors (Article 240). 
13) The enlargement from 60 to 90 days for the time limit given 
to the Assembly of the Republic to pass the law or the 
corresponding international agreement with  an affirmative 
answer from the electorate with binding effect (Article 241). 
14) The prohibition of the approval by the Assembly of the 
Republic or the Government of law or international 
agreement regarding the questions that received a negative 
answer with binding effect, except new election of the 
Assembly of the Republic or new referendum with an 
affirmative answer (Article 243). 
                                                 
199 In Ruling No. 288/98, of 17 April, the Constitutional Court judged that there would be a 
specific interest in the emigrants' participation if the legal treatment of the matters would 
have a particular incidence regarding the interests of Portuguese emigration.  
The National Referendum   319 
 
 
7. Subsequent Evolution 
7.1. Abortion, Regionalisation and the European Union 
       - Remission 
The entry into force of Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April, almost one 
year after the Constitutional revision of 1997, concluded the legal 
framework needed for the first referendum of the Portuguese democratic 
period. After the law passed, on 4 March, and following multiple 
vicissitudes, the Assembly of the Republic passed a resolution approved 
on 19 March that proposed a referendum on the alteration of the law on 
abortion, which took place on 28 June of that year. On 8 November, the 
referendum on regionalisation was held. Its draft had been approved in the 
Assembly of the Republic on 29 June. An eventual referendum on the 
European Union Treaties had been imminent in Portuguese political life 
since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. It reappeared in 1998 as a true 
possibility with the Amsterdam Treaty, and again in 2001 with the Nice 
Treaty. In 2005, there was the European Constitutional Treaty, and finally 
in 2008 the Lisbon Treaty. However, the referendum was never held. 
The referendums on the decriminalisation of abortion, the 
creation of the administrative regions and participation in the European 
integration process, defined the future debates and referendum initiatives 
that were proposed and passed in Portugal as a national referendum. It is 
therefore justified to analyse in detail each one of these three main themes 
of the referendum in Portugal in the following chapters. Other 
unsuccessful referendum proposals were proposed during the last few 
years. These were always about less peaceful questions such as drug 
consumption, medically assisted procreation and gay marriage. 
 7.2. The referendum proposals on the decriminalisation of 
        drug consumption 
In 2000, the CDS-PP and some PSD members belonging to the 
JSD, proposed a referendum on the decriminalisation of drug 
consumption. On 25 February 2000, the Left Block (BE) introduced Bill 
No. 113/VIII on the separation of narcotic markets and the struggle for 
drug addiction, aiming to separate the markets between the so-called soft 
and hard drugs. Soft drugs would become legal, and the public healthcare 
system could supply substances like heroin and cocaine to the citizens 
who needed them, under medical supervision. The State would control the 
trade, importation and distribution of such substances [DAR (II-A) 23, 3 
March 2000, pp. 479-488]. A few days later, on 2 March, the PCP 
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introduced two bills on the legal system of drugs. Bill No. 120/VIII on the 
decriminalisation of drug consumption, and Bill No. 119/VIII established 
the system of administrative sanctions applicable for that consumption. 
According to the bills, the mere consumption of drugs would not be a 
crime, with dissuasion used instead of criminal sanctions [DAR (II-A) 24, 
15 March 2000, pp. 521-524]. 
On 11 May, some PSD members belonging to the JSD 
introduced Bill No. 210/VIII on ‘drugs and the struggle against 
addictions’, supporting the decriminalisation of soft drug consumption, 
and the medical prescription of other drugs needed by the addicted as a 
result of their addiction [DAR (II-A) 41, 18 May 2000, pp. 1506-1508]. 
Finally, on 1 June, the PS Government introduced Government Bill No. 
31/VIII defining the legal system of drug consumption and the health and 
social care of people who consume such substances without medical 
supervision. Drug consumption would be decriminalised, giving way to 
merely administrative sanctions [DAR (II-A) 47, 8 June 2000, pp. 1594-
1599]. The plenary debate was scheduled by the BE, which allowed the 
discussion of all bills already introduced. It took place on 21 June 2000. 
During the previous week, on 15 June, the CDS-PP introduced 
Draft Resolution No. 59/VIII proposing a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of drug consumption. The two proposed questions were 
the following [DAR (II-A) 50, 17 June 2000, pp. 1658-1659]: ‘1) Do you 
agree that the consumption of the so-called soft drugs should stop being 
punished by the State? 2) Do you agree that the consumption of the so-
called soft drugs should stop being considered a crime, giving way to 
merely administrative sanctions?’     
The CDS-PP wanted to hold the debate on its referendum 
proposal on the same day of the debate on the bills, but the BE did not 
accept that proposal.  On the eve of the debate, the JSD members 
introduced their referendum proposal, through Draft Resolution No. 
63/VIII, including the following questions [DAR (II-A) 51, 24 June 2000, 
p. 1668]: ‘1) should the consumption of ‘soft’ drugs (cannabis and by-
products) in establishments expressly authorised for that effect be 
decriminalised and regulated? 2) Should the medical prescription of ‘hard’ 
drugs (methadone, heroin and/or similar substances) to citizens who need 
them be allowed, with the State controlling the trade, importation and 
distribution of such substances?  
The proposals had different purposes. The CDS-PP wanted to 
avoid the decriminalisation of drug consumption, which was foreseeable 
in the bills introduced by the Government, the PCP, the BE and even the 
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JSD members. The decriminalisation had wide support in Parliament. The 
only solution for the CDS-PP was to appeal to voters, and this was why it 
insisted on holding the referendum proposal and the wider debate on the 
same day. The JSD proposal had another purpose, which was to give way 
to the PSD Bill No. 210/VIII. This JSD bill did not have universal 
approval within the PSD. On the contrary, the majority of the party and 
the parliamentary group were clearly against it. Given the divided 
opinions on the bill, the appeal to hold a referendum was the common 
denominator able to unite the party. 
The CDS-PP’s draft referendum was not formally accepted for 
consideration.200 However, it was present in the debate. The BE criticised 
it with a political declaration201 and the CDS-PP supported it in the same 
way.202 In the debate, the idea of referendum was always present having 
been supported by the PSD and CDS-PP members and rejected by the 
others [DAR (I) 81, 23 June 2000, pp. 3161-3177 and 3180-3198]. The 
proposals were not submitted to vote. The bills were sent to the 
Committee for a fresh discussion, and a replacement text emerged with 
majority support.  On 6 July, the bills from the BE and the PSD were 
rejected and those by the Government and the PCP were passed.203 The 
replacement text passed by the Committee had yea votes from the PS, the 
PCP, the BE and the PEV and nay votes from the PSD and the CDS-PP. 
However, given the lack of prior consultation with the self-
government bodies of the autonomous regions regarding a law whose 
regulation in the regions would be under the responsibility of the 
legislative assemblies, the President of the Republic vetoed the law on 24 
July 2000,204 sending it back to Parliament for further consideration, 
which happened on 18 October [DAR (I) 89, 27 July 2000, pp. 3549-
3550]. During this time, the CDS-PP and the PSD made several appeals 
for the acceptance of their proposal for referendum. In the plenary sittings 
of 26 July 2000, when the presidential veto was announced, the PSD 
leader appealed for the referendum with a political declaration [DAR (I) 
                                                 
200 The proposal from the PSD, introduced only on the eve of the debate had no legal 
conditions for appreciation.  
201 See speech by Luís Fazenda in DAR (I) 81, 23 June 2000, pp. 3150-3151.  
202 See speech by Basílio Horta in DAR (I) 81, 23 June 2000, pp. 3155-3156. 
203 The BE bill had yea votes from the BE, the PEV and 14 PS members, nay votes from 
the PSD, CDS-PP and three PS members, and abstentions from the PS, the PCP and six 
PSD members. The JSD bill had only 14 yea votes from PSD members, the abstentions 
from the BE and 16 PS members, and nay votes from the others. The Government and 
PCP bills had yea votes from the PS, the PCP and the PEV, nay votes from the PSD and 
the CDS-PP and abstentions from the BE. 
204 See the reasons for the veto in DAR (II-A), 61, 28 July 2000, p. 1976. 
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89, 27 July 2000, pp. 3549-3550], thus starting the PSD political 
campaign with the purpose of addressing public opinion.  
On that same day, a movement called ‘Drug, All for the 
Referendum’ sent a letter to the Assembly of the Republic requesting the 
suspension of the new appreciation of the law, and the PSD and the CDS-
PP demanded a referendum before the final decision.205 Nobody requested 
to set the proposals of referendum in the order of business. However, on 
the day after the debate, 19 July, during the final overall vote, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP introduced a proposal to add a provision in order to make 
the introduction of the law conditional on the holding of a referendum. 
The PS refuted that proposal, arguing that is was unConstitutional because 
the decision on the holding of a referendum required a specific initiative 
and a specific procedure of approval. For that reason, no law could 
include a provision where its entry into force was conditional on an 
eventual referendum, whose initiative could not even be considered by 
Parliament. The appeal by the PS was supported by the PCP, the BE and 
the PEV. Consequently, the Parliament did not admit the proposal for 
discussion.206 In the event, Parliament passed Law 30/2000, of 29 
November, which decriminalised the consumption of drugs. The proposals 
for referendum introduced by the PSD and the CDS-PP were never 
discussed as laid down by the Constitution. 
 7.3. The Initiative for a Referendum on Medically Assisted 
        Procreation 
Another proposal for referendum, this time by popular initiative, 
referred to the techniques of medically assisted procreation. On 19 July 
2005, the BE introduced Bill No. 141/X in order to regulate the medical 
applications of assisted procreation [DAR (II-A) 34, 20 July 2005, pp. 62-
69]. After that, there three other initiatives were introduced: on 28 July 
2005, Bill No. 151/X (PS) regulated the techniques of medically assisted 
procreation [DAR (II-A) 47, 7 September 2005, pp. 20-29]; on 6 October, 
Bill No. 172/X (PCP) covered the techniques of medically assisted 
reproduction [DAR (II-A) 55, 13 October 2005, pp. 66-75]; and on 14 
October, Bill No. 176/X (PSD) was on the legal system of medically 
assisted procreation [DAR (II-A) 59, 22 October 2005, pp. 36-46]. 
                                                 
205 See speeches by Telmo Correia (CDS-PP) and Durão Barroso (PSD) in DAR (I) 12, 19 
October 2000, pp. 437-439 and 440-441. 
206 See speeches from Luís Marques Guedes (PSD) and Telmo Correia (CDS-PP) 
supporting the proposal and from Jorge Lacão (PS), António Filipe (PCP) and Luís 
Fazenda (BE) refuting it for being unConstitutional [DAR (I) 13, 20 October 2000, pp. 
489-491].  
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All these drafts were discussed in plenary sittings, passing the 
general principles on 10 November 2005,207 and then sent to the Health 
Committee for a detailed discussion, which finished on 23 May 2006.208 
On the very same day of the final overall vote, 25 May, a so-called ‘Pro 
Referendum Movement on Medically Assisted Procreation’ addressed the 
Assembly of the Republic with a petition signed by 78,333 citizens, 
asking for the suspension of the final overall vote and the calling of a 
referendum on that subject. Also on the same day, the CDS-PP introduced 
a request to delay the final overall vote for a week, which was rejected by 
the PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV, and was supported by the PSD, the 
CDS-PP and two PS members. In the final overall vote, Law No. 32/2006 
of 26 July, on medically assisted procreation, had yea votes from the PS, 
the PCP, the BE, the PEV and eight PSD members; the nay votes  came 
from the PSD, the CDS-PP and three PS members; and the abstention 
from 21 PSD members [DAR (I) 127, 26 May 2006, p. 5859]. 
The questions for the referendum proposed by the petition were 
the following: 1) Do you agree that the law should allow the creation of 
more human embryos than those immediately transferred to the mother? 
2) Do you agree that the law should allow the conception of a child 
without a biological father and mother united through a stable 
relationship? 3) Do you agree that the law should allow surrogate 
motherhood, allowing a woman to become pregnant with a child that was 
not biologically her own? 
The day after, the President of Parliament sent the petition to the 
Health Parliamentary Committee to give an opinion on its admission. On 
6 July, the Committee passed an opinion made by Manuel Pizarro (PS), 
expressing doubts on the admission of the petition and requesting the 
President to send the petition to the Constitutional Affairs Committee for 
opinion. On 21 June, the opinion of this last Committee, drawn by 
Vitalino Canas (PS) considered the petition as illegal and unable for 
admission. 
The Referendum Law lay down in article 4(1) that only issues 
included in international agreements or legislative acts in procedure can 
be the subject of referendum, since they were not definitively passed. 
                                                 
207 The votings were the following: BE bill: yea – PS, PCP, BE, PEV, two PSD; nay – 
PSD, CDS-PP, three PS; abstentions – 15 PSD. PS bill: yea - PS, PCP, BE, PEV; nay – 
CDS-PP; abstentions – PSD, three PS. PCP bill: yea - PS, PCP, BE, PEV; nay – PSD, 
CDS-PP, three PS; abstentions – 17 PSD. PSD bill: yea – PSD; nay – PCP, CDS-PP, PEV; 
abstentions – PS, BE [DAR (I) 127, 26 May 2005, pp. 2823-2824]. 
208 See Opinion by the Health Committee in DAR (II-A) 114, 25 May 2006, pp. 2-17. 
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Therefore, once the final overall vote of the bills concerning medically 
assisted procreation was held, the act was definitively passed. It could not 
be submitted to referendum. 
On 22 June, the President of the Assembly of the Republic sent 
the opinion of the Constitutional Affairs Committee to the Health 
Committee so that it could finish its own opinion. On 27 June, the Health 
Committee considered the petition illegal and unable to be admitted. 
However, the President did not follow the opinion of the 
committees and, on 28 June, he decided to notify the representatives of the 
group of citizens who had taken the initiative giving them the opportunity 
to perfect the initiative. The reason was that, as laid down by article 17(4) 
of the Referendum Law, the initiative of citizens should be followed by a 
bill, which should put forward the subject that they want to submit to 
referendum. 
The PCP appealed against that decision, following the opinions 
passed by the parliamentary committees and considering that the 
introduction of a bill was useless given that this could not be submitted to 
referendum since a law on that same subject had been passed. The 
Constitutional Affairs Committee was requested to give its opinion on this 
incident. This time, Paulo Rangel (PSD) drew an Opinion draft where he 
refused the appeal, considering that the opinion of the Parliamentary 
Committees on the admission of initiatives was not binding and that the 
decision of the President was not final and definitive.  
The subscribers of the popular initiative took advantage of the 
opportunity and addressed Parliament with a draft on medically assisted 
procreation. President Jaime Gama admitted the initiative of a referendum 
on 16 July 2006 and sent it to the Health Committee in order for the draft 
resolution to be drawn as laid down by law. 
On 13 October 2006, the Health Committee presented Draft 
Resolution No. 159/X, which gave a legal form to the popular initiative. It 
was submitted to the plenary sittings of the Assembly of the Republic and 
proposed a national referendum on the subject of medically assisted 
procreation [DAR (II-A) 11, 21 October 2006, pp. 26-27]. The debate took 
place on 15 November 2006 and the initiative was rejected, with nay votes 
from the PS, the PSD, the PCP, the BE and the PEV, and yea votes from 
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the CDS-PP, two from the PS, one from the PSD, and one abstention from 
the PS.209 
This initiative was taken by the most conservative sectors of 
Portuguese society and its purpose was to prevent the passing of 
legislation for medically assisted procreation. They did not keep, however, 
within the deadline. After the legislative procedure opened in July 2005 
and finished in May 2006, which was when the final overall vote was 
scheduled, the petition for referendum was presented and requested the 
suspension of the voting. Once the voting was held, the admission of that 
initiative was unfeasible. This was the opinion of the Parliamentary 
Committees, but the President of the Assembly did not follow it and 
admitted the petition. 
In spite of the clear illegality of the proposal, the President 
preferred to admit it, worried that public opinion would react badly to a 
refusal based entirely on procedural reasons. He preferred therefore to 
allow the appreciation of the matter. The proposal was refused, having 
had only yea votes from the CDS-PP and three isolated votes from the PS 
(two) and the PSD (one). The same majority, which passed the law on 
medically assisted procreation, also rejected a referendum that only 
wanted to refuse that law.            
7.4. The Popular Initiative for a Referendum on 
       Gay Marriage 
The last attempt to hold a referendum in the first decade of the 
21th century regarded the legal admission of gay marriage. It was a 
popular initiative that wanted to be a last appeal to prevent the passing of 
legislation on that matter. However, without great expectations as to the 
result, it was clear from the start that the majority who passed the law 
would reject the idea of a referendum. 
This question arose in 2006 when the BE introduced Bill No. 
206/X [DAR (II-A) 85, 11 February. 2006, pp. 8-10] on 7 February which 
proposed the alteration of the Civil Code in order to allow gay marriage. It 
was soon followed on 3 March by the PEV which introduced Bill No. 
208/X [DAR (II-A) 93, 11 March 2006, pp. 9-12] under the title of 
universal and equal access to marriage. The difference between both 
initiatives was the right to adopt. While the BE, saying nothing, admitted 
the adoption of children by married people of the same sex, the PEV 
                                                 
209 See the debate in DAR (I) 20, 16 November 2006, pp. 54-61 and the voting in DAR (I) 
21, 17 November. 2006, p. 86. 
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allowed the possibility of adoption only to married people of a different 
sex. 
The discussion on the general principles of both bills took place 
on 10 October 2008, and both were rejected [DAR (I) 12, 11 October 
2008, pp. 19-29]. The bill of the BE had nay votes from the PS, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP, abstentions from the PCP, the PEV and one PSD 
member, and yea votes from the BE and the independent MP Luísa 
Mesquita (ex-PCP). The bill from the PEV also had nay votes from the 
PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP, the abstentions of eight PSD members and 
Luísa Mesquita, and the yea votes from the PCP, the PEV, two PS and 
one PSD members [DAR (I) 12, 11 October 2008, p. 42]. The reason for 
the different voting was the different option of each bill regarding the 
adoption. 
The rejection of the initiatives by the PS, which held the 
absolute majority, was justified by reasons of timing. The PS affirmed 
itself in favour of gay marriage, but considered that the civil law should 
only be changed in that sense after new elections, when that proposal had 
appeared expressly in the candidates’ programmes.210 Consequently, the 
bills introduced in the X Legislature were rejected and nobody proposed 
any referendum. 
In the XI Legislature, which began in 2009, the question was 
different, given that the PS, which remained as a major party although 
without an absolute majority, decided to move forward with the legal 
acceptance of the gay marriage, excluding, however, the possibility of 
adoption by gay couples. The right wing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) 
maintained their opposition. The PEV evolved to the position of the BE, 
supporting the possibility of adoption. The PCP adhered to the solution 
proposed by the PS Government, admitting marriage but not adoption. 
The legislative procedure was resumed on 16 October 2009, 
with the introduction of Bill No. 14/XI by the BE [DAR (II-A) 4, 12 
November 2009, pp. 40-43]. The PEV introduced Bill No. 24/XI on 30 
October, [DAR (II-A) 4, 12 November 2009, pp. 71-74] and the PS 
Government introduced Government Bill No. 7/XI on 21 December [DAR 
(II-A) 18, 22 December 2009, pp. 37-40]. The PSD introduced Bill No. 
119/XI on 4 January 2010 [DAR (II-A) 21, 7 January 2010, pp. 62-65] 
proposing the existence of a civil union registered between two persons of 
                                                 
210 See speech by Jorge Strecht in DAR (I) 12, 11 October 2008, pp. 25-26. 
The National Referendum   327 
 
 
the same sex as an alternative to marriage.211 The discussion on the 
general principles was scheduled for 8 January 2010. 
Meanwhile, on 5 January 2010, the President of the Assembly of 
the Republic received a popular initiative of referendum, signed by 90,785 
citizens (according to the account of the proponents). They proposed the 
holding of a national referendum through which the Portuguese citizens 
could say whether they agreed or not that marriage could be celebrated 
between persons of the same sex. The President admitted the initiative 
immediately and sent it urgently to the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
to issue an opinion,   within 24 hours. The entire procedure, necessary to 
make the joint discussion of the referendum and the bills proposed on 8 
January, was now ready to begin. 
The Committee did just that. The President dispensed the legal 
time limit of two days to send the initiative to the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, sending it on the very same day. The Committee did not use 
the time limit of 20 days to issue its opinion on the admission of the 
initiative, doing it in 24 hours. The Assembly did not use the legal 
procedure to verify the veracity of the signatures, giving credit to the 
proponents. The procedure that followed was exceptional. Having in mind 
the popular nature of the initiative and the social and political sensibility 
of the subject, Parliament wanted to avoid any accusation of having 
refused the debate on the initiative because of formal reasons. Everything 
was put in place to allow the debate on 8 January. 
The Constitutional Affairs Committee considered there were no 
Constitutional or legal obstacles to the admission of the initiative212 and, 
according to its responsibility, after first consulting the representatives of 
the proponents, it drew Draft Resolution No. 50/XI [DAR (II-A) 22, 18 
January 2010, pp.10-11] to submit to the plenary. The draft included the 
following question: ‘Do you agree that marriage could be celebrated 
between persons of the same sex?’ 
The referendum was not at the centre of the parliamentary 
debate of 8 January, which was opened by the Prime Minister, José 
Sócrates, who introduced the Government bill. The only express support 
                                                 
211 On the contents and Constitutional framework of the initiatives introduced, see the 
opinion drawn for the Constitutional Affairs Committee by António Filipe (PCP) in DAR 
(II-A) 23, 9 January 2010, pp. 2-22. 
212 See the opinion drawn by António Filipe (PCP) for the Constitutional Affairs Comittee 
in DAR (II-A) 23, 9 January 2010, pp. 44-48. 
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for the referendum came from the CDS-PP.213 The other parties, did not 
even refer to it, or did so briefly just to register their positions. Being sure 
that the proposal would be defeated, given the known positions of the PS, 
the BE, the PCP and the PEV, the debate would centre on the introduction 
of gay marriage, and the different conceptions of the parties regarding that 
question, and not the referendum. The popular initiative had been taken by 
the most conservative sectors of Portuguese society, some of them tied to 
the Catholic Church, having the clear support of the CDS-PP and the 
more discreet support of the PSD. The aim of the initiative was to put 
pressure on Parliament to block the passage of legislation enabling gay 
marriage, but it had no prospect from the beginning of being politically 
viable. 
The Government proposal was passed with yea votes from the 
PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV, nay votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP 
and two PS members, and seven abstentions from PSD members. The 
other initiatives were rejected.214 The draft resolution for the referendum 
was also rejected, with yea votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP and two PS 
members, nay votes from the PS, the BE, the PCP, the PEV, and the 
abstentions from three PSD members [DAR (I) 20, 9 January 2010, p. 59].    
7.5. The Alterations to the Referendum Law 
The only alteration to Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April, happened in 
2005. This happened because of controversies surrounding the call of a 
second referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion. On 20 April 
2005, the Assembly of the Republic passed the proposal for a new 
referendum on that subject. However, on 5 May, the President of the 
Republic, by message addressed to the Parliament, announced the refusal 
of that proposal. In response, the PS introduced Bill No. 122/X on 28 
June. The party aimed at holding that referendum in 2005 and this bill 
facilitated the procedures to hold referendums. 
The Assembly of the Republic passed that bill in general terms 
on 8 July [DAR (I) 40, 9 July 2005, pp. 1782-1783] and in a final overall 
vote on 28 July 2005 [DAR (I) 42, 29 July 2005, pp. 1917-1918] with yea 
votes from the PS and the BE and nay votes from the other parties. 
Therefore, Organisational Law No. 4/2005, of 8 September, changed 
                                                 
213 See speech by José Ribeiro e Castro in DAR (I) 20, 9 January 2010, pp. 35-37. 
214 The BE and PEV bills had the same voting: yea – BE, PEV, eight PS and one PSD 
members; nay – PS, PSD, CDS-PP; abstentions – PCP and one PSD member. The PSD 
bill had yea votes from PSD and CDS-PP, nay votes from PS, BE, PCP, PEV, two CDS-
PP and one PSD members, and abstentions from PSD and eight CDS-PP members [DAR 
(I) 20, 9 January 2010, p. 59]. 
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several time limits established in the Referendum Law, in the Law of the 
Electoral Registration and in the Electoral Law for the President of the 
Republic. The referendum started to be allowed between the 40th and the 
180th day after publication of the decree that called it (until then it should 
happen between the 60th and the 90th day). The new law also changed 
some intermediate time limits of the Referendum Law and of the Law of 
Electoral Registration, in order to contain the whole referendary procedure 
inside the minimum time limit allowed, which was 40 days.215 That 
attempt, however, was fruitless due to the unConstitutionality of the draft 
referendum. The alterations introduced in the law did not have the 
intended practical effects. 
8. Defining the Portuguese National Referendum 
Considering the national referendum, as it is enshrined in 
Portugal by the Constitution and by the law, in the context of the 
typologies adopted by several authors as described in Part I, we can define 
the Portuguese national referendum as follows: 
According to Jorge Miranda (1996a, pp. 237-238) it is a) 
internal; b) national; c) legislative, except in the case of the referendum on 
European Union, which would be political; d) optional, except in the case 
of the referendum on the administrative regions, which is mandatory; e) of 
parliamentary initiative; f) binding; g) positive; and h) resolutive. 
According to Maria Luísa Duarte (1987, pp. 207-208) it is a) 
legislative, except in the case of the referendum on the European Union, 
which would be on an international issue; b) national; c) optional,  except 
in the case of the referendum on the administrative regions, which is 
mandatory; and d) binding. 
According to Butler and Ranney (1978, pp. 23-24), it is a 
government-controlled referendum because the majority of the 
Parliament, which supported the Government, has the power to decide 
whether a referendum will be held. However, the Portuguese Government 
cannot decide on wheter the effect of the referendum is binding or merely 
advisory, because the binding effect is directly established by the 
                                                 
215 Bearing in mind that in the beginning of 2006 there would be the election of the 
President of the Republic, the PS approved in the same Organizational Law No. 4/2005, of 
8 September, an alteration to the Electoral Law for the President of the Republic, 
shortening the minimum antecedence for setting that election from 80 to 60 days, in order 
to make the referendum possible in 2005. 
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Constitution. In the case of the creation of the administrative regions, the 
referendum is Constitutionally required. 
Regarding the classifications of Gordon Smith (1976, p. 6), the 
Portuguese referendum is controlled, having in mind the degree of 
government control exercised on its holding. However, as to the 
consequences, as we will see in the next chapters, the first referendum on 
the decriminalisation of abortion and the referendum on the administrative 
regions were anti-hegemonic referendums. The second referendum on the 
abortion was pro-hegemonic. 
According to Uleri (1996, pp. 6-7), the Portuguese referendum is 
a) prescribed; b) optional, except in the case of the referendum on the 
creation of the administrative regions; c) binding; and d) decision-
controlling vote, given the coincidence between the promoter of the 
consultation and the author of the decision put to vote. 
Finally, according to LeDuc (2003, p. 39), the Portuguese 
referendum is a) mandatory Constitutional, having in mind the binding 
effect, and b) a resource of the parties, considering the political function 
of the referendum. Regarding the typology proposed by LeDuc (p. 39) the 
Portuguese referendum is on public policy questions, except the 
referendum on the European Union, which would be on an international 
treaty. 




The Referendums on the Decriminalisation of Abortion 
1. Antecedents 
1.1. I Legislature: 1976-1980 
On 8 March 2007 Parliament passed Law No. 16/2007 of 17 
April decriminalising abortion. The result of the referendum held on 11 
February that year, ended a long process of heated discussions, both inside 
and outside the Parliament, legal proceedings and human dramas. In that 
process, the referendum had a leading and decisive role. It was used to 
block, and later enabled the adoption of legislative measures to 
decriminalise abortion up to the tenth week of pregnancy. Long before the 
Constitutional possibility of holding referendums in Portugal, the issue of 
abortion was already referred to as a prototypal example of the kind of 
question that justified the appeal to referendum. 
Portugal criminalised abortion with the Penal Code of 1886, 
which kept the legal system in force since the Penal Code of 1852, and 
remained in force up to 1982. According to Article 358 of that Code, a 
pregnant woman who aborted, using for that purpose violence, beverages, 
medicines, or any other means, should be condemned to a prison penalty 
from 2 to 8 years. The same penalty would be applied to any woman who 
consented to actually have the abortion through those means, or who 
voluntarily tried to abort herself (Decree of 16 September 1886, DG, 20 
September 1886). 
Close to the end of the I Legislature, in June 1980, deputy Mário 
Tomé (UDP) introduced Bill No. 500/I [DAR (II) 69, 6 June 1980, pp. 
1138-1140], which was the first parliamentary initiative to put an end to 
the criminalisation of abortion. That bill revoked Article 358 of the 1886 
Penal Code and allowed a pregnant woman to request an abortion as long 
as it was carried out by qualified personnel, in either a public or private 
hospital, or in a properly equipped health centre within the first 12 weeks. 
The bill specified the reasons that could justify the termination of 
pregnancy, but gave women the right not to reveal those reasons. The 
legislative session ended without any discussion of that bill, and it 
automatically lapsed. 
1.2. II Legislature (1980-1983): The Debate of 1982 
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In the II Legislature, which began after the elections of 5 
October 1980, which resulted in an absolute majority for the AD, 
Parliament revived the issue of abortion with the introduction of Bill No. 
309/II, on 4 February 1982 by the PCP [DAR (II) 50, 6 February 1982, pp. 
1034-1041]. In that bill, the PCP proposed the revocation of Article 358 
of the Penal Code and the legalisation of abortion in certain conditions. 
The pregnant woman could request a termination of the pregnancy within 
the first 12 weeks and under the direction of a doctor, in a public or 
private health establishment especially authorised for that purpose, when: 
a) the pregnancy was the result of rape or another act that could be 
considered a violation of the woman’s freedom; b) the termination of the 
pregnancy was a suitable means of removing a serious danger or harm to 
the woman’s physical or psychological health; c) there was a serious risk 
that the child could suffer a severe illness or malformation; d) the woman, 
due to her familial situation or serious lack of economic resources, was 
unable to assure reasonable living conditions and education for the child, 
or the pregnancy would put her in a social and economic situation which 
was unbearable.  
On the other hand, the pregnancy could be terminated at any 
time when, according to the rules and knowledge of medicine, a) it was 
necessary to take action to remove the danger of death or serious harm to 
the pregnant woman; b) there was a serious probability of illness or 
malformation for the child that was not detected within the first 12 weeks. 
Anyone who conducted an abortion outside of these permitted 
circumstances would be punished with a jail sentence of up to one year if 
the woman had consented, or from 2 to 8 years if there was no consent, 
and from 8 to 12 years in the case of death or serious damage to the 
woman’s health. In other cases the woman would not be punished.  The 
discussion on the general principles happened for the first time on 2 
March 1982 [DAR (I) 59, 3 March 1982, pp. 2392-2420]. 
On 22 May 1982, while the procedure of the PCP bill was 
pending, the Government introduced Bill No. 100/II [DAR (II) 94, 22 May 
1982] asking for authorisation to legislate in order to draw a new Penal 
Code. This gave rise to the 1982 Penal Code published on 23 September 
(Executive Law No. 400/82). That Code laid down that, anyone who 
conducted an abortion on a woman without her consent should be 
punished with between 2 and 8 years in prison. Abortion with the 
woman’s consent should be punished with prison sentence of up to 3 
years, and the same penalty should be applied to any woman that aborted 
her own child or gave her consent for someone else to conduct the 
abortion. The penalty should only be up to 2 years in prison if the abortion 
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was carried out to hide the woman’s dishonour. If the abortion led to the 
woman’s death or serious harm, or if the person conducting the abortion 
did so frequently or for purposes of gaining profit, the penalty should be 
even more severe. That penalty, however, should not be applied to the 
woman. 
Bill No. 309/II was discussed again, in general terms, on 9 
November 1982 and rejected on 11 November. The voting was nominal, 
and the bill had 127 nay votes (from the PSD, the CDS, the PPM and the 
ASDI) and 105 yea votes (from the PS, the PCP, the UEDS, the 
MDP/CDE, the UDP and one from the PSD), [DAR (I) 12, 12 November 
1982, p. 406]. During the procedure, Teresa Ambrósio (PS), [DAR (I) 10, 
10 November 1982, p. 261], Helena Roseta [DAR (I) 59, 3 March 1982, 
pp. 2412-2413] Amadeu dos Santos (PSD) and the PPM members [DAR 
(I) 12, 12 November 1982, pp. 417-418] defended a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion, expressing regret that the Constitution did 
not allow it. 
1.3. III Legislature (1983-1985): Law No. 6/84, of 11 May 
In the III Legislature, after the 25 April 1983 elections, and 
under the PS/PSD Government, the PCP revived plans to decriminalise 
abortion through the introduction of Bill No. 7/III [DAR (II) 1, 1 June 
1983, pp. 23-31], on 31 May 1983, thus resubmitting the contents of the 
previous PCP bill. On 12 January 1984, the PS introduced Bill No. 265/III 
[DAR (II) 73, 14 January 1984, pp. 1955-1957], which excluded certain 
cases of abortion from illegality. It also proposed that no punishment 
should be handed down to a doctor for carrying out an abortion in a health 
establishment provided the consent of the pregnant woman had been 
obtained and, according to the knowledge and experience of medicine: a) 
it was the only means to remove the danger of death or serious and 
irreversible harm to the body or the physical or psychological health of the 
pregnant woman; b) it was suitable to avoid the danger of death or durable 
harm to the body or the physical or psychological health of the woman, 
and the abortion was conducted within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; c) 
there were good reasons to predict that the child would suffer from a 
serious and incurable disease or malformation, and the abortion was 
conducted within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; d) there were evidence 
that the pregnancy had been the result of rape and the abortion was made 
within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Besides that, the penalties laid 
down in the Code remained essentially the same. The only changes were 
that the penalty of up to 2 years in prison, which formerly applied if the 
abortion had been conducted to hide the woman’s dishonour, would be 
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replaced by prison of up to one year if the abortion had been conducted to 
prevent the woman experiencing social blame, or if there was another 
reason that could sensibly decrease the agent’s guilt. 
On 25 and 26 January 1984, the general principles of both bills 
were discussed. Through nominal voting, the PCP bill was rejected. It had 
128 nay votes (from the PSD, the CDS, 24 from the PS and two from the 
ASDI), 44 yea votes (from the PCP, the UEDS and the MDP/CDE) and 63 
abstentions (from the PS and one from the PSD). The general principles of 
PS bill was passed with 132 yea votes (from the PS, the PCP, the UEDS, 
the MDP/CDE, one from the ASDI and one from the PSD), 102 nay votes 
(from the PSD, the CDS and one from the ASDI) and with one abstention 
from a PS member [DAR (I) 67, 26 January 1984, pp. 2886-2948 and 68, 
27 January 1984, pp. 2953-3070]. 
In the debate of 26 January 1984, António Marques Mendes, on 
behalf of the PSD, expressed his regret that a referendum was not 
permitted by the Constitution because it would shed light on the true 
feelings and will of the Portuguese people towards the abortion issue 
[DAR (I) 68, 27 January 1984, p. 3060]. That same position was Stated in 
the declarations of vote by the PSD members Agostinho Branquinho and 
Luís Monteiro [DAR (I) 68, 27 January 1984, pp. 3077-3078]. In the final 
overall vote, on 14 February 1984, the bill was passed with yea votes from 
the PS, the PCP, the UEDS, the MDP/CDE and one from the ASDI. The 
nay votes were from the PSD, the CDS and two ASDI members, and there 
were two abstentions from PS members [DAR (I) 75, 15 February 1984, p. 
3292]. 
Thus, Law No. 6/84, of 11 May, changed Articles 139, 140 and 
141 of the 1982 Penal Code in the sense of the PS proposal.216 The 
enactment of this law was not peaceful. The President of the Republic 
Ramalho Eanes requested a prior review its Constitutionality by the 
Constitutional Court, and even suggested an extraordinary Constitutional 
revision to allow a referendum on the abortion issue. In the event, the 
Constitutional Court did not declare the law unConstitutional.217 
                                                 
216 In the case of eugenic abortion, with the possibility of a serious disease or malformation 
of the child, the abortion could be made within the first 16 weeks and not only within the 
first 12 weeks as had been previously proposed.   
217 See Ruling No. 25/84, of 19 March. The Ombudsman (Provedor de Justiça) also 
requested the review of Constitutionality of Law No. 6/84, of 11 May, which was 
confirmed by Ruling No. 91/85, of 18 June 1985. See the synthesis of the Constitutional 
jurisprudence on this subject in the report on Bills No. 177/VII, 235/VII and 236/VII, 
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1.4. VI Legislature (1991-1995): The Reform of Criminal 
       Law in 1994 
During the VI Legislature (1991-1995), the second with a PSD 
absolute majority, the abortion issue reappeared with Government Bill 
No. 92/VI, which authorised a review of the Penal Code. This bill was 
introduced on 16 February 1994 [DAR (II-A) 24 − Supplement, 24 
February 1994, pp. 380(2-45)]. In the debate on the general principles, on 
29 June 1994, the Justice Minister, Laborinho Lúcio, answered a question 
from Mário Tomé by declaring that the issue of abortion decriminalisation 
should be submitted to popular consultation, i.e. through a referendum 
[DAR (I) 85, 30 June 1994, p. 2751]. 
On 13 July 1994, in the detailed debate of the Government Bill, 
the PCP requested a discussion of its proposal to exclude abortions made 
within the first 12 weeks from the Penal Code, provided they had been 
requested by the woman.  They also proposed to lengthen the time limit 
for eugenic abortion from 16 weeks to 22 weeks, and to decriminalise the 
behaviour women who had abortions outside the circumstances laid down 
in Article 142 of the Penal Code. The requirement was rejected with nay 
votes from the PSD and the CDS, but had yea votes from the PS, the PCP, 
the PEV, the PSN, the UDP and the ID [DAR (I) 91, 14 July 1994, p. 
2976]. 
Executive-Law No. 48/95, of 15 March, published under the 
Authorisation given by Law No. 35/94, of 15 September, which changed 
the Penal Code, was submitted to parliamentary consideration.218 On that 
occasion, the PS and the PCP proposed to change the legal framework of 
abortion criminalisation, but the parliamentary majority rejected these 
proposals. The issue of abortion was neither in the core of the debate of 
the 1994 reform of criminal law, nor was it the subject of significant 
public discussion at that time, even if it was not exactly absent. The legal 
framework introduced a small amount of flexibility, but it was discreet 
and made no controversy or had important social impact.219 
                                                                                                               
made for the Youth Parliamentary Committee by Luís Pedro Martins (PS), [DAR (II-A) 22, 
20 February 1997, pp. 329-331]. 
218 See Ratificação No. 138/VI [DAR (II) 26, 8 April 1995, p. 126] and the respective 
debate [DAR (I) 76, 13 May 1995, pp. 2463-2474]. 
219 In this sense, see the Report by José Magalhães (PS) for the Committee of 
Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties on Bills No. 177/VII, 235/VII and 
236/VII [DAR (II-A) 21 - Supplement, 21 February 1997, pp. 358(12-16)]. 
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After the 1994 reform, the Penal Code retained the 
criminalisation of abortion in Article 140. Anyone who, by any means, 
and without the woman’s consent, aborted an unborn child, should be 
sentenced to between 2 and 8 years in prison (No. 1); anyone who, by any 
means, and with the woman’s consent, conducted an abortion, should be 
imprisoned for up to 3 years (No. 2); the woman who gave consent for the 
abortion, conducted by a third person or, through her own initiative or 
through a third person’s, aborted an unborn child herself, should be 
punished with prison up to 3 years (No. 3). 
Article 141(3) strengthend the penalties when the abortion or the 
means used to case an abortion resulted in the death, or caused significant 
harm to the pregnant woman’s health, or when the agent dedicated himself 
to the usual practice of abortions, or conducted abortions for purpose of 
gaining a profit. Finally, Article 142(1) laid down that the abortion was 
not punishable when it was made by a doctor, or under his direction, in an 
official or officially recognised health establishment, and with the 
pregnant woman’s consent, provided, according to the knowledge and 
experience of medicine a) it was the only means to remove the danger of 
death or serious and irreversible harm to the body or physical and/or 
psychological health of the pregnant woman; b) it was appropriate to 
avoid the danger of death or serious and irreversible harm to the body, or 
to the physical or psychological health of the pregnant woman, and it was 
made within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; c) there were sure reasons to 
believe that the child would suffer from a serious and incurable disease or 
malformation, and the abortion was conducted within the first 16 weeks of 
pregnancy; d) there were serious signs that the pregnancy had been the 
result of a crime against the woman’s sexual freedom and self-
determination, and it was made within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. 
This was the starting point at the beginning of the VII Legislature. 
1.5. VII Legislature: 1995-1999 
   1.5.1. The Attempt to Decriminalise Abortion in 1996-1997 
On 20 June 1996, the PCP revived the initiative on the 
decriminalisation of abortion, introducing Bill No. 177/VII [DAR (II-A) 
51, 22 June 1996, pp. 985-987]. In this bill, the PCP proposed a) the 
decriminalisation of abortion conducted within the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy upon the woman’s request; b) the extension of the time limit to 
16 weeks if the pregnant woman was addicted to drugs; c) a further 
extension from 16 to 22 weeks in the case of eugenic abortion, including 
cases when the child could be infected with AIDS; d) an extension the 
period when the abortion could be made without penalties from 12 to 16 
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weeks to avoid danger of death or serious and durable harm to the body or 
physical and psychological health of the pregnant woman; e) the extension 
from 12 to 16 weeks in the cases where the woman had been the victims 
of  crimes against her sexual freedom and self-determination, and up to 22 
weeks where the women was younger than 16 or mentally handicapped; f) 
the decriminalisation of the behaviour of the woman who consented to the 
abortion outside of the time limits laid down by law. The PSD proposed a 
referendum on the subject. This idea was strongly criticised in the 
Assembly of the Republic by Odete Santos (PCP), [DAR (I) 5, 25 October 
1996, pp. 176-178]. 
On 30 October 1996, socialist members introduced two different 
bills on abortion. Bill No. 235/VII [DAR (II-A) 5, 9 November 1996, pp. 
60-62], subscribed at first by Manuel Strecht Monteiro, proposed a) the 
decriminalisation of abortion, without a time limit, if the child was 
unfeasible; b) the extension from 16 to 24 weeks in the cases of eugenic 
abortion, where the problem had been confirmed by an ultrasound; c) the 
extension from 12 to 16 weeks for abortions without punishment in the 
cases of crimes against the sexual freedom and self-determination and 
those younger than sixteen or mentally handicapped. Bill No. 236/VII 
[DAR (II-A) 5, 9 November 1996, pp. 62-66], whose first subscriber was 
the Secretary General of the Socialist Youth (JS), Sérgio Sousa Pinto, 
proposed a) the exclusion of the illegality of abortion made within the first 
12 weeks upon the woman’s request, when she deemed herself unable to 
exercise a conscious motherhood; b) the extension of the time limit from 
12 to 16 weeks when the abortion was recommended to avoid the danger 
of death or serious harm to the body or the physical and psychological 
health of the pregnant woman; c) the extension of the time limit from 12 
to 16 weeks in the cases of crimes against sexual freedom and self-
determination, and up to 18 weeks when these crimes were committed 
against those younger than 16 or mentally handicapped. 
   1.5.2. The Bills’ Discussion and Voting 
The joint discussion and the nominal voting of the bills took 
place on 20 February 1997 [DAR (I) 42, 21 February 1997, pp. 1480-
1545]. The PCP Bill No. 177/VII was rejected with 99 yea votes, 115 nay 
votes and 12 abstentions. The yea votes came from all the PCP members 
(13) and the PEV (2), as well as the PS (80) and the PSD (4). 15 members 
from the CDS-PP, 84 from the PSD and 16 from the PS voted nay. The 12 
abstentions came from PS members. The PS Bill No. 326/VII was also 
rejected by a margin of one single vote. It received 111 yea votes, 112 
nays and three abstentions. The yea votes came from 93 PS members, 13 
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PCP members, two PEV members, and three PSD members. 83 PSD 
members, 15 from the CDS-PP and 14 PS members voted nay. The 
abstentions came from the PS (two) and the PSD (one). Only Bill No. 
235/VII was passed in general terms, with 155 yea votes (106 from the 
PS, 34 from the PSD, 13 from the PCP and two from the PEV), 47 nay 
votes (34 from the PSD and 13 from the CDS-PP), and 24 abstentions (19 
from the PSD, three from the PS and two from the CDS-PP). 
While three parties stood united in their voting (PCP, CDS-PP 
and PEV), the PSD and especially the PS, were divided. In the case of the 
PSD, four members voted affirmatively on the PCP bill, three members 
voted affirmatively on the bill from the young socialists and one member 
abstained. As for the Strecht Monteiro bill, 34 members from the PSD 
voted in favour and 19 abstained. 
The deepest divisions, however, were within the PS. Although 
the majority position inside the party favoured relaxing the law that 
criminalised abortion to some extent, the opposition of the leader and 
Prime Minister, António Guterres, was well known. That division was 
clear since the introduction of the two different bills, and the JS bill, were 
rejected by one vote due to the abstentions from three PS members. The 
division of the Socialist field was actually induced by the position of the 
Catholic sectors, which strongly opposed the decriminalisation of 
abortion. 
Nonetheless, Bill No. 235/VII was passed. After the detailed 
voting in the Committee on 17 June 1997 [DAR (II-A) 53, 19 June 1997, 
pp. 1047-1048], it was submitted to a final overall vote on 26 June 1997, 
having been passed with 118 yea votes (PS, PSD, PCP and PEV), 36 nay 
votes (PSD and CDS-PP) and 11 abstentions (PS, PSD, CDS-PP), [DAR 
(I) 86, 27 June 1997, p. 3047]. Assent was therefore given to Law No. 
90/97, of 30 July, which changed the time limits for the exclusion of 
illegality in some cases of abortions foreseen in Article 242 of the Penal 
Code. Being certain that the child would suffer from an incurable and 
serious congenital disease or malformation, the time limit for abortion 
without punishment was lengthened from 16 to 24 weeks of pregnancy, 
except in the cases of an embryo that was not viable, which could be 
aborted at any time. Given serious signs of crime against sexual freedom 
or self-determination, the time limit for an unpunished abortion was 
extended from 12 to 16 weeks. 
   1.5.3. The Draft Referendum 
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Meanwhile, on 20 December 1996, the PSD proposed a 
referendum on abortion, introducing Draft Resolution No. 38/VII [DAR 
(II-A) 12, 9 January 1997, p. 200]. The PSD considered that the position 
on the legal framework for abortion was not a normal ideological or 
partisan situation because it was essentially a matter of individual 
conscience, based on personal convictions and attitudes towards values 
and fundamental rights. On the other hand, the PSD thought that some of 
the proposed bills would mean a liberalisation of abortion although 
limited in time, and that question should be decided by the Portuguese 
people through a referendum.  They argued that this would represent a 
fundamental change of the law in force, that it would essentially touch on 
values and fundamental rights, and that these decisions should be based on 
the free and intimate convictions of each Portuguese citizen. The question 
proposed was the following: ‘Should the right to have an abortion, without 
any medical reasons, be free within the first 12 weeks?’ 
The debate of the PCP and PS bills was scheduled for 20 
February 1997. The PSD wanted its draft referendum to be previously 
debated, but it did not have PS or PCP support for that. However, by the 
end of January, the PS announced the acceptance of the referendum, but 
never before the general debate of the bills. This position, although 
criticised by the PSD, which insisted on a referendum before any 
parliamentary position on the bills, reflected the weight of those who 
opposed the decriminalisation of abortion inside the PS.  
The referendum would be held only if any bill was passed in 
principle because, if bills were rejected, their renewal would not be 
possible in the same legislative session. Thus, if the decriminalisation was 
passed in principle in Parliament, the voters could contradict that decision 
by referendum and withdraw it. However, if Parliament rejected the 
decriminalisation, the voters would not have the possibility to pronounce 
themselves in opposition to this decision.220 Nevertheless, the JS and the 
PCP bills were rejected in general on 20 February 1997, and 
consequently, Draft Resolution No. 38/VII, which proposed the 
referendum, was not discussed. 
   1.5.4. A New Attempt at Decriminalisation: 1997-1998 
In the very beginning of the next legislative session, the PCP 
revived the initiative, introducing Bill No. 417/VII in 7 October 1997 
                                                 
220 See speeches by Correia de Jesus (PSD) and Jorge Lacão (PS) on 30 January 1997 
[DAR (I) 33, 31 January 1997, pp. 1222-1226].  
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[DAR (II-A) 3, 17 October 1997, pp. 19-32] essentially with the same 
content of Bill No. 177/VII but with some adjustments resulting from Law 
No. 90/97, of 30 July. On the contrary, the CDS-PP introduced Bill No. 
448/VII on 14 January 1998, which proposed the change of Article 66 of 
the Penal Code in order to establish the beginning of the legal personality 
from the moment of conception [DAR (II-A) 24, 17 January 1998, pp. 
441-445]. 
The PS introduced two different bills once again. On 23 January, 
Bill No. 451/VII [DAR (II-A) 27, 29 January 1998, pp. 478-480] had the 
Secretary General of the JS as the first subscriber. It essentially recycled 
the content of Bill No. 236/VII, but shortened the proposed period when 
abortion would not be illegal from 12 weeks to 10 weeks after the advice 
of a family consultancy centre. According to the subscribers, the new time 
limit only had a political reason, with the purpose of obtaining 
parliamentary support for its approval. 
On 28 January 1998, two PS members, António Braga and 
Eurico Figueiredo, introduced Bill No. 453/VII [DAR (II-A) 28, 31 
January 1998, pp. 555-559] proposing to add a new cause of exclusion of 
the illegality of abortion to the Penal Code. The legal framework proposed 
was as follows: a) the illegality of abortion would be excluded if realised 
within the first 12 weeks, rightly authorised by a Commission of 
Motherhood Protection, upon a woman’s request, and only for social and 
economic reasons; b) if the pregnant woman was underage, the request 
should be made with the legal representatives’ consent; c) in every district 
or region there would be a Commission of Motherhood Protection, which 
would be responsible for assessing the reasons for the request and 
promoting the right conditions for the pregnancy or abortion, and inform 
the requester of the meaning and consequences of the abortion; d) the 
Commission should authorise or refuse the abortion requested within five 
days, leaving the requesters with the chance to appeal to the Justice 
Minister or to the Supreme Administrative Court; e) the Commission 
would have five members: an obstetrician, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a 
magistrate and a social service technician; f) the abortion requests would 
be free, urgent and confidential.221 
After the PCP bill, and once the PS bill was announced 
proposing the exclusion of the illegality of abortion up to the 10th week 
with the woman’s request, the PSD introduced Draft Resolution No. 
                                                 
221 See Report drawn by José Magalhães (PS) for the Constitutional Affairs, Rights, 
Freedoms and Guaranties Committee on Bills No. 417/VII, 451/VII and 453/VII [DAR (II-
A) 29, 5 February 1998, pp. 567-576]. 
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75/VII [DAR (II-A) 23, 15 January 1998, pp. 434-435]. One of the reasons 
called upon by the PSD was the position taken by the PS in 1997 in favour 
of a referendum if any initiative aimed at the decriminalisation of abortion 
passed in general terms. The PSD argued that any decision substantially 
changing the philosophy of the legal framework for abortion should be 
taken by the Portuguese citizens, through a referendum, before any 
parliamentary decision was made. However, if the parliamentary majority 
did not agree and sustained that the decision should be taken by 
Parliament, then, in the worst case scenario, the referendum should be 
made soon after the decision and discussed in detail until it is held.  
On 4 February 1998, all of the general terms of the bills were 
discussed. The PSD Draft Resolution No. 38/VII, the first that proposed 
the referendum, remained valid and it was also discussed. Meanwhile, the 
appreciation of the second draft resolution on the referendum was 
scheduled for 19 February. In the 4th of February debate, Sérgio Sousa 
Pinto (PS) criticised the PSD proposal and rejected the idea of a 
referendum aiming to bypass the Assembly of the Republic if the PS bill 
passed. According to him, that was a weapon against the democratic 
legitimacy of the Assembly, and behind the referendum was a hidden 
hope to delay, which would prevent any legal evolution [DAR (I) 36, 5 
February 1998, p. 1171]. 
Given the predicable rejection of Draft Resolution No. 38/VII, 
the PSD did not submit it to voting, announcing immediately that if any 
decriminalisation bills passed in general terms, it would forward a new 
referendum proposal. The voting was nominal. The PCP Bill No. 417/VII 
was rejected, with 107 yea votes, 110 nays and nine abstentions. The yea 
votes were from the PCP (13), the PEV (2), the PS (89) and the PSD (3). 
The nay votes were from the CDS-PP (15), the PSD (85) and the PS (10). 
The abstentions were only from PS members. The CDS-PP Bill No. 
448/VII was rejected, with only 14 yea votes, all of them from the CDS-
PP, 24 abstentions (22 from the PSD, one from the PS and one from the 
PSD) and 188 nay votes [DAR (I) 36, 5 February 1998, pp. 1209-1211]. 
Bill No. 453/VII subscribed by António Braga and Eurico Figueiredo was 
not submitted to nominal voting, because no one requested that, but it was 
also rejected with only yea votes from both subscribers, a few abstentions 
from PS and PSD members, and nay votes from all parties [DAR (I) 36, 5 
February 1998, p. 1214]. Meanwhile, Bill No. 451/VII was passed in 
general terms, with 116 yea votes (98 from the PS, 13 from the PCP, two 
from the PEV and three from the PSD), 107 nays (74 from the PSD, 15 
from the CDS-PP and eight from the PS), and three PS abstentions [DAR 
(I) 36, 5 February 1998, p. 1211-1213]. 
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2. The Referendum of 1998 
2.1. The Procedure 
One day after the passing, in general, of PS Bill No. 451/VII, the 
socialist leadership announced an agreement with the PSD to hold a 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion. The counterpart to this 
agreement was a compromise on the composition of the Constitutional 
Court and the PSD acceptance that the referendums on the European 
Union and regionalisation could be held on the same day. The election of 
judges to the Constitutional Court by the Assembly of the Republic (10 in 
13) demanded a two-thirds majority, which involved an agreement 
between the PS and the PSD. In the beginning of 1998, an impasse 
between both parties meant that several unoccupied judge positions went 
unfilled. The PS leadership considered yielding to the PSD on the abortion 
referendum in exchange for an agreement that would lift the blockade on 
the Constitutional Court’s composition. This PS position, in response to 
the PSD referendum proposal, which denied all the arguments of its 
deputies during the discussion the day before, was strongly criticised in 
Parliament by CDS-PP and PCP members, who accused the socialists of 
withdrawing a Statement and giving up on principles in exchange for a 
beneficial deal.222 
In the plenary sittings of 19 February 1998, the PSD Draft 
Resolution No. 75/VII was discussed [DAR (I) 42, 20 February 1998, pp. 
1409-1423]. After that, the PSD, hoping that the proposal would be 
strictly discussed in the committee in order to obtain the clearest and most 
objective question to submit to the citizens, requested the sending of the 
draft to the Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties 
Committee, for four weeks, so that the final overall vote could happen up 
to 19 March 1998. The request was passed with the yea votes from the PS, 
the PSD and the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP and the PEV [DAR 
(I) 42, 20 February 1998, p. 1423]. 
On 19 March, the plenary of the Assembly of the Republic 
discussed the question (or questions) to submit to the voters [DAR (I) 51, 
20 March 1998, pp. 1743-1750]. The PSD and the CDS-PP proposed to 
replace the first PSD proposal with the following questions: 1) ‘Do you 
agree that the abortion should be free within the first 10 weeks of 
pregnancy?’ 2) ‘Do you agree that economic and social reasons may 
justify an abortion as being a serious danger to the woman’s health?’ 
                                                 
222 See speeches by Jorge Ferreira (CDS-PP) and Octávio Teixeira (PCP) on 11 February 
1998 [DAR (I) 39, 12 February 1998, pp. 1290-1291 and 1293-1294].  
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Submitted to vote, these questions were rejected with nay votes 
from the PS, the PCP and the PEV, and yea votes from the PSD, the CDS-
PP and two PS members (Claúdio Monteiro and Maria do Rosário 
Carneiro), [DAR (I) 51, 20 March 1998, p. 1750]. After that, the PS 
submitted its proposal for the referendum question, which was the 
following: ‘Do you agree with the decriminalisation of abortion where a 
woman can choose to abort within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy, in a 
legally authorised health establishment?’ This question was passed with 
yea votes from the PS, nay votes from the PCP, the PEV and two PS 
members, and abstentions from the PSD, the CDS-PP and 12 PS members 
[DAR (I) 51, 20 March 1998, p. 1750]. The PS also proposed that only 
registered voters in the national territory could vote in the referendum. 
This proposal had yea votes from the PS and the PSD, nay votes from the 
PCP, the PEV and two PS members, and the abstention from the CDS-PP 
[DAR (I) 51, 20 March 1998, p. 1750]. 
Therefore, the PS accepted the referendum imposing, however, 
its own question, and refusing the PSD and CDS-PP proposal. These 
parties, in spite of their disagreement regarding the question, abstained 
from the PS proposal, thus showing their support for the referendum. The 
PCP and the PEV, voted against all the proposals in disagreement with the 
referendum on abortion, considering that the decision on that subject 
should be taken by Parliament. 
On 31 March, Resolution No. 16/98, including the referendum 
proposal [DR (I-A) 76, 31 March 1998, p. 1414] was published. On 2 
April 1998, the President of the Republic submitted it to the Constitutional 
Court for the prior review of the referendum’s Constitutionality and 
legality, including its electoral universe. 
The Constitutional Court, through Ruling No. 288/98 [DR (I-A) 
91, 18 April 1998], concluded that the proposal for referendum was 
according to the Constitution and the law. The decision was taken by 
seven judges against six, which considered that the Constitution did not 
allow the decriminalisation of abortion, so that the affirmative answer 
would be unConstitutional. Given the Constitutional Court’s decision, the 
President of the Republic called the referendum for 28 June 1998 [DR (I-
A) 98 − Supplement, 28 April 1998]. 
Ten political parties and seven citizen groups declared their 
intention to take part in the campaign to the National Elections 
Commission. The parties were all the parliamentary parties (the PS, the 
PSD, the PCP, the CDS-PP and the PEV), the PPM, the PCTP/MRPP 
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(former Maoist party), and three parties that would later create the Left 
Block (the PSR, the UDP and the Politics XXI). As for the citizen groups, 
four of them supported the negative answer (‘Abortion by request? No!’, 
‘North Life’; ‘Solidarity and Life Platform’; and ‘Together for Life’) and 
three of them supported the affirmative answer, being all of them named 
‘Yes, for Tolerance’, but having different subscribers. On 28 June 1998, 
the results were as follows:223 
Table 3 
National Results of the 1998 Referendum on Abortion 
Registered 
voters 
Actual Voters Abstentions Blank ballot papers 
Null ballot 
papers 
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
8,496,089 2,709,503 31.89 5,786,586 68.11 29,057 1.07 15,562 0.57 
 
YES Votes NO Votes 
Total % Total % 
1,308,130 48.28 1,356,754 50.07 
 
2.2. Analysis of the Results 
The main point to note regarding the results of the first national 
referendum during the democratic period is the high rate of abstention. In 
fact, an absention rate of 68.11% was a historical low for electoral 
participation. In the three previous elections, the rate of participation was 
much higher. In the parliamentary elections of 1 October 1995 the 
abstention rate was 33.70%; in the presidential election of 14 January 
1996 33.71% of the registered voters abstained; and in the local elections 
of 14 December 1997 the abstention rate was 39.90%. The abstention in 
the 28 June referendum even passed the highest rate of abstention in 
national elections in history, which was 64.46% for the European 
Parliament election of 12 June 1994. 
Michael Baum and André Freire (2003a) considered the 
abstention as the most remarkable fact of this referendum, given its 
extremely high rate. The abstention rate was more than twice the rate of 
the 1995 legislative elections in Portugal and it was about twice as high as 
the abstention rate in national referendums in other western democracies. 
                                                 
223 Available at 
http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/index.cfm?dia=28&mes=06&ano=1998&eleicao=re1 
[accessed 17 June 2011]. 
 
The Referendum on the Decriminalisation of Abortion   345 
 
 
The authors suggested three main explanations for the abstention. First, 
divisions within the Socialist Party forced the party to present a campaign 
that was simultaneously for and against the decriminalisation. Second, the 
efforts of the Catholic Church that used the pulpit and media as a way of 
getting their message across. And third, the erroneous pre-announcement 
of the ‘yes’ victory by the polls without verification of the ballots (Freire 
& Baum, 2003a, p. 15). 
Table 4 














Aveiro 69.4 32.3 67.7 Lisboa 65.7 68.5 31.5 
Beja 77.0 78.2 21.8 Portalegre 75.9 67.7 32.3 
Braga 60.5 22.7 77.3 Porto 66.6 42.4 57.6 
Bragança 71.4 26.3 73.8 Santarém 70.2 56.6 43.4 
C.Branco 71.2 47.2 52.8 Setúbal 66.6 81.9 18.1 
Coimbra 72.7 52.9 47.1 V. Castelo 65.9 26.2 73.8 
Évora 73.3 73.0 27.0 Vila Real 68.7 24.0 76.0 
Faro 77.6 69.6 30.4 Viseu 69.6 24.2 75.8 
Guarda 68.0 29.9 70.1 Açores 72.8 17.2 82.8 
Leiria 70.6 48.3 51.7 Madeira 67.2 24.0 76.0 
 
Regarding the positions of the main parties in the referendum, it 
there were several important aspects. On the left, the PCP was for 
decriminalisation but against the referendum, thinking that the Assembly 
of the Republic should directly assume the responsibility of changing the 
criminal law, and considering the referendum as an attempt to block the 
decriminalisation by Parliament. The right wing, both the PSD and the 
CDS-PP, assumed a position against decriminalisation and tried to use the 
referendum as a means to avoid it. The PSD favoured a referendum but 
were divided over the preferred answer. Several well known members 
supported the affirmative option and actively took part in its campaign, in 
spite of having a large majority inside the party against decriminalisation. 
However, there was no serious division inside the PSD, whose members 
regarded the referendum as a useful tool to weaken the PS in the 
upcoming 1999 elections. The CDS-PP was united around the ‘no’. 
The PS was, in fact, the most divided party, and its positions 
suffered the greatest changes. One should be reminded that, less than 24 
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hours after the passing of the PS bill in Parliament, in which several PS 
members strongly criticised the PSD for supporting a referendum in 
debate, an agreement between both leaders precisely about the referendum 
was announced. The positions of the Prime Minister and the PS Secretary 
General, António Guterres, and the Catholic sectors of the party against 
decriminalisation, were well known. The majority of the party supported 
the ‘yes’ campaign in the referendum, but there was no official position 
and the party’s division prejudiced the commitment of the party in the 
campaign and confused the voters. 
As Freire and Baum (2003a, pp. 11-12) highlight, the division 
within the PS encouraged abstention, and was decisive for the result. They 
demonstrated that the municipalities with a PS/PCP majority had highter 
abstention rates than municipalities with a PSD/CDS-PP majority. In the 
1995 parliamentary elections, the left parties were stronger in the 
municipalities with higher participation, unlike the ones on the right. In 
the abortion referendum, these correlations inverted. The higher 
abstention rate took place precisely in the left municipalities and, given 
the tight margin that decided the referendum, it is clear that the abstention 
played a decisive role. 
Another influential factor in the campaign, and surely in the 
result, was the Catholic Church’s involvement. Despite some moderate 
voices, several bishops and priests used religious services and the media 
to address extremist messages against the liberalisation of abortion. That 
involvement converged with the active participation of the rightist parties 
in the campaign, aiming to second the Church efforts and to give the idea 
that the referendum was a religious matter. 
The fact that every poll on the referendum predicted a ‘yes’ 
victory could also have acted to demobilise voters. On the one hand, they 
had the PS divided between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, and the PCP struggling 
actively for the ‘yes’ but not very enthusiastic as for the referendum itself. 
On the other hand, they had the right sectors strongly committed, 
supported by the Catholic Church activism. The result was the disinterest 
of some sectors potentially in favour of the decriminalisation during the 
referendum day, which contributed to the tangential victory of the ‘no’ 
campaign, contradicting all opinion polls. 
The geography of the referendum shows that, besides the higher 
abstention in the regions with greater influence of the ‘yes’ parties, there 
was a clear victory of the ‘no’ in the seven northern districts (Aveiro, 
Braga, Bragança, Guarda, Viana do Castelo, Vila Real and Viseu) and in 
Madeira and The Azores Islands, with results higher than 67%. In the 
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Oporto district, the ‘no’ campaign won tangentially, while the ‘yes’ 
campaign won in the city and in the surrounding areas. In two districts of 
the central region (Castelo Branco and Leiria), the ‘no’ campaign won by 
a slight margin. The ‘yes’ campaign gained a narrow victory in two other 
districts of the central region (Coimbra and Santarém) and clearly won in 
Lisbon (with results over 67%) and in all south districts (Setúbal, 
Portalegre, Évora, Beja and Faro). 
Table 5 
Comparative Results of the 1998 Referendum and Parliamentary 
Elections224 
















Aveiro 44.0 32.3 45.4 54.0 67.7 52.2 
Beja 78.9 78.2 78.6 19.3 21.8 18.4 
Braga 48.8 22.7 51.8 48.9 77.3 45.9 
Bragança 43.7 26.3 43.8 54.2 73.8 53.8 
C. Branco 58.2 47.2 58.8 39.7 52.8 38.7 
Coimbra 55.9 52.9 55.9 41.5 47.1 41.6 
Évora 72.6 73.0 73.5 25.7 27.0 24.1 
Faro 59.5 69.6 60.1 37.5 30.4 36.8 
Guarda 47.3 29.9 48.2 49.9 70.1 49.0 
Leiria 42.8 48.3 44.7 54.7 51.7 52.2 
Lisboa 59.0 68.5 60.8 38.4 31.5 36.2 
Portalegre 67.5 67.7 68.7 29.7 32.3 28.8 
Porto 53.7 42.4 57.1 44.3 57.6 40.5 
Santarém 57.5 56.6 58.6 39.7 43.4 46.3 
Setúbal 71.8 81.9 73.2 26.0 18.1 24.1 
V. Castelo 44.5 26.2 47.1 53.7 73.8 50.3 
Vila Real 43.4 24.0 44.5 53.8 76.0 52.9 
Viseu 41.4 24.2 42.0 55.7 75.8 55.1 
Açores 40.5 17.2 56.4 57.1 82.8 41.3 
Madeira 37.6 24.0 39.1 59.0 76.0 57.1 
Total 
National 54.2 49.1 56.3 43.3 50.9 41.0 
 
                                                 
224 Parties voting ‘yes’ in 1995: PS, CDU (PCP/PEV), PCTP/MRPP, PSR and UDP. 
Parties voting ‘yes’ in 1999: PS, CDU (PCP/PEV), BE, PCTP/MRPP and POUS. Parties 
voting ‘no’ in 1995: PSD, CDS-PP and PPM/MPT. Parties voting ‘no’ in 1999: PSD, 
CDS-PP and PPM. 
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Seeking to determine the relation between the parties’ influence 
in the parliamentary elections immediately before and after the 
referendum and the referendum results, we drew Table 5. In nine districts 
in the north and the autonomous regions, the ‘yes’ result in 1998 was 
lower than the sum total of the ‘yes parties’ in the 1995 and 1999 
elections. In the three districts of Alentejo (Portalegre, Évora and Beja), 
the results were closer to the ones of the parties, but in the Lisbon area 
(Lisbon and Setúbal districts), Leiria and Faro the ‘yes’ result largely 
exceeded the result of its party’s supporters. The conclusions from these 
facts are merely tendencies, given the high rate of abstention. However, it 
seems clear that many PS voters in the north of the country decided to 
vote ‘no’, while mainly in the urban centres, but also in the Leiria and 
Faro districts, the number of PSD voters who voted ‘yes’ was significant. 
It also seems clear that the cultural influence of the Catholic Church was 
important in the northern districts and in the autonomous regions. 
Finally, it is possible to conclude that the citizen groups did not 
replace the political parties as the main mediators between the State and 
civil society. The Referendum Law gave an important role to the parties in 
the referendum campaign, but also, as Freire and Baum (2003a, p. 16) 
remark, the traditional political culture in Portugal overlapped the new 
democratic possibilities opened by the referendum. The faithful partisans 
were, after all, decisive in the voting, and when partisanship broke down, 
the voters decided to abstain.  
The 28 June 1998 referendum halted the legislative process on 
decriminalisation of abortion. Constitutionally, the referendum had no 
binding effect because more than 50% of the registered voters did not 
vote. However, that effect was politically recognised. The bill passed in 
Parliament to decriminalise abortion up to the 10th week of pregnancy was 
not discussed in detail and lapsed by the end of the legislature. 
3. Between Two Referendums: 1998-2007 
3.1. VIII Legislature: 1999-2001 
In the VIII Legislature, the PCP once again introduced its bill to 
decriminalise abortion on 17 November 1999 [Bill No. 9/VIII, DAR (II-A) 
5, 27 November 1999, pp. 53-55]. Meanwhile, the BE, now a constituted 
political party that obtained parliamentary representation in the October 
1999 elections, introduced a bill on the same subject on 10 January 2000 
[Bill No. 64/VIII, DAR (II-A) 14, 13 January 2000, pp. 265-267]. These 
initiatives were never discussed and lapsed on 4 April 2002 following the 
dissolution of Parliament. However, the issue of abortion did not 
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disappear from the media agenda or political discourse. On 18 October 
2001, 17 women were submitted to trial, at the Maia court, and charged 
with abortion in a lawsuit where 43 people were accused. The impact of 
this trial activated the debate on the need to change the criminal law.225 
3.2. IX Legislature (2002-2005): The Majority against the 
       Referendum 
During the IX Legislature, under a PSD/CDS-PP coalition 
Government, the issue of abortion returned to the political agenda. The 
first bill of that legislature, introduced by the PCP on 10 April 2002, 
tackled the abortion issue head on [Bill No. 1/IX, DAR (II-A) 4, 9 May 
2002, pp. 32-34], reviving the contents of previous bills from that party. 
Four years after a referendum without binding effect, the Assembly of the 
Republic had total legitimacy to change the criminal law without a 
referendum. The Penal Code, which punished abortion, remained 
unchanged. The criminal prosecution of women charged with abortion had 
followed. These facts were the reasons why the PCP decided to revive the 
initiative, proposing to decriminalise abortion, upon the woman’s request, 
within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. 
On 18 April, the PS introduced Draft Resolution No. 3/IX [DAR 
(II-A) 4, 9 May 2002, p. 63] on the accomplishment of Laws No. 6/84, of 
11 May, and No. 90/97, of 30 July, on backstreet abortion in Portugal, 
proposing that the Assembly of the Republic should commission a study 
by an external entity, namely a university, in order to assess as objectively 
as possible the situation in Portugal as to that subject. The discussion took 
place on 16 May 2002 and the draft was sent to the Work and Social 
Affairs Committee for detailed consideration before voting. There, the PS, 
the PSD and the CDS-PP arrived at an agreement that significantly 
extended the scope of the study.226 This text was passed as Resolution No. 
57/2002, of 17 October, with the only opposition of the PCP and the PEV 
which saw that Resolution as a way to delay the passing of legislation. 
The study, however, was never made. 
On 27 June 2002, the BE introduced its first bill on abortion 
proposing, like the PCP, the decriminalisation of abortion upon a 
woman’s request within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy [Bill No. 89/IX, 
DAR (II-A) 17, 29 June 2002, pp. 512-517]. On 4 December 2003, there 
was a new trial against seven women charged with abortion. 
                                                 
225 See parliamentary speeches by Francisco Louçã (BE), Helena Roseta (PS), Margarida 
Botelho (PCP) and Isabel Castro (PEV), [DAR (I) 14, 19 October 2001, pp. 466-468]. 
226 See the Committee’s Report [DAR (II-A) 30, 8 October 2002, pp. 931-517]. 
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In Parliament, the issue of abortion was again revivived at the 
beginning of 2004. The PS introduced the Bill No. 405/IX on 20 January 
[DAR (II-A) 31, 14 January 2004, pp. 1755-1757], which excluded 
illegality in certain cases of abortion, and Draft Resolution No. 203/IX 
[DAR (II-A) 31, 14 January 2004, p. 1760] proposing a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy. The 
PS introduced a bill on decriminalisation, but proposed at the same time 
that the solution be submitted to referendum. In their view, any change of 
law would depend on a referendum that overturned the decision of the 
voters taken in 1998, in spite of its non-binding effect and the recognition 
of the legitimacy of Parliament to change the law without referendum. 
On 30 January 2004, the PEV introduced Bill No. 409/IX [DAR 
(II-A) 33, 5 February 2004, pp. 1795-1797] essentially agreeing with the 
solution proposed by the PCP and the BE. On 11 February 2004, the 
Assembly of the Republic received the first popular initiative for 
referendum. 121,151 citizens used the power of initiative that the 
Constitution and the law gave them to propose, to the Assembly, a fresh 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion. The Constitutional 
Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties Committee unanimously 
considered that the initiative met the conditions to be admitted, and 
assumed, as laid down by law, the responsibility of drawing the respective 
draft resolution.227 The question was the following: ‘do you agree that an 
abortion carried out within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy with the 
woman’s consent in a legal health establishment should cease being 
considered a crime?’ 
On 17 February, the PSD and the CDS-PP, acting together, 
introduced Draft Resolution No. 225/IX [DAR (II-A) 37, 19 February 
2004, pp. 1926-1928] on preventive measures for abortion, including 
several recommendations for the Government in the areas of education, 
motherhood support, family planning, and the guarantee of law 
enforcement. On that same day, the BE introduced Draft Resolution No. 
227/IX [DAR (II-A) 37, 19 February 2004, p. 1929] proposing a 
referendum in the terms of the popular initiative that had already 
introduced. 
On 3 March 2004, the PCP used its right to schedule the order 
of business in the Assembly of the Republic, setting the discussion of its 
Bill No. 1/IX. As laid down by the Rules of Procedure, the Group holder 
of the initiative can allow the discussion of bills introduced by other 
                                                 
227 See Draft Resolution No. 230/IX [DAR (II-A) 41, 4 March 2004, pp. 2015-2020]. 
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parties for a common discussion. The PCP allowed the discussion of the 
bills and draft resolutions on the referendum proposed by the PS, the BE 
and the PEV. It did not allow the discussion of the PSD and the CDS-PP 
draft resolution since it thought that its subject was not the 
decriminalisation of abortion. However, the parliamentary majority forced 
a new interpretation of the Rules of Procedure, compelling the holder of 
the schedule to accept the discussion of other initiatives even against its 
will. Despite the PCP’s protest, and even without ruling grounds, the 
majority imposed itself and the PSD and CDS-PP draft resolution was 
also scheduled for 3 March 2004.228 
In the end, the PSD/CDS-PP majority rejected all the bills that 
proposed the decriminalisation of abortion and did not even allow the 
nominal voting proposed by the PS and the PCP [DAR (I) 58, 4 March 
2004, p. 3256]. The PCP, BE and PEV bills were rejected with nay votes 
from the PSD, the CDS-PP and nine PS members, abstention from three 
PS members and yea votes from the PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV. 
The PS bill was also rejected by the majority and four PS members, with 
abstentions from two PS members. The draft resolutions proposing 
referendums were also rejected by the negative votes from the PSD, the 
CDS-PP and three PS members. The PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV 
voted affirmatively on all of them. 
As we can see, the party positions towards the referendum 
changed from 1998. The PS and the BE supported the change of the law 
as long as it was preceded by a referendum, and they proposed that 
referendum because it actively supported the gathering of signatures for 
the popular initiative. The PCP and the PEV supported the change of the 
law without a referendum. However, once the parliamentary majority had 
rejected all the bills on decriminalisation, they voted in favour of the draft 
resolutions for referendum since that was the only way to change the law 
during that legislature. The PSD and the CDS-PP believed that the law 
must not be changed without referendum, but they voted against all the 
draft resolutions for referendum, finding them inopportune. 
In the PS strategy, the referendary option was heavier than 
decriminalisation. The party majority supported the decriminalisation of 
abortion, but they did not want to assume that responsibility without the 
legitimacy given by a new referendum. The BE, not even divided as to the 
decriminalisation, decided to bet on the referendum as a way to overcome 
it. The PCP and the PEV, who were against the referendum in 1998 since 
                                                 
228 See debate [DAR (I) 58, 4 March 2004, pp. 3204-3273]. 
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they believed that it had been called precisely to avoid decriminalisation, 
voted for it in 2004 because it would not be possible to decriminalise 
abortion through a parliamentary decision during that legislature because 
of the position of the majority. The PSD and the CDS-PP made their 
option against decriminalisation clear. They wanted the referendum in 
1998 to avoid decriminalisation, and they rejected it in 2004 with exactly 
the same purpose. In 2004, the right wing parties’ intentions were clear: 
neither a law nor a referendum was acceptable. 
Only the draft resolution by the PSD and the CDS-PP passed 
with both party votes, nay votes from the PS, the PCP, the BE and the 
PEV, and the abstention of 33 PS members. The decriminalisation of 
abortion was rejected and no proposal for referendum was passed.  
3.3. X Legislature (2005-2009): A Troubled Procedure 
   3.3.1. The First Attempt for Referendum 
On the very first day of parliamentary work, on 16 March 2005, 
the PCP, the PEV and the BE introduced their bills to decriminalise 
abortion once again.229 On that same day, the BE introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 7/X which proposed the referendum [DAR (II-A) 4, 2 
April 2005, p. 107]. On 22 March 2005, the PS introduced Bill No. 19/X 
on the exclusion of the illegality of certain cases of abortion [DAR (II-A) 
4, 2 April 2005, pp. 98-100] and Draft Resolution No. 9/X [DAR (II-A) 4, 
2 April 2005, pp. 109-110] which proposed a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy. On 
that same day, the independent MPs, Maria do Rosário Carneiro and 
Teresa Venda, who had been elected on the PS ticket but were members 
of a Christian movement named Humanism and Democracy, which was 
against decriminalisation, introduced Bill No. 20/X [DAR (II-A) 4, 2 April 
2005, p. 101]. It mandatorily stipulated the provisional suspension of the 
criminal proceedings on certain cases of abortion.230 
The initiatives of the PCP, the PEV, the BE and the PS, 
essentially revived the bills introduced by these parties and refused by the 
parliamentary majority in the previous legislature. The bill introduced by 
the Humanism and Democracy Movement reflected the disquiet of 
significant sectors of Portuguese society. Even those who declared 
                                                 
229 See Bills No. 1/X (PCP), No. 6/X (PEV) and No. 12/X (BE), in DAR (II-A) 4, 2 April 
2005, respectively pp. 3-5, 28-31 and 38-44. 
230 This bill was not included in the order of business with the others and was later 
removed for being considered useless. 
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themselves against the decriminalisation of abortion, and supported the 
criminal censure of its practice, sometimes felt uncomfortable with the 
practical consequences of that censure. In fact, the trials after the 1998 
referendum, in which were amplified by the media, specifically in the 
Maia and Aveiro Courts, proved that criminalisation was not innocuous, 
and that the women, even if found not guilty, which was never sure, were 
submitted to police prosecution and public humiliation during the trial. 
To sum up, according to the PCP and the PEV, the Assembly of 
the Republic should decriminalise abortion without a referendum, because 
it was not Constitutionally or politically required, and they introduced 
bills with that purpose. The PS and the BE supported the decriminalisation 
of abortion, but it should depend on a referendum to supersede the 1998 
result. They accepted that the referendum was not Constitutionally 
required, but they thought that a political decision taken by referendum 
should only be changed by another referendum. Maria do Rosário 
Carneiro and Teresa Venda considered that, with a new referendum in 
sight, the criminal proceedings against women accused of abortion should 
be provisionally suspended. 
The general debate was held on 20 April 2005, and the PS [DAR 
(I) 10, 21 April 2005, pp. 347-376] agreed to discuss the bills of the PCP, 
the PEV and the BE. The yea votes from the PS, the PCP, the BE, the 
PEV and four PSD members passed the PS bill in general terms. It had 
nay votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP and four PS members, and 
abstentions from one PS and one PSD members [DAR (I) 10, 21 April 
2005, p. 376]. The other bills were rejected.231 
The position of the PS, holder of an absolute majority, was 
decisive. Insofar as the option to pass the law after a referendum that 
legitimised it, the PS decided to pass only its bill, in order to make the 
question proposed in the referendum and the wording proposed in the law 
coincide, that is, the decriminalisation of abortion in the first 10 weeks of 
pregnancy. Thus, the PS voted against the PCP bill, rejecting it, and 
abstained in the BE bill, leading to its rejection by the right wing parties. 
The difference of attitude from the PS towards the BE and PCP bills is 
explained by the difference of opinions that these parties held towards the 
                                                 
231 The PCP bill had nay votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP, and abstentions 
from 10 PSD members. The PEV bill had nay votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-
PP, yea votes from the PCP, the BE and the PEV and abstentions from seven PSD 
members. The BE bill had nay votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP and four PS members, yea 
votes from the PCP, the BE and the PEV, and abstentions from the PS and seven PSD 
members [DAR (I) 10, 21 April 2005, p. 376]. 
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referendum. While the PCP refused the referendum and accused the PS of 
trying to escape from its responsibility to decriminalise abortion and 
passing it on to Parliament (Filipe, 2007), the BE proposed the referendum 
as well and accepted the PS proposal in that sense. 
The draft resolutions from the PS and the BE on the referendum 
were discussed on the same day, 20 April 2005 [DAR (I) 10, 21 April 
2005, pp. 377-396]. The BE withdrew its draft and the PS draft was 
passed with yea votes from the PS and the BE, nay votes from the PCP, 
the CDS-PP, the PEV, one from the PS and one from the PSD, and 
abstentions from the PSD and one PS member [DAR (I) 10, 21 April 
2005, p. 396]. 
The CDS-PP, taking into consideration that the PS bill, included 
a provision in which abortion could be decriminalised when it was 
appropriate to avoid the danger of death or serious and durable harm to 
the body, or physical and psychological health of the pregnant woman, 
including for economic and social reasons, within the first 16 weeks, 
thought that the question was not about abortion up to 10 weeks, but 
actually up to 16 weeks. Thus, it introduced an amendment to the PS draft, 
replacing the question for the following: ‘do you agree with the 
decriminalisation of abortion within the first 16 weeks of pregnancy, with 
the woman’s consent, in a legal health establishment?’ This CDS-PP 
proposal was undermined by the previous passing of the PS proposal, 
which led to the Resolution of the Assembly of the Republic No. 16-
A/2005, of 26 April. 
However, the President of the Republic, Jorge Sampaio, decided 
to use his power to refuse to hold the referendum. On 2 May 2005, he 
transmitted that decision with a message addressed to Parliament [DAR 
(II-A) 12, 7 May 2005, p. 2]. Taking into consideration the time limits in 
force, the proposed referendum would need to happen on a Sunday in 
July. For that reason, the President of the Republic thought that the 
minimum conditions for a significant participation did not exist. In his 
message, Jorge Sampaio reminded Parliament of the weak participation in 
the 1998 referendum. He was concerned that, if such a low turnout were 
repeated, it could fundamentally jeopardise the institution of the 
referendum itself. Therefore, the President’s refusal should not be seen as 
a political rejection of the proposal, but as an appeal to hold a referendum 
in better circumstances, encouraging a more active and participative 
citizenship.  
The reading of the presidential message on 5 May, gave rise to a 
brief debate in Parliament. The BE disagreed with the President, and 
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believed that the Assembly of the Republic should move forward with 
decriminalising abortion if no referendum was held in 2005.232 The PSD 
and the CDS-PP applauded the President’s decision.233 From the left, the 
PCP and the PEV welcomed the decision, and challenged the PS to 
reintroduce the legislative procedure in Parliament, given the 
impossibility of making a referendum during the first legislative session. 
If the PS insisted on the referendum, the decriminalisation of abortion 
would be delayed for a very long time.234 The PS understood the 
President’s worries, but reasserted again its compromise to have the 
referendum.235 
   3.3.2. The Change of the Legal Time Limits 
On 28 June 2005, the PS introduced Bill No. 122/X [DAR (II-A) 
31, 2 July 2005, pp. 8-10] to solve the problem of the time limits for the 
referendum and other electoral acts, with a view to calling a referendum 
on the decriminalisation of abortion. The PS proposed at this time to 
change the time limits regarding referendums. The Referendum Law 
(Organisational Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April) laid down in Article 35(2) 
that the referendum should happen between the 60th and the 90th day after 
the President of the Republic decreed on it. The bill proposed a new time 
limit that spanned between the 40th and the 180th days. 
In addition, the PS proposed to change some intermediate time 
limits established in the law: a) the time limit for parties, coalitions and 
citizen groups to declare their participation in the campaigns would be 
changed from the 15th to the 30th day before the referendum (Articles 40 
and 41); b) the time limit to fix the  polling stations would be changed 
from the 35th to the 30th day before the referendum (Article 77); c) the 
time limit to stipulate the location of the polling stations would be 
changed from the 25th to the 30th day before the referendum [Article 
79(1)]; d) the time limit to publicise the location of the polling stations  
would be changed from the 28th to the 23th day before the referendum 
[Article 79(2)]. 
                                                 
232 See speeches by Luís Fazenda and Francisco Louçã [DAR (I) 16, 5 May 2005, pp. 593 
and 596-598]. 
233 See speeches by Nuno Melo (CDS-PP) and Luís Marques Guedes (PSD), [DAR (I) 16, 
5 May 2005, pp. 593-594 and 595]. 
234 See speeches by Heloísa Apolónia and Francisco Madeira Lopes (PEV) and Bernardino 
Soares (PCP), [DAR (I) 16, 5 May 2005, pp. 592-593, 600-601 and 598-600]. 
235 See speech by Alberto Martins (PS), [DAR (I) 16, 5 May 2005, pp. 595-596]. 
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Some time limits laid down in the Electoral Registration Law 
(Law No. 13/99, of 22 March) would be changed, with the referendum 
being called with less than 55 days of antecedence. The Electoral Law to 
the President of the Republic would also be changed so that it could be 
scheduled with 60 days of antecedence, lowering the time limit from 80 
days.236 The idea was to hold a referendum in 2005, a race against time 
and the time limits. Given that no referendum could be called or held after 
elections for sovereignty organs had been called, it was necessary to 
shorten the time limits for holding referendums and for calling elections, 
keeping in mind that local elections were due to be held in October 2005. 
The first reading debate and the general voting of that bill 
happened on 8 July 2005 [DAR (I) 40, 9 July 2005, pp. 1762-1783]. The 
PS and the BE passed the bill, despite the votes against it from other 
parties. The opponents accused the PS of trying to condition the free 
decision of the President of the Republic, making him responsible for the 
eventual refusal of holding the referendum in 2005. Even if the President 
of the Republic and the Constitutional Court did not use up the time 
available to make their decisions and accepted to make them earlier, the 
referendum could hardly take place before 19 December; neither could it 
occur after 9 January, because the presidential elections would then need 
to be called. Therefore, the referendum could not be held in conditions 
would guarantee high levels of citizen participation.237 
The BE were in favour of the PS bill, and considered that a 
decision to decriminalise abortion without referendum could be an 
ephemeral and unsafe solution, susceptible to being overturned by another 
parliamentary majority. However, the BE declared that it would support 
the referendum only if it were held before the presidential elections. A 
second failed referendum should lead to the only acceptable alternative, 
which was through a legislative procedure in Parliament.238 
In the detailed debate, on 20 July 2005, the PS made some 
changes on the Referendum Law that were not in the initial text: a) Article 
8 allowed the introduction of referendum initiatives even after the calling 
of elections for the sovereignty organs, self-government bodies of the 
autonomous regions, local authorities and the European Parliament; b) 
Article 35(2) fixed a special time limit for calling referendums with the 
                                                 
236 See Executive-Law No. 319-A/76, of 3 May, article 11. 
237 See speeches by Vitalino Canas (PS) supporting the bill [DAR (I) 40, 9 July 2005, pp. 
1762-1764] and Luís Marques Guedes (PSD), António Filipe (PCP) and Pedro Mota 
Soares (CDS-PP) in the opposite sense [DAR (I) 40, 9 July 2005, pp. 1768-1776]. 
238 See speech by Fernando Rosas (BE), [DAR (I) 40, 9 July 2005, p. 1778-1779]. 
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participation of emigrants, which would be between the 55th and the 180th 
days. 
All provisions had the yea votes from the PS and the BE and nay 
votes from all other parties [DAR (II-A) 40, 30 July 2005, pp. 6-9]. The 
same happened in the final overall vote on 28 July [DAR (I) 42, 29 July 
2005, pp. 1917-1918]. Organisational Law No. 4/2005 was passed on 8 
September. 
   3.3.3. The Second Attempt for a Referendum 
At the beginning of the parliamentary sittings, on 15 September, 
the PS re-introduced the initiative for a referendum by introducing Bill 
No. 69/X [DAR (II-A) 50, 22 September 2005, pp. 22-23], thus creating a 
Constitutional problem. Article 115(10) of the Constitution specified that 
a draft referendum refused by the President of the Republic could not be 
resubmitted during the same legislative session, except when there had 
been new elections for the Assembly of the Republic. Article 171(1) laid 
down that ‘the legislature shall last for four legislative sessions’ and 
Article 171(2) laid down that in the event of the dissolution of the 
Assembly, the newly elected Assembly shall commence a new legislature, 
with the amount of time needed being extended to complete the period 
that corresponded to the legislative session that was in progress at the date 
of the election. 
This meant that the PS draft referendum should be accepted, 
since a new legislative session had begun on 15 September 2005. Based 
on Article 115(10) of the Constitution, the PS thought that the prohibition 
laid down in such a provision did not exist in the event of a new election 
of the Assembly of the Republic. The opposition parties, except for the 
BE, did not think that way. Based on Article 171, and given that the 2nd 
legislative session had began on 15 September, the legislature would not 
have four, but five legislative sessions. Obviously, the problem existed 
because there were elections on 20 February 2005 as a result of the 
dissolution of the Assembly. 
On 21 September 2005, the CDS-PP appealed against the 
admission of the PS draft resolution [DAR (I) 47, 22 September 2005, pp. 
2124-2125], but the appeal was rejected with the passing of an opinion 
drawn by Vitalino Canas on 22 September. The conclusion, with 
affirmative votes from the PS and the BE and negative votes from all the 
other parties, was that the legislative sessions lasted one year, and their 
beginning was always the 15th of September. The holding of elections 
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does not interrupt the ongoing legislative session. Therefore, on 15 
September 2005 a new legislative session had began and Draft Resolution 
No. 69/X could be introduced.239 
The draft resolution was discussed in plenary sittings on 28 
September 2005, and passed with the votes from the PS and the BE, with 
all the other parties and Teresa Venda, elected as an independent in the PS 
lists, having voted against it. Maria do Rosário Carneiro, also elected in 
the PS lists, abstained [DAR (I) 50, 29 September 2005, p. 2204]. This 
gave rise to the Resolution of the Assembly of the Republic No. 52-
A/2005, of 29 September, proposing a referendum to the President of the 
Republic, through which the registered voters in the national territory 
were called to decide on the following question: ‘do you agree with the 
decriminalisation of abortion, if the woman chooses to abort within the 
first 10 weeks in a legally authorised health establishment?’ Meanwhile, 
considering the position taken by the majority in Parliament, according to 
which a new legislative session had begun, the PCP introduced its bill on 
the decriminalisation of abortion once again [Bill No. 166/X, DAR (II-A) 
55, 13 October 2005, pp. 40-43]. 
After the resolution was submitted to a prior review, the 
Constitutional Court decided on 28 October, with Ruling No. 578/2005, 
that the first legislative session of the X Legislature would only finish on 
15 September 2006, according to Article 171 of the Constitution. The 
Assembly elected on 20 February 2005 had begun a new legislature 
whose duration was added to the time needed to finish the ongoing 
legislative session. Consequently, the Constitutional Court considered that 
the two resolutions regarding the referendum on abortion were passed in 
the same legislative session, despite the prohibition of Article 115(10) of 
the Constitution and 36(3) of the Referendum Law. The proposed 
referendum was judged unConstitutional and illegal240 and the President 
of the Republic sent it back to Parliament on 10 November 2005 [DAR (I) 
59, 10 November 2005, pp. 2664-2665].241 Given the Constitutional Court 
decision as to the beginning of the first legislative session, the PCP 
withdrew Bill No. 166/X [DAR (II-A) 62, 12 November 2005, p. 4]. It was 
necessary to wait for the second legislative session to see more 
developments. 
                                                 
239 See the opinion text [DAR (II-A) 51, 24 September 2005, pp. 6-8] and the debate in 
plenary session [DAR (I) 48, 23 September 2005, p. 2204]. 
240 The decision was taken by seven votes against six [DR (I) 220, 16 November 2005]. 
241 See the debate on the presidential message addressed to Parliament [DAR (I) 65, 9 
December 2005, pp. 3099-3108]. 
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3.4. The Referendum of 2007 
   3.4.1. The Procedure 
On the very first day of the second legislative session, on 15 
September 2006, the PCP introduced Bill No. 308/X [DAR (II-A) 2, 21 
September 2006, pp. 14-18] re-introducing the contents of its previous 
initiatives.242 The PEV introduced Bill No. 309/X [DAR (II-A) 2, 21 
September 2006, pp. 18-19]. The PS introduced Draft Resolution No. 
148/X [DAR (II-A) 2, 21 September 2006, p. 42] proposing again the 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion within the first 10 weeks. 
On 27 September the BE introduced Bill No. 317/X [DAR (II-A) 5, 6 
October 2006, pp. 13-19].243 
The debate and passing of Draft Resolution No. 148/X took 
place on 19 October 2006. The PS, the BE and the PSD voted yea. The 
PCP, the PEV, Matilde Sousa Franco (PS) and Pedro Quartin Graça 
(PSD) voted nay. The CDS-PP, two PS members and one PSD member, 
abstained [DAR (I) 14, 20 October 2006, pp. 6-28]. The question that 
passed was as follows: ‘do you agree with the decriminalisation of 
abortion, when a woman decides to abort within the first 10 weeks in a 
legally authorised health establishment?244 The CDS-PP introduced a draft 
replacement for the question, replacing the word ‘decriminalisation’ for 
‘liberalisation’ [DAR (II-A) 12, 28 October. 2006, p. 11]. 
It is important to highlight the evolution of the right wing 
parties’ thought, particularly the PSD, to become more favourable towards 
the referendum. This can be explained by several factors. Essentially, the 
PSD did not change its position regarding the referendum. The 
circumstances, however, had changed. In 1998, the PSD had been the first 
to support the referendum as a way to prevent the passing of a law that 
decriminalised abortion. In the IX Legislature, with a CDS-PP coalition 
and a majority able to prevent decriminalisation, the PSD opposed the 
referendum. In the X Legislature, there was a majority with a tendency 
towards decriminalisation, and the PSD had nothing to lose with the 
referendum. On the PS draft referendums, the PSD abstained on the first 
and voted against the second, not so much for being against the 
referendum, but given the weaknesses of the proposals regarding the 
                                                 
242 This bill expired on 22 November 2007 because the decriminalisation of abortion 
passed in the meanwhile. 
243 This bill expired on 3 October 2007 because the decriminalisation of abortion passed in 
the meanwhile. 
244 See the Assembly of the Republic Resolution No. 54-A/2006, of 20 October. 
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calendar, which eventually led to their failure. Once these obstacles were 
gone, the PSD put aside its opposition to the referendum. Meanwhile, the 
position of that party as to the main question had also changed. The PSD 
did not adopt an official position against the decriminalisation of abortion 
any longer, having recognised the freedom of vote of its militants in the 
referendum and of its members in Parliament. The CDS-PP moved 
towards abstention because since the parliamentary majority was in favour 
of decriminalisation, and the best hope of avoiding that outcome would a 
victory for the ‘no’ campaign in the referendum, as in 1998. 
On the left, the positions remained the same. The PCP and the 
PEV continued to oppose the referendum, thinking that Parliament should 
assume the responsibility of deciding on the decriminalisation. The BE 
supported the PS position on the referendum. This tactic caused problems 
for the BE, keeping in mind that there was some similarity between the BE 
and PS positions regarding the referendum, and the confusion that the 
latter party embroiled in the process. In fact, by accepting the idea 
supported by the PS that the decriminalisation of abortion should be 
decided by referendum, the BE became dependent on the socialist 
strategy. When the PS went forward with draft referendums that were 
clearly weak and always counted on the support of the BE, but delayed 
decriminalisation given the refusal of the referendums by the President of 
the Republic, the BE itself was targeted by the PCP critics, who thought 
the referendum was not essential for decriminalisation. For that reason, 
the BE position was accused of being hesitant and ambiguous, somewhere 
between full support for the referendum and the admission that, if the 
referendum was impossible, Parliament should change the law. 
In a prior review, the Constitutional Court judged the draft 
referendum as being Constitutional and legal with Ruling No. 617/2006, 
taken on 15 November.245 Consequently, the President of the Republic 
elected in the meantime, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, scheduled the referendum 
for 11 February 2007 (Decree No. 117-A/2006, of 30 November). 
All the parties represented in Parliament (the PS, the PSD, the 
PCP, the CDS-PP, the BE and the PEV) declared their intention to 
participate in the campaign to the National Election Commission (CNE). 
The Humanist Party (PH), the National Renovator Party (PNR), the 
Worker Party of Socialist Unity (POUS) and the Popular Monarchist Party 
(PPM), did the same. The number of citizen groups created to take part in 
                                                 
245 The decision was taken by seven votes against six. Some judges disagreed of the 
decision regarding essentially the requirements of objectivity, clearness and precision of 
the question and the conformity of the positive answer as to the Constitution. 
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the campaign was the highest ever. 19 groups were constituted, with five 
for the ‘yes’ campaign and fourteen for the ‘no’.246 Three parties fought 
for the answer ‘no’ (the CDS-PP, the PPM and the PNR) and six fought 
for the answer ‘yes’ (the BE, the PH, the PCP, the PEV, the POUS and 
the PS). The PSD did not take an official position. André Freire (2007, pp. 
108-109) stresses the great increase of civic mobilisation compared to 
1998, mainly in the ‘no’ field, with several movements linked to the 
Catholic Church. 
   3.4.2. Analysis of the Results 
Table 6 




Actual Voters Abstentions Blank ballot papers 
Null ballot 
papers 
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
8,814,016 3,840,176 43.57 4,973,840 56.43 48,094 1.25 25,884 0.67 
 
YES Votes  NO Votes  
Total % Total % 
2,231,529 59.25 1,534,669 40.75 
 
The first data to note is the inversion of the results in relation to 
the 1998 referendum. The substantial reduction of abstentions, by 11.7%, 
contributed decisively in that respect. There were 1,130,673 more voters 
than in 1998. The ‘yes’ campaign had 923,399 more votes than in 1998 (a 
relative increase of 10.1%) and the ‘no’ had 177,915 more votes (a 
relative decrease of 10.1%). The speculation after the 1998 referendum 
that the high abstention rate had decisively harmed the ‘yes’ option was 
proven entirely true in 2007. On the other hand, while in 1998 the ‘no’ 
campaign had won narrowly, by 1.89%, in 2007 the ‘yes’ won a decisive 
victory with an advantage of 18.16%. 
                                                 
246 Full list available at 
http://www.cne.pt/index.cfm?sec=0306000000&EleicaoID=49&Eleicao2ID=0 [accessed 
18 June 2011]. 
247 Results available at 
http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/index.cfm?dia=11&mes=02&ano=2007&eleicao=re1  
[accessed 18 June 2011]. 
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The results of the districts (Tables 7 and 8) revealed that the 
‘yes’ campaign, besides strengthening the districts where it had clearly 
won in 1998, also clearly won in the Coimbra and Santarém districts. In 
Castelo Branco, Leiria and Oporto districts, there was an inversion of the 
results, with the victory of ‘yes’. The ‘no’ campaign won again in the 
seven districts of the north, except in Oporto (Viana do Castelo, Braga, 
Vila Real, Bragança, Guarda, Viseu, Aveiro), and in the Autonomous 
Regions of The Azores and Madeira. 
Table 7 














Aveiro 57.7 44.6 55.4 Lisboa 51.3 71.5 28.5 
Beja 60.2 83.9 16.1 Portalegre 61.1 74.4 25.6 
Braga 53.6 41.2 58.8 Porto 55.1 54.4 45.6 
Bragança 65.6 40.8 59.2 Santarém 55.9 65.1 34.9 
C.Branco 59.4 61.6 38.4 Setúbal 51.5 82.0 18.0 
Coimbra 59.9 62.9 37.1 V. Castelo 60.4 40.4 59.6 
Évora 57.0 78.4 21.6 Vila Real 64.8 38.1 61.9 
Faro 61.2 73.6 26.4 Viseu 62.3 38.5 61.5 
Guarda 61.5 46.7 53.3 Açores 70.5 30.7 69.3 
Leiria 56.1 58.3 41.7 Madeira 61.4 34.6 65.4 
 
Table 8 compares the results of the 1998 and the 2007 
referendums in each district. 
In addition to the inversion of results in three districts, that 
inversion also became apparent in three district capitals (Aveiro, Guarda 
and Leiria) and in 37 municipalities. In 1998, the ‘no’ had won in 184 
municipalities and the ‘yes’ in 124. In 2007, the situation was the 
opposite: the ‘yes’ won in 161 municipalities and the ‘no’ in 147. 
Table 9 shows the relation between the abstention, the ‘yes’ vote 
and the ‘no’ vote in both referendums. This table shows that, despite the 
reduction of abstentions in all districts of the country, the reduction was 
more substantial in the districts where the ‘yes’ vote won and where the 
left parties are more influential, with reductions of over 14% in the eight 
southern districts. 
 





In the districts with the ‘no’ vote, the reduction of abstention 
was less significant, given that in 1998 there was a greater mobilisation of 
voters in these regions. However, the most significant increase of the ‘yes’ 
vote took place precisely in the strongest districts of the ‘no’, where the 
positions were inverted or the differences were significantly reduced, as in 
Oporto, Leiria and Castelo Branco.  
Table 8 
Comparative Results of the Referendums on Abortion, by Districts 
and Autonomous Regions 
 YES NO Abstentions 
 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 
 % % % % % % 
Aveiro 32.3 44.6 67.7 55.4 69.4 57.7 
Beja 78.2 83.9 21.8 16.1 77.0 60.2 
Braga 22.7 41.2 77.3 58.8 60.5 53.6 
Bragança 26.3 40.8 73.8 59.2 71.4 65.6 
Castelo Branco 47.2 61.6 52.8 38.4 71.2 59.4 
Coimbra 52.9 62.9 47.1 37.1 72.7 59.9 
Évora 73.0 78.4 27.0 21.6 73.3 57.0 
Faro 69.6 73.6 30.4 26.4 77.6 61.2 
Guarda 29.9 46.7 70.1 53.3 68.0 61.5 
Leiria 48.3 58.3 51.7 41.7 70.6 56.1 
Lisboa 68.5 71.5 31.5 28.5 65.7 51.3 
Portalegre 67.7 74.4 32.3 25.6 75.9 61.1 
Porto 42.4 54.4 57.6 45.6 66.6 55.1 
Santarém 56.6 65.1 43.4 34.9 70.2 55.9 
Setúbal 81.9 82.0 18.1 18.0 66.6 51.5 
Viana do Castelo 26.2 40.4 73.8 59.6 65.9 60.4 
Vila Real 24.0 38.1 76.0 61.9 68.7 64.8 
Viseu 24.2 38.5 75.8 61.5 69.6 62.3 
Açores 17.2 30.7 82.8 69.3 72.8 70.5 
Madeira 24.0 34.6 76.0 65.4 67.2 61.4 
Total National 49.1 59.2 50.9 40.8 68.1 56.4 
 
 



















Aveiro ▼ 11.7 ▲ 12.3 
▼ 





Beja ▼ 16.8 ▲ 5.7 
▼ 





Braga ▼ 6.9 ▲ 18.5 
▼ 





Bragança ▼ 5.8 ▲ 14.5 
▼ 





C.Branco ▼ 11.8 ▲ 14.4 
▼ 





Coimbra ▼ 12.8 ▲ 10.0 
▼ 





Évora ▼ 16.3 ▲ 5.4 
▼ 





Faro ▼ 16.4 ▲ 4.0 
▼ 





Guarda ▼ 6.5 ▲ 16.8 
▼ 





Leiria ▼ 14.5 ▲ 10.0 
▼ 











    
 
In Table 10, we make an extrapolation of tendencies between the 
vote in the 2007 referendum and the results of the previous legislative 
elections, which happened in February 2005. There are two new data for 
analysis: first, the fact that the PSD did not take an official position, 
recognising the freedom of vote of its militants, which is obviously 
important, in spite of the participation of the leader in the ‘no’ campaign. 
Second, there were the good results of the PS, which for the first time in 
its history won the absolute majority. What we see, however, is that in the 
districts south of Coimbra, except in Castelo Branco, the percentage of 
‘yes’ votes, is higher than the percentage of the parties that supported the 
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‘yes’ votes. In the north and in the islands, the percentage of ‘no’ votes is 
higher than the sum of the PSD and the CDS-PP votes. This means that in 
the north, many socialist voters voted ‘no’, and on contrary many rightist 
voters in the centre and in the south voted ‘yes’. The traditional influence 
of the Catholic Church in the north of the country remained powerful. 
Table 10 
Comparative Results of the 2007 Referendum and the 2005 
Parliamentary Elections248 
 % YES Parties 
2005 % YES 
% NO Parties 
2005 % NO 
Aveiro 50.6 44.6 45.6 55.4 
Beja 81.9 83.9 15.4 16.1 
Braga 56.0 41.2 40.8 58.8 
Bragança 47.5 40.8 48.9 59.2 
Castelo Branco 64.5 61.6 32.2 38.4 
Coimbra 58.3 62.9 37.5 37.1 
Évora 76.9 78.4 20.5 21.6 
Faro 65.3 73.6 30.6 26.4 
Guarda 54.2 46.7 42.0 53.3 
Leiria 46.8 58.3 48.9 41.7 
Lisboa 64.0 71.5 32.1 28.5 
Portalegre 72.7 74.4 24.6 25.6 
Porto 61.7 54.4 34.6 45.6 
Santarém 62.6 65.1 33.5 34.9 
Setúbal 75.5 82.0 21.4 18.0 
Viana do Castelo 51.4 40.4 45.1 59.6 
Vila Real 49.7 38.1 47.1 61.9 
Viseu 46.9 38.5 49.0 61.5 
Açores 58.2 30.7 38.5 69.3 
Madeira 44.1 34.6 51.8 65.4 
Total National 60.2 59.2 36.2 40.8 
 
André Freire (2007, pp. 97-122), in a work that analyses the 
connections between the referendum results, the religious practice and the 
partisanship vote, concludes that religious practice is strongly and 
positively correlated with the ‘no’ vote, and negatively and strongly 
correlated with the ‘yes’ vote. Regarding the partisanship vote, the author 
concludes that there were changes of intensity, but the general pattern of 
                                                 
248 Yes parties: PS, CDU (PCP/PEV), BE and PCTP/MRPP; No parties: PSD and CDS-
PP. 
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distribution of partisan votes remained unaltered. The greatest differences 
are connected to abstention. In 1998, the more religious zones were 
participated more actively, while in 2007 the contrary occurred. In 2007, 
abstention was higher in the PSD bastions. 
    
3.4.3. Comparative Analysis of the Referendums 
          on Abortion 
Several factors led to the change of results between 1998 and 
2007. The first factor was the real situation of clandestine abortion and the 
criminalisation of women. This situation did not change for the better 
between 1998 and 2007, and obtained more visibility in the meantime. 
The trials of women accused of abortion, in the Maia, Aveiro or Setúbal 
courts, were widely reported in the media, and demonstrated to the public 
that criminalisation was neither merely symbolic nor irrelevant. Even 
without condemnations, there were judicial inquests, charges, trials and 
humiliations that shocked public opinion, which even led some supporters 
of the ‘no’ campaign to separate themselves from the criminal 
consequences of the law that they supported to maintain. 
The second factor is the changing of the political and 
partisanship situation. Unlike the situation in 1998, the PS appeared as a 
united party that supported the ‘yes’ vote. While in 1998 the leader of the 
party and Prime Minister publicly supported the ‘no’ vote, which did not 
happen in 2007, isolating those who supported the ‘no’ vote inside the PS. 
On the other hand, the PSD did not assume an official position in favour 
of the ‘no’. Although the leader, Marques Mendes, publicly supported the 
‘no’, several MPs and outstanding militants assumed a defence of the 
‘yes’ vote, and were more intensively committed to the campaign than in 
1998. On the left, the PCP, despite its position against the referendum, 
was committed to the ‘yes’ campaign, just as in 1998, and the BE, which 
had consolidated itself as a party with significant parliamentary 
representation, also participated actively in the campaign. 
Finally, the complacenly that contributed to the defeat of the 
‘yes’ campaign in 1998 did not occur in 2007 for obvious reasons. 
Participation in the referendum increased and, consequently, the ‘yes’ 
votes increased as well. Although participation was still less than a half of 
the registered voters, and consequently the referendum was non-binding 
from the legal point of view, its political efficacy was entirely recognised. 
   3.4.4. Consequences of the Referendum 
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On 7 and 8 March the PS Bill No. 19/X was discussed in detail 
[DAR (II-A) 51, 8 March 2007, pp. 1-12]. Then, the PSD and the CDS-PP 
still tried to include in the law some schemes to make it difficult for the 
woman to freely choose to abort. On the 8 March plenary sittings, these 
proposals were rejected. At the final overall vote, Law No. 16/2007, of 17 
April was passed with yea votes from the PS, the PCP, the BE, the PEV 
and 21 PSD members, nay votes from the PSD, the CDS-PP and three PS 
members, and abstentions from three PSD members [DAR (I) 58, 9 March 
2007, pp. 42-44]. Law No. 16/2007, of 17 April, which excludes the 
illegality of some cases of abortion, changed Article 242 of the Penal 
Code in order to consider abortion not punishable when performed by a 
doctor, or under his direction in an officially recognised health 
establishment, and with the woman’s consent, when carried out within the 
first 10 weeks of pregnancy. 
4. In conclusion 
The decriminalisation of abortion will take its place in history as 
the most important issue of the Portuguese referendary experience. The 
subject gave the Portuguese political agenda moments of particular 
intensity, with passionate debates flaring up since the beginning of 1980s. 
From 1998 onwards, the issue of decriminalising abortion was always 
connected to the referendum. This, imposed initially by the PSD and later 
accepted by the PS, hindered the decriminalisation in 1998 due to the 
tangential and non-binding victory of the negative answer. In the IX 
Legislature, the referendum would come to be proposed by the PS, the BE 
and by a popular initiative, but was rejected by the PSD/CDS-PP 
majority. In the X Legislature, the PS, in which by then had a majority, 
sought to decriminalise abortion if the Portuguese citizens favoured this 
course of action in a referendum. Given several ups-and-downs, the 
referendum was only held on the third attempt. However, the 
decriminalisation of abortion was, in the event, decided through a 
referendum. 
The referendum on abortion was also an important test of this 
institution as it related to political parties, citizens and the Portuguese 
political system. The experience of the referendums on abortion 
demystified the referendum, showing that it was sometimes revered with 
an excessive importance as an instrument of expression of popular will. 
Indeed, the will of Portuguese citizens to express themselves through 
referendum was not confirmed by effective participation when the 
referendums were held. The participation of Portuguese citizens, 
particularly in the first referendum held in 1998, did not meet 
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expectations, and was lower than participation in elections for the 
representative bodies. Nonetheless, within the first 38 years of Portuguese 
democracy, the decriminalisation of abortion was the only case of optional 
referendum actually carried out. It gave rise to two referendums with 
different results, and produced real consequences at the level of politics, 
legislation and civilisation. 
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Chapter 5 
The Referendum on the Administrative Regions 
1. The Administrative Regions in the 1976 Constitution 
The democratic Constitution of 1976 enshrined the autonomy of 
local authorities as a fundamental principle. The territorial organisation of 
the State included a system of political and administrative autonomy for 
the island regions of The Azores and Madeira. It considered them as 
autonomous regions, holding self-government bodies with legislative 
powers. This reflected their geographic, economic, social and cultural 
characteristics, as well as the island populations’ historical aspirations for 
autonomy. 
In the mainland, however, where such conditions do not exist, 
the Constitution only foresees that local authorities can hold their own 
representative bodies, seeking to pursue the interests of local people, 
without any power to legislate (Article 237). For the mainland territory, 
the Constitution defined three categories of local authorities: the parishes 
(freguesias), the municipalities (municípios) and the administrative 
regions (regiões administrativas) (Article 238).249 
Title VIII on the organisation of political power, which is 
dedicated to local government, has a chapter on each of the local authority 
categories. Therefore, chapter IV was entirely dedicated to the 
administrative regions, establishing that the regions have the task of 
coordinating and supporting the municipalities’ action, and public service 
management, as well as take part in the making and execution of regional 
plans (Article 257). The representative bodies of the regions are: a) the 
regional assembly, which included members directly elected by the 
citizens, and a lower number of members indirectly elected by the 
municipal assemblies (Article 259); b) a regional junta, as the executive 
body, elected by the regional assembly through a secret ballot amongst 
their members (Article 260); c) a regional council, as an advisory body, 
representing the cultural, social, economic and professional organisations 
of the respective area (Article 261). In each region, the Government has a 
delegate appointed by the Council of Ministers (Article 262). 
                                                 
249 In the autonomous regions of The Azores and Madeira, the Constitution established 
only parishes and municipalities in order to avoid any overlapping between the 
autonomous regions and the administrative regions. 
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As for the regions’ institutional setup, a) the regions shall be 
instituted simultaneously, and the regional statute of each one can be 
different from the others; b) the regional areas shall be the same as the 
‘plan-regions’; c) the actual institution of each region shall depend on the 
passing in the majority of municipal assemblies, since they represent the 
greatest part of the population (Article 256).250 
The regionalisation process would have two different moments: 
the simultaneous creation of all regions by law in Parliament; and, after 
that, the municipal assemblies should pronounce themselves on the actual 
institution of their own regions. The regionalisation process would be 
implemented if approved by the majority of municipal assemblies, 
representing the majority of the population. This second phase did not 
demand simultaneity [Sá, 1989, p. 25; Canotilho & Moreira, 1993 (II) p. 
409]. 
Changing the parishes and municipalities that already existed in 
the local authorities was easy. The revolutionary power instituted on 25 
April 1974 ratified provisional structures for the election of local 
governments through popular meetings, which replaced the office-holders 
appointed by the dictatorship. That worked until the first election of 
democratic local government bodies, as provided by the Constitution, on 
12 December 1976. 
As to the administrative regions, they should be instituted as laid 
down in the Constitution. However, the process was more complex, since 
this went beyond creating new bodies based on territorial constituencies 
that already existed, like the municipalities or parishes. The administrative 
regions would be new structures, built on territorial bases that did not 
previously exist. They would be instituted by an unprecedented process of 
organic referendums in the municipal assemblies. The administrative 
regions would be local government structures occupying an intermediate 
level between the municipalities and the central public administration. 
However, they would be institutionally and territorially different from any 
previously existent intermediate structure. 
The territorial division inherited from the 19th century included 
an intermediate territorial division known as the district. These structures 
had an irregular existence, local government authorities in historical times 
of decentralisation and mere administrative subdivisions in times of 
centralization (Oliveira, 1993, pp. 48-55; Sá, 1989, pp. 65-68). When the 
                                                 
250 All these provisions were passed unanimously in the Constituent Assembly. On the 
administrative regional Constitutional system in 1976, see Sá (1989, pp. 21-24). 
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democratic revolution broke out, the districts were mere extensions of the 
central State, led by civil governors with the regime’s confidence, and 
with some functions of an administrative and security nature. The choice 
of the Constituent Assembly in 1976 was to provisionally keep the 
districts, while the administrative regions were not constituted. In each 
district, there would be a deliberative assembly composed by the 
municipalities’ representatives, and the civil governor would stay as the 
Government’s representative (Article 263). 
It is important to distinguish the administrative regions from the 
regional structures of planning, which were geographically removed from 
the central administration of the State. On 20 December 1967, Law No. 
2133 passed the bases of the organisation and execution of a so-called 
‘Foment Plan’ for 1968-1973, giving the responsibility to approve a plan 
for regional development to the Council of Ministers for Economic 
Affairs. The organisational structure to execute such a plan was defined in 
1969 with the creation of the plan-regions, through Executive Law No. 
48.905, of 11 March. In the mainland territory, four plan-regions were 
created (North, Centre, Lisbon and South),251 with regional advisory 
commissions whose presidents were appointed by the Government, with 
the other members being appointed by the districts. These commissions 
had a mere advisory role towards the governmental decisions on regional 
planning (Oliveira, 1996b, pp. 495-499). 
The 1976 Constitution, within the Title on economic planning, 
retained the idea of dividing the country into plan-regions (Article 95) in 
order to assure the balanced development of the country. It was up to the 
law to determine which regions would be created, and which bodies they 
should have. The administrative regions foreseen in the Title of the Local 
Government would be something different. They should have the same 
territory as the plan-regions, but they should be indeed local authorities at 
a regional level, with bodies legitimised through democratic elections. 
They should also replace the districts, and they should have specific 
responsibilities established by law. However, there was a long way to go 
before these would be introduced.    
2. The Troubled Process of Institution 
2.1. I Legislature: 1976-1980 
In the I Legislature, on 15 June 1977, the PCP took the first step 
for the institution of the administrative regions by introducing Bill No. 68 
                                                 
251 The Azores and Madeira also had plan-regions.  
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/I [DAR, 120, 16 June 1977, 7th Supplement, pp. 4130-(135-142)]. The 
PCP proposed the institution of eight administrative regions (Alentejo, 
Algarve, Beira, Estremadura e Vale do Tejo, Lisboa, Minho, Douro e 
Trás-os-Montes, and Porto). With 30 days of the publication of the law, 
the municipal assemblies should give their opinion on the proposed 
boundaries and the date of the regional assembly election. This election 
would take place on 2 April 1978 if the majority of the municipal 
assemblies did not oppose it. The PCP considered it fundamental to 
institute the administrative regions so that the political and institutional 
framework established in the Constitution would be complete. However, 
Parliament never discussed that bill. 
In January 1979, Sá Carneiro (1979, p. 161) proposed in his 
draft amendment to the Constitution, to change the Constitutional system 
to introduce the administrative regions. The organic or indirect 
referendum of the municipal assemblies should be replaced by a popular 
referendum of the registered citizens of each regional area. 
On 21 March 1979, the PS introduced Bill No. 226/I, [DAR (II) 
43, 22 March 1979, pp. 914-920] on the plan-regions and on the regional 
planning organisation. It was not on the institution of administrative 
regions, but on the division of the country into plan-regions as laid down 
in Article 95 of the Constitution. According to this article, the area of the 
administrative regions and of the plan-regions should be the same. 
Therefore, the PS proposed the division of the country into seven plan 
regions: (Norte Litoral, Norte Interior, Beira Litoral, Beira Interior, 
Estremadura e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and Algarve). The procedure 
regarding the establishment of local authorities at a regional level should 
be wisely considered. This bill was never discussed either. Meanwhile, the 
V Constitutional Government, led by Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and 
created to last a hundred days up to the elections of 2 December 1979, 
passed Executive Law No. 494/79, of 21 September, turning the Regional 
Planning Commissions into Regional Coordination Commissions. 
After the elections, the AD (PSD/CDS/PPM) Government drew 
the ‘Regionalisation White Book’. It was not a document that would serve 
as a base for the advancement of the regionalisation process, but a general 
reflection on the subject, with a view to the next elections, which were 
due in October 1980, as was Constitutionally demanded (Sá, 1989, pp. 75-
76). 
Still in the I Legislature, on 13 June 1980, the PS introduced its 
bill on plan-regions and regional planning organisation once again (Bill 
No. 505/I), [DAR (II) 71, 14 June 1980, pp. 1195-1201], proceeding with 
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Bill No. 506/I [DAR (II) 71, 14 June 1980, pp. 1202-1206] to create a pilot 
administrative region in the Algarve. They considered that this region had 
been defined for centuries, and had a strongly defined regional identity. 
For these reasons, it would provide the perfect conditions for a pilot study 
on regionalisation. This Bill was obviously unConstitutional because it did 
not respect the Constitutional rule that the administrative regions must be 
created simultaneously. However, it was not discussed in that legislature 
or the next one when it was introduced again (Bill No. 102/II), [DAR (II) 
17, 9 January 1981, pp. 299-304]. 
2.2. II Legislature: 1980-1983 
In the II Legislature, which commenced after the 5 October 1980 
elections with a new absolute majority for the AD, the Assembly of the 
Republic assumed Constitutional revision powers. On 25 April 1981, 
when the Government of Pinto Balsemão was already in office, the AD 
introduced its draft amendments to the Constitution, reviving the idea of a 
referendum for the institution of administrative regions as proposed by Sá 
Carneiro. It was the only draft that included changes regarding the 
administrative regions, and as to their institution it proposed the end of the 
organic referendum foreseen in Article 256. The actual institution of each 
region needed the approval of the registered citizens living in the regional 
area, but it did not require the audition of the municipal assemblies before 
the simultaneous creation of the administrative regions by law. The AD 
also proposed to remove the territorial correspondence between the plan-
regions and the future administrative regions. 
After a political crisis in the summer of 1981, the VIII 
Constitutional Government, led once again by Pinto Balsemão, promoted 
regionalisation of the mainland as one of its priorities. During the debate 
of its Programme before the Assembly of the Republic, on 14 September 
1981, the Prime Minister admitted an eventual referendum on the 
regionalisation process. The Government would send the legislative acts 
needed to start the regionalisation process to the Assembly of the 
Republic. As for the creation of the administrative regions in the 
mainland, the regional elections and popular participation at that level of 
power (particularly through referendums), these would all be topics of a 
deep reform of the institutions and of Portuguese democracy in the 1980s 
[DAR (I) 94, 15 September 1981, pp. 3944-3945]. 
On 29 October 1981, the Council of Ministers passed 
organisational measures that had the regionalisation process in view. 
Resolution No. 231/81, published on 16 November, created four structures 
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in the governmental range: a) there would be a working group chaired by 
the Secretary of State for Regional and Local Administration that would 
globally supervise the regionalisation process and propose political 
measures to the Council of Ministers; b) there would be a Supreme 
Council for Regionalisation Affairs, chaired by the Prime Minister or by 
the Home Minister under his delegation, composed by 12 to 15 members 
appointed by the Prime Minister; c) there would be Technical Staff for the 
Regionalisation, as a support unity of coordination and planning for the 
regionalisation process; d) there would be a Commission for 
Administrative Devolution. These structures should be created before the 
end of 1981. 
On 16 December 1981, the Council of Ministers passed 
Resolution No. 1/82 of 4 January, which defined and scheduled several 
phases of the regionalisation process in the mainland. What should happen 
from January to June 1982 included: a) the conclusion of the debate on 
the ‘White Book’; b) the consultation of the majority and opposition 
parties; c) the Government introduction of bills on several subjects 
regarding the statute and functioning of local authorities; d) the definition 
of the role of the districts up to the institution of the administrative 
regions; e) the study of the transfer of powers, services, and human, 
material and financial resources to the regions; f) the study of technical 
and administrative services to create support for the regional bodies; g) 
the development of actions to value regionalism and to increase the 
consciousness of the regionalisation process; h) the introduction of the 
Bill of Framework Law on the Administrative Regions to the Assembly of 
the Republic. 
What should happen between July and December 1982 included: 
a) the reconsideration of the regionalisation policy in light of the 
Constitutional revision; b) the schedule of transfer of powers, services and 
resources to the regions; c) the definition of the transfer of State and 
district property goods to the regions; d) the definition of the statute of 
civil governors as coordinators of the peripheral administration of the 
State; e) the introduction of a Government Bill including the regional 
division of the mainland territory. 
What was scheduled to happen between January and December 
1983 included:  a) the institution of each region through votes by the 
municipal assemblies or, eventually through regional referendums; b) the 
appointment of installation commissions for each region; c) the re-
examination of regionalisation policies in light of the agreement to join 
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the European Community; d) the publication of the legislation and 
complementary rules needed for the regionalisation. 
The following developments were scheduled for between 
January and October 1984: a) the election of the representative bodies of 
the regions and the installation of their holders; b) the extinction of the 
Regional Coordination Commissions; c) the extinction of the districts.  
Meanwhile, the Constitutional revision process was proceeding. 
The first reading of the AD proposals was held in a sub-committee on 16 
November 1981. The referendum proposal had opposition from the PS 
and the PCP. The ASDI and the UEDS reserved their position for a later 
moment [DAR (II) 19, 25 November 1981, 3rd Supplement, pp. 432-(63)]. 
In the CERC meeting, the PS and the PCP explained the reasons for their 
disagreement. Luís Nunes de Almeida (PS) considered that the 
replacement of the organic referendum of the municipal assemblies, which 
demanded a double majority (the majority of the municipalities 
representing the majority of the population) through a direct referendum, 
could lead to a regionalisation process against the will of the 
municipalities [DAR (II) 50, 6 February 1982, 1062-(34)].252 Amândio de 
Azevedo (PSD) recognised that the proposal seemed unviable, since it 
could not be sustained if other AD proposals regarding the referendum 
were not accepted [DAR (II) 50, 6 February 1982, 1062-(35)].  
The CERC proposal submitted to the plenary sitting passed 
unanimously on 21 July 1981. It laid down that the regions should be 
created simultaneously, after consulting the municipal assemblies, and 
that the law may lay down differences between the rules applicable to 
each one [DAR (I) 124, 22 July 1982, p. 5259]. The AD proposal to 
abolish the need for contiguous boundaries between the plan-regions and 
the future administrative regions did not have the required two-thirds 
majority. It only had 100 yea votes, from the PSD, the CDS and the PPM 
and 77 nay votes from the PS, the PCP, the ASDI, the UEDS, the 
MDP/CDE and the UDP. The PS proposal on the territorial coincidence 
between the administrative regions and the plan-regions passed with 
negatives votes only from the PPM. The AD proposal on the referendum 
was sent again to the Committee for appreciation, with the PCP being the 
only party that abstained [DAR (I) 124, 22 July 1982, p. 5259]. In the 
meeting of 29 July the CERC rejected the proposal [DAR (II) 134, 30 July 
1982, p. 2392]. 
                                                 
252 See also the speech by Vital Moreira on behalf of the PCP [DAR (II), 50, 6 February 
1982, pp. 1062-(36-37)]. 
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In the last plenary sitting for the detailed vote on the 
Constitutional revision, the PS proposal, introduced only a few days 
before, on 27 July, was considered. It had a new provision that allowed 
the exceptional creation of pilot regions in zones that would surely 
become administrative regions. That creation would depend on three 
cumulative conditions: a) the region should be a distinct territorial unit, 
historically speaking, b) its population should have its own social, cultural 
and economic identity, and c) its creation should reflect the historic and 
general will of the population. That proposal was defeated, with 104 yea 
votes (PS, PCP, PPM, UEDS, MDP/CDE and UDP), 80 nays (PSD, ASDI 
and 15 CDS) and the abstentions from the remaining CDS members [DAR 
(I) 132, 13 August 1982, p. 5562]. By the end of 1982, after a long 
political crisis, the Prime Minister resigned and the Assembly of the 
Republic was dissolved, without any concrete announcement as to the 
process of regionalisation. 
2.3. IV Legislature: 1985-1987 
Only on 22 April 1986, during the IV Legislature, with a 
minority Government in office led by Cavaco Silva, whose programme 
said nothing about regionalisation, the issue returned to the Assembly of 
the Republic with the introduction of Bill No. 187/IV by the PCP [DAR 
(II) 57, 26 April 1986, pp. 2022-2036]. After the introduction of the PCP 
bill, the Internal Affairs and Local Government Committee approved a 
schedule for the regionalisation, foreseeing the introduction of bills up to 
15 January 1987, and the opinions of municipal assemblies up to 15 
March. 
By the end of 1986, eight other initiatives were introduced: Bill 
No. 320/IV (PRD) on 12 December [DAR (II) 21, 17 December 1986, pp. 
886- 896]; Bill No. 330/IV (MDP/CDE) on 6 January 1987 [DAR (II) 27, 
9 January 1987, pp. 1291-1309]; Bill No. 334/IV (MP Gonçalo Ribeiro 
Teles) on 13 January [DAR (II) 30, 16 January 1987, pp. 1492-1506]; 
Bills No. 337/IV and 338/IV (PS), [DAR (II) 31, 17 January 1987, pp. 
1526-1533]; Bill No. 340/IV (CDS), [DAR (II) 31, 17 January 1987, pp. 
1534-1539] and Bill No. 341/IV (PSD), [DAR (II) 31, 17 January 1987, 
pp. 1539-1549], all on 15 January; and finally Bill No. 399/IV (PEV) on 
25 March 1987 [DAR (II) 59, 23 March 1987, pp. 2398-2411]. 
With its initiative, the PCP wanted to unblock the 
regionalisation process, which had been a problem since 1976 due to a 
lack of political will. According to the PCP, the difficulties that allegedly 
resulted from the Constitutional demand of simultaneity, the divergences 
on the regional division or different conceptions as to the nature and 
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responsibilities of the future regions were all false arguments used to as 
cover for the lack of will to move forward with the regionalisation 
process.253 
The PCP bill assumed the districts as a starting point. Then, the 
municipal assemblies should give their opinions within the time limit of 
90 days, taking one of the following positions: a) agreement with the 
proposed division; b) fusion with the contiguous regions; c) integration of 
their municipality into another region. After verifying the municipal 
assemblies’ opinions, the Assembly of the Republic should pass the laws 
instituting each one of the administrative regions. 
The PRD bill proposed nine regions (Entre Douro e Minho, 
Trás-os-Montes, Beira Litoral, Beira Interior, Estremadura, Ribatejo, 
Alto Alentejo, Baixo Alentejo and Algarve). The municipal assemblies 
should give their opinions within the time limit of 90 days and the 
Assembly of the Republic should then pass the laws instituting each one 
of the administrative regions. 
The MDP/CDE bill proposed 10 regions (Noroeste, Nordeste 
Transmontano, Beira Ocidental, Beira Interior, Centro Litoral, Alto 
Alentejo, Baixo Alentejo, Algarve, Zona Metropolitana do Porto and Zona 
Metropolitana de Lisboa). The hearing procedure of the municipal 
assemblies was the same as the one proposed by the PCP. 
The independent MP, Gonçalo Ribeiro Teles, proposed eight 
regions (Entre Douro e Minho, Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Litoral 
Atlântico, Beira Alta, Beira Interior, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and 
Algarve). The institution of each one would be dependent on the vote, 
with an absolute majority, by the municipal assemblies. The fusion of 
regions after their institution would demand a consultation of the voters in 
the regions that wanted it. This could be requested to the Constitutional 
Court by 5% of the voters of each of the municipalities in those regions. It 
is obvious that direct consultation was not Constitutionally allowed.  
The PS introduced a Bill of Basic Law for Regionalisation 
without any territorial division, characterising only the principles of the 
administrative regions. It simultaneously introduced a Bill of Framework 
Law for Administrative Devolution. 
                                                 
253 See in this sense the speech by João Amaral [DAR (I) 34, 23 January 1987, pp. 1342-
1342]. 
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The CDS did not propose any regional division either, leaving it 
for a future law by Parliament. Following the legislative initiatives 
regarding the regions would depend on the express agreement of at least 
two thirds of the municipal assemblies of each proposed region. The 
actual institution of each region would depend on the will of the 
respective population expressed through a binding referendum. This 
procedure was obviously not Constitutionally permitted.  
The PSD, in its Bill of Framework Law of Administrative 
Regions, did not introduce any regional division in the institution process. 
That bill only ruled on the decision procedure of the municipal assemblies 
as laid down in the Constitution. 
The final bill, presented by the PEV, proposed 11 regions 
(Minho, Porto, Trás-os-Montes, Beira Litoral, Oeste, Beira Interior, 
Ribatejo, Lisboa, Alto Alentejo, Baixo Alentejo and Algarve). The hearing 
process of the municipal assemblies was similar to the one proposed by 
the PCP. 
Seeing the contents of the initiative, we can see that the process 
would not be easy, not only because of the difference among the territorial 
divisions that was proposed, but essentially because of the abstention from 
the two main parties (the PS and the PSD) to introduce any real solution. 
They preferred to address it at a later and indeterminate moment. No party 
defined itself against the regionalisation, but having in mind the PS, PSD 
and CDS bills, it was clear that the process did not have any conditions to 
move forward during the IV Legislature. 
In a speech given on behalf of the PS on 8 January 1987, 
Eduardo Pereira referred to the difficulties of the process, which in his 
opinion would last many years to build and would go through three 
phases: the first included discussing the bases of the regionalisation; the 
second was to define the specific principles for creating the several 
regions; and the third, to institute each region. He even admitted that the 
regionalisation process could include a direct consultation of the citizens, 
in addition to a wide-ranging institutional and autarchic consultation. He 
finally announced that the PS, in the next Constitutional revision, would 
propose the removal of the Constitutional obstacles for to regionalisation 
[DAR (I) 28, 9 January 1987, pp. 1178-1180]. 
Meanwhile, the PS and the PSD obstructed the legislative 
procedure. On 22 January 1987, they decided to create an Ad Hoc 
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Parliamentary Committee for the Regionalisation,254 while several senior 
members of the PS, the PSD and the CDS declared that regionalisation 
was not a priority and postponed it for after the Constitutional revision, 
meaning after 1987.255 In the end, the fall of the PSD minority 
Government and the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic in April 
1987 ended the IV Legislature. 
2.4. V Legislature: 1987-1991  
   2.4.1. The Bills  
After the elections of 19 July 1987, which resulted in an 
absolute majority for the PSD, the PCP raised the issue of the 
regionalisation again, presenting the Draft Deliberation No. 3/V [DAR (II-
A) 10, 17 October 1987, pp. 108-109] on 15 October 1987. It proposed 
the creation of a new ad hoc committee for the regionalisation and the 
scheduling of the legislative procedure. The bills should be presented up 
to 15 November 1987 and the municipal assemblies should give their 
opinions between 1 January and 31 March 1988. On 27 October, this draft 
was discussed and rejected with nay votes from the PSD, the PS and the 
CDS, yea votes from the PCP, the PRD, the ID and the PEV and 
abstentions from three independent deputies elected by the PS [DAR (I) 
15, 28 October 1987, pp. 320-329]. 
Meanwhile, all parties reintroduced their bills on the 
regionalisation. On 15 October, the PS presented Bill No. 45/V 
(Framework Law for Regionalisation) and Bill No. 46/V (Framework Law 
for Administrative Devolution). On 22 October, the PRD presented Bill 
No. 60/V (Framework Law for the Administrative Regions). On 23 
October, the CDS presented Bill No. 69/V (Basic Law for 
Regionalisation). On 11 December, the PEV presented Bill No. 129/V 
(Framework Law for the Administrative Regions). On 15 December, the 
PCP presented Bill No. 130/V (Creation and Institution Process of the 
Administrative Regions) and Bill No. 134/V (Framework Law for the 
Administrative Regions). Almost five months later, on 6 May 1988, the 
                                                 
254 This Committee was created through the passing of Draft Resolution No. 33/IV 
introduced and passed with yea votes from the PSD, the PS, the PRD, the CDS and the 
MDP/CDE, but with the abstentions from the PCP, which remained sceptical on that 
process [DAR (I) 34, 23 January 1987, p. 1353].   
255 See Sá (1989, pp. 92-93) for those declarations with examples published by the press. 
Also see the speech by Eduardo Pereira and Hernâni Moutinho (CDS) supporting the 
reconsideration of regionalisation in the Constitutional revision, which was applauded by 
Duarte Lima (PSD), [DAR (I) 31, 16 January 1987, p. 1268]. 
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PSD presented Bill No. 240/V (Framework Law for the Administrative 
Regions), (DAR, Off-print 5/V, 23 June 1988). 
The PS bill proposed the creation of the regions by law, which 
would divide the respective territories, establish their powers and define 
the election system, as well as the organisation and responsibilities of their 
bodies. The bills would be sent to a parliamentary committee, which 
would prepare a hearing of the municipal assemblies, upon which the 
Government would organise a national public discussion. The whole 
process should be concluded within the time limit of 120 days. After that, 
the parliamentary committee would present a report, which would allow 
the approval of a provisional scheme for territorial division by the 
Assembly of the Republic. Then the assemblies of the municipalities near 
the frontier of each region could give their opinion on their inclusion in a 
neighbouring region within the time limit of 60 days. Finally, the 
Assembly of the Republic would pass the law to create the administrative 
regions. 
The next step would be the actual institution of the regions. The 
Government, within 30 days after the publication of the law to create the 
regions, should appoint a delegate for each region, to initiate the process. 
Each delegate should solicit the deliberations of the municipal assemblies 
on the institution of the region within the time limit of 60 days. In case of 
an affirmative vote from the majority of the municipal assemblies, the 
delegate should send a report to the Government within the next 15 days, 
which, in turn should send it to the Assembly of the Republic within the 
next eight days. After that, the Assembly of the Republic should pass the 
law instituting the region. In case there is no affirmative vote, the delegate 
should bring a new hearing process within the next month. If the negative 
position remained, the process could only be opened again if requested by 
the majority of the municipal assemblies or after new national elections in 
the municipal assemblies. The refusal of a region did not jeopardise the 
others. 
The PRD maintained the regional division and the institution 
process it had proposed in the last legislature. The CDS insisted on its 
proposal for binding referendums in each region before proceeding with 
implementation. The PEV also essentially re-submitted its previous 
proposal. The PSD bill did not include any regional division. The 
Framework Law of the Administrative Regions ruled only on the formal 
terms of the consultation in the municipal assemblies in order to institute 
each region after the approval of the law to create the regions by 
Parliament. The PCP presented two bills re-introducing the same 
The Referendum on the Administrative Regions  381 
 
solutions as Bill No. 187/IV. Bill No. 130/V dealt with the process of 
instituting the administrative regions and Bill No. 134/V of Framework 
Law for the Administrative Regions, defined the statute of the regions, as 
well as the composition, form of election, powers and responsibilities of 
the respective bodies. 
The general debate of the bills happened, with a PS initiative, on 
17 May 1988. A request subscribed by all parliamentary groups was 
passed.  It sent the bills to the Local Government Parliamentary 
Committee without being voted. The Committee, within the next month, 
should proceed to the hearing on the topic of the municipal assemblies. 
That hearing should be concluded by November 1988, and the Committee 
should then present a report to the plenary up to the end of the year [DAR 
(I) 89, 18 May 1988, pp. 3597-3630]. 
   2.4.2. The 1989 Constitutional Revision 
The Constitutional revision process elapsed simultaneously with 
the introduction of draft amendments between October and November 
1987. From the 10 drafts introduced, eight proposed amendments to 
Articles 256 on the institution of regions, in the following terms: 
On the creation of the regions – The CDS proposed that the 
law should define which municipalities should take part of each region, 
require the previous agreement of at least two thirds of them, and define 
the areas with reference to the geographic, natural, social, historical and 
cultural nature of the territory, taking into consideration its balanced 
development and the needs and interests of the population. The PCP, the 
PS, the independent Helena Roseta, the ID, the PEV and the PRD 
proposed the end to the legal obligation to create the regions 
simultaneously. The PCP proposed that the law defined the powers of the 
regions, as well as the responsibilities of their bodies and their financial 
regime. The PS proposed that the powers of the regions, as well as the 
composition, responsibilities and working of their bodies were defined by 
law. The PRD proposed that the creation, organisation and working 
system of the regions should be defined by law. 
On the actual institution of the regions - The CDS proposed 
that the actual institution of each region be approved by a binding 
referendum from the citizens living in the respective regional area. The 
PCP proposed that the institution of each region could not be refused if 
the majority of the municipal assemblies representing the majority of the 
population had given their opinion in favour of the proposed regional area. 
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On other subjects – The CDS, the PCP, the PSD and the PRD 
proposed the end of correspondence between the administrative regions 
and the plan-regions. The PCP proposed to establish, in the Constitution, 
an obligation for the Assembly of the Republic to approve the general 
system of mainland regions within 90 days of the Constitutional revision 
coming into force. The PS proposed the same obligation, but with a time 
limit of one year. 
The debate on these proposals took place in the first reading of 
the CERC during the session of 27 July 1988 [DAR (II) 54 − RC, 2 
November 1988, pp. 1676-1688] and the second reading was on 16 
February 1989 [DAR (II) 93 − RC, 28 April 1989, pp. 2704-2719]. In this 
session, the proposals were submitted to indicate the voting, with a 
PS/PSD joint proposal being passed in favour of Article 256. According to 
that Article, the administrative regions would be created simultaneously, 
and by law. It also defined the respective powers, composition, 
responsibilities and working of their bodies, being able to establish 
differences as to the applicability of the regime for each one (No. 1). The 
institution of each administrative region, which would be made by law, 
would depend on that law and on the affirmative vote of the majority of 
the municipal assemblies representing the most part of the population of 
the regional area (No. 2).256 The removal of the territorial correspondence 
between the administrative regions and the plan-regions was unanimously 
approved. 
The rest of the proposals were rejected. The CDS proposals, 
including the referendum for the institution of the regions, received nay 
votes from the PSD, the PS and the PCP. The PCP proposals received nay 
votes from the PSD257 and abstentions from the PS. Helena Roseta’s 
proposal to remove the demand of simultaneity for the creation of the 
regions received nay votes from the PS and the PSD and yea votes from 
the PCP. The proposals from the PRD, the PEV and the ID received yea 
votes from the PCP and nay votes from the PS and the PSD. 
The plenary sitting of 30 May 1989 ratified the proposals passed 
in the CERC. No. 1, with yea votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS and 
nay votes from the PCP, the PRD, the PEV, the ID and Mendes Bota 
(PSD). No. 2 only had abstentions from the PEV and Mendes Bota. The 
proposals from the PCP, the PRD, the PEV, the ID and Helena Roseta 
                                                 
256 In the CERC, only the PCP voted against No. 1 and abstained in No. 2. 
257 The PSD abstained in the proposal that prohibited the refusal of the institution of a 
region that had obtained the favourable vote of the majority of the municipal assemblies 
that were consulted. 
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were rejected by the PS, the PSD and the CDS, having had yea votes from 
the rest of the parties. The proposals to settle a time limit for the approval 
of the law to create the regions were also rejected, with nay votes from the 
PSD, yea votes from the rest of the parties and abstentions from four PSD 
members elected in the Madeira region. In the meanwhile, a proposal 
introduced by the PS members elected by the Algarve constituency was 
rejected. It would have allowed the Assembly of the Republic to approve 
the creation of pilot regions before the law was passed to create the 
regions in general, as long as it had a two-thirds majority and obtained the 
approval of the municipal assemblies in the terms provided for in the 
Constitution. This last proposal had nay votes from the PSD, yea votes 
from the PS, the PCP, the PRD, the PEV, the ID and six PSD members, 
and abstentions from the CDS and two PSD members. 
The 1989 Constitutional revision did not contain any significant 
innovations as to the regionalisation, not even removing the demand for 
the simultaneous creation of the regions, which had been considered 
before as an obstacle to the advance of the process. It is true that the PS 
and the PSD dissociated themselves from the settling of a time limit for 
the regionalisation and the possibility of creating pilot regions. It is also 
true that the fundamental contents of the Constitutional revision were the 
result of an agreement between both parties, and the PS accepted it 
knowing that its proposals were not accepted by the PSD. 
   2.4.3. The Framework Law for the Administrative Regions 
On the same day that the Constitutional revision was concluded, 
30 May 1989, the general debate of Bills No. 45/V (PS), 60/V (PRD), 
69/V (CDS), 129/V (PEV) and 134/V (PCP) on regionalisation took place, 
and they were approved. The PCP and the PS forced the subject onto the 
order of business. This occurred five months after the time limit 
established for the introduction of a report on the consultation of 
municipal assemblies in the plenary by the Committee. The announcement 
of a new debate on the regionalisation by the Government, and the 
imposition of a new time limit for the Committee of the end of 1989, gave 
rise to the imposition of the debate by the opposition parties. Until then, 
171 municipal assemblies (out of 305), representing 80% of the country’s 
entire population, had expressed their opinion, and only in two cases was 
that opinion against the creation of the administrative regions. The PSD 
decided not include its bill in the order of business, but decided to vote for 
the others, which were unanimously approved in general [DAR (I) 89, 31 
May 1989, pp. 4377-4397]. 
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After the conclusion of the 1989 Constitutional revision, and the 
passage of five bills on regionalisation, the PCP wanted to revive the 
process presenting, on 23 January 1990, Draft Decision No. 71/V which 
scheduled the parliamentary work to make the Framework Law for the 
Administrative Regions. The PCP proposed to set 30 March 1990 as the 
time limit for the conclusion of the works by the Parliamentary 
Committee and the month of April for the final overall vote in plenary 
[DAR (II-A) 15, 27 January 1990, pp. 686-687]. 
At the end of the time limit proposed, without any discussion on 
the decision of the draft, the PCP insisted on the introduction of Draft 
Decision No. 107/V, which established a new schedule for the conclusion 
of the approval process for the law to create the administrative regions at 
the beginning of the next legislative session, on 3 October 1990 [DAR (II-
A) 68, 4 October 1990, pp. 1838-1839]. On 19 October, the PS introduced 
Draft Decision No. 111/V on the methodology and schedule for 
regionalisation [DAR (II-A) 5, 26 October 1990, p. 86]. 
According to the PCP proposal, the framework law for the 
regions should be passed by January 1991 and the matter regarding 
territorial limits by the end of April. The PS proposed that the detailed 
voting on the hanging framework law bills be finished up to 20 December 
1990 in a committee, so that the respective text could be analysed and 
voted in a plenary sitting during January 1991. Before the end of April, 
the law to create the administrative regions would be passed, so that the 
municipal assemblies could give their opinions, allowing the process to be 
concluded up to the end of the V Legislature. Both drafts, which 
essentially converged on the time limits, were submitted to debate on 9 
November 1990 [DAR (I) 10, 10 November 1990, pp. 275-282] and 
rejected on 28 November, with nay votes from the PSD and the approval 
from all the other parties [DAR (I) 18, 29 November 1990, p. 610]. 
On 3 December 1990, the PSD Government introduced a 
Government Bill of Framework Law for the Administrative Regions in 
order to institute the regions, but hardly anything went forward. Besides 
reproducing the Constitutional terms, it established the formal terms of the 
hearing of the municipal assemblies, just as the PSD had previously 
proposed [DAR (II-A) 12, 3 December 1990, pp. 223-231]. 
On 28 February 1991, the PCP introduced Draft Decision, No. 
129/V. It proposed the Constitution of an ad hoc committee for the 
regionalisation, to prepare the voting of the Framework Law for the 
Regionalisation up to 15 May 1991. The time limit was 30 May for the 
final overall vote, so within that legislature, which would end in July 
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1991, they could begin the phase of the territorial division of the regions 
[DAR (II-A) 31, 9 Mar. 1991, p. 895]. 
On 11 April 1991, the Government Bill of Framework Law for 
the Administrative Regions was debated and passed in general, with only 
abstentions from the PCP and José Magalhães, who had become an 
independent MP in the meantime [DAR (I) 62, 12 April 1991, pp. 2052-
2076].  The PS and the PCP introduced a motion, so that the responsible 
parliamentary committee would proceed, within 20 days, with the detailed 
discussion on the bills for the Framework Law of the Administrative 
Regions, which was unanimously passed. On 6 June 1991, the first phase 
of the procedure was concluded, with the unanimous approval of Law No. 
56/91, of 13 August [DAR (I) 89, 7 June 1991, pp. 2964-2966]. The 
Government bill was accepted in its entirety, and became law.  
According to the law of the Assembly of the Republic, the 
regions should be created simultaneously. It should also institute each 
region, with the laws of institution being dependent on the law of creation 
and the affirmative vote of the majority of the municipal assemblies, since 
they represent the majority of the population of the area included in the 
region. The Assembly of the Republic should promote the consultation of 
the municipal assemblies. The decisions regarding the municipal 
assemblies should be taken in extraordinary public sessions, exclusively 
summoned for that purpose, and with a minimum notice period of 30 
days. The decisions should be communicated to the Assembly of the 
Republic within 30 days. If no decision was reached in the region, the 
Assembly of the Republic should promote a fresh consultation one year 
later. After that, a new consultation process could only be opened after 
general elections for the local authority bodies. A few days before the 
elections, the first phase finished, but there was still a long way to go 
before the regionalisation of Portugal moved from an aspiration in the 
Constitution to reality. 
2.5. VI Legislature: 1991-1995 
At the very beginning of the VI Legislature, after the October 
1991 elections, which gave a new absolute majority to the PSD of Cavaco 
Silva, the PS and the PCP again revived the process of creating 
administrative regions. On 30 January 1992, the PS presented Bill No. 
67/VI for the creation of the administrative regions [DAR (II-A) 16 − 
Supplement, 1 February 1992, pp. 312-(3-14)] and Draft Decision No. 
18/VI, which proposed a schedule for the process [DAR (II-A) 16 − 
Supplement, 1 February 1992, pp. 312-(46)]. The following month, on 25 
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February, the PCP presented Bill No. 91/VI on the process for the 
creation and institution of the administrative regions [DAR (II-A) 20, 29 
February 1992, pp. 272-274] and Draft Decision No. 19/VI to define a 
schedule for the regionalisation [DAR (II-A) 20, 29 February 1992, pp. 
402-403]. 
The PS bill proposed the creation of eight administrative 
regions: Entre Douro e Minho, Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Beira 
litoral, Beira Interior, Estremadura e Ribatejo, Alto Alentejo, Baixo 
Alentejo and Algarve. The institutionalisation process would depend on 
the affirmative vote of the municipal assemblies. Draft Decision No. 
18/VI proposed the approval of the law to have the administrative regions 
created by the Assembly of the Republic before March 1992, and the final 
overall vote before 15 June. The adjustments made following the 
consultations should be concluded before 15 June 1993. 
The PCP re-introduced its proposal from the previous 
legislatures. It assumed the division of the districts as a starting point, and 
allowed the municipal assemblies to give their opinions, showing their 
adhesion to the division proposed, proposing the fusion between 
contiguous regions, or proposing the integration of their municipality 
inside other contiguous regions within 90 days after the publication of the 
law. The proposed schedule foresaw the discussion of the bills to create 
the regions in March 1992, the final overall vote by15 June, and the 
hearing process for the municipal assemblies before 31 December. The 
draft decisions regarding the schedule were discussed on 17 March 1992. 
They were inserted in a debate on several bills regarding local authorities 
[DAR (I) 41, 18 March 1992] and were rejected in 26 March with 
opposition from the PSD and abstentions from the CDS and the PSN 
[DAR (I) 44, 27 March 1992, p. 1371]. 
On 17 December 1992, the UDP deputy, Mário Tomé, elected as 
an independent in the PCP lists, introduced Draft Decision No. 42/VI 
[DAR (II-A) 14, 9 January 1993, p. 265], which called for a referendum 
by the President of the Republic on the administrative regionalisation. The 
proponent did not want to ask to the Portuguese if they agreed with the 
regionalisation, because that was already established from the 
Constitutional point of view. The subject of the proposed referendum 
would be the schedule. Frustrated the attempts of the PS and the PCP to 
pass a schedule for regionalisation, the UDP proposed to ask the 
Portuguese people, through a referendum, if they agreed that the regions 
be created up to the end of 1994. The Assembly did not discuss that draft 
decision. 
The Referendum on the Administrative Regions  387 
 
On 14 January 1993, the PS set in the order of business the 
general debate of its bill to create the administrative regions and Draft 
Decision No. 52/VI for the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee for the 
Administrative Devolution [DAR (I) 15, 16 January 1993, p. 280] 
introduced a few days before. The debate also included the PCP bills on 
the creation and institution of the administrative regions and on the 
finances and powers of the regions [DAR (I) 29, 15 January 1993, pp. 
1028-1063]. All bills were rejected, with nay votes from the PSD and the 
CDS, an abstention from Freitas do Amaral258 and yea votes from the rest 
of the parties. The draft decision was rejected with nay votes only from 
the PSD, with all of the other parties having voted yea.  
On 2 March 1993 the PSD presented Draft Resolution No. 53/VI 
[DAR (II-A) 23, 6 March 1993, pp. 463-464] to create a Committee for the 
Reform of Town and Country Planning, which was discussed on 12 May 
[DAR (I) 69, 13 May 1993, pp. 2210-2222] and passed with abstentions 
only from the PCP and the ID [DAR (I) 71, 14 May 1993, p. 2256]. This 
resulted in the Assembly of the Republic Resolution No. 16/93, of 3 June. 
That Committee was entrusted to introduce a preliminary report and a 
proposal on the next phase of the reform preparatory works within one 
year. 
On 9 February 1994, the PCP introduced Draft Resolution No. 
87/VI [DAR (II-A) 23, 12 February 1994, pp. 361-362], proposing a new 
schedule for the regionalisation. The discussion of the bills to create the 
administrative regions should be in April 1994, with the respective final 
overall vote happening up to 15 June. The municipal assemblies should 
give their opinions during that time for the detailed discussion. The 
hearing for the actual institution of the regions should happen up to 31 
December 1994. This bill was never discussed. On the same day, the PCP 
introduced Bill No. 379/VI [DAR (II-A) 23, 12 February 1994, pp. 355-
356] on the process to create and institute the administrative regions, 
except for other initiatives on the finances and powers of the 
administrative regions which were not discussed. The PCP kept the 
division of the districts as a starting point. 
Between July and September 1994, the draft amendments 
regarding the IV Constitutional Revision, failed in that legislature for lack 
of agreement between the PS and the PSD, including some proposals 
regarding the creation of the administrative regions. The Constitutional 
                                                 
258 Freitas do Amaral returned to the CDS leadership to dispute the 1991 elections, having 
left it before the electoral results and taking upon the parliamentary seat as an independent 
MP for a short period. 
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revision failed, but there was also no progress on the regionalisation 
process in that legislature. After the approval of the Framework Law for 
the Administrative Regions on the eve of the 1991 elections, the process 
ground to a halt. The PSD, which had an absolute majority, postponed the 
process in the V Legislature, saying that it was in favour of a more 
reflective and wise process. However, they refused to carry it through in 
the VI Legislature, assuming a position against the regionalisation, in 
accordance with the positions repeatedly advocated by the Prime Minister 
Cavaco Silva. 
2.6. VII Legislature: 1995-1999 
After the 1 October 1995 elections, which gave a relative 
majority to the PS, the PCP introduced Draft Decision No. 2/VII [DAR 
(II-A) 2, 8 November 1995, p. 26], on 7 November, proposing the 
adoption of a new schedule for the regionalisation in order to ‘break the 
blockade’ that obstructed this crucial reform. That draft proposed the 
introduction of bills on the creation of the administrative regions up to 15 
December 1995, and their submission to public consultation up to 30 
March 1996. The debate, and vote on the law, should occur before the end 
of June and the municipal assemblies should give their opinions up to 30 
November. In the case of an affirmative response, the law for the 
institution of the region should be published up to 31 December 1996. 
On 15 December 1995, the PCP introduced Bills No. 49/VII, 50 
/VII and 51/VII [DAR (II-A) 11, 21 December 1995, pp. 207-213] on the 
powers, the finances of the regions, and the transfer of services and 
property from the central administration to the administrative regions. 
They also introduced Bill No. 94/VII [DAR (II-A) 24, 17 February 1996, 
pp. 374-376] on the creation and institution process of the administrative 
regions on 7 February 1996. In this last bill, the PCP re-submitted the 
institution building process introduced in the previous legislatures, but 
changed the geographical division to be based on nine regions: Minho; 
Porto e Douro Litoral; Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro; Beira Litoral; Beira 
Interior; Alta Estremadura, Oeste e Ribatejo; Região Metropolitana de 
Lisboa e da Península de Setúbal; Alentejo; Algarve. 
On 11 April 1996, the PS introduced its bills. Bill No. 136/VII 
proposed changes to the Framework Law of the Administrative Regions 
and Bill No. 137/VII [DAR (II-A) 34, 13 April 1996, pp. 602-613] 
proposed the creation of nine administrative regions: Entre Douro e 
Minho; Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro; Beira Litoral; Beira Interior; 
Estremadura e Ribatejo; Lisboa e Setúbal; Alto Alentejo; Baixo Alentejo; 
Algarve. Both the PS and the PCP proposed the creation of nine regions 
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as a starting point, but with differences: while the PCP divided the North 
into two regions (Minho, with Braga and Viana do Castelo districts and 
Porto e Douro Litoral with the Oporto district), the PS proposed a single 
region including the three districts. As for the Alentejo, the PCP proposed 
a single region while the PS proposed two regions (Alto Alentejo and 
Baixo Alentejo). 
The PS retained the hearing procedure for the municipal 
assemblies foreseen in the Constitution and the Framework Law, but in 
the preamble of Bill No. 136/VII it said that it was able to welcome the 
way of popular consultation if admitted in time in the Constitution. The 
PS also presented Draft Decision No. 10/VII [DAR (II-A) 34, 13 April 
1996, p. 619] in order to assure the fit transparency and participation in 
the legislative procedure regarding the mainland regionalisation, through 
the hearing of the national association’s representatives of local 
authorities. 
On 23 April 1996, the PEV introduced Bills No. 143/VII and 
144/VII [DAR (II-A) 37, 27 April 1996, pp. 650-656] on the creation and 
institution process of the administrative regions and their respective 
powers. The PEV also proposed the creation of nine regions, adhering to 
the solution of geographic division proposed by the PCP. 
The discussion of the bills and draft decisions on the 
regionalisation was set for 2 May 1996 [DAR (I) 65, 3 May 1996, pp. 
2077-2134]. The PSD tried to delay the debate and the legislative 
procedure, giving priority to the Constitutional revision in order to reach 
its goal of making the institution of the administrative regions depend on 
the holding of a referendum. In the PSD Congress, held in Santa Maria da 
Feira in the end of March 1996, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa elected the 
Constitutional revision as a priority and threatened to boycott the 
regionalisation process if the Constitutional revision that imposed the 
referendum on the administrative regions was not concluded before. 
Given the need for an agreement between the PS and the PSD for the 
Constitutional revision to proceed, that speech was a true ultimatum 
addressed to the PS, making the Constitutional revision itself dependent 
on the PS acceptance of the referendum in the regions (Sousa, 1999, p. 
13). 
Thus, the PSD presented, on 26 April, Draft Decision No. 
11/VII [DAR (II-A) 37, 27 April 1996, pp. 657-658] proposing the 
suspension of the debate on the regionalisation, and giving priority to the 
Constitutional revision in order to institute the national referendum as a 
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previous condition for the regionalisation. The debate was held on 2 May, 
with the general appreciation of the bills and draft decisions introduced by 
the PS, the PCP and the PEV on the administrative regions. The PS, as 
holder of the order of business, demanded the voting of the initiatives. 
The PSD and the CDS-PP refused to take part in the voting as a 
way of protesting that their proposal, to suspend the legislative procedure 
until a decision on the referendum had been reached in the Constitutional 
revision, had been rejected. Thus, the parliamentary groups of the PSD 
and the CDS-PP left the room before the voting, with only the 
parliamentary leader of the CDS-PP, Jorge Ferreira staying in his place.  
The bills were approved in general, with yea votes from the PS, 
the PCP and the PEV, and with only one nay vote from Jorge Ferreira. 
Draft Decision No. 10/VII (PS) on the following of the legislative 
procedure was also approved. The PCP gave up on its Draft Decision No. 
2/VII, having introduced amendments to the PS draft. The proposal that 
let the Assembly of the Republic, during the time of public debate on the 
approved bills, promote the hearing of experts and debates on television 
about the subject of regionalisation was also approved. The PS rejected 
the schedule proposed by the PCP. The PCP proposed the final overall 
vote of the law to create the administrative regions up to 16 October 1996, 
the hearing of the municipal assemblies up to the end of 1996, and in the 
case of an affirmative result, the publication of the law to institute the 
regions up to 31 January 1997. The PS did not accept that schedule, and 
for that reason, the PCP abstained in the final vote on the decision, which 
was published on 9 May. 
Under the terms of Decision No. 12-PL/96, the public 
consultation should happen within the time limit of 90 days after the 
general approval of the law to create the administrative regions [DAR (II-
A) 40, 9 May 1996, p. 40]. This happened indeed, having the respective 
results and the opinion drawn by the Parliamentary Committee of Local 
Authorities being put in a report dated 11 March 1997 (AR, 1997). 
3. The Referendum on the Administrative Regions 
3.1. The 1997 Constitutional Revision 
The draft amendments to the Constitution were in the meanwhile 
introduced with several positions as to the regionalisation.259 The CDS-PP 
                                                 
259 All the draft amendments to the Constitution are published in the DAR, Off-print No. 
6/VII, 8 April 1996. 
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(Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 1/VII), proposed the complete 
removal of the regionalisation chapter (Articles 255 to 262) retaking the 
proposal that the regionalisation of the mainland territory be submitted to 
the previous referendum held under the terms of Article 118 of the 
Constitution. The PS  (Draft Amendment to the the Constitution No. 
3/VII), proposed that the institution of each administrative region be 
submitted to the previous referendum of registered citizens in the 
respective area. The draft from the independent MP elected by the PS 
(Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 8/VII) proposed to remove the 
demand that the administrative regions should be introduced 
simultaneously, and admitted that their institution could be submitted to a 
previous direct consultation of the registered citizens in the included areas 
of the regions under the terms to establish by law. The drafts introduced 
by PSD members included three different solutions: the draft from the 
members elected by the constituency of Madeira (Draft Amendment to the 
Constitution No. 6/VII) proposed a Constitutional transitory rule so that 
the regionalisation process in the mainland would be concluded up to the 
end of 1996; the draft of JSD members (Draft Amendment to the 
Constitution No. 2/VII) proposed the same solution as the PS draft; the 
official draft of the PSD (Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 
5/VII), proposed the end of regionalisation as a Constitutional command. 
According to the PSD draft, the law could foresee ways for the 
administrative regionalisation of the mainland, starting with the 
municipalities and their associations or federations. The law should define 
the territory of each region and its powers, such as the composition, 
responsibilities and working of their bodies. That law should be submitted 
to a national referendum and should be enacted only if voted affirmatively 
by more than half of the registered citizens. After that, the law should 
decide on the actual institution of each region and each law of institution 
should be submitted to referendum for the registered citizens of each 
region, and it could only be enacted if voted affirmatively by more than 
half of the registered citizens. Therefore, the PSD proposed a double 
referendum: one of national scope for the law to create the regions; and 
one of regional scope for each one of the regions. Furthermore, they 
proposed a deliberative quorum that was particularly hard to please, 
involving not only the participation of more than half of the citizens in the 
referendum, but also the affirmative vote of more than half of those 
citizens. In practice, the abstentions would be counted as negative votes. 
Given the lack of response to Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa’s 
ultimatum, the Constitutional revision works began without the PSD 
members, who followed a successful strategy that lead the PS to yield to 
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it. In the second CERC session, on 13 May 1996, Jorge Lacão, on behalf 
of the PS, assumed the acceptance of the referendum on the creation of the 
regions and advanced with the questions that the PS would propose as 
soon the law for the creation of the regions was passed and the holding of 
a referendum was admitted by the Constitution. 
The referendum would have two questions: ‘first – do you agree 
with the institution of the administrative regions? Second – do you agree 
with the region created in your area of electoral registration?’  Under these 
terms, the institution of the regions would only proceed if there were an 
affirmative answer to the first question, and the institution of each region 
would depend on the affirmative answer to the second question [DAR (II) 
2 − RC, 14 May 1996, p. 17]. 
The CDS-PP welcomed the PS position, which had been the 
subject of talks between them. In spite of having decided to assume a 
position against the regionalisation, after an internal referendum, the CDS-
PP supported the referendum with the obvious purpose of preventing the 
creation of the administrative regions. As a way of protest against what 
they considered an abusive manipulation of the CERC for a ‘press 
conference’, the PCP and PEV members left the room. In the next session, 
on 17 May, all the parliamentary groups were present, and the PSD 
obtained another goal: to begin discussing the referendum on the 
regionalisation. 
In the 21 May session, the PS introduced its proposal for a 
referendum on the regionalisation in the following terms: a) the law of 
institution for each region would depend on the law that created the 
regions, and the affirmative vote of the majority of the citizens registered 
in the national territory, and in each regional area that took part in a direct 
consultation; b) when the majority of the participants in the referendum 
did not State that they were in favour of the question at a national scope, 
the affirmative answers to the question of a regional scope could only be 
effective after the holding of a new referendum; c) the consultations 
would take place under the terms and conditions laid down by 
organisational law, by the decision of the President of the Republic, 
through a proposal by the Assembly of the Republic, which would be 
applicable, with the due adaptations, to the regime established in Article 
118 of the Constitution; d) The referendums would be binding when they 
had the participation of at least half of the registered voters, without 
damaging, in the case of no institution of the administrative regions, the 
efficacy of the affirmative answers regarding the questions at a regional 
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scope, that could be submitted by law to a time limit of caducity [DAR (II) 
4 − RC, 22 May 1996, p. 52]. 
In the 4 June session, the PSD introduced a counterproposal in 
the following terms: the institution of the administrative regions, which 
would be done by law, would depend on the holding of a national 
referendum on the law that would create the regions, and on the 
affirmative vote of the majority of the registered citizens in each of the 
respective regional areas through a regional referendum. The regional 
referendums would depend on the affirmative result of the national 
referendum and would be held after them within a time limit established 
by law [DAR (II) 7 − RC, 5 June 1996, p. 106]. 
The PSD proposed that the law creating the regions, as well as 
the institution of each one, would be submitted to referendums. The PS 
proposed that only the institution be submitted to referendum. However, 
according to the PS proposal, the referendum on the institution would 
have two questions, being one of a national scope and the other of a 
regional scope. The PSD proposed two referendums at two different 
moments. However, in the session of 12 June, Marques Guedes (PSD) 
announced that, bearing in mind the receptivity of the PS towards the 
proposal of referendum, and with the holding of the referendum being the 
essential question, the PSD gave up its proposal and accepted the second 
PS proposal [DAR (II) 8 − RC, 13 June 1996, p. 120]. 
The second reading and vote of the proposals happened on 2 
July [DAR (II) 13 − RC, 13 July 1996, pp. 234-244]. The CDS-PP 
proposal to remove the chapter on regionalisation was rejected, with 
affirmative votes only from the proponent party and negative votes from 
all the other parties. The proposal from the independent deputies of the PS 
was also rejected. Its intention was to remove the demand for the 
simultaneous creation of the regions, and it received nay votes from the 
PSD, the CDS-PP, the PEV and Vital Moreira. The PS and the PCP 
abstained believing that the question would be surpassed with the 
approval of the law to create the regions. Thus, Article 255 of the 
Constitution, on the creation of the regions, did not change. 
As for Article 256, it only subsisted for voting the PS’s proposal, 
with all the rest being withdrawn or invalidated. No. 1, according to which 
the institution of the administrative regions, and the approval of the law of 
institution for each one, depended on the law of creation, and on the 
affirmative vote expressed by the majority of registered voters in each 
regional area of the national territory who took part in the direct 
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consultation, had yea votes from the PS and the CDS-PP and nay votes 
from the other parties. The PSD voted nay because it disagreed with the 
reference to the registered citizens in the national territory, arguing that 
emigrants should vote on the question regarding national scope. The CDS-
PP thought the same but, in spite of that, voted in favour of the PS 
proposal. 
The next items had nay votes from the PCP and the PEV and 
yea votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP. It was approved that, 
when the majority of the voters in the referendum did not respond 
affirmatively to the question of national scope on institution of the 
administrative regions, the answers regarding each region created by law 
should not produce any effect. The citizens would be consulted in the 
conditions and terms laid down by organisational law, through a decision 
by the President of the Republic, under a proposal by the Assembly of the 
Republic, which would be applicable, with the due adaptations, to what 
was established in Article 118. The last item of the PS proposal, on the 
eventual caducity of the affirmative answers to the questions of regional 
scope, in case the national question was refused, was also withdrawn.  
On 12 October 1996, the PS introduced Draft Decision No. 
24/VII, proposing the extension to 60 days for the term established by 
Decision No. 12-PL, regarding public consultation on the bills for the 
regionalisation. This draft was discussed on 16 October [DAR (I) 1, 17 
October 1996, pp. 39-45] and passed on 17 October with yea votes from 
the PS, abstentions from the PSD and nay votes from the CDS-PP, the 
PCP and the PEV [DAR (I) 2, 18 October 1996, p. 89]. It was published 
on 19 October as No. 23-PL/1996. 
The Constitutional revision proceeded up to the end of July 
1997. In the 30 July plenary sitting, the proposal by CERC regarding 
Article 256 of the Constitution had yea votes from the PS, the PSD and 
the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP and the PEV [DAR (I) 104, 31 
July 1997, pp. 3937-3952, and 4016]. The text that passed is as follows: 
1. The institution of the administrative regions by means of the 
individual laws instituting each one shall depend on the law 
provided for in the previous article,260 and on the casting of 
an affirmative vote by the majority of the registered voters 
who cast their votes in a direct national ballot covering each 
of the regional areas. 
                                                 
260 It is the law that creates the administrative regions. 
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2. In the event that the majority of the registered voters who 
cast their votes did not respond affirmatively to the question 
on a national scope regarding the institution of the 
administrative regions, the answers to such questions as may 
be put in relation to each region that is created by law shall 
not take effect. 
3. The consultation of registered voters provided for in the 
previous paragraphs shall take place in accordance with the 
provisions of an organisational law and by decision of the 
President of the Republic, upon a proposal from the 
Assembly of the Republic. The system derived from Article 
115 shall be applied mutatis mutandis. 
 
Jorge Miranda and Rui Medeiros [2007 (III) p. 537] highlight 
the main aspects of the Constitutional system that was instituted: a) the 
holding of the referendum is obligatory in the sense that, without its 
holding, it is not possible to institute the regions; b) the initiative is 
exclusive to the Assembly of the Republic, but it can receive proposals 
from the Government or citizens; c) the President of the Republic must 
call the referendum because it is a Constitutional institution; d) the 
binding effect of the referendum does not depend on the votes of more 
than half of the registered citizens, but on the affirmative votes of the 
majority of voters who took part in the referendum; e) in the event of a 
negative result, Parliament cannot decide on the subject, but can only 
propose that a fresh referendum be called. 
As for the relation between the questions at the national and 
regional level, the same authors referred that a) the popular decision at a 
national scope prevails the decision at a local scope; b) in the event of an 
affirmative answer of national scope, the map of regions is approved; c) in 
the event of a positive national answer and a negative answer on the 
question regarding the regional scope, another regional referendum will be 
held so that the administrative region can be created [Miranda & 
Medeiros, 2007 (III) p. 538]. 
3.2. The Conclusion of the Legislative Procedure 
On 9 October 1997, the text drawn up by the Local Authorities 
Committee (on the creation of the administrative regions in the sequence 
of the approval of the PS, PCP and PEV bills) was submitted to the 
plenary of the Assembly of the Republic for detailed discussion and final 
overall voting. The proposal that was passed divided the territory into 
eight administrative regions: Entre Douro e Minho; Trás-os-Montes e Alto 
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Douro; Beira Litoral; Beira Interior; Estremadura e Ribatejo; Lisboa e 
Setúbal; Alentejo; Algarve. It represented a compromise between the PS 
and the PCP. The PS accepted the Alentejo as a single region, and the 
PCP accepted the Entre Douro e Minho, including Oporto, Braga and 
Viana do Castelo districts, as a single region. A provision, proposed 
jointly by the PS, the PCP and the PEV was also included. It Stated that 
after the direct consultation in the terms of Article 256 of the Constitution, 
the instituted boundaries of the administrative regions could be 
Constitutionally changed through an organisational law by the Assembly 
of the Republic, which would ensure that the procedure included hearing 
the views of the municipal assemblies and the regional assemblies of the 
regions involved. Nonetheless, these changes should always respect the 
principle of territorial contiguity [DAR (I) 2, 10 October 1997, pp. 48-81]. 
In the final overall voting, the law creating the administrative regions was 
approved with yea votes from the PS, the PCP, the PEV and Mendes Bota 
(PSD). The nay votes came from the PSD and the CDS-PP, with the 
abstentions from three PSD members elected in the Algarve.261 
3.3. The Special System of the Referendum 
       on Regionalisation 
In October 1997, the legislative procedure to change the 
Organisational Law of the Referendum began, including a special part 
regarding the referendum on the administrative regions, given its 
Constitutional specificity. Government Bill No. 145/VII [DAR (II-A) 3, 17 
October 1997, pp. 30-58] introduced on 9 October 1997, included a 
specific chapter on that subject, since it was the only case of an obligatory 
referendum in Constitutional terms. The subject of that referendum would 
be the institution of the administrative regions, including two questions, 
one of a national scope and another regarding each regional area. In the 
autonomous regions, the referendum would only have the question of a 
national scope. The right to vote would be given to Portuguese citizens 
who resided in the national territory. They would be allowed to vote on 
the national scope, and in the regional area in which they were registered, 
according to the geographic division established in the law for the creation 
of the administrative regions.  
In the case of a negative answer regarding the question of a 
national scope, the answers on the regional question would not produce 
any effect. If the answer regarding the national scope was affirmative and 
the answer on the regional question was negative in a region, this would 
                                                 
261 António Vairinhos, Cabrita Neto and Macário Correia. 
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not be instituted until a new referendum, restricted to that region, had an 
affirmative answer. In the case of an affirmative answer, the referendum 
would be binding only if the number of voters was more than half of the 
registered citizens. 
On 15 October, the PSD introduced Bill No. 420/VII [DAR (II-
A) 4, 18 October 1997, pp. 67-68) which was specifically about the 
referendum on regionalisation. The PSD proposed a two-stage 
referendum, with the regional referendums taking place 14 days after the 
national one, if the majority of voters had responded affirmatively. In this 
case it would have a binding effect. The referendum of a national scope 
should also allow Portuguese citizens living abroad to take part. In the 
case of affirmative answers, the law to institute each region should be 
approved within 60 days. The PSD bill included the questions all at once. 
The national question would be: ‘do you agree with the institution of the 
administrative regions, as they are enshrined by law?’ The question at a 
regional scope would be: ‘do you agree with the institution of the 
administrative region as enshrined by law for your area of residence?’262 
On 6 November, the PCP introduced Bill No. 428/VII [DAR (II-
A) 11, 15 November 1997, pp. 210-211]. According to the bill, in the 
event of an affirmative answer in the consultations at both national and 
regional scopes, the laws of institution for the regions should be passed 
within 90 days. 
The general debate on the initiatives took place on 20 November 
1997 [DAR (I) 16, 21 November 1997, pp. 614-638] and the voting on the 
27th. The Government bill passed with yea votes from the PS, nay votes 
from the PCP and the PEV and abstentions from the PSD and the CDS-
PP. The PSD bill was rejected, with yea votes from the PSD, nay votes 
from the PS, the PCP and the PEV and abstentions from the CDS-PP. The 
PCP bill passed with yea votes from the PCP and the PEV, nay votes 
from the CDS-PP and abstentions from the PS and the PSD [DAR (I) 19, 
                                                 
262 In the dispatch of the admission of the bill, the President of the Assembly of the 
Republic, Almeida Santos, Stated the difficulty to join in the same legislative initiative 
matters which should be the subject of organisational law and matters which should be the 
subject of a resolution, because the respective system of Constitutional review should be 
different. He also raised objections as to the Constitutionality of the participation of 
emigrants [DAR (II-A) 4, 18 October 1997, p. 68). In the report made for the 
Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties Committee on these legislative 
initiatives, Barbosa de Melo referred to the objections, recognising that the inclusion of 
matters that should be the subject of a resolution into a bill was technically less blissful 
and considering that the inclusion of emigrants in the electoral universe was a question of 
reasoning [DAR (II-A) 13, 24 November 1997, p. 248]. 
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28 November 1997, p. 711]. However, the law to create the administrative 
regions would suffer one more setback. Both the President of the Republic 
and 54 PSD deputies requested the prior review of its Constitutionality by 
the Constitutional Court, which pronounced on it in Ruling No. 709/97 on 
10 December 1997 [DR (I-A) 20 January 1998]. 
The Constitutional Court declared the law unConstitutional on 
two points. First, it laid down that the law of institution for the regions 
could establish different legal systems for each one of them. The Court 
held that such diversity could only be established by the law that created 
the administrative regions, since only an organisational law could be 
submitted to referendum. Second, it considered any change of the 
territorial division of the regions to be unConstitutional after the 
referendum. Given that the territorial division of the regions is 
mandatorily submitted to referendum, its subsequent change could only be 
made after a new referendum, which would give it legitimacy.263 
Consequently, the President of the Republic vetoed the law and 
his decision was announced to the Assembly of the Republic on 17 
December [DAR (II-A) 18, 19 December 1997, p. 334]. The deletion of 
the unConstitutional provisions took place in the plenary sittings of 26 
March 1998 [DAR (I) 53, 27 March 1998, pp. 1798-1806 and 1808]. On 
28 April 1998 Law No. 19/98, on the Creation of the Administrative 
Regions, was published. The referendum on their institution could finally 
move forward.264 
Meanwhile, on 4 March there was a detailed discussion and the 
final overall vote for the Organisational Law of the Referendum, which 
had yea votes from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP and nay votes from 
the PCP and the PEV [DAR (I) 44, 5 March 1998, pp. 1470-1492]. The 
provisions for Law No. 15-A/98, of 3 April, regarding the referendum on 
the regions followed directly from the Government bill. The approved 
legal framework was essentially the following: 
1) The referendum has a mandatory nature (Article 245), by 
Constitutional command, being the only case of an 
obligatory referendum in Portuguese law.265 
                                                 
263 The Constitutional Court decision was taken by seven votes against five. 
264 On 4 February, the leader of the PSD Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (1999, p. 95) suggested 
the holding of the referendum on abortion before the summer and the referendums on the 
regions and Europe after the summer. This became true regarding the abortion and the 
regions. 
265 On the meaning of that obligation, see Miranda & Medeiros [2007 (III) p. 537]. 
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2) The subject of the referendum is the institution of the 
administrative regions (Article 246) as laid down by the 
Framework Law for the Administrative Regions (Law No. 
56/91, of 3 August) and by the Law for the Creation of the 
Administrative Regions (Law No. 19/98, of 28 April). 
3) The referendary initiative belongs to the President of the 
Republic through a proposal by the Assembly of the 
Republic (Article 247). 
4) The Constitutional Court proceeds with the prior review of 
the Constitutionality and legality of the referendum, 
including requirements on the electoral universe (Article 
248). 
5) The referendum has two questions, one of a national scope 
and another regarding each regional area. The questions are 
the same in the entire national territory and there is a single 
ballot paper. Outside of the regional areas in question 
(which was the case of the Autonomous Regions of The 
Azores and Madeira), the referendum only has the question 
of national scope (Article 249). 
6) As for the question regarding each region, only registered 
citizens in each region can take part (Article 250). 
7) The approval of laws for the institution of each region 
depends on the affirmative vote of the majority of citizens 
who take part in the referendum [Article 251(1)]. 
8) In the event of an affirmative answer, the referendum only 
has binding effect if the number of votes cast is more than 
50% of the registered citizens [Article 251(2)].266 
9) If the answer to the question of a national scope is 
affirmative and the answers to the question of a regional 
scope are negative in one or more regions, these cannot be 
instituted until new referendums restricted to this region or 
regions obtains an affirmative answer [article 251(3)].267 
 
3.4. The Referendum Procedure 
The next step would be the approval of the resolution on the 
referendum. Working towards that, the PSD introduced Draft Resolution 
No. 89/VII [DAR (II-A) 55, 30 May 1998, p. 1201] on 27 May, the PS 
                                                 
266 Miranda & Medeiros consider this provision unConstitutional, given that Article 256 of 
the Constitution refers only that the actual institution of the administrative regions depends 
on the casting of an affirmative vote by the majority of the registered voters who cast their 
votes, without any requirement of quorum in relation to the number of registered citizens. 
267 See the note on this legal system in Mendes & Miguéis (1998, pp. 145-152). 
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introduced the Draft Resolution No. 93/VII [DAR (II-A) 62, 25 June, p. 
1386] on 19 June 1998 and the CDS-PP introduced Draft Resolution No. 
95/VII [DAR (II-A) 62, 25 June, pp. 1388-1389] on 23 June. The main 
difference among them was in relation to the electoral universe: the PSD 
and the CDS-PP proposed the participation of Portuguese emigrants in the 
question of a national scope.268 
The consideration of the draft resolutions was held on 29 June 
[DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, pp. 2963-2970]. The PSD draft was rejected 
with nay votes from the PS and abstentions from the CDS-PP, the PCP 
and the PEV. The PS draft was passed. However, in the section regarding 
the electoral universe, the draft received nay votes from the PSD, the 
CDS-PP and Helena Roseta (PS), with abstentions from the PCP and the 
PEV. The section regarding the question had yea votes from the PS and 
the CDS-PP, with abstentions from the PSD, the PCP and the PEV and a 
nay vote from Helena Roseta [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, pp. 3003-3004]. 
The CDS-PP draft was considered useless. The PS only voted in favour of 
its own proposal. The PSD voted against the electoral universe proposed 
by the PS and abstained on the question, preferring its own wording 
(which was not substantially different). The CDS-PP adhered to the 
question proposed by the PS, disagreeing, however, about the electoral 
universe. The PCP and the PEV decided to abstain on all proposals, 
disagreeing with the referendum but recognising that it was mandated by 
the Constitution. Helena Roseta voted against, arguing for a 
postponement. In her view, the weak participation in the referendum on 
abortion (which had been held the day before) justified further reflection 
on decisions about any other referendums. 
Yet, the resolution was passed. All registered citizens in the 
national territory would be asked: ‘do you agree with the institution of the 
administrative regions?’ Registered citizens in each of the regions created 
by Law No. 19/98, of 28 April, would be asked: ‘do you agree with the 
institution of the administrative region in your area of electoral 
registration?’ The ballot papers in the autonomous regions would only 
include the first question (Resolution No. 36-B/98), [DR (148 − 
Supplement) 30 June 1998]. 
On the very same day, the PS introduced the bills for the 
institution of each of the proposed regions: Bill No. 544/VII (Estremadura 
                                                 
268 In the report drawn for the Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties 
Committee, António Filipe (PCP) pronounced himself for the Constitutionality and 
pertinence of the solution proposed by the PS, which did not allow the participation of 
emigrants in the referendum [DAR (II-A) 65, 1 July 1998, pp. 1491-1492]. 
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e Ribatejo), 545/VII (Beira Litoral), 546/VII (Alentejo), 547/VII (Lisboa e 
Setúbal), 548/VII (Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro), 549/VII (Entre Douro e 
Minho), 550/VII (Algarve), 551/VII (Beira Interior). 
The Constitutional Court, in the prior review made under the 
Constitutional terms on the Assembly of the Republic Resolution decided, 
through Ruling No. 757/98 of 29 July 1998 [DR (I-A) 174, 30 July 1998], 
to declare the proposed referendum Constitutional and legal.269 On 1 
September, the President of the Republic set the referendum for 8 
November 1998 (Decree of the President of the Republic No. 39/98), [DR 
(I-A) 201, 1 September 1998]. 
The intention to take part in the referendum campaign was 
declared by all the parliamentary parties (PS, PSD, CDS-PP, PCP and 
PEV), nine parties without representation in Parliament (MPT, MUT, 
PCTP/MRPP, PDC, PPM, PSN, PSR, Política XXI and UDP) and 20 
groups of citizens (9 for ‘yes’ and 11 for ‘no’).270 Five of the groups for 
‘yes’ assumed a regional form, supporting the creation of their region, and 
four assumed a national scope, supporting regionalisation as a whole. 
From the ‘no’ side, six assumed a regional form, against the region 
proposed in their area, and five were against the regionalisation from a 
national perspective. Although the number of movements had been larger 
in the referendum on regionalisation than in the referendum on abortion, 
André Freire and Michael Baum (2003a, p. 16) noted that the relative 
influence of the parties was greater in the referendum on regionalisation, 
given the greater weight of the Catholic Church in the referendum on 
abortion. 
From the side of the main parties, the PCP and the CDS-PP 
assumed clear positions and kept their internal cohesion: the PCP in 
favour and the CDS-PP against. The PCP had supported the creation of 
                                                 
269 Five of the 13 judges voted against the decision. The more controversial item was the 
clearness and objectivity of the questions. 
270 Groups for the ‘yes’: Alentejo, Yes to the Regionalisation, for Portugal; Movement for 
the Creation of the Region of Algarve; Movement for the Region of Trás-os-Montes e Alto 
Douro; Movement Yes for the Regionalisation – Yes for Algarve; In Minho, for the 
Regionalisation; For a Portugal with Cohesion, Yes to the Regionalisation; Portugal Plural; 
Solidarity Portugal – Movement for Beira Interior; Yes to the Regions, Better Portugal. 
Groups for the ‘no’: Aveiro says No to the Regionalisation; Give Strength to the 
Municipalism, for Leiria District; Minho for No to the Regionalisation; Unique Portugal 
Movement; Movement Regionalisation, Not Like This; United Nation: A Portugal; No to 
this Regionalisation and No to the Region of Beira Interior; No to this Regionalisation and 
No to the Region of Estremadura e Ribatejo; No to the Region of Beira Litoral; 
Municipalist Platform; Regionalisation? We pass! The initial number of citizen groups was 
25. Five of them, however, were excluded for not fulfilling the legal requirements. 
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administrative regions since 1976, and the CDS-PP assumed a position 
that was clearly against the regionalisation after an internal referendum on 
that subject. The PS assumed an official position in favour, but there were 
some audible voices of dissent, not so much against regionalisation as a 
whole, but above all against the solutions proposed for specific regions. 
At the national level, the PS and its Government assumed a position in 
favour. However, there were dissenting voices. While all the northern 
leaders vocally supported the proposed new regions, some critics, like 
Mário Soares, did not hide their scepticism in relation to the 
regionalisation, and in some regions the socialist structures showed their 
disagreement towards the proposed regional map. Inside the PSD, the 
situation was the opposite. The party supported the ‘no’ campaign, 
disagreeing with both the procedure followed and the proposed map. 
Opposition to the idea of regionalisation had a decisive majority in the 
PSD, especially with Cavaco Silva against it. Nevertheless, the negative 
position of the PSD had the main purpose of weakening the PS 
government, which favoured regionalisation. The idea was to impose a 
fresh defeat, building pressure following the failed abortion 
referendum.271 
The reasons given by the supporters of the regionalisation were 
based on the full realisation of the Constitution, which had enshrined the 
administrative regions since 1976; on the democratic legitimacy of the 
exercise of regional power, which would stop being an arm of the central 
administration and become a result of the popular vote; on the need to 
ensure national cohesion and reduce the regional asymmetries which 
resulted from a centralist organisation of the State; and following the 
example of the European Union, where the existence of intermediate 
levels of power between the central administrations and the municipalities 
is practically general. 
 Among the supporters of the negative answer, we can 
distinguish those who were simply against the existence of administrative 
regions and those who were against the procedure which led to the 
drawing of the regional map and/or the map itself. Some people, although 
regionalists, swelled the ranks of the ‘no’ campaign because they 
disagreed with the region that was proposed to them. The reasoning by the 
opponents was that Portugal was a small country, which meant there was 
no need for an intermediate level of power between the Government and 
the municipalities; the idea that the regionalisation would lead to the 
                                                 
271 See the detailed exposition of the PSD position expressed by the leader himself in the 
National Council of 29 July 1998, in Sousa (1999, pp. 87-116). 
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increase of regional rivalries which could be dangerous for national unity; 
the opposition to the creation of new political posts, which meant more 
public expenses; the idea that the regionalisation would simply create new 
patronage structures; or opposition to the regional map that had been 
proposed.272 
3.5. Analysis of the Results 
The first aspect to stress regarding the results of the referendum 
on the regionalisation is the high rate of abstention (see Table 11). The 
participation was higher than in the referendum on abortion, but not 
enough to guarantee the binding effect of the referendum in the event of a 
‘yes’ victory, given that the Referendum Law laid down that in the case of 
an affirmative answer, the referendum only has binding effect when the 
number of voters is higher than 50% of the registered citizens.273 
Abstention was about 20% higher than in the previous parliamentary 
elections (Freire & Baum, 2003a, p. 10). 
André Freire and Michael Baum (2003a, p. 12) point out to the 
poor handling of the regionalisation campaign by the PS as a first reason 
for abstention. The strong division within that party explains the high 
abstention rate to a great extent.  
Table 11 




Voters Abstentions Blank ballot papers 
Null ballot 
papers 
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
8,632,842 4,171,099 48.29 4,465,743 51.71 57,050 1.37 77,420 1.86 
 
National question Regional questions 
YES NO YES NO 
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
1,458,132 34.96 2,537,822 60.84 1,386,718 33.25 2,457,604 58.92 
 
As for the regional distribution of abstentions (Table 12), the 
salient fact is the extremely weak participation in the autonomous regions. 
                                                 
272 On the arguments used in the campaign, see, Barreto (1998); Sá et al (1998); Ministério 
do Equipamento, Planeamento e Administração do Território (1998); Lacão (1998); 
Lourenço (1998); Sousa (1999, pp. 87-116); Nascimento et al (1998) among many others. 
273 Jorge Miranda and Rui Medeiros consider this demand to be unConstitutional with 
good reasons. 
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It is easily explained given that the subject of the referendum was only the 
creation of the administrative regions in the mainland. There was no 
question about the creation of any administrative region in the territory of 
the autonomous regions; consequently, the citizens registered there were 
called to decide on regions that were irrelevant to them, and naturally they 
were disinterested. The greatest problem was that the abstention of the 
citizens from the autonomous regions could be decisive in making the 
creation of the administrative regions on the mainland unviable. 
Table 12 
Participation in the Referendum for the Institution of the 
Administrative Regions 









Aveiro 51.03 48.97 Lisboa 48.72 51.28 
Beja 47.60 52.40 Portalegre 49.73 50.27 
Braga 52.17 47.83 Porto 49.22 50.78 
Bragança 44.72 55.28 Santarém 48.76 51.24 
C.Branco 50.80 49.20 Setúbal 46.91 53.09 
Coimbra 46.69 53.31 V. Castelo 49.32 50.68 
Évora 50.90 49.10 Vila Real 45.97 54.03 
Faro 44.46 55.54 Viseu 49.77 50.23 
Guarda 55.66 44.34 Açores 22.15 77.85 
Leiria 53.12 46.88 Madeira 36.38 63.62 
Nonetheless, the negative answer won with 60.84% of the votes 
regarding the question on national scope and 58.92% in the total number 
of the questions at a regional scope. The victory of the ‘no’ campaign on 
the national question made the institution of any region impossible. 
In terms of districts (Tables 13 and 14), the affirmative answer 
on the national scope only won in three districts (Setúbal, Évora and 
Beja). The affirmative answer for the question at a regional scope only 
won in the district of Évora. In the case of Beja, the difference of votes 
between the two questions was very significant, revealing the non-
acceptance of the idea of a single Alentejo region.  
Only in the district of Faro was the number of affirmative votes 
in the regional question higher than in the national one. In all the other 
districts, the rejection of the proposed region was greater than the 
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rejection of the idea of regionalisation in general. The number of blank 
votes was significantly higher on the questions of a regional scope. 
Table 13 
Results of the Referendum on the Institution of the Administrative 
Regions 
by Districts and Autonomous Regions (Question of a National Scope) 












Aveiro 22.89 73.44 0.86 Lisboa 35.61 60.22 0.84 
Beja 56.82 38.90 1.14 Portalegre 42.37 53.28 1.14 
Braga 32.43 63.41 1.20 Porto 43.38 52.61 0.95 
Bragança 32.47 62.98 1.17 Santarém 29.60 65.62 1.30 
C. Branco 31.61 63.93 1.19 Setúbal 50.23 45.76 0.87 
Coimbra 29.97 65.15 1.12 V. Castelo 30.20 65.40 1.05 
Évora 54.85 40.93 1.09 Vila Real 30.17 65.25 1.17 
Faro 43.28 51.72 1.47 Viseu 20.12 75.76 1.04 
Guarda 17.91 78.10 1.06 Açores 36.72 58.81 2.09 




Results of the Referendum on the Institution of the Administrative 
Regions by Districts 
(Questions of a Regional Scope) 











Aveiro 20.94 74.38 1.86 Leiria 16.73 78.41 1.97 
Beja 47.72 46.91 2.23 Lisboa 35.42 59.52 1.72 
Braga 31.66 63.14 2.24 Portalegre 41.42 53.20 2.16 
Bragança 32.02 61.77 2.83 Porto 43.06 52.04 1.84 
C. Branco 29.77 64.66 2.30 Santarém 28.47 65.61 2.44 
Coimbra 28.47 65.45 2.31 Setúbal 49.81 45.50 1.55 
Évora 54.24 40.60 2.04 V. Castelo 29.14 65.01 2.50 
Faro 46.07 47.97 2.43 Vila Real 29.82 64.19 2.58 
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If we consider the voting in relation to the proposed regions 
(Tables 15 and 16) we can see that only in the Alentejo did the ‘yes’ 
campaign win, and even so, only on the question of a national scope. 
Table 15 
Results of the Referendum on the Institution of the Administrative 
Regions 
by Administrative Region (Question of a National Scope) 
 % YES % NO % Blank 
Entre Douro e Minho 38.84 57.06 1.04 
Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro 29.68 65.82 1.17 
Beira Litoral 23.37 72.51 0.97 
Beira Interior 25.09 70.68 1.13 
Estremadura e Ribatejo 24.29 71.49 1.06 
Lisboa e Setúbal 39.06 56.81 0.84 
Alentejo 51.56 44.19 1.10 




Referendum results on the institution of the administrative regions 
by administrative region (question of a regional scope)  
 % Yes % No % Blank 
Entre Douro e Minho 38.37 56.54 2.03 
Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro 29.28 64.79 2.61 
Beira Litoral 21.65 73.15 2.06 
Beira Interior 22.23 72.58 2.09 
Estremadura e Ribatejo 22.46 72.19 2.18 
Lisboa e Setúbal 38.89 56.15 1.67 
Alentejo 47.98 46.76 2.10 
Algarve 46.07 47.97 2.43 
 
If we compare the results of the referendum on the 
regionalisation and the results of the parliamentary elections held 
immediately before and immediately after (Tables 17 and 18) we verify 
that the total number of votes for the parliamentary parties that supported 
the ‘yes’ campaign (PS and PCP/PEV) was largely greater than the actual 
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votes in favour of regionalisation. Therefore, the ‘no’ votes were greater 
in all districts than those obtained jointly by the PSD and the CDS-PP.274  
 
Table 17 
Comparative Results of the Referendum on the Institution of the 
Administrative Regions and the Parliamentary Elections of 1995 and 
1999 (Question of a National Scope) 
 
















Aveiro 42.98 22.89 43.71 53.83 73.44 51.86 
Beja 75.00 56.82 75.05 19.30 38.90 18.38 
Braga 47.45 32.43 49.74 38.20 63.41 45.60 
Bragança 42.25 32.47 42.36 54.16 62.98 53.76 
C. Branco 56.66 31.61 56.87 39.34 63.93 38.20 
Coimbra 54.20 29.97 53.27 41.52 65.15 41.17 
Évora 69.47 54.85 70.30 25.40 40.93 23.72 
Faro 57.38 43.28 56.67 37.52 51.72 36.76 
Guarda 45.94 17.91 46.52 49.86 78.10 48.99 
Leiria 41.24 19.14 42.07 54.73 77.13 52.52 
Lisboa 56.32 35.61 54.99 38.37 60.22 35.76 
Portalegre 64.42 42.37 66.20 29.73 53.28 28.38 
Porto 52.71 43.38 54.23 44.11 52.61 40.19 
Santarém 55.31 29.60 55.63 39.73 65.62 38.29 
Setúbal 68.65 50.23 68.49 25.62 45.76 23.65 
V. Castelo 43.33 30.20 45.21 53.35 65.40 49.80 
Vila Real 41.92 30.17 43.17 53.84 65.25 52.37 
Viseu 40.15 20.12 40.34 55.74 75.76 54.77 
Açores 39.31 36.72 55.03 57.15 58.81 41.34 
Madeira 34.17 27.91 37.87 59.01 67.53 57.06 
Total 52.33 34.96 53.05 43.17 60.84 40.66 
 
In seeking to explain the results, André Freire and Michael 
Baum (2003a, p. 13) referred to, besides the unskilful leading of the 
                                                 
274 In this comparison, only the votes of the parliamentary parties were counted, excluding 
the BE, because the parties that take part in it assumed divergent positions in the 
referendum on regionalisation (the UDP and the Politics XXI for the ‘yes’ and the PSR for 
the ‘no’). For a more detailed comparison, see Freire and Baum (2003a, pp. 13-15). 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  408 
 
process by the PS, the fact that the arguments of the rightist opposition 
against the regionalisation (fewer politicians, less public spending, less 
corruption) were easier for the public to grasp than the arguments 
promised by the ‘yes’ supporters. The consequence of the 1998 
referendum was the unfeasibility of the institution of the administrative 
regions enshrined in the Constitution, while those who worked for that 
purpose held precisely that goal in mind. Actually, in spite of its 
enshrinement in the Constitution in 1976, the regionalisation always found 
obstacles that were not always assumed, but always decisive. 
 
Table 18 
Comparative Results of the Referendum on the Institution of the 
Administrative Regions and the Parliamentary Elections of 1995 and 
1999 (Questions of a Regional Scope) 
 
















Aveiro 42.98 20.94 43.71 53.83 74.38 51.86 
Beja 75.00 47.72 75.05 19.30 46.91 18.38 
Braga 47.45 31.66 49.74 38.20 63.14 45.60 
Bragança 42.25 32.02 42.36 54.16 61.77 53.76 
C. Branco 56.66 29.77 56.87 39.34 64.66 38.20 
Coimbra 54.20 28.47 53.27 41.52 65.45 41.17 
Évora 69.47 54.24 70.30 25.40 40.60 23.72 
Faro 57.38 46.07 56.67 37.52 47.97 36.76 
Guarda 45.94 14.08 46.52 49.86 81.13 48.99 
Leiria 41.24 16.73 42.07 54.73 78.41 52.52 
Lisboa 56.32 35.42 54.99 38.37 59.52 35.76 
Portalegre 64.42 41.42 66.20 29.73 53.20 28.38 
Porto 52.71 43.06 54.23 44.11 52.04 40.19 
Santarém 55.31 28.47 55.63 39.73 65.61 38.29 
Setúbal 68.65 49.81 68.49 25.62 45.50 23.65 
V. Castelo 43.33 29.14 45.21 53.35 65.01 49.80 
Vila Real 41.92 29.82 43.17 53.84 64.19 52.37 
Viseu 40.15 19.26 40.34 55.74 75.54 54.77 
 
In 1976, all parties supported the regionalisation as it was in the 
Constitution. In the early 1980s, the PSD/CDS Governments assumed the 
purpose of moving forward with the institution of the administrative 
regions, but in all truth they continuously delayed the process. At the start 
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of the 1990s, the rightist parties clearly assumed positions against 
regionalisation. The PSD made it unviable until 1995, while it was in 
Government, and only began to support the holding of a referendum with 
the arrival of the PS in 1995.  At this time it created conditions that, in 
principle, could lead to the institution of the regions. 
The Socialist Party, being in favour of the institution of the 
regions in principle, remained ensnared in indecisions and contradictions 
that never allowed the decisive advance of the process. The acceptance of 
the referendum, as the rightist parties claimed, and the erratic and 
contradictory behaviour of the PS during the entire referendum procedure, 
paved the way for the negative result, which meant a clear victory for 
those who saw the referendum as a way to prevent the regionalisation 
process in years to come. PCP’s parliamentary activism on the institution 
of the regions was not enough to surpass the opposition from the right-
wing parties and the contradictions of the PS regarding the 
regionalisation. 
3.6. The Deadlock of the Regionalisation after the 
       Referendum 
About two month after the referendum, on 14 January 1999, the 
CDS-PP introduced Bill No. 604/VII [DAR (II-A) 31, 21 January 1999, p. 
851] to repeal the regionalisation laws.275 The general principles were 
discussed on 11 March 1999, and the bill was rejected with nay votes 
from the PS, the PCP and the PEV, having obtained yea votes from the 
PSD and the CDS-PP [DAR (I) 58, 12 March 1999, pp. 2157-2166 and 
2174]. An identical initiative was revived in the next legislature, on 8 
November 1999, through Bill No. 9/VIII [DAR (II-A) 3, 11 November 
1999, pp. 26-27], which lapsed on 4 April 2002 without having been 
discussed. The regionalisation laws were kept in force, being sure that the 
institution of the regions depended on holding a new referendum, which 
would have an affirmative response in that sense. 
In the VI Constitutional Revision on 14 November 2003, the 
Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 2/IX, introduced jointly by the 
PSD and the CDS-PP, then allies in the Government, proposed the 
removal of Articles 256 to 265 of the Constitution regarding the 
administrative regions, and proposed a new wording for Article 255, 
providing that a) the law can provide forms of administrative 
                                                 
275 These laws were, obviously, the Framework Law of the Administrative Regions (Law 
No. 56/91, of 13 August) and the Law of the Creation of Administrative Regions (Law No. 
19/98, of 28 April). 
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regionalisation in the mainland; b) that law defines the territory of each 
region and the respective powers, and rules the composition, the way of 
Constitution, the responsibilities and working of their bodies; c) the 
approval of the law depends on more than half of the registered voters 
pronouncing favourably in a national referendum. It returned with the 
PSD proposal removing the regionalisation as a Constitutional command, 
turning it instead into a mere faculty given to the legislator and making it 
depend on a referendum where more than 50% of the registered citizens 
would need to vote affirmatively. As for the abstentions, they would have 
the same value as negative votes. In the CERC session of 16 April 2004 
these proposals had yea votes from the PSD and the CDS-PP and nay 
votes from the PS, the PCP, the BE and the PEV. In the plenary sittings of 
23 April, these proposals did not obtain the qualified two-thirds majority 
needed for their approval. 89 Members voted nay (76 PS, eight PCP, three 
BE and two PEV) and 108 voted yea (93 PSD, 14 CDS-PP and one PS), 
(Magalhães, 2004). 
On 19 July 2005, the PCP introduced a new initiative in favour 
of regionalisation, introducing Draft Resolution No. 54/X [DAR (II-A) 36, 
22 July 2005, pp. 24-25] and setting a schedule for the institution of the 
administrative regions during 2007. The PCP proposed that, up to the end 
of 2007, two possible maps for the regions be submitted to the municipal 
assemblies: the map of eight regions laid down in the Law for the 
Creation of the Administrative Regions approved in 1998 and the map 
corresponding to the five plan-regions. The municipal assemblies should 
give their opinions up to the end of the first semester of 2006. In the 
second semester there would be the approval of the map of the regions to 
be submitted to referendum in the first quarter of 2007. This bill was 
never discussed. 
In 2008, a civic movement named ‘Regions, Yes!’, formed by 
citizens from different political sectors who assumed themselves as 
supporters of a model of regionalisation based on the five plan-regions, 
gathered signatures with the aim of presenting a petition to the Assembly 
of the Republic. With a view to future Constitutional revision, it appealed 
to the parties to remove the excessive conditions that had created 
obstacles to the creation of the administrative regions. These namely 
involved removing the obligation of the simultaneous creation of the 
regions, and the demand that the number of voters in the referendum be 
more than 50% of the registered citizens to have binding effect.276 
                                                 
276 As previously Stated, Jorge Miranda and Rui Medeiros consider that the demand for 
50% of participants to assure the binding effect of the referendum is not a Constitutional 
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Without aiming to predict the destiny of any future initiative 
attempting to move the institution of the administrative regions forward, it 
is clear that the success of such a proposal seems to be, at least, remote. 
The Constitutional demand of a referendum for the institution of the 
regions, and the experience of 1998, makes it clear that the regionalisation 
of the Portuguese mainland territory will not be possible without a wide 
consensus among the political parties, as well as on regional boundaries, 
and the nature and powers of the administrative regions to institute. Since 
that consensus is far from being achieved, the possibility of a new 
referendum, whose result would be any different from the previous one, is 
remote. The referendum of 1998, and the Constitutional framework, had 
the effect of delaying the institution of the administrative regions sine die. 
                                                                                                               
demand in relation to the referendum on the administrative regions. That demand only 
appears in the Referendum Law, which in that point is unConstitutional. 
 
 




The Question of the Referendum on the European Union 
1. The Question of the Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty 
1.1. Antecedents 
When, on 1 January 1986, Portugal became a member of the 
European Community, there was no Constitutional possibility of 
submitting the decision to a referendum, and there was no proposal to 
make a referendum possible. The political forces that supported the 
Constitutional introduction of the referendum in Portugal were also 
enthusiastic supporters of accession to the European Community, so the 
idea of submitting the decision to a referendum was never even discussed. 
The idea of subjecting certain international agreements to a 
referendum was first suggested in 1975, during discussions about the new 
Constitution. Jorge Miranda (1975, pp. 82-83), in Article 166 of his draft, 
proposed the institution of a referendum on international agreements that 
involved restrictions on sovereignty within their scope of contents. In 
Miranda’s view, these treaties should have been subject to a popular 
referendum after being passed in Parliament. The essay by Lucas Pires 
(1975, p. 106), which served as a contribution to the future draft of the 
Constitution from the CDS included, besides several types of referendum, 
the need for approval through a national plebiscite, of any decision to be 
taken or already taken, regarding the international integration process, or 
any privileged agreement with great powers, especially within the military 
domain. Integration would change the sovereign contract between the 
people and their representatives, meaning the Portuguese people would 
become EEC subjects, and the voice should be heard (Urbano, 1998, p. 
118). However, none of these ideas were enshrined in the Constitution. 
Several voices raised the idea of a referendum in Portugal on the 
European integration process. On 17 March 1977, calling upon the PS 
Government on its economic policy, the MP Acácio Barreiros from the 
UDP, supported the need of a referendum on the EEC adhesion (DAR 87, 
18 March 1977, p. 2966). Three months later, on 3 May, he re-affirmed 
that position during the debate on a CDS proposal to create a 
parliamentary committee on European affairs (DAR 104, 4 May 1977, p. 
3515). However, that idea did not have any Constitutional support.
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In the 1989 Constitutional revision, even after Portuguese 
adhesion to the EEC, the CDS proposed that the conclusion of treaties 
which transferred State power to an international organisation should be 
passed by the Assembly of the Republic by a two-thirds majority of 
members in full exercise of their office. If a treaty in this case did not 
obtain the two thirds majority, but received the affirmative vote from the 
absolute majority of the members in full exercise of their office, the 
President of the Republic could submit the decision to national 
referendum [DAR (Off-print 1/V) 31 December 1987, p. 11]. This 
proposal was rejected. 
The 1989 Constitutional revision introduced the national 
referendum, but expressly forbid its use to deliberate on international 
treaties. Article 118(3) of the Constitution excluded matters referred in 
Article 164, which included the approval of treaties regarding Portuguese 
participation in international organisations. The question of the 
referendum on the Portuguese participation in the European Community 
forced itself onto the political agenda only after the Maastricht Treaty 
signature in 1992, and it became especially intense with the holding of the 
French and Danish referendums. 
In Portugal, the opportunity to participate in decision-making on 
the European integration process through referendums was something 
new, but there were several precedents in Europe. Besides the example 
that immediately inspired the proposers of a referendum in Portugal, 
which was undoubtedly the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty 
on 2 June 1992, the European integration process had several examples of 
‘European referendums’ in different countries. 
Soon after the first enlargement process, in 1972, several 
adhesion treaties were submitted to referendum: in Ireland, on 10 May 
1972, with 83% affirmative answers; in Denmark, on 26 September, with 
63.5% affirmative answers; in Norway, on the very same day, where the 
negative answer prevailed, with 54% of the votes cast making it 
unfeasible for that country to adhere to the European Community. 
Curiously, France submitted the adhesion treaties of those three countries, 
and also the accession of Great Britain, to a referendum. It was held on 23 
April 1972, and had 68% of the affirmative answers. 
In Great Britain there was no referendum on accession, although 
the Labour opposition demanded one. In October 1971, there was a vote 
in the House of Commons on the adhesion to the Community, which 
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resulted in 356 yea votes, 244 nays and 22 abstentions. The vote on the 
ratification itself, on 13 July 1972, was even more finely balanced (301 
yea votes and 284 nay votes), (Ribeiro, 1994). After the electoral victory 
of the Labour Party in 1974, the new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who 
had strongly criticised the Conservatives for signing the treaty, arguing 
that it would be economically disastrous for Great Britain, proposed a 
national referendum on the renegotiated accession conditions. This took 
place on 5 June 1975, with 67% of the affirmative votes against 32% of 
the negative answers. 
The Maastricht Treaty sparked a second wave of referendums. 
The ‘yes’ vote won easily in Ireland on 18 June, but ‘no’ prevailed in 
Denmark on 2 June 1992.  In France, on 20 September 1992, there was a 
narrow victory for the ‘yes’ campaign (51.04%). A referendum was held 
on the European Union in Italy on the same day as the 1989 parliamentary 
elections, with the affirmative answer winning, but without reference to 
any specific treaty. In Portugal, the idea that it was possible to hold a 
referendum on the European Union Treaty appeared when the PS and the 
PSD recognised that its ratification demanded an extraordinary 
Constitutional revision. 
1.2. The 1992 Constitutional Revision 
   1.2.1. The Decision 
In early May 1992, the President of the PSD and the Secretary 
General of the PS openly expressed a common understanding from both 
parties that the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty would demand a 
Constitutional revision. Therefore, Cavaco Silva and António Guterres 
agreed on a Constitutional revision that would be restricted to the 
provisions in conflict with the treaty, without supporting the idea of a 
referendum (Magalhães, 1997). 
The collision between the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Constitutional provisions in several countries such as France, Spain, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium had already led to Constitutional 
revisions in order to make it viable. That problem also existed in Portugal. 
The PSD and PS leaders had two possibilities: to immediately review the 
Constitution, or to maintain a future Constitutional battle that would lead 
to an uncertain result. In the end, they decided to review the Constitution.  
Meanwhile, other parties proposed that the Constitutional 
revision should include changes that would enable a referendum for the 
European Union Treaty. The PSN, which had a member in the Assembly 
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of the Republic between 1991 and 1995 (Manuel Sérgio), introduced a 
Draft Resolution No. 25/VI on 12 May 1992 to create an Ad Hoc 
Committee for the Constitutional Revision [DAR (II-A) 39, 23 May 1992, 
p. 760]. On 15 May, the CDS proposed that the Assembly of the Republic 
take powers of Constitutional revision through Draft Resolution No. 26/VI 
[DAR (II-A) 39, 23 May 1992, pp. 760-761]. It must be noted, however, 
that none of these parties opposed the European Union Treaty. The PSN 
was in favour, and the CDS carried out a process of internal debate. 
These draft resolutions were discussed on 22 May and they were 
rejected, with the only affirmative votes coming from the proposers [DAR 
(I) 67, 23 May 1992, pp. 2186-2196]. The PS refused to Constitutionally 
reconfigure the referendum, but admitted to review the Constitution only 
insofar as it was strictly necessary to make ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty possible.277 The PSD, which also voted against the referendum, 
considered that it could only be justifiable if there was a deep division in 
the Portuguese society about the general problem of being for or against 
the European Community.278 The PCP and the UDP, which had not yet 
decided to support the referendum, argued that it was necessary to hold a 
wide national debate before any decision on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty.279 
Before long, the question arose again in the Assembly of the 
Republic. On 26 May, the Government submitted Draft Resolution No. 
11/VI to Parliament in order to approve the European Union Treaty signed 
in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 [DAR (II-A) 40 −  Supplement, 27 May 
1992]. In the admission dispatch to the draft, the President of the 
Assembly raised doubts about its Constitutionality and admitted it 
provisionally, requesting an opinion from the Constitutional Affairs, 
Rights, Freedoms and Guaranties Committee. 
A majority passed the opinion, drawn by Rui Machete (PSD), on 
1 June 1992.280 It considered that the provisions of the treaty on the single 
currency, the European System of Central Banks, the European Central 
Bank, the financial, monetary and exchange policies, the electoral 
capacity, the restrictions to the admission of foreigners from third 
countries and the issuing of visas might be incompatible with Portuguese 
                                                 
277 See speech by Alberto Costa [DAR (I) 67, 23 May 1992, p. 2190]. 
278 See speech by Rui Machete [DAR (I) 67, 23 May 1992, p. 2192-2193]. 
279 See speeches by João Amaral (PCP) and Mário Tomé (UDP), [DAR (I) 67, 23 May 
1992, pp. 2195 and 2192]. 
280 The opinion got yea votes from the PSD, the PS and the CDS and nay votes from the 
PCP, [DAR (II-A) 42, 5 June 1992, pp. 807-808]. 
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Constitutional rules. This opinion summed up the consensus between the 
two main parties as to the scope of the revision to be made. Before its 
approval, the President of the Assembly decided to suspend consideration 
of the draft resolution approval of the treaty until the Constitutional 
revision procedure, which had begun a few days earlier, was concluded. 
Indeed, between 26 and 27 May, the CDS, the PSD and the PS 
introduced draft resolutions to open an extraordinary Constitutional 
revision procedure in order to make the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty Constitutionally viable.281 In the debate of these drafts, and under 
the influence of the referendum held two days before in Denmark, the 
question for a referendum was presented again with the support of the 
CDS.282 
The PSD and the PS maintained their positions of against such a 
referendum.283 The PCP, in spite of its vote against all the draft 
resolutions, favoured holding a referendum for the first time. In their 
opinion the referendum should be a pre-condition to any type of 
Constitutional revision.284  
The vote took place on 11 June, with the CDS draft having been 
rejected and all the others passed.285 This resulted in Resolution No. 18/92 
of 12 June, through which the Assembly of the Republic assumed powers 
of Constitutional revision [DAR (II-A) 135 − Supplement, 12 June 1992]. 
   1.2.2. The European Referendum in the Draft 
             Amendments to the Constitution 
Between 11 June and 15 July the Draft Amendments to the 
Constitution No. 1/VI (PSD), No. 2/VI (Mário Tomé), No. 3/VI (PS), No. 
4/VI (PCP), No. 5/VI (CDS) and 6/VI (PSN) were introduced.286 Four of 
them proposed that a referendum should be held. 
                                                 
281 See Draft Resolutions No. 29/VI (CDS), 30/VI (PSD) and 31/VI (PS), [DAR (II-A) 41, 
30 May 1992, pp. 781-782]. 
282 See speech by Adriano Moreira [DAR (I) 73, 5 June 1992, pp. 2393-2395].  
283 See speeches by Rui Machete (PSD) and Jaime Gama (PS), [DAR (I) 73, 5 June 1992, 
pp. 2398-2399 and 2401-2403]. 
284 See speech by Octávio Teixeira [DAR (I) 75, 12 June 1992, p. 2463]. 
285 With yea votes from the PSD, the PS, the CDS and the PSN and nay votes from the 
PCP, the PEV and two independent MPs elected in the PCP lists (204 votes against 15, 
which guaranteed the necessary majority of four fifths).  
286 All draft amendments to the Constitution are published in DAR, Off-print 12/VI, 9 
October 1992. 
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The draft from Mário Tomé (UDP) proposed to add a single 
provision to the Constitution over-riding the interdiction of submitting the 
ratification of international treaties to referendum, laid down in Article 
118(3), in this specific instance. The purpose was to temporarily lift the 
Constitutional obstacle to a referendum on matters relating to the 
European Union Treaty. 
The PCP draft also included a single provision stating that the 
exclusions laid down in Article 118(3) of the Constitution were not valid 
regarding changes to the European Community Treaties, including the 
creation of a European Union. The PCP proposed that the only purpose of 
the Constitutional revision procedure was to make the referendum 
possible, as it was the only way to carry out a Constitutional revision 
procedure aimed at removing the Constitutional obstacles to the 
ratification of the treaty. 
The CDS proposed to introduce in Article 118 of the 
Constitution, a provision stating that the President of the Republic should 
submit the approval of treaties to national referendum when they gave an 
international organisation the right to exercise powers that previously 
belonged to the Portuguese State. In addition, they proposed that the 
approval of conventions and international treaties should not be excluded 
from the scope of the referendum. Finally, the PSN proposed that the 
European Union Treaty, given its exceptional influence on the destiny of 
the country, should not be excluded in Article 118(3) of the Constitution. 
Thus, the PCP, Mário Tomé and the PSN, supported the idea 
that the Constitutional revision should first be used to make the 
referendum viable. Only if the referendum gave an affirmative answer 
should it pose the question of changing other provisions in order to adjust 
the Constitution and the treaty. The CDS proposed the revision of other 
aspects of the Constitution. As for the referendum, they proposed that it 
should always be compulsory when the transfer of powers for the 
Portuguese State to an international organisation was under discussion. It 
was not an exceptional and transitory provision, but a general rule which 
would also be applied towards the European Union Treaty. 
   1.2.3. The Constitutional Revision Works 
The first meeting of the CERC was held on 21 September and its 
work lasted until 12 November. At the very beginning, the PCP 
introduced a proposal of methodology.  According to this proposal, the 
Committee should only consider proposals of transitory provisions aimed 
at allowing a referendum on the European Union Treaty. The Committee 
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should address a report to the President of the Assembly with the 
discussion of these proposals, requesting the call for a plenary sitting to 
discuss and vote on them. That proposal was rejected, with nay votes from 
the PSD, the PS and the PSN, abstentions from the CDS and yea votes 
from the proposers and the PEV [DAR (II-A) 2 − RC, 24 September 1992, 
pp. 18-24]. 
After that event closed, the leading question of the referendum 
was discussed exhaustively during the 7 October session.287 It was 
submitted in the end to an indicative voting in the CERC, with all of the 
proposals for a referendum being rejected. The PSD and the PS voted 
against all of them. The PCP and the CDS voted in favour of all. The PSN 
abstained in the CDS proposal, voted against the PCP and Mário Tomé’s 
proposals, and voted affirmatively on its own [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 29 
October 1992, pp. 173-174].288 
In the final plenary debate, on 17 November, the question was 
discussed once again. The PCP proposed the previous discussion of the 
referendum issue. That proposal was refused such as in the CERC. During 
the debate, several voices spoke out on the referendum. João Amaral, who 
supported the PCP proposal, considered that the priority was not the 
Constitutional revision procedure but the holding of a wide national 
debate that would conclude with the referendum. That was the reason for 
the PCP proposal for a Constitutional revision that covered only the 
referendum, with the aim of making this a condition of any institutional 
procedures that would review the Constitution and ratify the Treaty [DAR 
(I) 14, 18 November 1992, p. 420]. Nogueira de Brito supported the CDS 
proposal, stressing the referendum as one of its main purposes. For that, 
the CDS proposed that the restrictions imposed by Article 118 of the 
Constitution be removed, thus allowing a referendum on the ratification of 
international treaties [DAR (I) 14, 18 November 1992, p. 423]. 
The parties that were against the referendum gave less 
importance to the question in their speeches. Nonetheless, they still 
referred to it. Costa Andrade (PSD) first refuted the proposals to allow a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty alone. He believed that that matter 
should not be the subject of a referendum. As for the CDS proposal, he 
                                                 
287 See speeches by MPs Nogueira de Brito (CDS), João Amaral and António Filipe (PCP) 
and Mário Tomé (UDP) supporting the referendum, and Rui Machete, Costa Andrade and 
Luís Pais de Sousa (PSD), Almeida Santos, Jorge Lacão and José Magalhães (PS) against 
it [DAR (II) 5 − RC, 8 October 1992].  
288 Mário Tomé did not have the right to vote because he was not a member of the 
Committee, but he took part in the debate as the author of a proposal. 
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refused it since it exceeded the scope of the Constitutional revision.  The 
PSD wanted to restrict the adjustment made to the Constitution during the 
creation of the European Union [DAR (I) 14, 18 November 1992, p. 438]. 
Jorge Lacão explained the PS position. He criticised the PCP proposal, 
considering it a change of the PCP position towards the referendum. As 
for the CDS position, he considered it untenable to support a compulsory 
referendum [DAR (I) 14, 18 November 1992, pp. 439-440]. 
The destiny of the proposals was decided. After the 1992 
Constitutional revision, it continued to be forbidden in the Constitution to 
hold a referendum on the European Union Treaty. The Treaty itself was 
passed for ratification on 10 December that same year, with 200 yea votes 
(PSD, PS and Freitas do Amaral) and 21 nay votes (PCP, CDS, PEV, 
Mário Tomé and Corregedor da Fonseca), [DAR (I) 19, 11 December 
1992, pp. 697-698]. 
1.3. The Reasons for the Refusal 
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was the first time that 
the question of a referendum on the Portuguese participation in the 
European integration process was intensively discussed. The opponents of 
the ratification of the Treaty, encouraged by the negative vote in the 
Danish referendum and the narow victory of the affirmative answer in 
France, saw in the referendum the chance to reject it, or at least, to create 
trouble for its supporters. They knew that the two main parties in 
Parliament (PSD and PS) would no problems approving it.  
The request for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was 
widely supported by the public, and not just by opponents of the Treaty. 
The CDS, sustaining an ambiguous position on the Treaty, used the 
proposal for a referendum as an element of differentiation from the PS and 
the PSD, considering it essential to have popular legitimacy regardless of 
the outcome. But even some voices close to the PS and the PSD, including 
the President of the Republic, Mário Soares, supported the referendum as 
a way to strengthen the legitimacy of Portugal’s European choice.  
A few years later, José Magalhães (1997) admitted in his 
Dictionary of the IV Constitutional Revision that, in many countries, 
supporters of the referendary cause tended to favour the ‘no’ campaigns. 
He also Stated that there was a fear of submitting a group of obscure 
changes that were open to varying interpretations to a referendum. In his 
view, it was risky: there was too much at stake. As the favourable position 
was revealed by President Soares several times, the bipartisan refusal can 
only be understood because the PS had, at the time, considerable problems 
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in consolidating its new leadership, and because the PSD was afraid that 
the referendum would be a motion of no confidence against the 
Government. 
2. The Failed Referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty 
2.1. The Referendum in the 1994 Draft Amendments 
        to the Constitution 
After the intense controversy about the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the idea of a referendum on the European integration 
would come to be discussed in the Assembly of the Republic some years 
later, although in a completely different context. In the draft amendments 
introduced at the time of the failed Constitutional revision in 1994, some 
provisions foresaw the possibility of submitting questions regarding the 
European treaties to referendums.289 
The Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 1/VI, from the 
PS, admitted the holding of referendums on issues that were the subject of 
conventions and treaties regarding Portugal’s participation in international 
organisations, agreements of friendship, defence, military affairs, and 
others submitted by the Government to the Assembly of the Republic. The 
exclusion of issues that were the object of conventions or agreements 
concerning peace or rectification of borders should be kept. However, the 
PS did not propose the possibility of referendums directly on the 
ratification of agreements, but only on issues included in them. The CDS, 
in its Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 2/VI, insisted on the 
proposal that agreements transferring powers from the Portuguese State to 
international organisations should be submitted compulsorily to 
referendum. The Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 3/VI, from the 
PSN, only excluded changes to the Constitution and the issues and acts 
with a budgetary, tax-related or financial implications from the scope of 
the referendum. The PSD draft did not contain any proposal regarding the 
referendum, but the Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 8/VI, 
subscribed by several members of the JSD, proposed referendums on 
international agreements through which Portugal agreed to jointly exercise 
the powers needed to construct and strengthen the European Union. The 
Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 13/VI, from Luís Fazenda 
(UDP), proposed a compulsory referendum to approve agreements on the 
participation of Portugal in international organisations where powers 
would be transferred from the Portuguese State. Finally, the Draft 
                                                 
289 All drafts are published in DAR, Off-print 24/VI, 7 November 1994. 
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Amendment to the Constitution No. 14/VI, from the PSD member Pedro 
Roseta, only excluded issues and acts that were of a budgetary, tax-related 
or financial nature from the scope of the referendum. 
 
2.2. The PCP Proposal for an Extraordinary Constitutional 
       Revision 
As soon as the VII Legislature began, after the October 1995 
elections, the PCP introduced Draft Resolution No. 1/VII [DAR (II-A) 2, 
8 November 1995, p. 25]. With the forthcoming revision of the European 
Union Treaty, the PCP considered it essential to invite the Portuguese 
people to participate in a great national debate, and to express their views 
on the revision of the European Union Treaty through a referendum. 
Therefore, the PCP proposed to alter Article 118 of the Constitution 
through an extraordinary revision procedure. 
This situation was unusual because the PCP proposed a 
Constitutional revision procedure for the first time. Previous 
Constitutional revisions had always been initiated by agreements between 
the PS and the PSD, with strong opposition from the PCP. In addition, 
there was also the fact that an extraordinary revision was being proposed 
when the Assembly of the Republic already had the necessary powers to 
make an ordinary revision. 
The PCP wanted a Constitutional revision that allows a 
referendum on the revision of the European Union Treaty, but did not 
wish to initiate a process that would go encourage further Constitutional 
tinkering. Thus, citing the urgency of making the referendum 
Constitutionally possible, the PCP sought to disconnect that issue through 
an extraordinary revision that, once concluded, would not jeopardise a 
further procedure of ordinary revision. The proposal did not find any 
objections as to its Constitutionality, but it was never discussed in the 
plenary sittings because the ordinary revision procedure began on 26 
January 1996. 290 
2.3. The European Referendum in the 1997 Constitutional 
       Revision 
                                                 
290 See report and opinion by Laborinho Lúcio (PSD), [DAR (II-A) 14, 6 January 1996, pp. 
237-240]. 
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The draft amendments to the Constitution,291 introduced by the 
CDS-PP, PS, PCP, and JSD members,292 revived the 1994 proposals. The 
PSN and the UDP failed to gain representation in Parliament. For the first 
time, the PSD draft proposed a referendum on decisive issues regarding 
agreements on the participation of Portugal in international organisations, 
or on amendments to such agreements, before their approval by the 
Assembly of the Republic.293 The draft from the independent MPs elected 
by the PS implicitly allowed the referendum on European treaties, given 
that they only excluded alterations to the Constitution, amnesties and 
generic pardons, acts of budgetary, tax-related or financial contents, and 
declarations of war, peace, State of siege or emergency from the scope of 
the referendum.294 The PEV draft was essentially similar to the PCP 
one.295 
In this Constitutional revision procedure, the innovation of civic 
initiatives was introduced. These were publicly presented by their authors 
in Parliament, and were the object of consideration. Regarding the 
European referendum, a proposal from Professor Jorge Miranda was also 
favourable. It removed the exclusion of referendums on international 
agreements, only excluding alterations to the Constitution, amnesties and 
generic pardons, decisions of budgetary, tax-related or financial contents, 
and decisions which during the financial year involved an increase in the 
State’s expenditure or a decrease in its revenues. It also excluded the 
organisation of the courts and the Public Prosecutors Office (Magalhães, 
1997). 
The work of the IV Constitutional Revision began with a 
discussion of the referendum proposals. The CDS-PP proposal was 
discussed in the 21 June 1996 session. It suggested that the referendum be 
compulsory when it entailed agreements that transferred the powers of 
Portuguese sovereign bodies to international organisations. This was 
opposed by all the other parties for the reasons explained above [DAR (II) 
10 − RC, 22 June 1996, pp. 176-180].296 In the 25 June session other 
                                                 
291 The Draft Amendment to Constitution No. 1/VII (CDS-PP) is published in DAR (II-A) 
21 − Supplement, 1 February 1996, and the other drafts are published in DAR (II-A) 27 − 
Supplement, 7 March 1996. 
292 Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 1/VII, 3/VII, 4/VII and 2/VII, respectively. 
293 Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 5/VII. 
294 Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 8/VII. 
295 Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 10/VII. 
296 See page 286. In spite of the availability declared by all the other parties to accept a 
referendum on the European Treaty, the proposal was not accepted for two other reasons: 
the disagreement on whether or not the referendum would be strictly compulsory and the 
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proposals on the European referendum were discussed. The discussion 
produced a consensus on the enlargement of the referendary scope to all 
agreements regarding the participation of Portugal in international 
organisations, or their alterations, with the possibility of enlarging it even 
further. The question on whether the subject of referendum should be the 
specific agreement itself, or the broad concept of the agreement, remained 
inconclusive [DAR (II) 11 − RC, 26 June 1996, pp. 200-205]. 
The CDS-PP and PCP proposals were rejected in the indicative 
voting during the CERC meetings on 16 and 17 July [DAR (II) 14 − RC, 
17 July 1996, pp. 283 e 287 and 15 − RC, 18 July 1996, pp. 300-301]. The 
proposal that prevailed synthesised the PS and PSD proposals drawn by 
Vital Moreira, according to which the referendum would be held on 
important issues of national interest were the object of international 
agreements, in the terms of Article 164 (j) of the Constitution, except 
when they concerned peace or the rectification of borders [DAR (II) 15 − 
RC, 18 July 1996, p. 303]. 
After a political agreement was signed between the PS and the 
PSD on the Constitutional revision, on 7 March 1997, it became possible 
to include matters relating to the ratification of international agreements, 
making the holding of a referendum on European issues viable. In the 23 
July plenary sittings, the parties confirmed the positions taken in the 
CERC. The CDS-PP and PCP proposals for Article 118 were rejected and 
the proposals that came from the CERC with a two thirds majority were 
passed [DAR (I) 100, 24 July 1997, pp. 3754-3756]. Thus, Article 118(5), 
which would be renumbered as 115(5), admitted referendums on 
important issues concerning national interest, which had to be the object 
of international agreement except when they concerned peace or the 
rectification of borders. 
2.4. The Attempts to Submit the Amsterdam Treaty 
       to Referendum 
   2.4.1. The Draft Resolutions 
Parliamentary initiatives regarding the referendum were 
introduced soon after the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, on 2 
October 1997. The Government introduced the first on 6 October, (Draft 
Resolution No. 71/VII). It proposed including Portuguese citizens 
registered to vote in the national territory and in the other Member States 
                                                                                                               
fact that the proposal from the CDS-PP could be applied to an indefinite number of 
international agreements and not only to the European Union Treaty. 
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of the European Union. The proposed referendum would ask whether 
Portugal should continue its participation in the construction of the 
European Union resulting from the Amsterdam Treaty [DAR (II-A) 3, 17 
October 1997, pp. 60-61]. 
On the very same day, the PSD introduced Draft Resolution No. 
67/VII, which proposed a referendum in which Portuguese citizens 
registered to vote in Portugal and abroad would participate. There were 
three questions: 1) ‘do you agree with deepening the integration of 
Portugal in the European Union, according to the Amsterdam Treaty?’ 2) 
‘Do you agree with the reinforcement of the European cooperation of 
security forces in the struggle against drug trafficking, mafias and others 
forms of organised crime?’ 3) Do you agree with the reinforcement of 
European cooperation in the struggle against unemployment, without 
prejudicing the main responsibility of the Member States?’ [DAR (II-A) 3, 
17 October 1997, pp. 59-60].297 
On 16 October the PCP introduced Draft Resolution No. 69/VII, 
which had the following question: ‘do you agree that the evolution of 
European integration involves a greater transfer of national sovereignty, 
including the replacement of the escudo298 and the imposition of fines on 
countries that do not fulfil the Maastricht criterions, up to and including 
the new transfers foreseen in the Amsterdam Treaty?’  [DAR (II-A) 7, 25 
October 1997, pp. 121-122]. On 4 March 1998, the CDS-PP presented 
Draft Resolution No. 82/VII so that the Portuguese citizens registered to 
vote in Portugal and abroad would answer the following question: ‘do you 
agree that the evolution of European integration, resulting from the 
Amsterdam Treaty, be made through a progressive transfer of sovereign 
powers, in agreement with the federal pattern?’  [DAR (II-A) 36, 12 
March 1998, pp. 871-873]. 
On 27 May 1998 the PSD introduced Draft Resolution No. 
91/VI replacing the previous one [DAR (II-A) 55, 30 May 1998, pp. 1202-
1203]. The reason given was related to the change of the calendar 
anticipated for referendums in 1998. The PSD had introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 67/VII in October, aiming to hold the referendum in the 
spring of 1998. However, the agreement with the PS for a referendum on 
abortion in June included the postponement of the referendums on 
regionalisation and European integration, which would be held on the 
                                                 
297 In the admission dispatch of this draft, the President of the Assembly of the Republic, 
Almeida Santos, was doubtful that the three questions could be considered on the same 
subject [DAR (II-A) 3, 17 October 1997, p. 60]. 
298 The Portuguese currency prior to the introduction of the euro. 
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same day, after summer. The PSD understood that holding two 
referendums simultaneously demanded a simplification of the European 
question. Therefore, PSD’s new draft question was: ‘do you agree with 
deepening the integration of Portugal in the European Union, in 
agreement with the Amsterdam Treaty?’ 
Finally, on 23 June, the CDS-PP introduced Draft Resolution 
No. 94/VII, replacing the previous one, and including the following 
questions: 1) ‘do you agree with the participation of Portugal in the 
European construction within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty?’ 
2) ‘Do you agree that the evolution of the European construction be based 
on the reinforcement of the national States, in the cooperation and 
solidarity among Governments, and in the democratic scrutiny of the 
communitarian decisions, in rather than following a pattern of political 
federalism?’ [DAR (II-A) 62, 25 June 1998, pp. 1386-1388]. The new 
draft of the CDS-PP reflected the change of the party’s leadership, with 
Paulo Portas taking the place of Manuel Monteiro, and replacing the 
latter’s anti-federalist approach with a more pro-European stance. 
Therefore, the substitution of the question was controversial within the 
CDS-PP Parliamentary Group, and was opposed by members that were 
faithful to the defeated former leadership. 
The drafts that were introduced had significant differences. As 
for the electoral universe, the PSD and CDS-PP drafts proposed the 
participation of all emigrants registered anywhere around the world. The 
Government draft proposed, on the other hand, the participation of 
emigrants registered in other Member States of the European Union, while 
the PCP draft was not specific on that point. 
The contents of the questions were also significant. Both the PS 
Government and the PSD wanted to lead voters to an affirmative vote, 
asking them about the participation of Portugal in the construction of 
European Union. The acceptance of that integration would necessarily 
involve the acceptance of the Amsterdam Treaty. In the initial phase, the 
PSD still added questions that were hardly refusable, like the struggle 
against crime or unemployment, trying to link such aims to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. However, the PSD retreated from those additional 
questions, moving towards acceptance of the Government’s question. On 
its side, the PCP’s draft questions tried to introduce points that were 
critical of the European integration process, aiming to lead voters to the 
negative answer. Thus, the PCP draft referred to the transfer of national 
sovereignty, the end of the national currency, and the fines applied to the 
countries that did not fulfil the Maastricht criterions. The CDS-PP was 
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undergoing an internal transition process, and this flux was reflected in the 
draft resolution. The party evolved from an anti-federalist position, 
expressed in Draft Resolution No. 82/VII, to an acceptance of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The latter, more pro-European, stance was seen in the 
first question of Draft Resolution No. 94/VII, which approached the 
question supported by the PS and the PSD, reflecting the change of 
leadership in the party.299 
All of the referendum drafts attempted to avoid an obvious 
problem, which came from the terms adopted in the 1997 Constitutional 
revision: the fact that the Constitution did not allow referendum directly 
on the approval of international agreements, but only on the broad issues 
that such agreements raised. Although everyone had the Amsterdam 
Treaty in mind, there was doubt about the effect of a negative answer, 
since the ratification of the referendum could still proceed.  
   2.4.2. The Proposal 
On 29 June, the plenary of the Assembly of the Republic 
discussed Draft Resolutions No. 69/VII, 91/VII and 94/VII and 
Government Draft No. 71/VII [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, pp. 2970-2981]. 
The PCP draft was rejected with nay votes from the PS, PSD and CDS-
PP, but had yea votes from the PCP and PEV [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, 
pp. 3005]. The CDS-PP draft had nay votes from the PS, PCP and PEV 
and abstentions from the PSD, having also been rejected [DAR (I) 86, 30 
June 1998, pp. 3005]. 
 As for the Government draft, the PS introduced two draft 
alterations. The first agreed with the PSD, and proposed to ask: ‘do you 
agree with the following of the participation of Portugal in the European 
Union within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty?’ It had yea votes 
from the PS and PSD, abstentions from the CDS-PP and nay votes from 
the PCP, PEV and the PS member Helena Roseta [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 
1998, pp. 3004].300 The second draft alteration was about the electoral 
universe and proposed the participation of registered citizens in the 
national territory and in the Member States of the European Union. It had 
yea votes from the PS, nay votes from the PSD and Helena Roseta and 
                                                 
299 In the voting of Draft Resolution No. 94/VII, on 29 June, six CDS-PP members 
explained that they had voted yea due to the partisan discipline, in spite of their 
disagreement with the drafting of the first question [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, pp. 3020-
3024]. 
300 The negative vote from Helena Roseta was justified due to the disagreement towards 
the decision of holding new referendums without a reflection on the scarce participation in 
the referendum on the abortion held two days before. 
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abstentions from the CDS-PP, PCP and PEV. The PSD submitted the 
electoral universe to voting on its draft, proposing to include all 
Portuguese citizens registered abroad. It had the yea votes from the PSD 
and the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PS, PCP and PEV, which led to 
its rejection [DAR (I) 86, 30 June 1998, pp. 3005]. 
Thus, the final text passed included the PS/PSD question (‘do 
you agree with the following of the participation of Portugal in the 
European Union within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty?’) and 
the electoral universe proposed by the PS, giving the right to vote only to 
the Portuguese citizens registered to vote in the Member States of the EU. 
   2.4.3. The Refusal 
After the draft referendum was passed through Resolution No. 
36-A/98, of 30 June, it was submitted to the Constitutional Court. The 
Court decided, in Ruling No. 531/98, of 29 July, that the draft referendum 
passed by the Assembly of the Republic did not observe the requirements 
of objectivity, clarity and precision demanded by Article 115(6) of the 
Constitution and by Article 7(2) of the Referendum Law. Consequently 
the draft was considered neither Constitutional nor legal [DR 174 (I-A) 
Supplement, 30 July 1998]. 
The Court rejected the question because they considered that it 
was not formulated with clarity or precision, and it could be interpreted in 
more than one way. According to one interpretation, the focus of the 
question was the participation of Portugal in the construction of the 
European Union, with reference to the framework of the Amsterdam 
Treaty as a circumstantial, complementary or explanatory element. 
According to another interpretation, the subject of the referendum was the 
approval of the Amsterdam Treaty, with the first part of the phrase being a 
circumstantial, complementary or explanatory element. 
The Court also considered that the question was not objectively 
formulated. They held that the term ‘following’ in the expression 
‘following of the participation of Portugal in the construction of the 
European Union within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty’ could 
lead the voters to misinterpret the consequences of rejecting the Treaty, 
thus influencing their answer. The Court was concerned that the wording 
of the question might lead less informed voters to assume that a negative 
answer implied a withdrawal from the European Union. Therefore, the 
question was formulated to lead the voters who wanted Portugal to 
continue its participation in the construction of the European Union to 
vote affirmatively in the referendum. This downplayed the essence of the 
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changes that were proposed, which related to the Amsterdam Treaty rather 
than the European Union itself.301 
This attempt to hold a referendum failed, with consequences 
regarding the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty by Portugal. The 
question in 1998 was different from the one that had shaken the country in 
1992 regarding the Maastricht Treaty. At that time, the question that 
divided the parties and the country was the referendum itself. The political 
forces and Portuguese society were divided between favouring and 
rejecting the very idea of a referendum. In 1998 all the political forces 
agreed that there should be a referendum, but they were divided about 
‘which referendum’. The PCP wanted to focus on Portuguese 
participation in the single currency, and tried to achieve a formula to 
attack it through the Amsterdam Treaty. The two main parties tried, on the 
other hand, to compromise by offering a referendum but leading voters 
towards a pro-integration response.   
In the end, the question about the eventual referendum on the 
Amsterdam Treaty was a way to heal the wounds of Maastricht. However, 
as Maria Luísa Duarte wrote (1998, p. 60), the removal of the 
Constitutional obstacle was late. Important, and even irreversible, 
decisions were taken at the time of the Maastricht Treaty: new political 
structures were built that was not merely economic in nature, but also set 
boundaries on the powers of the Member States in the areas of traditional 
sovereignty. Contrarily to what happened in other States, namely in 
France and in Denmark, it was not possible at that time to ask the 
Portuguese people if they agreed or not on the creation of a single 
currency. It is even questionable whether a referendum on the Amsterdam 
Treaty was really desired by its proposers, since it is hard to see that the 
potential advantages of holding a referendum justified the potential 
political and financial costs. Therefore, Duarte suggests that the 
Portuguese Government hoped that the Constitutional Court would block 
this politically inopportune referendum. (Duarte, 1998, p. 62). 
Therefore, calls to hold a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty 
failed. On 10 August 1998, Draft Resolution No. 118/VII was introduced 
in the Assembly of the Republic. This ratified the Amsterdam Treaty. It 
was passed on 6 January 1999 with yea votes from the PS, PSD and CDS-
PP and nay votes from the PCP, PEV and nine members from the CDS-
PP [DAR (I) 31, 7 January 1999, p. 1178]. 
                                                 
301 The decision was taken by eight votes against five. 
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3. The Referendum Proposals on the Nice Treaty 
3.1. The European Referendum in the 2001 Constitutional 
                       Revision 
In 2001, the Portuguese Constitution was again reviewed 
through an extraordinary procedure. That year, the Government submitted 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Assembly of 
the Republic for approval. The ratification of that agreement by the 
Portuguese State was inconsistent with some Constitutional provisions at 
that time. As a result, the amendment was supported by the PS, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP. Given that the previous ordinary Constitutional revision 
had been in 1997, less than five years before, the revision would only be 
possible through an extraordinary procedure. 
That procedure began on 2 March 2001 when the PS introduced 
a draft resolution so that the Assembly of the Republic could take up 
extraordinary powers for Constitutional revision. This was followed by a 
similar initiative from the PSD. Both parties finally agreed on a joint 
resolution, which was passed on 29 March and gave permission to 
commence the V Constitutional Revision. Only the PS, the PSD and the 
CDS-PP introduced draft amendments to the Constitution. 
In the event, the Constitutional revision was not limited to its 
initial purpose. Using the Constitutional cover of the International 
Criminal Court jurisdiction, the revision also changed Constitutional 
provisions regarding a) the Constitutional status of citizens from the 
member States of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries) living in Portugal; b) the allowance of the application of rules 
on judicial cooperation in criminal matters established in the European 
Union; c) the Constitutional rule of home inviolability which was now 
broken; d)  amended provisions on the restrictions of the exercise of rights 
by military personnel and members of the security forces and services; 
and e) qualified Portuguese as the official language of the Republic 
(Magalhães, 2004). 
Before the unexpected widening of the Constitutional revision, 
the PCP went forward in the CERC meeting of 27 September 2001 with a 
proposal that allowed the Constitution to hold referendums on agreements 
related to the participation of Portugal in the European Union. This was 
proposed with a view to submitting the ratification of the Treaty of Nice 
to a referendum.  It had been signed on 26 February and introduced for 
approval in the Assembly of the Republic since 25 May by Draft 
Resolution No. 59/VIII [DAR (II-A) 62 − Supplement, 31 May 2001]. 
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The PCP proposal had the same intention as the ones introduced 
in previous revisions: it kept the Constitutional interdiction of 
referendums on the ratification of international agreements, except for the 
agreements through which Portugal agreed to jointly exercise the powers 
needed to construct and strengthen the European Union.  Submitted to an 
indicative voting in the CERC, the proposal was rejected with yea votes 
from the PCP, nay votes from the PS and PSD and abstentions from the 
CDS-PP and BE [DAR, 18 − RC, 27 September 2001, p. 274]. In the first 
plenary sittings held on 4 October, which closed the Constitutional 
revision, the proposal had nay votes from the PS and PSD, yea votes from 
the PCP, BE and PEV and abstentions from the CDS-PP [DAR (I) 9, 6 
October 2001, p. 302]. 
Despite this conclusion, the BE introduced Draft Resolution No. 
155/VIII on the Nice Treaty [DAR (II-A) 7, 16 October 2001, p. 106]. 
This draft included a proposal for a referendum, in which Portuguese 
citizens living in Portugal and abroad would take part, with the following 
question: ‘do you agree with the changes introduced in the European 
Union, resulting from the Nice Treaty?’ This initiative was never 
discussed. The Nice Treaty was passed for ratification in the Assembly of 
the Republic on 25 October 2001, with yea votes from the PSD, PS and 
CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP, BE and PEV [DAR (I) 17, 25 
October 2001, p. 591]. 
4. The Question of the Referendum on the European Constitutional 
    Treaty 
4.1. The Proposal for a Referendum on the Same Day of the 
       European Elections 
On 8 October 2003, the PSD, after a meeting of its National 
Council, announced its position in favour of a referendum in Portugal to 
follow the revision of the European Treaties, which would be passed in 
the Intergovernmental Conference. They proposed that the referendum 
should be held on the very same day as the elections for the European 
Parliament on 13 June 2004. This announcement was made in the 
Assembly of the Republic by the parliamentary leader, Guilherme Silva. 
With that in mind, the National Council of the PSD assigned the 
parliamentary group to propose the Constitutional alterations needed for 
that in the Assembly of the Republic [DAR (I) 9, 9 October 2003, pp. 436-
438]. The proposal was supported by the CDS-PP302 and opposed by all 
                                                 
302 See speech by Telmo Correia [DAR (I) 9, 9 October 2003, pp. 438-439]. 
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the other parties,303 which accused the PSD of aiming to distract attention 
from the troubles of the PSD/CDS-PP coalition Government. 
Indeed, the proposal was soon condemned to defeat. Given that 
the Constitution expressly forbids the coincidence of the referendum and 
the elections for the European Parliament, the success of the proposals 
would depend on a Constitutional revision that removed that forbiddance, 
which would only be possible with the PS agreement. However, on the 
very same day the proposal was announced, the PS member António 
Costa peremptorily rejected the idea [DAR (I) 9, 9 October 2003, p 442]. 
There would be no referendum on 13 June 2004. 
Despite that refusal, Prime Minister Durão Barroso, in the 
monthly debate in Parliament two days later – on 10 October 2003 – 
insisted on proposing the referendum and the European elections 
simultaneously, for three reasons: firstly, because the European elections 
would set the stage for the great European debate; secondly, because there 
would be more popular participation; thirdly, because in 2004 there would 
be at least two elections, one for the European Parliament and another for 
the Regional Assemblies of The Azores and Madeira [DAR (I) 11, 11 
October 2003, p. 533]. The proposal was again refused by the PS leader 
Ferro Rodrigues. He expressed his support for referendum if the Treaty 
involved significant changes in the share of sovereignty between Portugal 
and the European Union, but he reasserted the PS position that the 
referendum should not be on the same day as the European elections 
[DAR (I) 11, 11 October 2003, p. 536]. 
In the event, the deadlock over the final treaty draft, which 
became stuck at the European Council in Brussels on 12 and 13 December 
2003, meant that a referendum and European elections on the same day 
would not be possible. This was recognised by the Prime Minister in the 
monthly debate of 18 December 2003, whose subject was precisely the 
deadlock of the Intergovernmental Conference. 
4.2. The Draft Referendum on the Main Choices of the 
       Treaty 
A few days later, as soon as the works on the Convention calling 
for a draft on the Constitution for Europe were finished, and the works for 
the Intergovernmental Convention opened, the BE introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 185/IX proposing a referendum on the main choices of the 
                                                 
303 See speeches by Isabel de Castro (PEV), Bernardino Soares (PCP), Francisco Louçã 
(BE) and António Costa (PS), [DAR (I) 9, 9 October 2003, pp. 438-443]. 
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Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [DAR (II-A) 10, 25 October 
2003, p. 394]. This draft, introduced on 22 October, assumed that all 
Portuguese politicians with responsibilities would support the holding of a 
referendum on the fundamental choices of the so-called European 
Constitution, considering it desirable that the Portuguese people should 
decide if the Government should sign the treaty, or not. 
The question proposed included three questions: 1) ‘do you 
agree with the institution of a Constitution of the European Union, which 
will prevail over the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic?’ 2) ‘Do you 
agree with the creation of the post of President of the European Council, 
replacing the rotational presidencies by all Member States of the European 
Union?’ 3) ‘Do you agree with the increase of responsibilities and powers 
of the European Union in the sphere of defence?’ 
Thus, the BE wanted to position itself in relation to the other 
parties by proposing the referendum. This would anticipate the treaty 
itself.  The proposition to hold a referendum on some questions discussed 
in the works of the Convention, that would be included in the future 
treaty, would stimulate opposition to its ratification. For that matter, the 
BE selected the question on the primacy of the European Constitution 
over the Portuguese Constitution, the end of the rotational presidencies 
and the European policy of defence. 
The draft was discussed on 3 December 2003 at the BE’s 
initiative. The PS expressed itself in favour of a referendum, but only after 
knowing the contents of the treaty and without any Constitutional revision 
being necessary.304 The PSD was also in favour of a referendum on the 
European construction, stressing that it did not seek to avoid the 
Portuguese people’s consultation. Having in mind that the new European 
treaty would be adopted soon, the PSD considered that the moment of the 
consultation was near, and that moment should be the same as the 
elections for the European Parliament in June 2004, as had been suggested 
in October 2003. Regarding the BE proposal, the PSD considered it 
improper, both in terms of time and form, because the treaty was not yet 
finalised, and because it placed separate questions, chosen without 
criterion and logic.305 
The CDS-PP followed the PSD position: the referendum should 
be on the same day of the European elections in June.306 The PCP 
                                                 
304 See speech by António José Seguro [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, p. 1566]. 
305 See speech by Pedro Duarte [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, pp. 1572-1573]. 
306 See speech by Diogo Feyo [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, pp. 1576-1577]. 
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strongly opposed the treaty that was being drawn, and criticised the PS 
and PSD for having approved a Constitutional provision in 1997 that 
made a referendum on the European Treaties impracticable. They also 
supported its revision and rejected the idea of simultaneously holding the 
referendum and the European elections. However, the PCP did not 
support the BE draft. In spite of supporting a referendum, the PCP also 
considered that it should only take place when the ratification procedure 
was underway, prior to the decisive moment of binding the draft to the 
Portuguese State. The PCP also raised objections as to the 
Constitutionality of the proposed questions.307 The PEV agreed on the 
need for the referendum, but considered the BE proposal premature: a 
referendum before the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference 
could be ineffective.308 
The BE draft was submitted to voting and rejected with the only 
yea votes coming from the BE. The PSD, the PS and the CDS-PP voted 
nay and the PCP and the PEV abstained [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, 
p. 1594]. 
4.3. The Resolution on the European Constitution 
On 3 December 2003, the European Affairs and Foreign Policy 
Committee309 introduced Draft Resolution No. 194/IX [DAR (II-A) 19 − 
Supplement, 6 December 2003, pp. 701-702] on the European 
Constitution. This took into consideration the works of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, and the holding of a European Council 
summit in December. It proposed that the Assembly of the Republic 
should ‘consider it desirable’ to hold a referendum in Portugal before 
agreeing to the further evolution of the European Union. 
This draft, introduced after a report on the works of the 
Convention (which approved the draft of Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, drawn by António José Seguro (PS) for the 
European Affairs and Foreign Policy Committee), was discussed on 12 
December (Seguro, 2004). In the debate, members of the PCP, BE and 
PEV criticised the terms referred in the draft resolution regarding the 
referendum, where it was considered ‘desirable’. For these parties, the 
                                                 
307 See speech by Bernardino Soares [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, pp. 1582-1583]. 
308 See speech by Heloísa Apolónia [DAR (I) 27, 4 December 2003, p. 1584]. 
309 In the IX Legislature (2001-2004) the Assembly of the Republic decided to join the 
Committees of European and Foreign Affairs. That solution would be changed in the next 
legislature, in 2005.  
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resolution that came to be passed should be unambiguos the need of the 
referendum.310 
4.4. The European Referendum in the 2004 Constitutional 
       Revision 
The procedure which led to the VI Constitutional Revision 
began on 7 October 2003, with the introduction of the Draft Amendment 
to the Constitution No. 1/IX (PS), and finished on 23 April 2004. Three of 
the draft amendments included provisions regarding the referendum, 
having in mind especially the referendum on the European Constitutional 
Treaty, given the compromise assumed by all of the parties. 
The PS and BE drafts did not include any change in the 
Constitutional provisions on the referendum, on the grounds that holding a 
referendum would not require any Constitutional change.311 The Draft 
Amendment to the Constitution No. 3/IX, which was jointly introduced by 
the PSD and the CDS-PP [DAR (II-A) 14, 21 November 2003, pp. 564(9-
24)] proposed the elimination of the Constitutional provision that forbade 
the calling and holding of referendums between the date of calling and 
holding of general elections for the sovereignty organs, or the self-
government bodies of the autonomous regions and the local authorities, as 
well as the members of the European Parliament [Article 115(7)]. The 
reason for this proposal was obvious: it wished to give Constitutional 
covering to the proposal announced by the PSD in October 2003 to hold 
the referendum and the elections for the European Parliament on the same 
day. 
The Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 4/IX (PCP), 
[DAR (II-A) 14, 21 November 2003, pp. 564(24-35)] wished to allow, in 
line with the proposals made on the 1997 and 2001 revisions, the appeal 
for the referendum on all subjects that were considered fundamental for 
the participation of Portugal in the European Union. Taking into 
consideration that the Constitutional text only allowed the referendum on 
important issues concerning the national interest which were included in 
an international agreement, the PCP wanted to widen its scope to enable 
an explicit referendum about whether or not Portugal should be bound to a 
new treaty, or its refusal. They argued that it was important to make the 
                                                 
310 See speeches by Honório Novo (PCP), Luís Fazenda (BE) and Heloísa Apolónia 
(PEV), [DAR (I) 31, 12 December 2003, pp. 1789, 1790 and 1797]. 
311 See Draft Amendments to the Constitution No. 1/IX [DAR (II-A) 8 − Supplement, 18 
October 2003, pp. 338(2-7)] and No. 2/IX [DAR (II-A) 14 − Supplement, 21 November 
2003, pp. 564(2-9)]. 
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question specific so that the results of the referendum could translate into 
clear action. The Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 6/IX (PEV), 
although different, aimed at a similar purpose [DAR (II-A) 14, 21 
November 2003, pp. 564(39-45)]. 
In the CERC meeting of 21 April 2004 the PSD and the CDS-PP 
withdrew their proposal to have the referendum and the elections for the 
European Parliament coincide, given that it was already too late to arrange 
both elections on the same day. The PCP and PEV proposals were 
rejected with yea votes from the PCP, BE and PEV and nay votes from 
the PS, PSD and CDS-PP [DAR (II − RC) 10, 22 April 2004, pp. 318-
319]. On 22 April the texts were discussed and voted in plenary sittings. 
The PCP proposal was rejected by 173 nay votes (87 PSD, 73 PS and 13 
CDS-PP), and 13 yea votes (four PCP, three BE, two PEV, two PSD and 
two PS). 
4.5. The Draft Referendums on the European Constitutional 
       Treaty  
   4.5.1. The Antecedents 
The approval of a draft agreement in the Intergovernmental 
Conference on 18 June 2004 was the starting point of a new phase on the 
debate about the referendum in Portugal. On 23 June there was an 
emergency debate in the Assembly of the Republic requested by the BE 
on the European Constitution and the referendum in Portugal [DAR (I) 99, 
24 June 2004, pp. 5371-5391]. On that occasion, the requesting party 
urged the Government to define its position by holding referendum before 
the spring of 2005, and formulating a viable, clear and explanatory 
question.312 In response, the Foreign Minister, Teresa Patrício Gouveia, 
announced that, by September 2004, the Government would introduce to 
the Assembly of the Republic a proposal for a referendum during 2005 
[DAR (I) 99, 24 June 2004, pp. 5374]. 
Meanwhile, the appointment of Prime Minister José Manuel 
Durão Barroso as President of the European Commission forced the 
formation of a new Government under the leadership of Pedro Santana 
Lopes. Confronted with the European referendum, during the debate on 
the Government’s Programme on 27 July, the new Prime Minister was 
less peremptory. He affirmed his will to hold a referendum, but this 
conditional on unspecified agreements and other vague conditions. He 
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refused to assume any concrete compromise on behalf of the 
Government.313 
A clearer position on behalf of the Government was taken on 15 
September by the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Rui Gomes da Silva. 
Taking into consideration the foreseeable approval of the Constitutional 
Treaty in the European Council of October, the Government announced 
its intention to propose the referendum for 5 June 2005 [DAR (I) 1, 16 
September 2004, p. 42]. 
   4.5.2. The Drafts 
On 29 October 2004, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe was signed in Rome. Consequently, on 18 November, Draft 
Resolutions No. 290/IX (BE), 291/IX (PCP) and 292/IX (PSD, PS and 
CDS-PP) were introduced in the Assembly of the Republic, in order to 
submit that Treaty to referendum [DAR (II-A) 17, 20 November 2004, pp. 
111-113]. 
The question in the BE draft was the following: ‘do you agree 
with the alteration of the institutions and responsibilities of the European 
Union, in the terms of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe?’ 
The PCP question was: ‘do you agree with binding Portugal to the new 
treaty that institutes a Constitution for Europe?’ In explaining its draft, the 
PCP called attention to the risk of unConstitutionality in the questions, 
regretting that the Constitutional revision had not clarified matters. They 
were critical of the possibility of adopting a question that would lead to an 
ambiguous situation regarding the effect of the referendum on the 
ratification of the Treaty. The question of the common draft by the PSD, 
PS and CDS-PP was the following: ‘do you agree with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the rules of voting by a qualified majority and the 
new institutional framework of the European Union, in the terms of the 
Constitution for Europe?’ 
The debate about the drafts took place on 18 November 2004, 
and it is important to compare the positions of the different parties [DAR 
(I) 18, 19 November 2004, pp. 1028-1041]. The PSD declared that it had 
done everything to hold a referendum on the Constitution for Europe. It 
had assumed since the beginning of the works of the Convention that if 
the result was the approval of a text which included important advances in 
the rights of the European citizens and in the definition of new rules 
                                                 
313 See speech by Francisco Louçã (BE) and the Prime Minister’s response [DAR (I) 106, 
28 July 2004, pp. 5712-5714]. 
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which significantly modulated the working and the institutions of the 
European Union, it would demand the holding of a referendum. However, 
the PSD, tried to show some distance as to the question they had 
subscribed, expressing their preference for the questions proposed by the 
PCP and by the BE because it was a simple and linear question. They 
even declared a willingness to make an express Constitutional 
authorisation, if needed.314 
The PS supported the proposal that had been subscribed jointly 
by the PSD and the CDS-PP, despite stating that it was not ‘its own 
question’. The criterion, according to the PS Statement, was innovation. 
The idea was to consult the Portuguese people on the new matters 
included in the Treaty, which would be the extension of the rule of 
qualified majority and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.315 The CDS-PP 
renewed its position in favour of the referendum and supported the 
question that they had subscribed as the ‘possible question’, despite 
having participated in the meetings with the PS and the PSD where the 
question was drawn up.316 
The BE declared itself perplexed by the question proposed by 
the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP, expressing concern that it could, once 
again, lead to the frustration of the referendum. The question was not 
precise because it included not one but three questions. It was also not 
objective because it focused on some of the Treaty’s innovations while 
neglecting to mention others. Finally, the question was not impartial 
because it suggested an affirmative answer by selecting on the aspects of 
the Treaty that were likely to prove more attractive to the people.317 
The PCP accused the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP of seeking to 
avoid the referendum. These parties had refused a Constitutional revision 
six months before that would have allowed the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty without any doubt. Furthermore, the question that 
they proposed clearly ran the risk of being refused by the Constitutional 
Court because it was not objective, clear and precise. On the other hand, 
the PCP accused the proposers of not clarifying the practical effect of an 
eventual negative answer, which also meant that they were not clearly 
assuming that in that case the Treaty could not be ratified by Portugal. For 
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315 See speech by António José Seguro [DAR (I) 18, 19 November 2004, p. 1029]. 
316 See speech by Miguel Anacoreta Correia [DAR (I) 18, 19 November 2004, p. 1030]. 
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The Question o f the Referendum on the European Union   439 
 
the PCP, the proposed referendum would be a ‘make-believe’ 
referendum.318 
The draft resolutions from the PCP and BE were rejected, with 
yea votes from both parties and the PEV and nay votes from the PS, the 
PSD and the CDS-PP. The draft resolution subscribed by these parties had 
the respective affirmative votes and negative votes from the others [DAR 
(I) 18, 19 November 2004, p. 1041].319 
The draft referendum was submitted to the prior review of the 
Constitutional Court on 25 November 2004. As predicted, it was judged 
unConstitutional and illegal because of its lack of clarity, and because the 
question was not formulated for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer.320 The Court 
considered that the question was not clear, because it contained three 
different questions. The referendum addressed a global judgement – 
whether or not there should be a Constitution for Europe – but the 
question was not clear in that respect. On the other hand, by including 
three autonomous questions, it was clear that the question was not 
formulated for a ‘yes or no’ answer. Consequently, the President of the 
Republic did not call the referendum and announced his decision to the 
Assembly of the Republic on 6 January 2005 [DAR (I) 22, 7 January 
2005, p. 1413]. 
   4.5.3. The Outcome of a Failed Referendum 
The outcome of the draft referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty in the IX Legislature justified the suspicions of 
those who had argued that the question (jointly subscribed and passed by 
the PSD, the PS and the CDS-PP) was condemned, from the start, to being 
declared unConstitutional. Thus, the PCP, the BE and the PEV accused 
the proposers of concealing their true lack of will to submit the ratification 
of the European Constitutional Treaty to the popular verdict, hiding 
behind a false referendum proposal. 
The PSD refuted these accusations, accusing the PS of 
formulating the question alone. Guilherme Silva, the parliamentary leader 
of the PSD at that time, later described the arrangements between the 
PSD/CDS-PP parliamentary majority and the PS regarding the question to 
adopt:  
                                                 
318 See speech by Bernardino Soares [DAR (I) 18, 19 November 2004, pp. 1031.1032]. 
319 The resolution is published in DAR (II-A) 20, 3 December 2004, p. 2.  
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When the works of the Convention were still running we thought 
that, if the result of these works were significant changes in the framework 
of the functioning of the European Union, as an actual result of the 
European Constitutional Treaty, it would be imperative to consult the 
Portuguese people, by referendum, on that subject. And we said from that 
very instant that a Constitutional revision was needed. It was not 
thinkable to formulate a clear question on that subject without a 
Constitutional revision. 
We insisted near the leadership of the Socialist Party, to move 
forward with a Constitutional revision that would allow an exceptional 
solution, but we found a barrier of opposition from the PS. The Secretary 
General of the PS himself said the following to my party’s leadership, in 
my presence: we accept a Constitutional revision only if it demonstrated 
that we cannot do this referendum in the framework of the Constitution in 
force. We then began the fate and the torment of the question. 
In that sense, we posed the Socialist Party with a very clear 
question: we feel that it is difficult to find a question that, in the present 
framework, could be Constitutional. If you found it, we would agree with 
it. If you gave us the guarantee of its Constitutionality, we shall not touch 
it or even add a comma. As we wanted to make this consultation by any 
means, we were even confronted with the following demand from the 
Socialist Party: ‘this is our question, but we don’t want to subscribe it. Do 
it yourself in your draft resolution.’ At last, the deal was known, that is, 
the draft resolution was subscribed by the PSD, the PS and the CDS-
PP.321  
4.6. The Extraordinary Constitutional Revision of 2005 
   4.6.1. Preliminaries 
In the X Legislature, on 16 May 2005, the PSD introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 5/X [DAR (II-A) 4, 2 April 2005, pp. 105-106] so that the 
Assembly of the Republic could assume extraordinary powers for a 
Constitutional revision. For the proposing party, the idea was to overcome 
the Constitutional blockade that existed on the possibility of a referendum 
on the European Constitutional Treaty, which subsisted in the previous 
legislature because of PS. On 30 March, the socialist parliamentary 
majority took a similar initiative, through Draft Resolution No. 12/X 
[DAR (II-A) 4, 2 April 2005, p. 111], recognising the difficulty of holding 
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the referendum if some changes were not made to the existing 
Constitutional system. The draft resolutions were discussed on 7 April 
2005 and passed unanimously, with the respective text being unified 
under a proposal by the President of the Assembly [DAR (I) 6, 8 April 
2005, pp. 197-209]. 
The only real disagreement of the debate was on the date of the 
referendum, given that the PS started to support that the European 
referendum be on the same day as the elections for local authorities in 
October 2005. This proposal had been announced by the Prime Minister, 
José Sócrates in the Government’s Programme debate on 21 March 2005 
[DAR (I) 3, 22 March 2005, p. 53]. Regarding that, the PCP expressed its 
disagreement and stressed that such a proposal meant a change of opinion 
from the PS, which a few months before had contested the PSD proposal 
to make the referendum and the elections for the European Parliament 
coincide.322 
   4.6.2. The Draft Amendments to the Constitution 
Six draft amendments to the Constitution were introduced.323 
The PS draft, introduced on 8 April, included two provisions:324 one of 
them removed the prohibition of coincidence between the day that 
national referendums and elections for local authority bodies were held; 
the other added a transitory provision allowing a referendum on the 
approval of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, making an 
exception in the Constitutional provision that only allowed the referendum 
on issues which should be the object of agreements and not the 
agreements themselves. 
The PCP draft, introduced on 13 May, aimed only to change 
Article 115 of the Constitution. It exempted the construction and 
strengthening of the European Union in the prohibition of submitting 
international agreements to referendum.325 The PSD draft, introduced on 
                                                 
322 See speeches by António Filipe (PCP) and Guilherme de Oliveira Martins (PS), [DAR 
(I) 3, 22 March 2005, pp. 205-206 and 211]. 
323 One of the drafts, introduced by monarchist members elected by the PSD did not make 
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324 See Draft Amendment to Constitution No. 1/X [DAR (II-A) 15, 19 May 2005, p. 2]. 
325 See Draft Amendment to the Constitution No. 2/X [DAR (II-A) 15, 19 May 2005, pp. 3-
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the same day,326 included two provisions: a transitory provision, in order 
to allow the referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, signed in 2004, and its future alterations, and another provision in 
order to allow the coincidence between the holding of only this 
referendum, and the elections for local authority bodies. The CDS-PP 
draft,327 also introduced on 13 May, included a provision that was not on 
the European referendum but insisted on the allowance of a Constitutional 
referendum, which only excluded matters in which the Constitutional 
revision would be restricted to in the terms of Article 288.  
Regarding the European referendum, the CDS-PP proposed that 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe be considered an issue 
of important national interest in order to be submitted to referendum. The 
CDS-PP also proposed to make it possible to hold a referendum and local 
elections simultaneously. On the very same day, the CDS-PP introduced 
Bill No. 79/X, which changed the Referendum Law in terms that reflected 
its draft amendments to the Constitution [DAR (II-A) 17, 21 May 2005, 
pp. 21-22]. The PEV draft, introduced on 16 May, only proposed an 
exception in the interdiction of submitting international agreements to 
referendum in order to allow the referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty.328 
   4.6.3. The Vicissitudes of the Final Decision 
In the works of the CERC which took place on 1 June, a 
common proposal from the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP was introduced. 
It replaced the draft amendments from the three parties. Thus, a transitory 
provision would be introduced in the Constitution in order to expressly 
allow the Assembly of the Republic to call and hold a referendum on the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe or its alterations. This 
referendum could be held on the same day as the general elections for the 
local authority bodies. The proposal had yea votes from the PS, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP, the BE and the PEV. The 
main criticism from these parties, besides the disagreement as to the 
coincidence with the local elections, was the direct reference to the 
European Constitutional Treaty, at a moment when, due to the holding of 
referendums in France (on 29 May) and in The Netherlands (on the very 
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same day, 1 June) with negative results for the ratification of the Treaty, 
its viability was obviously prejudiced. The PCP and the PEV did not give 
up on their drafts, which had affirmative votes from the proposers and the 
BE and negative votes from the PS, PSD and CDS-PP.329 
The debate on the Constitutional revision in plenary sittings took 
place on the same day as the debate on the European Council of Brussels 
(16 and 17 June 2005), which, after the referendums of France and The 
Netherlands, had decided to halt the ratification process of the European 
Constitutional Treaty. In that debate, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, 
Augusto Santos Silva, proposed the postponement sine die of the national 
referendum foreseen for October, but he reaffirmed the Government’s 
commitment to submit the Treaty to referendum, taking into consideration 
that any other solution would be unacceptable and would be contrary to 
the growing interest of the Portuguese people in the European questions 
[DAR (I) 32, 23 June 2005, p. 1288]. This position of the Portuguese 
Government was accepted by the opposition on the right (PSD and CDS-
PP) but criticised by the opposition on the left (PCP, BE and PEV). The 
latter opposed the Treaty, and considered that, after the French and Dutch 
referendums, the implementation of the Constitutional Treaty had been 
shelved.  As a result, insisting it be submitted to a referendum did not 
make any sense.330 
At the beginning of the debate in the plenary, the proposal that 
had been passed in the CERC was withdrawn by its proponents and 
replaced with another one. The chance of having a referendum in October 
was out of the question. Therefore, holding a referendum simultaneously 
with the local elections did not make sense, and the proposal to make this 
possible was withdrawn. On the other hand, since there was a strong 
possibility that the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty 
would be scrapped and another treaty drawn on same topic, it was 
necessary to create structures that would guarantee that any future treaty 
be submitted to a binding referendum. 
For that reason, the final proposal allowed the calling and 
holding of a referendum on the approval of any treaty that had as its 
purpose the construction and strengthening of the European Union. 
According to Vitalino Canas (PS), the Portuguese people would be asked 
if they agreed that the Assembly of the Republic approve a treaty whose 
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purpose was the construction and strengthening of the European Union 
[DAR (I) 32, 23 June 2005, p. 1311]. 
In the final vote, the PCP and PEV drafts had 174 nay votes 
(101 PS, 63 PSD and 10 CDS-PP) and 20 yea votes (11 PCP, seven BE 
and two PEV). A BE proposal, submitted directly to the plenary, aimed to 
allow the referendum on any international agreements except when they 
concerned peace or rectification of borders, had the same 174 nay votes, 
seven7 yea votes (from the BE) and 13 abstentions (PCP and PEV), [DAR 
(I) 32, 23 June 2005, pp. 1320-1322]. The joint PS, PSD and CDS-PP 
proposal was passed with 180 yea votes (PS, PSD, CDS-PP and BE) and 
13 abstentions (PCP and PEV), [DAR (I) 32, 23 June 2005, p. 1327]. With 
the possibility of holding a referendum on the European Constitutional 
Treaty being removed, since the ratification process was stopped, the 
question of the referendum emerged again with the Lisbon Treaty, which 
replaced it. 
5. The Question of the Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
5.1. From the European Council of June to the Signature of 
       the Treaty 
In the second half of 2007 Portugal took the presidency of the 
European Union, with the main purpose of reforming the treaties. With 
that in mind, the European Council of Brussels on 21 and 22 June 2007 
decided that the next presidency would be in charge of drawing up a new 
draft treaty, to be submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference, which 
should be opened in July. This should complete its work before the end of 
2007 so that the ratification of the treaty could be concluded before the 
European election of June 2009. 
When the Prime Minister announced the Programme of the 
Portuguese Presidency of the EU to the Assembly of the Republic on 27 
June, there was a conviction, or at least a strong suspicion, that the 
European Heads of Government would agree to avoid holding 
referendums on the future treaty. The PSD leader, Marques Mendes, 
wanted to know if any agreement among the Heads of Government had 
been made to avoid referendums on the future treaty, and reaffirmed the 
PSD’s commitment to a referendum in Portugal on the future treaty.  He 
announced that the PSD, at the right moment, would formalise that 
proposal [DAR (I) 99, 28 June 2007, p. 9]. In response, the Prime Minister 
denied the existence of any agreement on the referendum, but refused to 
take any position before knowing the contents of the future treaty [DAR 
(I) 99, 28 June 2007, p. 13]. 
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The BE, the PCP and the PEV explicitly accused the Portuguese 
Government of seeking to avoid a referendum. Francisco Louçã (BE) 
spoke about a ‘conspiracy of instantaneous ratification’ fed by the refusal 
of a referendum by all means. Agostinho Lopes (PCP) accused the 
political heads of the European Union of making-up the Constitutional 
treaty to avoid the ratification by referendum, and Álvaro Saraiva (PEV) 
concluded that everything was set out as a stratagem from several 
countries to avoid the referendum [DAR (I) 99, 28 June 2007, pp. 27-30]. 
On 19 October 2007, in a parliamentary debate with the 
participation of the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Augusto Santos Silva, 
several deputies that supported the referendum tried to obtain a 
commitment from the Government.331 They also confronted the 
Government with the compromise inserted in its Programme, in which the 
approval and ratification of the treaty should be preceded by a popular 
referendum. In addition, they pointed to the similarity of the essential 
contents between the new treaty and the Constitutional Treaty. The 
Minister addressed the decision for a moment after the signature of the 
treaty, which would take place on 13 December [DAR (I) 12, 20 October 
2007, p. 8]. 
The change in the PSD’s position on the referendum, reflecting 
the replacement of Marques Mendes by Luís Filipe Menezes in the 
partisan leadership on 28 September 2007, was also expressed in that 
debate. On 19 October, the speech by Pedro Santana Lopes as 
parliamentary leader was very distant from the position in favour of the 
referendum which had been expressed by the former leadership [DAR (I) 
12, 20 October 2007, pp. 28-29]. The doubts expressed by the President of 
the Republic, Cavaco Silva, on the European referendum, and the 
commitment of the former leader of the party, Durão Barroso, as President 
of the European Commission, to approve the Lisbon Treaty, influenced 
that change of position. 
5.2. The Draft Referendums and the Debate on the 
       Ratification of the Treaty 
On the very same day as the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, 13 
December 2007, the question of the referendum returned to the 
Portuguese Parliament. The PCP announced the immediate presentation 
                                                 
331 See speeches by Bernardino Soares (PCP), [DAR (I) 12, 20 October 2007, p. 7]; Luís 
Fazenda (BE), [DAR (I) 12, 20 October 2007, p. 11]; Heloísa Apolónia (PEV), [DAR (I) 
12, 20 October 2007, pp. 13-14]; António Filipe (PCP), [DAR (I) 12, 20 October 2007, pp. 
19-20]; and Honório Novo (PCP), [DAR (I) 12, 20 October 2007, pp. 29-30]. 
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of Draft Resolution No. 241/X, proposing the holding of a referendum 
with the participation of all Portuguese citizens registered to vote in the 
national territory, or in other Member States of the European Union, with 
the following question: ‘do you approve of the Lisbon Treaty which alters 
the European Union Treaty and the Treaty that Institutes the European 
Community?’ [DAR (II-A) 51, 2 February 2008, pp. 22-24].332 
On 20 December, a week after the signature of the Treaty, a 
parliamentary debate with the Foreign Minister Luís Amado took place. 
The Government was again asked about its position on the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty.333 Despite the insistence, the Government refused to 
make a decision before the beginning of 2008 [DAR (I) 29, 21 December 
2007, p. 26]. 
On 21 December, the BE also introduced Draft Resolution No. 
246/X with the purpose of submitting to referendum the approval of the 
Lisbon Treaty, and with the same question proposed by the PCP [DAR 
(II-A) 51, 2 February 2008, p. 24]. The CDS-PP took a similar initiative 
through Draft Resolution No. 248/X, whose question was the following: 
‘do you agree with the approval of the Lisbon Treaty?’ [DAR (II-A) 51, 2 
February 2008, pp. 24-25]. On 8 January, the PEV introduced Draft 
Resolution No. 250/X with the following question: ‘do you agree with the 
contents of the Lisbon Treaty (which alters the Treaties of the European 
Union and the European Community)?’ [DAR (II-A) 51, 2 February 2008, 
p. 25-26].334 
Finally, on 9 January 2008, Prime Minister José Sócrates 
announced in the Assembly of the Republic the refusal of the referendum 
on the Lisbon Treaty for three main reasons: 1) It is not justified to hold a 
referendum when there is a wide consensus in the Portuguese society as to 
the European project and the Lisbon Treaty itself. The main Portuguese 
institutions and political forces agree with the ratification of the Treaty. 
There is, therefore, no reason of doubt that the wide consensus in 
                                                 
332 See the political Statement by António Filipe (PCP) in support of the referendum [DAR 
(I) 26, 14 December 2007, pp. 12-14]. 
333 See speeches by Honório Novo (PCP), [DAR (I) 29, 21 December 2007, p. 27]; Heloísa 
Apolónia (PEV), [DAR (I) 29, 21 December 2007, pp. 27-28]; Diogo Feyo (CDS-PP), 
[DAR (I) 29, 21 December 2007, p. 30]; and João Semedo (BE), [DAR (I) 29, 21 December 
2007, pp. 32-33]. 
334 The admission of the draft resolutions by the President of the Assembly of the Republic 
occurred only on 31 January 2008, after the presentation of Draft Resolution No. 68/X, 
through which the Government proposed the approval of the Lisbon Treaty for ratification 
to the Assembly of the Republic (DAR (II-A) 51 − Supplement, 2 February 2008, pp. 27-
(2-272)]. 
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Parliament expresses the major will of the Portuguese people. 2)  
Ratification by Parliament is as legitimate and democratic as the 
ratification by referendum. The holding of a referendum in Portugal 
would keep in check, without any reason, the full legitimacy of the 
ratification by the national parliaments, as carried out in all other 
European countries. 3) The Treaty of Lisbon is different from the former 
draft of the Constitutional Treaty, and the electoral compromise of the PS 
on the referendum expressly respected the Constitutional Treaty and not 
any other [DAR (I) 32, 10 January 2008, pp. 7-9]. 
The announcement of the Government’s refusal to accept a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty resulted in the presentation of a motion 
of no confidence by the BE, in order to confront the Government with the 
non fulfilment of its compromise to submit the Treaty to referendum. The 
motion was discussed on 16 January and rejected by nay votes from the 
PS, having obtained yea votes from the BE, the PCP and the PEV and 
abstentions from the PSD and the CDS-PP [DAR (I) 35, 17 January 2008, 
pp. 6-52]. 
The discussion of the draft referendums took place on 7 
February 2008 at the PCP’s initiative [DAR (I) 45, 8 February 2008, pp. 
6-43]. In that debate, the proposers of the referendum refuted the Prime 
Minister’s arguments that the referendum was not necessary, considering 
that refusal a serious non-fulfilment of a compromise inserted in the 
Electoral Programme of the PS and in the Programme of the Government. 
They argued that this reflected the broad consensus in Parliament, and in 
the country, on the European integration process. The right of the 
Parliament to ratify the Treaty without a referendum had been surrendered 
when the PS promised, in the Programme of the Government, that a 
referendum would be held, and when they promoted the 2005 
Constitutional revision with the express purpose of enabling such a 
referendum. The idea that the Lisbon Treaty was substantially different 
from the European Constitutional Treaty was also refuted.  Statements 
from several European leaders affirming that the treaties were similar in 
substance were quoted.335 
The CDS-PP position, supporting its draft resolution, diverged 
from the PS and PSD views as to the referendum, and also diverged from 
the PCP, BE and PEV as to the answer to give if the referendum took 
                                                 
335 See speech by Agostinho Lopes (PCP) who, quoting Statements from José Luís 
Zapatero, Angela Merkel and Romano Prodi, considered that the new treaty was nothing 
but a Constitutional Treaty with a new name that had been exclusively changed to try to 
avoid new popular rejections [DAR (I) 45, 8 February 2008, pp. 6-7]. 
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place. While the left parties proposed the referendum and assumed the 
refusal of the Treaty, the CDS-PP supported the referendum because it 
wanted to remain faithful to the compromise it had made with the 
Portuguese people. They hoped that the Portuguese people would favour 
the ratification of the Treaty, rejecting the argument by the PS and PSD 
that the supporters of the referendum only wanted to attack the European 
integration process. 336 
The draft resolutions were rejected. The PCP, the CDS-PP, the 
BE and the PEV voted affirmatively on all the drafts, as well as the PS MP 
António José Seguro, two members of the Party of the Land Movement 
(MPT) and two PPM members elected by the PSD. The PS MP Manuel 
Alegre abstained. The PS and PSD members voted negatively, although 
four PS members and nine PSD members sent explanations of vote 
expressing their disagreement towards the positions taken by their 
parties.337 
Nonetheless, the approval of the Lisbon Treaty for ratification 
would be made in the Assembly of the Republic on 23 April 2008, with 
yea votes from the PS, PSD and CDS-PP and nay votes from the PCP, 
BE, PEV and one member of the MPT elected by the PSD (Pedro Quartin 
Graça). Manuel Alegre (PS) and nine PSD members tempered their yea 
votes with Statements of regret that the approval of the Treaty had not 
been preceded by a referendum [DAR (I) 75, 24 April 2008, pp. 43-48]. 
5.3. Some Remarks on the Refusal of the Referendum on the 
       Lisbon Treaty 
The referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was refused following a 
change of PS and PSD positions, which was denied by the PS, but 
admitted by the PSD in respect to itself. It is undeniable that the allegation 
concerning the compromise of the PS and its Government with the 
referendum only respected the European Constitutional Treaty is not 
believable. It is obvious that when those programmes were drawn the only 
treaty that was foreseeable and could be submitted to referendum was the 
Constitutional Treaty, but it is not less true that when the 2005 
Constitutional revision was concluded, with the only purpose of making 
possible the referendum supported by all Portuguese parties, the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty was already out of question. The 
last minute change of the Constitutional provision that had been passed 
                                                 
336 See speech by Diogo Feyo (CDS-PP), [DAR (I) 45, 8 February 2008, pp. 13-14]. 
337 See voting and the explanations for the vote in DAR (I) 45, 8 February 2008, pp. 34-
43]. 
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had the only intention of making it possible to hold a referendum on 
another treaty, which would replace the Constitutional Treaty, and that 
treaty is none other than the Lisbon Treaty.  
It is also not true that the Lisbon Treaty is substantially different 
from the Constitutional Treaty. Firstly, because such an idea is sufficiently 
denied by a lot of Statements from European leaders confirming the 
substantial identity of both treaties; secondly, because if in Portugal José 
Sócrates refused the referendum because the treaties were different, in 
Spain, Zapatero refused a new referendum because the treaties were 
similar; thirdly, because the three questions chosen by the PS to include 
the draft referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and that justified a 
referendum for being innovative, went through the Lisbon Treaty. The 
truth is that the victory of the negative answer in the referendum held in 
France and in The Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty threw some 
panic among the supporters of the European construction process drawn 
on that Treaty. Therefore, it was obvious that the mandate given to the 
Portuguese Presidency in the European Council of Brussels of June 2007, 
presupposed an agreement that was not publicised among the European 
leaders with the purpose of avoiding by all means the holding of 
referendums in the ratification process of the next treaty. It is exactly what 
happened. Only in Ireland was there a referendum by Constitutional 
imperative and the result allowed us to understand the fear of European 
leaders in holding other referendums. 
In Portugal, the parties that supported a referendum on the 
European integration process since the Maastricht Treaty, the PCP, the 
CDS-PP, the PEV, and the BE since its creation, all tried within their 
powers to submit the Lisbon Treaty to referendum. The left parties, 
assumed the proposal of a referendum and the struggle against the Treaty. 
The CDS-PP assumed the proposal of a referendum and the support of the 
Treaty. The PS and the PSD preferred to avoid the risk of a referendum 
with an uncertain result and changed their positions. For both parties, the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was too important to run the risk of its 
refusal by referendum.  
6. The Ghost of the European Referendum in the Portuguese 
    Political Life 
Since 1992, the referendum on the participation of Portugal in 
the European integration process has hovered, like a spectre, over 
Portuguese political life. The referendum was proposed and gave rise to a 
particularly intense debate regarding the Maastricht Treaty; it was again 
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proposed on the Amsterdam Treaty; it was present, although less 
intensively, on the Nice Treaty; it came burst back on to the agenda over 
the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. However, this 
referendum never happened. 
The proposal for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was 
born on the political right wing. The CDS-PP was the first parliamentary 
party to propose the idea, during a ‘euro-sceptic’ phase of this party, under 
the leadership of Manuel Monteiro. The idea would soon be supported by 
the left, who saw in the referendum a possibility to contradict, through a 
popular vote, an approval in Parliament by an expressive majority. This 
idea was encouraged by the victory of the ‘no’ campaign in Denmark and 
by the narrow affirmative result in France. That was the position of the 
PCP and the PEV, which from this time forward, always supported the 
referendum when dealing with the ratification of a new European treaty. 
Much like the PCP and the PEV, the BE consistently supported the 
referendum since its creation, and followed the positions of the political 
forces which took part in it. This included the referendum on the 
European treaties, even if they were not as critical of the European 
integration process as the PCP, defining themselves as the ‘Europeanists 
of the left’. 
On the right, the CDS-PP was consistently in favour of the 
European referendum. Despite their abandonment of euro-sceptic 
positions at the beginning of 1990’s, it assumed a favourable position 
towards the European integration process once again. The CDS-PP 
remained faithful to the idea that the international agreements, including 
the European treaties, should be the object of referendum. 
The positions of the centrist parties were always more 
contradictory. Assuming an essential political convergence as to the 
European integration, the PS and the PSD kept an adjusted position on the 
possibility of a referendum. In 1992, they jointly refused the referendum 
on the Maastricht Treaty, rejecting the proposal introduced in the 
Constitutional revision. In 1997, they adopted a Constitutional formula 
that supposedly allowed a referendum aimed indirectly at European 
treaties, but which achieved opposite result. In spite of their Statements 
supporting a referendum on the European integration process, the PSD 
and the PS prevented it in practice, with the Constitutional text they 
adopted and with the unConstitutional and illegal questions which they 
agreed to put forward, first with the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, 
and later on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
Meanwhile, both refused a Constitutional proposal that would allow a 
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referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001. With the referendum on the 
European Constitutional Treaty, which all parties promised to submit to 
referendum, the PSD laid the blame on the PS for the failure of their 
common draft for the referendum, for having refused to change the 
Constitution and for having ‘imposed’ a question that was clearly 
unConstitutional. But, the truth is that the PSD subscribed to the question, 
and when the decisive moment for the Lisbon Treaty arrived, it was again 
in agreement with the PS in refusing the referendum. 
The single conclusion to take is that in Portugal there was never 
a referendum on the European integration process because neither the PS 
nor the PSD wanted to hold one. Despite having admitted to its 
convenience in 1998 and having assumed the compromise of holding it in 
2004, the truth is that they obstructed it. While they declared themselves 
supportive of the democratic value of the referendum, they placed greater 
importance on the European integration process, which always had an 




Final Notes and Conclusions  453 
 
 
Final Notes and Conclusions 
1. The Constitutional Monarchy 
The referendum was an unfamiliar institution to Portuguese 
monarchic Constitutionalism. In the 88 years from the first Portuguese 
Constitution, which came into force on 23 September 1822, to the 
republican revolution on 5 October 1910, Portugal did not adopt any 
device of semi-direct democracy. There was never any direct consultation 
of the people when approving any of the three Constitutions or their 
amendments, called Additional Acts. Moreover, Parliament never 
approved any legislation foreseeing referendums, either national or local 
in scope.   
In fact, the Portuguese monarchic Constitutional liberalism, 
established with the triumphant liberal revolution of 1820 or, more 
precisely, with the liberal victory at the end of the civil war in 1834, 
always maintained the representative principle as a matter of fundamental 
principle. It is true that historically the nature of the elections was merely 
instrumental. They served more to legitimate Governments than to choose 
them. In 45 general elections, the Government lost only twice (Proença & 
Manique, 1992, pp. 20-21). The debates on the electoral system were 
always on the more or less restrictive character of the suffrage, on the 
direct or indirect nature of the representatives’ election, on the existence 
of one or two parliamentary chambers, and on the elective or hereditary 
nature of the High Chamber. Only in the last quarter of the 19th century, in 
1872, did a concrete proposal to introduce the referendum in the 
Constitution first appear. The idea of introducing the popular ratification 
of Constitutional reforms did not proceed.   
The political process of 19th century Portugal allows us to 
understand this option. From the start, the liberal victory was a difficult 
and troubled process. In a first phase, the Portuguese liberals were focused 
on the survival of the regime itself, threatened by successive waves of 
absolutist reaction. The country had a strong tradition of clerical influence 
and agrarian dominance. Under these circumstances, any direct 
consultation of the people would hardly have been favourable to the 
interests of a bourgeoisie that was essentially urban, composed of 
merchants, industrialists and liberal professionals, and who followed 
revolutionary ideals and tried to substitute the power of the old nobility 
and the clergy, who supported the ancient regime.   
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After defeating the counter-revolution at the end of the civil war 
in 1834, the most powerful liberal forces imposed a highly restricted 
suffrage and the contradictions between the liberal establishment and the 
popular aims led to an upsurge in huge popular revolts, mainly in the 
1840s. When, at the end of the 19th century, demands for wider suffrage 
grew substantially, with demands to move straight to universal suffrage 
(which would not, in fact, arrive in Portugal until much later), the fear of 
republican influence amongst urban voters led to a suffrage restriction. 
The aim was to delay the fall of an increasingly contested Monarchy for 
as long as possible. 
2. The First Republic 
The idea of a plebiscite, which was raised during the First 
Portuguese Republic, is inevitably linked with the aim of monarchic 
restoration. Paiva Couceiro wanted the plebiscite as a way to avoid the fall 
of the Monarchy, and revived that idea as a possible way to restore it. In 
1911, he addressed an ultimatum to the new republican authorities, 
demanding their voluntary retirement from power.  He assumed an armed 
struggle in the north of the country on behalf of the plebiscite. The neutral 
nature of that movement, downgrading the monarchic restoration as an 
immediate purpose and making it depend on an expression of popular will 
by plebiscite, divided the royalists more than it disturbed the republicans. 
When Couceiro was defeated militarily, Dom Manuel II firmly expressed 
himself against any chance of a plebiscite. 
In the following years, during the deepest republican crises, 
when the monarchic hopes reappeared, the idea for a plebiscite reappeared 
as well. This happened in 1918, during Sidónio Pais’s presidency, when 
the royalists challenged the President to call a plebiscite on the regime. It 
happened again, before the uncertainties after Sidónio Pais’s murder. That 
question also divided the supporters of the monarchic cause during that 
time. Dom Manuel II, who never agreed with the plebiscite, supported by 
the royalists who were against his recognition as King. The plebiscite was 
contested by principle reason that it denied the Monarchy’s own basis. It 
was defended for pragmatic reasons, as a way of opposing and 
challenging the Republic, and trying to probe its eventual weaknesses and 
divisions. It was a proposal by someone who had nothing to lose, and who 
obviously had no other chance of obtaining a good reception from the 
republican power.  However, the idea was as far as ever from uniting the 
monarchists. 
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The constituent republican representatives of 1911 refused to 
consider a national referendum. They did not reject the referendum 
institution in principle, but feared its practice in the current Portuguese 
conditions. In fact, Switzerland’s democracy appears in the speeches of 
several representatives as an admired example, but was considered 
possible in Switzerland due to the high civic and political culture of its 
people. In Portugal, the referendum would lead to the desegregation of the 
republican regime, given the general lack of culture. It was indeed the 
same fears that led the Portuguese republicans to restrict the right to vote 
instead of widening it, which is what they had intended to do. The truth is 
that, as Vasco Pulido Valente explains (2004, pp. 152-154), the 
republican’ support was an urban phenomenon, with solid roots in Lisbon 
but weak support elsewhere in the country.     
The Republican Constitution of 1911 laid down the referendum 
only at a local level, allowing two modalities: 
a) the municipal authorities could hold an organic referendum 
on some deliberations from district authorities, and parish 
authorities could also have organic referendums on some 
deliberations from municipal authorities; 
b) the popular referendum was optional on some deliberations 
from municipal authorities, and mandatory on some 
deliberations from parish authorities. It was a necessary 
condition for the approval of statutes regarding the creation, 
annexation or disunion of administrative circumscriptions.   
Due to the political instability of the First Republic, but also to 
the sluggish legislative procedure that intervened with symmetrical 
powers, the two Chambers of the Parliament with a clear supremacy over 
the Executive in terms of legislation, the regulation of the local 
referendum also dragged slowly for several years, paralysing its 
application and creating doubts about its compulsory nature.   
Nonetheless, the local referendum did exist in the First Republic. 
During its 16 years, the republican authorities created several 
municipalities and parishes, and the administrative bodies took several 
decisions on financial matters, with and without a referendum. This will 
not be surprising if we think, not just about the long legislative 
indecisiveness of that period, but also the fact that the country was several 
times in a State of siege and that dictatorial decrees dissolved the 
administrative bodies twice. Despite those vicissitudes, after the 
regulation of its procedure in 1916, the local referendum played a 
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contradictory role. Instead of being a genuine way of delegating decision-
making to the people, the local referendum was restricted to limited 
spheres. Local government could not take certain decisions without a 
referendum, most importantly when they wanted to impose duties on the 
taxpayers. Afterwards, the claim for the regulation of local referendums 
led to calls for its scope to be restricted, leaving the administrative bodies 
free to take certain decisions.   
It seems clear that referendums under the conditions of the First 
Republic would suffer some democratic deficit but, in all probability, 
neither more nor less than the other electoral acts. Similarly, the wisdom 
of submitting certain decisions from the administrative bodies to a 
referendum is evidently questionable, especially when the decisions 
imposed financial duties on the citizens.   
The experience of local referendums in the First Republic was 
not wholly satisfactory. It could hardly have been so. In the Deputies 
Chamber session of 5 March 1926, less than three months before the 
beginning of 48 years of dictatorship, Alfredo Guisado appealed for the 
approval of a new Administrative Code. He deplored that, after 16 years 
of a Republic, Portugal was still ruled by ragged monarchic codes, and 
wished that something new and useful could be done with the parish 
authorities’ functions, given that, even the referendum which had been 
given to them by law, was no more than a gag (DCD, 47, 5 March 1926, 
p. 9).   
This frustration is not surprising. In a historical period like the 
First Portuguese Republic, where few political experiences were 
satisfactory, we cannot be surprised that the experience of the referendum 
was problematic. 
3. The Dictatorship of the New State 
The dictatorship established in Portugal used the plebiscite for 
Constitutional legitimisation. It was not an expression, or even a 
consultation, of the popular will, but rather a process that avoided the 
election of a Constituent Assembly and imposed a Constitution that the 
dictator put in place. 
Portugal lived under a dictatorship from May 1926 until April 
1974. Oliveira Salazar ascended to power by undermining democratic 
principles. With a restricted group of collaborators, he drew up a 
Constitutional draft that was submitted to a pale discussion involving only 
those loyal to the regime. A plebiscite followed. 
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The plebiscite did not even have a democratic appearance. There 
were neither alternative proposals, nor the freedom to debate the proposed 
draft due censorship and the prohibition of civil liberties. The vote was 
obligatory, not secret, and abstentions counted as favourable votes. The 
plebiscite on the Constitution of 1933 was no more than a farce, as were 
other electoral acts held by the dictatorship during its existence. 
After approving the Constitution through a plebiscite, the regime 
never again used a similar device. The first version of the Administrative 
Code approved in 1936, kept the local referendum as it had been during 
the First Republic, although it placed more limitations on the right to vote 
(which was not free and restricted to the heads of family loyals to the 
regime). However, the definitive version of that Code, approved in 1940, 
removed even that possibility. The Constitutional revision of 1935 gave 
the President the power to summon a plebiscite if the National Assembly 
intended to review the Constitution, in the part respecting the legislative 
power, but he never used that possibility. All the other proposals to hold 
referendums during the 48 years of dictatorship took place only in the 
1960s, mainly to resolve the colonial problem. 
4. The Referendum on the Colonial Problem 
Except for the plebiscite of 1933, which was held to give formal 
legitimacy to the dictatorship, almost every proposal, or mere suggestion, 
of a referendum during the 48 years of fascism, were focused on 
Portugal’s colonial policy. In the early 1960s, before the the invasion of 
the ‘Portuguese State of India’ by the Indian Union was imminent, the 
Secretary of State of the Army, Francisco da Costa Gomes, proposed the 
holding of a referendum to Salazar, hoping to allow for an honourable 
withdrawal, without any illusions as to the result. Salazar peremptorily 
refused that option. Some disperse references, found in the international 
press after the fall of Goa, Daman and Diu, referred to a supposed 
Portuguese referendary proposal. However, these are not credible. The 
Indian Union would never have accepted such a proposal, but the 
Portuguese Government never made it. 
After the outbreak of the wars in the African colonies, with an 
international situation that was clearly favourable to the liberation 
movements, several plans were made by the US Administration to solve 
the Portuguese colonial problem, which included the proposal of 
referendums. Convinced that Portuguese colonialism was condemned to 
failure in the near future, they tried to achieve a solution of self-
determination in such a way that would safeguard the American interests 
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and prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its sphere of influence. The 
Sakva Plan, drawn in 1962, foresaw the holding of referendums in 1967. 
In 1963, George Ball, on behalf of the Kennedy Administration, made a 
similar proposal that was unsuccessful. In 1965, under the Johnson 
Administration, the Ambassador in Lisbon, George Anderson, introduced 
a similar plan, without the conviction of a positive answer. 
Salazar’s answer was always peremptorily negative. In August 
1963 he encouraged speculation as to the eventual admission of a 
plebiscite, alluding to the advantage of a ‘solemn and public act’ through 
which the country could pronounce itself on the overseas policy of the 
Government. However, it quickly became clear that such an initiative was 
never in the dictator’s mind. 
Meanwhile, some sectors of the non-communist opposition 
cherished the idea of a referendum. Humberto Delgado supported the 
creation of a Federal Republic of the United States of Portugal, by 
plebiscite, in 1960. That proposal was as unrealistic as the General’s 
expectations of overthrowing the regime by a military coup, which he 
would lead from exile. Inside Portugal, the Communist Party, in its 5th 
Congress held in 1957, decided to support actively the struggle for the 
total independence of the colonies. However, some elements of the 
republican and liberal opposition supported a referendum on the colonial 
policy. This proposal was ignored by the Government, and had no echo in 
the rest of the opposition, which reflected all the hesitations of the 
proponents. The purpose was to keep some distance towards the 
Government and its colonial policy, but they were also hesitant to 
recognise the rights of the peoples under colonial rule to self-
determination. 
At the start of the 1970’s, the idea of a referendum on the 
colonial policy was raised again, this time from the regime’s ranks. 
General António de Spínola proposed this in his book Portugal e o 
Futuro. His aim was to find a solution for autonomy that would be 
sanctioned by a referendum prepared by the regime and accepted by the 
international community, being sure that the colonial problem could not 
have an honourable military solution for the Portuguese Government. 
However, nobody welcomed the proposal. The regime wanted to resist, 
militarily, at all costs. The opposition unanimously recognised the right of 
the people from the colonies to self-determination and independence. For 
the liberation movements, independence was only a matter of time. 
Final Notes and Conclusions  459 
 
In the first months of the Portuguese democratic revolution, the 
holders of the new political power were deeply divided as to the solution 
for the overseas problem. The excessive vagueness of the MFA 
Programme, in the compromise version negotiated on the nights of the 
25th to the 26th of April 1974, reflected precisely those divergences. 
The Coordinating Commission of the MFA, and the more 
progressive political forces, extolled the immediate recognition of the 
right of the people from the colonial territories to self-determination and 
independence. They also recognised the liberation movements as 
legitimate representatives of the respective people. General António de 
Spínola, his military followers, the Prime Minister of the First Provisional 
Government (Adelino da Palma Carlos) and the more conservative 
political parties that had been recently constituted (namely PPD and 
CDS), defended popular consultations in the territories. These 
consultations should involve not only the liberation movements, but also 
new political forces supported by Portugal, and also the communities of 
Portuguese residents in the territories. 
This disagreement meant that the decolonisation process was 
delayed for several months. The talks between the Portuguese authorities 
and the liberation movements remained inconclusive, and the war 
continued on the ground. The publication of Law No. 7/74, of 27 July, by 
which the Portuguese State formally accepted the independence of the 
overseas territories, meant the defeat of Spínola’s project. 
In July 1974, with the resignation of the Prime Minister Palma 
Carlos after a failed Constitutional coup, António de Spínola lost his main 
support. The Coordinating Commission of the MFA and the left parties 
increased their influence over those in power, with immediate effects on 
the decolonisation process. On the other hand, the combined pressures 
from the United Nations, the liberation movements that continued the war, 
and the Portuguese troops in the territories that refused to fight and 
threatened to recognise the respective independence on their own, created 
the necessary conditions for a fast progression of the decolonisation 
processes. 
In the territories where the military ending was imminent, 
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the negotiations excluded any concept 
of popular consultations. The Portuguese Government recognised the 
PAIGC and the FRELIMO as legitimate representatives of their peoples, 
and those new countries proclaimed independence, on 10 September 1974 
and 25 June 1975, respectively. 
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In two territories where there was no colonial war but where 
intense claims for independence existed (Cape Verde and Sao Tome and 
Principe), the independence foresaw, not exactly popular consultations 
under the form of a referendum, but some form of popular consultation 
through the direct election of constituent assemblies. The candidates were 
formally presented by the citizens’ groups, which certainly meant that 
they were, in practice, promoted by the liberation movements (the PAIGC 
in Cape Verde and the MLSTP in Sao Tome and Principe). 
In the case of Angola, considered the jewel of the crown of 
Portuguese colonialism due to its immense natural resources, the situation 
was more difficult. There were three liberation movements competing in 
the territory, and the process became internationalised, given the direct 
involvement of the regional and world powers in the support of the several 
movements. Furthermore, even after Law No. 7/74, António de Spínola 
insisted on leading the process, and he did not give up on this until his 
resignation in the end of September 1974. 
The Alvor Agreement, signed by the Portuguese Government 
and the three liberation movements, established the date of 11 November 
1975 for the independence of Angola. It foresaw the election of a 
Constituent Assembly by October 1975, prepared jointly by the three 
movements and contested only among them. Before the signature of the 
Alvor Agreement, the liberation movements refused an informal proposal 
made by António de Almeida Santos. The idea was to hold a referendum 
on a Constitutional draft which would be drawn by the three movements, 
foreseeing a tripartite form of sharing power in order to create peaceful 
conditions for future elections. In fact, the power system of the Alvor 
Agreement did not work due to the belligerent situation in the territory. 
However, the strong implantation of the MPLA in the area of Luanda 
allowed this movement to proclaim the independence of Angola in the 
capital, in the foreseen date.  
East Timor was therefore the only Portuguese colony that 
achieved independence through a popular consultation, after a long and 
stormy process. The first idea for a referendum, through which the 
Timorese people would decide between independence, a connection to 
Indonesia, and a connection to Portugal, was set out in 1975. However, 
the unilateral proclamation of independence by the FRETILIN, after 
having defeated an attempt of the UDT to take power, provoked the 
invasion and military occupation of the territory by Indonesia. 
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During the 25 years of occupation, Indonesian forces conducted 
genocide of Timorese people, with more than 200,000 people killed. 
However, the resistance to the occupants remained unbroken. The 
guerrillas’ fight in the mountains, the clandestine action among the 
populations and the action taken by the international community, with the 
support of Portugal as the administrative power recognised by the United 
Nations, finally gained results. 
Particularly after the international repercussion of a massacre 
perpetrated in 1991 by the Indonesian Army in Santa Cruz’s cemetery in 
Dili, the cause of the East Timorese people became more visible to the 
world, and the condemnation of the Indonesian invasion became louder 
and more widespread in the international community. Moreover, the 
political changes in Indonesia by the end of the 20th Century, with the fall 
of Suharto and his substitution by Habibie, created the necessary 
conditions for an agreement obtained in the United Nations, between the 
Portuguese and the Indonesian Governments, as to a popular consultation 
in East Timor. 
In spite of the violence exercised against the pro-independence 
activists by pro-integration militia, the choice of the Timorese people was 
overwhelmingly in favour of independence. On 30 August 1999, and 
through popular consultation, the East Timorese recovered the 
independence lost in 1975, proclaiming it again on 20 May 2002. East 
Timor was, thus, the only former Portuguese colony that achieved 
independence through a referendum. However, this happened 25 years 
after the Portuguese withdrawal from the territory, and no longer against 
the Portuguese colonial rule, but actually against Indonesian occupation. 
5. The Referendum in the Portuguese Democracy 
5.1. The Primacy of the Representative Democracy 
At the time of the 1974 revolution, Portuguese democrats had 
bad memories of referendums. The only plebiscite in Portuguese history 
was used by the dictator to give himself formal legitimacy in the 1933 
Constitution. In the context of a military dictatorship, without public 
freedoms or any chance to present alternatives, the plebiscite of 1933 only 
had a vague appearance of a popular consultation. The Constitutional text 
that was adopted as a result served as formal frame for the repressive 
dictatorship, from which Portugal was only able to rid itself from 41 years 
later. 
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At the beginning of the democratic regime, the institution of the 
referendum was not rehabilitated. Any suggestion of a referendum was 
treated with suspicion that the proposer wished to undermine Portugal’s 
fledgling democracy. Firstly, there were Spínola’s attempts to overthrow 
the Armed Forces Movement Programme through a referendum, by 
replacing the Constituent Assembly election for a provisional 
Constitution. He also attempted to prevent the unavoidable decolonisation 
process by holding referendums in the former colonies. Both attempts 
were rejected by the revolutionary soldiers and the political forces. The 
soldiers consequently identified themselves more with democratic 
revolution, and then committed themselves in defending it. 
After the approval of the 1976 Constitution, the Constitutional 
referendum became a goal supported by the opponents of the economic, 
social and political changes that were Constitutionally enshrined. The 
parties that were against the 1976 Constitution, including not only the 
CDS, which had voted against its approval, but mainly the PSD, which 
despite having voted for the Constitution never accepted its contents, tried 
to over-rule the demand of a two-thirds parliamentary majority needed for 
the Constitutional revision, through a referendum. 
The aim of changing the Constitution through a referendum, 
which contradicted the established rules for the Constitutional revision, 
was clearly assumed by the candidate for President of the Republic in 
1980 supported by the PSD and the CDS. This fact made that election 
primarily about the defence of the 1976 Constitution. With the re-election 
of Ramalho Eanes, representative democracy also defeated the 
referendary temptation. 
The leftist parties never accepted the Constitutional referendum, 
but after 1980 the PSD and/or the CDS persisted in proposing it even if 
they had no hope of obtaining approval. Insofar as the PS was converging 
with the PSD and the CDS in their aim to alter important aspects of the 
1976 Constitution, the rightist parties stopped agitating for a referendum 
and started to pressure the PS to sign Constitutional revision agreement, 
adding up to the necessary two-thirds majority. However, the insistence of 
the Portuguese right in the use of the referendum as an instrument to 
change the Constitutional system opened wounds that were hard to heal, 
and contributed to the fact that only in the 1989 Constitutional revision 
did the PS give up its position against the national referendum and allow it 
to be introduced, even if in extremely careful terms. 
5.2. The Weak Experience of Local Referendums 
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In almost 40 years of the Portuguese democratic system, there 
was never great enthusiasm for local referendums. Several reasons can 
help explain this fact. Jorge Miranda and Rui Medeiros [2007 (III) p. 482] 
attribute the tiny number of local referendums to citizens’ lack of interest 
in participating, local authority bodies’ reluctance to submit their 
proposals to popular vote, and to a very restrictive interpretation of the 
legislation by the Constitutional Court. 
The weak referendary tradition in Portugal, both at the national 
and local level, is a reality that can help to explain the weak popular 
enthusiasm for local referendums. It is also significant that the possibility 
of local referendums did not appear immediately after the transition to 
democracy. The Constitution only started to admit local consultations in 
1982, and the law did not enable them until 1990, and then with very 
restrictive terms. 
Moreover, experience reveals that the Constitutional Court 
judged most of the few subjects that raised the interest for calling local 
referendums as being unConstitutional or illegal. The restrictive nature of 
the Constitutional and legal enshrinement of the local referendum, with 
the backup of a restrictive jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, 
greatly limited the opportunities for referendums being held. On the other 
hand, the deliberations taken in order to call local consultations or 
referendums revealed, for the most part, great ignorance about the legal 
circumstances in which they could be held. If such ignorance can be 
understandable in some of the cases of the deliberations taken by 
assemblies of small parishes, municipal assemblies had less of an excuse. 
In the four local referendums actually held, we can verify a 
seemingly contradictory phenomenon. In the case of the parish of 
Serreleis, there was substantial electoral participation. In the cases of the 
municipalities of Tavira, Viana do Castelo and Cartaxo, turnout was very 
low. The difference can be explained by the relative importance attributed 
by the voters to the matter under consultation. While in a small village 
like Serreleis, the subject of the location of the playing field assumed 
considerable local relevance, for most of the population of Tavira and 
Viana do Castelo, the eventual demolition of an old water reservoir, or the 
integration of the municipality into an intermunicipal community, were 
almost irrelevant subjects. In the case of Cartaxo, even though the 
privatisation of car parking sparked great interest, the absolute consensus 
among the political forces, who also opposed the privatisation, surely 
demobilised the voters.  
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5.3. The Careful Inception of the National Referendum 
The national referendum was protected by extreme safeguards 
both in the Constitution and by law. There could only be a legislative 
referendum. In other words, referendums could only occur on matters 
upon which the Assembly of the Republic or the Government can decide 
by passing an international agreement or legislation. Many matters were 
excluded from the referendum’s scope. The referendum could not happen 
on alterations to the Constitution, or on issues and acts with a budgetary, 
tax-related or financial content, or on the Parliament’s most important 
issues of political and legislative responsibility.  
The referendum is, in general, optional. The only case of an 
obligatory referendum was established in the 1997 Constitutional revision, 
and regarded the de facto institution of the administrative regions. The 
referendum could only occur on acts in progress, and never on acts 
definitively passed within the same legislative session, thus making it 
impossible to hold referendums to revoke legislation that had already been 
approved by Parliament. The way that the national referendum was 
established was designed to emphasise the primacy of the representative 
bodies. 
In addition, the referendum could not be used to stoke conflict 
between the sovereignty organs. The referendum initiative belonged to the 
Government, the MPs and 75,000 citizens, but the decision to propose a 
referendum to the President of the Republic was the exclusive 
responsibility of Parliament. The decision to call a referendum belonged 
exclusively to the President of the Republic, and that decision was free 
and unfettered. Meanwhile, the President could only call a referendum if it 
was not declared unConstitutional or illegal by the Constitutional Court, a 
review that was obligatory. The referendum could not be called by the 
Government or by the Parliament against the President of the Republic, or 
by the President of the Republic against the Government or Parliament. 
Nonetheless, despite the admission of the referendum through popular 
initiative and the admission of the autonomous participation of the citizen 
groups in the referendum campaign, the decisive role was reserved for 
political parties, in both the calling the referendum, which required a 
parliamentary majority, and the campaign itself, where the parties were 
guaranteed a prominent position. 
Other important conditions were also established. The 
referendum could not coincide with national elections, in order to avoid 
electoral behaviour being contaminated by acts of a different nature. The 
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questions had to meet certain criteria: the referendum could be held on a 
single matter, and have a maximum of three questions, which had to be 
objective, and clearly and precisely formulated for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. 
These conditions help to explain the scarce use of the national 
referendum since it was introduced in into the Constitution. Nonetheless, 
before drawing a conclusion, it is important to consider the specific data, 
summed up in appendix 2, regarding the incidence of the referendum in 
the Portuguese democracy. 
5.4. The Referendum Proposals in the Portuguese 
       Parliament 
5.4.1. The Issues 
From 1989 up to 2011, the Parliament received 39 referendum 
proposals that related to nine different matters: 15 proposals were about 
European Union Treaties, 13 on the decriminalisation of abortion, four on 
the institution of administrative regions, two on the decriminalisation of 
drugs, one on the Portuguese Language Orthographic Agreement, one on 
the building of nuclear power plants, one on the appointment of the 
directors of public radio and television service, one on medically assisted 
procreation, and one on gay marriage. Three of these nine matters were 
never submitted to any parliamentary decision (the Orthographic 
Agreement, the nuclear power plants and the decriminalisation of drugs). 
From the six proposals remaining, three were rejected by Parliament: the 
appointment of directors to the public radio and television services; 
medically assisted procreation; and the referendum on gay marriage. 
Parliament approved the holding of referendums on three matters (the 
European Union Treaties, the decriminalisation of abortion and 
regionalisation), although only two of them were actually submitted to 
referendum. 
The referendum on the regionalisation was proposed four 
different times. It was not even discussed the first time (1992). It was 
rejected the second time (proposed by the PSD in 1998). It was passed the 
third time that it was proposed, by the PS in 1998, through an agreement 
with the PSD and the CDS-PP, which invalidated a CDS-PP proposal. 
The referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion was 
proposed 13 separate times. The first proposal (from the PSD in 1996) 
was withdrawn given the rejection of the bills that were introduced. In 
1998, a PSD proposal was not submitted to vote, after a joint proposal 
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from the PSD and the CDS-PP was rejected and a PS proposal was 
passed. There is no doubt that the divergence between the PS and the 
rightist parties related to the specific question, since the principle of 
holding the referendum had been agreed between the PS and the PSD. In 
2004, Parliament rejected proposals introduced by the PS, the BE and 
through popular initiative. 
In April 2005 a PS proposal was passed, after a BE proposal had 
been withdrawn and a CDS-PP proposal had been invalidated. The 
proposal that was passed, however, was refused by the President of the 
Republic. In September 2005, a new PS proposal was passed, but it was 
declared unConstitutional. In 2006, a PS proposal was passed, invalidating 
a proposal by CDS-PP, and a referendum was held in early 2007. 
The referendum on the European Union was proposed 15 
separate times. On the Amsterdam Treaty, in 1997, two PSD proposals 
and one from CDS-PP were withdrawn; two proposals from the CDS-PP 
and the PCP were rejected and a PS proposal was passed, which would 
come to be declared unConstitutional. On the Nice Treaty a BE proposal 
was introduced but it was never discussed. On the European 
Constitutional Treaty, a BE proposal was rejected in 2003; the BE and 
PCP proposals were rejected in 2004, and in that same year a joint 
proposal from the PS/PSD/CDS-PP that had passed would later be 
declared unConstitutional. On the Lisbon Treaty the proposals from the 
PCP, the BE, the CDS-PP and the PEV were rejected. 
5.4.2. The Authorship 
The authorship of the proposals was nearly always from the 
parliamentary groups. Only one of them, on the Amsterdam Treaty, was 
introduced in 1997 by the PS Government of António Guterres. Three 
proposals were introduced by independent deputies and neither was 
discussed. One proposal was introduced by a group of 14 PSD members 
and it was not discussed. The popular initiatives for a referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion in 2004, medically assisted procreation in 
2006, and gay marriage in 2010 were all rejected. 
33 of the 39 proposals were introduced to Parliament by the 
parliamentary groups. Seven of them were never discussed. Eight of them 
were discussed, but they were not voted on. 16 were rejected. Seven were 
passed (three on the decriminalisation of abortion, one on regionalisation 
and three on the European treaties). Seven proposals were submitted to the 
President of the Republic. One of them was refused without being sent to 
the Constitutional Court. Six were submitted to the Court and three of 
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them were declared unConstitutional. Three referendums were held. Two 
of them had a negative answer, and the other an affirmative one. In none 
of the referendums did more than 50% of the registered voters take part, 
and consequently none of them could be considered legally binding. 
We can conclude, therefore, that despite a significant number of 
proposals submitted to Parliament, the number of proposals passed was 
relatively scarce and fell upon only three matters. The criteria for passing 
were very restrictive and always decided according to partisan 
convenience. 
5.4.3. The Limits of a Popular Initiative 
The popular initiative was not very significant. The demand for 
75,000 signatures to propose a referendum to Parliament, in a country 
where a political party is legally constituted with 7,500 signatures, is 
clearly out of proportion and acted as a deterrent. Furthermore, that only 
entitled the proposers to see their draft discussed and voted upon. The fact 
that all the initiatives were rejected soon discouraged citizens from using 
this right of initiative. 
The right to create citizen groups to take part in the campaign 
was taken up in the three campaigns held, but the political parties had a 
decisive role in creating citizen groups that supported their own positions. 
Nonetheless, the participation of citizens in the three referendums was 
lower than predicted by those who had argued that the referendum would 
be an instrument of participation and expression of popular will. There 
was a clear contradiction between citizens who claimed, when asked by 
opinion pollsters, that they enthusiastically supported referendums, and 
claimed to favour of holding referendums on several matters, and the low 
turnout when the referendums actually took place. 
5.5. The President of the Republic and the Proposals 
       for Referendum  
The President of the Republic maintained a relatively low profile 
in relation to the referendum. Since the initiative belonged to Parliament, 
only once out of seven times did the President of the Republic (in this 
case, Jorge Sampaio) assume the political decision to refuse a referendum. 
In that case, he considered that the proposed date of the referendum, in the 
middle of summer, would not be conducive to high levels of participation. 
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As for the other cases, the President of the Republic merely 
followed the decisions of the Parliament or the Constitutional Court.  In 
the three cases of unConstitutionality, the President had no option but to 
refuse, and in the others, the President called the referendum. 
 The Constitutional Court’s decisions reflect the restrictive terms 
under which the referendum was established by the Constitution and the 
law, and none of the declarations of unConstitutionality were a surprise. 
Where proposals were made for referendums on the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the European Constitutional Treaty, the formulated questions were so 
obviously unConstitutional that it is legitimate to doubt if their proponents 
actually wanted the referendum. In the case of the referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion, there were some voices that warned about 
the formal unConstitutionality of the proposal, since it had been 
introduced in the same legislative session as another referendum on the 
same subject had been refused. 
5.6. The Political Parties and the Referendum 
5.6.1. PS 
The PS introduced nine proposals for referendum on four 
different matters: a) on the appointment of directors to the public radio 
and television services, which was rejected; b) on the regionalisation, 
which was approved; c) on the decriminalisation of abortion on five 
separate occasions: the first was approved in 1998 and gave origin to the 
first referendum; the second was rejected in 2004; the third was approved 
in 2005 and refused by the President of the Republic; the fourth was 
approved in 2005 and declared unConstitutional; and the fifth was 
approved in 2006 and gave origin to the second referendum; d) twice on 
European Treaties, both of which were declared unConstitutional. 
It is noteworthy that all the proposals for referendum that passed 
in Parliament were based on PS proposals, and they always occurred with 
a PS majority, even when original proposal for a referendum on a subject 
had come from a different source. The rightist majorities rejected two PS 
proposals, and all the rest were passed. The referendum on regionalisation 
was agreed with the PSD, but the question was agreed with the CDS-PP. 
As for the referendum proposals on abortion, the first was agreed with the 
PSD, but the question was passed with the abstentions from the PSD and 
the CDS-PP; the second was rejected by the PSD and the CDS-PP, 
despite the affirmative votes from the PCP, the BE and the PEV; the three 
remaining proposals were approved: the third was passed with the BE but 
it was refused by the President of the Republic; the fourth was also passed 
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with the BE but it was declared unConstitutional; the fifth was approved 
with the BE and the PSD and gave rise to the second referendum on the 
decriminalisation of abortion. The PS proposed two referendums on 
European treaties, both of which were approved: the first on the 
Amsterdam Treaty was passed with PSD support, and the second on the 
Constitutional Treaty, which was passed with PSD and CDS-PP support. 
Both, however, were declared unConstitutional. 
Besides having voted affirmatively on its nine proposals, the PS 
supported proposals for a referendum on the the decriminalisation of 
abortion, introduced in 2004 by the BE and by means of a popular 
initiative. However, the PS voted against the proposals referendums on 13 
separate occasions. Eight of those occasions were against proposals for 
referendum on European Treaties: the Amsterdam Treaty introduced by 
the CDS-PP and the PCP; the European Constitutional Treaty introduced 
by the BE (twice) and the PCP; the Lisbon Treaty introduced by the PCP, 
the CDS-PP, the BE and the PEV. It also voted against a joint PSD/CDS-
PP proposal for a referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion in 
1997, a PSD proposal for referendum on the regionalisation in 1998 and 
the proposals for referendum on the medically assisted procreation and 
gay marriage introduced by means of a popular initiative. 
The PS was behind the first proposal for referendum voted in 
Parliament, in 1992, which was rejected by the PSD’s absolute majority.  
However, the PS position would be decisive in all the referendums 
actually held. The PS agreed with the PSD about the holding of 
referendums on the decriminalisation of abortion and regionalisation, and 
it always kept a convergent position with the PSD as for the European 
Treaties: they agreed not to allow the referendums on the Treaties of 
Maastricht in 1992, of Nice in 2001 and of Lisbon in 2008; and they 
cooperated on proposals for referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty and the 
Constitutional Treaty, which were declared unConstitutional. 
As of 2004, the PS insisted on the need to hold a new 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion as a condition to approve 
any legal change. While it was in minority, its proposal for referendum 
was rejected. When it gained majority, it maintained its position that the 
law should not be changed without a referendum, and insisted on 
successive proposals for referendum until one was held. 
In the three referendums held, the PS defended the affirmative 
answer in all of them, and was defeated twice. The acceptance of 
referendums on the decriminalisation of abortion and on regionalisation in 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  470 
1998 meant that the PS has changed its positions, given that a few times 
before it had refused PSD proposals on the same topic. The results of the 
referendums in 1998 were PSD victories and PS defeats. The PSD insisted 
on holding the referendums and the results corresponded to its positions. 
The fact that a governing party agreed to hold two referendums and lost in 
both cases, resulting in political embarrassment, is somewhat strange. 
However, the 1998 referendums reflected the contradictions and the 
divisions within the PS, which the PSD cleverly exploited. On the 
decriminalisation of abortion, the leader himself contradicted the official 
position of the party. On regionalisation, there were also dissenting voices 
inside the PS, as was the case of the historic leader Mário Soares. The 
divisions inside the PS resulted in the acceptance of the referendums, a 
lack of commitment to the campaigns, and the negative results. 
5.6.2. PSD 
The PSD introduced eight proposals for referendum. The 
proposals on the decriminalisation of abortion in 1996, the Amsterdam 
Treaty and the decriminalisation of soft drugs were never discussed. Two 
proposals for referendums, on the liberalisation of abortion and the 
Amsterdam Treaty, were discussed but not voted. Two proposals were 
rejected: the joint proposal with the CDS-PP on the liberalisation of 
abortion and a first version of the proposal for referendum on 
regionalisation. By initiative of the PSD, only the proposal for referendum 
on the European Constitutional Treaty was approved, and it was declared 
unConstitutional. 
The PSD has voted negatively on most of the proposals for 
referendum submitted to vote. It voted affirmatively on six proposals: a) 
its three proposals, on the decriminalisation of abortion (joint proposal by 
the PSD/CDS-PP), on regionalisation, and on the European Constitutional 
Treaty (joint proposal by the PS/PSD/CDS-PP); b) the PS Government 
proposal for a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty; c) the proposal for a 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion in 2006; and d) the 
proposal for a referendum on gay marriage. 
However, the PSD has voted negatively on 15 proposals for 
referendum: a) the proposal for a referendum on the appointment of the 
directors to the public radio and television services; b) five proposals for a 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion, with three being from the 
PS, one from the BE and one by means of a popular initiative; c) eight 
proposals for a referendum on European Treaties: from the PCP on the 
Amsterdam Treaty, from the BE (two proposals) and from the PCP on the 
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Constitutional Treaty, and from the PCP, CDS-PP, BE and PEV on the 
Lisbon Treaty; d) the proposal, by means of a popular initiative, on 
medically assisted procreation. On three occasions, the PSD abstained: on 
the proposals for a referendum from the PS on the regionalisation and the 
Amsterdam Treaty and on the CDS-PP proposal on the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 
The PSD saw the Constitutional introduction of the referendum 
in 1989 as its victory, since it was its most insistent proposer. It never 
obtained what it wanted, which was the Constitutional referendum, but 
obtained the legislative referendum. However, while the PSD only 
initiated specific proposals for referendums, in 1996 and in 1998, it 
obtained a significant victory in terms of referendums. It imposed 
referendums on the PS about regionalisation and the decriminalisation of 
abortion, as it wanted to, and it ended up winning both, despite belonging 
to the opposition. The PSD’s purpose was to fight for the referendums in 
the hope of preventing regionalisation and the decriminalisation of 
abortion.  This weakened the PS government’s position by inflicting two 
embarrassing defeats.  
On European issues, the PSD’s position was similar to the PS. 
Both parties refused to hold referendums on the Treaties of Maastricht, 
Nice and Lisbon, and they cooperated on the questions about the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty, which were declared 
unConstitutional. 
The PSD never accepted referendums when it was in 
Government. In 1992 it voted negatively on the referendum proposed by 
the PS about the public radio and television services, and in 2004 it voted 
negatively on all the proposals for referendums on the decriminalisation of 
abortion. In 2006, sensing a parliamentary majority with a tendency to 
decriminalise abortion, it assumed the compromise of accepting a 
referendum, and it voted affirmatively on the PS proposal in that sense. 
5.6.3. CDS-PP 
The CDS-PP introduced nine proposals for referendum. One of 
them, on the decriminalisation of drugs, was not discussed. Four proposals 
were not voted: on abortion (twice), the Amsterdam Treaty and 
regionalisation. Three proposals were rejected: on abortion, the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. A joint proposal with the PS 
and the PSD on the European Constitutional Treaty was approved, but it 
would be declared unConstitutional. 
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The CDS-PP voted affirmatively on 10 proposals for 
referendum: a) the proposal for referendum on the abortion that was 
subscribed with the PSD in 1998; b) the PS proposal for referendum on 
regionalisation; c) its own proposal for a referendum on the Amsterdam 
Treaty; d) the proposal for a referendum, which was subscribed with the 
PS and the PSD, on the European Constitutional Treaty; e) the proposal 
by means of a popular initiative on medically assisted procreation; f) all 
the proposals for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty; and g) the proposal 
by means of a popular initiative for a referendum on gay marriage. 
The CDS-PP voted against proposals for referendum on 10 
separate occasions. It voted against a) the PS proposal on the appointment 
of the directors of public radio and television service; b) the PCP proposal 
on the Amsterdam Treaty; c) the BE and PCP proposals for a referendum 
on the European Constitutional Treaty; d) the three proposals for a 
referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion in 2004; and e) the two 
PS proposals in 2005 on the same subject. It abstained four times: a) on 
the PS proposal for a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty; b) on the 
PSD proposal for a referendum on regionalisation and on the PS proposal 
on the decriminalisation of abortion in 1998 and, c) in the last proposal for 
a referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion in 2006. 
The CDS-PP was the first party to support the holding of a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and from that time on it 
supported the holding of referendums on all treaties regarding the 
participation of Portugal in the European Union. It proposed the 
referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, subscribed the draft referendum on 
the Constitutional Treaty and maintained that position regarding the 
Lisbon Treaty. As for regionalisation, it assumed a position against its 
institution, and supported the referendum as a way to prevent that 
purpose. Concerning the decriminalisation of abortion, the CDS-PP was 
again opposed, and used the referendum as a platform for that opposition. 
When there was a parliamentary majority with the tendency to 
decriminalise abortion, the CDS-PP was not against the referendum, 
hoping to prevent it through those means. When there was a majority in 
Parliament that could prevent the decriminalisation, the CDS-PP did not 
accept the referendum, in order to avoid the possibility of an affirmative 
answer. 
5.6.4. PCP 
The PCP has always maintained reservations about the 
referendum, very much influenced by opposition to the PSD’s aspirations 
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for a Constitutional referendum. For that reason, the PCP did not follow 
the PS, PSD and CDS positions in the 1989 Constitutional revision, voting 
against the admission of the national referendum. The only exception is 
with regard to the treaties on Portugal’s participation in the European 
Union. The PCP argued for the institution of a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 Constitutional Revision, and from that time 
on it has proposed holding referendums on the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. It also argued for the 2001 
Constitutional Revision to allow a referendum on the Nice Treaty. The 
PCP introduced three referendum proposals, all of which were refused. 
The PCP voted affirmatively on 10 proposals for referendum. 
Regarding the European Treaties, it voted affirmatively on a) its three 
proposals, and the Amsterdam, Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties; b) the 
second BE proposal for a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty; and c) 
all the proposals for referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, it voted 
in favour of the proposals for referendum on the decriminalisation of 
abortion introduced in 2004 (from the PS, the BE and by means of popular 
initiative) after the rejection of the decriminalisation by the majority in 
Parliament. 
The PCP voted against 10 proposals for referendum: a) on the 
Amsterdam Treaty presented by the PS and the CDS-PP, because it 
disagreed with the formulated question, and the same happened regarding 
the joint PS/PSD/CDS-PP proposal on the Constitutional Treaty; b) on the 
decriminalisation of abortion in 1998 (PSD/CDS-PP and PS proposals), in 
2005 and 2006 (three PS proposals); c) on the medically assisted 
procreation; and d) on gay marriage. 
The PCP abstained four times: a) on the PS proposal for a 
referendum on public radio and television services; b) on the proposals for 
a referendum on regionalisation in 1998 (although it was against the 
referendum on regionalisation in the 1997 Constitutional Revision, it 
recognised in 1998 that the referendum was Constitutionally obligatory 
and it abstained for that reason); and c) on the first BE proposal for 
referendum on the main choices of the European Constitutional Treaty, 
which were considered to be premature. 
Up to 1989, the PCP kept a position against the Constitutional 
acceptance of the national referendum. Once the referendum became a 
reality, it assumed a pragmatic position about the use of the instrument. 
The PCP supported the holding of referendums on the European treaties, 
seeing them as a way to contradict the parliamentary hegemony of the 
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pro-European parties. If the approval of the treaties regarding the 
participation of Portugal in the European Union were submitted to 
Parliament, they would be easily have been passed by the large majority 
of parliamentarians without any hesitation. The use of the referendum, 
having in mind the examples of Denmark, France and The Netherlands, 
where the popular will expressed by the referendums did not coincide 
with the parliamentary expression of the pro-European parties, were seen 
as a useful and legitimate tool in the struggle against the ratification of the 
treaties. For that reason, the PCP always assumed that the holding of a 
referendum would be a means to make the refusal of the treaties possible. 
As for the decriminalisation of abortion, the position was the 
opposite. The PCP always considered that Parliament should assume the 
responsibility of decriminalising abortion and strongly criticised the PS’s 
surrender to the PSD by accepting to submit that legislative option to 
referendum. In 2005 and 2006 the PCP was once more against the 
referendum, and supported the legitimacy of Parliament to legislate 
without a referendum. It also criticised the PS and the BE for making the 
decriminalisation of abortion depend on a referendum to over-rule the 
voters’ option in 1998. The PCP voted affirmatively on the referendum to 
decriminalise abortion only in 2004, in the IX Legislature, when there was 
a rightist majority in Parliament, making decriminalisation by the 
Assembly of the Republic impossible. 
5.6.5. BE 
Since first winning parliamentary representation in 1999, the BE 
has been the most enthusiastic party in its appeals for referendums. It 
introduced six draft referendums: a) on the Nice Treaty in 2001; b) on the 
European Constitutional Treaty (in 2003 and 2004); c) on the Lisbon 
Treaty (in 2008); and d) on the decriminalisation of abortion (in 2004 and 
2005). The proposal on the Nice Treaty was not discussed. The 2005 
proposal for the referendum on abortion was set aside in favour of the PS 
proposal. The rest were rejected. 
The BE participated in 16 votings on referendum proposals. It 
has voted affirmatively on 13 and negatively on three. It voted against the 
popular initiatives for a referendum on medically assisted procreation and 
gay marriage, and the joint PS/PSD/CDS-PP proposal on the European 
Constitutional Treaty. It voted affirmatively on: a) its own four proposals; 
b) the proposals for a referendum on the decriminalisation of abortion 
introduced by the PS in 2004, 2005 and 2006, and the proposal by means 
of a popular initiative in 2004; c) the PCP proposal on the European 
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Constitutional Treaty; and d) all the proposals for a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
While generally favouring referendums, the BE opposed the 
referendum on medically assisted procreation, since it was otherwise 
flagrantly unConstitutional. It raised doubts about the question formulated 
by the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP on the European Constitutional 
Treaty, which was also declared unConstitutional. Only one refusal for a 
referendum was politically motivated, and that referred to the popular 
initiative for a referendum on gay marriage. As for the rest, the BE 
supported all the referendum initiatives on the European treaties, and all 
the referendum initiatives on the decriminalisation of abortion, even a 
majority in Parliament declared itself in favour of decriminalisation. As 
for this last question, the BE position was to accept the PS idea that the 
decriminalisation of abortion should only be decided by Parliament after a 
referendum to reverse the 1998 result. This was only achieved in February 
2007. 
5.7. Final Note 
More than 33 years have passed on the Constitutional admission 
of the national referendum in Portugal, and the experience has been 
relatively disappointing for those who hoped that the referendum would 
strengthen the direct participation of citizens in political life, surpassing 
the inherent limitations of the representative democracy and reducing the 
decisive role of the parties in the political system. Political parties have 
approached the referendum with extreme caution, preventing the 
possibility of its use against the representative democracy. 
A parliamentary majority is always needed to propose 
referendums, and they always demand the free decision of the President of 
the Republic and the previous review of their Constitutionality. The 
referendum was rarely understood as an end in itself by the Portuguese 
political forces. Asides from rare exceptions, the proposals for 
referendums were usually negative, i.e. designed to prevent the approval 
of something that would probably be approved if the decision were taken 
exclusively by Parliament.  Since the appeal to the direct decision of the 
people, through referendums, was used as a tool against parliamentary 
majorities, they may be seen as an opposition tactic. For those who have 
nothing to lose, the proposal of a referendum gives the parliamentary 
majority the burden of refusing ‘to give the floor’ to the people for fear of 
a negative result. This, in turn, inclines parliamentary majorities to refuse 
proposals for referendums. 
The Referendum in the Portuguese Constitutional Experience  476 
The decision to ask the President of the Republic to hold a 
referendum always belongs to the parliamentary majority, which can be 
rejected if it considers that the referendum would weaken its position or 
contradict its political goals. There are two reasons why a parliamentary 
majority might accept a referendum: a) the majority is so confident in a 
positive result that it goes forward with the referendum without 
hesitations, thus withdrawing any advantage that the opposition could 
have in the case of a refusal; or b) the majority is so divided on a certain 
question that is prefers to delegate decision-making to the people. In the 
latter case, the holding of a referendum demonstrates that the majority is 
divided and weak. The Portuguese democratic experience gives examples 
of both cases. 
The referendums on the decriminalisation of abortion and on 
regionalisation are examples of division and contradictions inside the 
majority. Both were accepted by the PS, under strong pressure, in the first 
case, by the Catholic sectors of the party, and in the second case, by the 
anti-regionalist sectors. The PS preferred to accept the results of 
referendums, rather than having its official positions defeated, thus 
avoiding the consequences of its own division. 
The referendums approved on European Treaties were designed 
to demonstrate wide support for the approval of the treaties. Both in the 
case of the Amsterdam Treaty and in the case of the European 
Constitutional Treaty, the convergence of the PS, the PSD and the CDS-
PP in favour should have guaranteed an easy victory in the referendum. 
Conscious of the frustration expressed by many Portuguese about not 
having had the chance to pronounce themselves on the integration of 
Portugal in the European Union through a referendum, the supporters of 
the integration process could have addressed those complaints by allowing 
a referendum. However, the referendums of Denmark and France in 1992, 
and France and The Netherlands in 2005, discouraged any excess of 
confidence, since support for pro-European parties did not necessarily 
translate into support for the treaties.  
As a result, the questions submitted to the Constitutional Court, 
both in the case of the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, and in the 
case of the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty, were 
designed to lead to an affirmative answer. However, they were ruled 
unconstitutional. The parliamentary majorities, which passed such 
proposals, did not want the referendum, so they passed responsibility for 
its refusal to the Constitutional Court. 
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In the three referendums held, popular participation did not 
reach expectations. The enthusiasm for the referendums, which seemed to 
exist up to 1998, was revealed to be an illusion given the low turnout in all 
the cases. The fact that the first referendum in democracy had a registered 
participation rate of 30% was a huge frustration to the referendum 
enthusiasts. The next referendums, despite the fact that participation was 
greater, were not enabling the democratic and participative merits of the 
referendum. In spite of the dissatisfaction often expressed by citizens 
regarding representative democracy, not to mention the small space 
reserved for citizens in the political system and the non-fulfilment of 
promises by power holders, the Portuguese did not find in the referendum 
to be an antidote for the well-known crisis of representative democracy. 
Out of 39 proposals for referendums introduced in the 
Portuguese Parliament, seven were approved and three were held with 
very low levels of participation, with apparent enthusiasm giving way to 
evident scepticism. The refusal to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
dashed any hopes of submitting Portugal’s participation in the European 
integration process to a referendum. In 2009, the distant possibility of a 
new referendum on the institution of the administrative regions was 
spoken about once again, but in different terms from the last one. There 
are also proposals for a referendum on gay marriage, which is currently 
impossible given the declared opposition from the PS, the PCP and the 
BE. However, it is unlikely that any referendum in the near future will 
mobilise public opinion, and encourage the civic participation of citizens. 
The experience of the referendum in Portuguese democracy is very far 
from being a success. 
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Glossary 
AD – Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance) 
AIDS – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
APODETI – Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (Timorese 
Popular Democratic Association) 
AR – Assembleia da República (Assembly of the Republic) 
ASDI – Acção Social Democrata Independente (Independent Social 
Democrat Action) 
ASDT – Acção Social Democrata Timorense (Timorese Social Democrat 
Action) 
ASP – Acção Socialista Portuguesa (Portuguese Socialist Action) 
BC – Before Christ 
BE – Bloco de Esquerda (Left Block) 
CDE – Comissões Democráticas Eleitorais (Electoral Democratic 
Commissions) 
CDS-PP – Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular (Democratic 
and Social Centre – Popular Party) 
CDU – Coligação Democrática Unitária (Democratic Unitarian 
Coalition) 
CERC – Comissão Eventual de Revisão Constitucional (Ad hoc 
Committee of Constitutional Revision) 
CEUD – Comissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática (Electoral 
Commission of Democratic Unity) 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
CLSTP – Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (Commitee for 
the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) 
CNE – Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Election Commission) 
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CPLP – Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of 
Portuguese Speaking Countries) 
DAC – Diário da Assembleia Constituinte (Official Journal of the 
Constituent Assembly) 
DANC – Diário da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte (Official Journal of 
the National Constituent Assembly) 
DAR – Diário da Assembleia da República (Official Journal of the 
Assembly of the Republic) 
DC – Diário do Congresso (Official Journal of the Congress)   
DCD – Diário da Câmara dos Deputados (Official Journal of the 
Chamber of Deputies) 
DCGENP – Diário das Cortes Gerais e Extraordinárias da Nação 
Portuguesa (Official Journal of the General and Extraordinary Courts of 
the Portuguese Nation) 
DCSD – Diário da Câmara dos Senhores Deputados (Official Journal of 
the Chamber of Deputies) 
DG – Diário do Governo (Official Journal of the Government) 
DR – Diário da República (Official Journal of the Republic)  
DS – Diário do Senado (Official Journal of the Senate) 
DSAN – Diário das Sessões da Assembleia Nacional (Official Journal of 
the National Assembly)  
EEC – European Economic Community 
EU – European Union 
EUA – Estados Unidos da América (The United States of America) 
FNLA – Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola) 
FRELIMO – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front of Liberation of 
Mozambique) 
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FRETILIN – Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente 
(Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) 
FRS – Frente Republicana e Socialista (Republican and Socialist Front) 
ID – Intervenção Democrática (Democratic Intervention) 
INTERFET – International Force East Timor 
JS – Juventude Socialista (Socialist Youth) 
JSD – Juventude Social Democrata (Social Democrat Youth) 
JSN – Junta de Salvação Nacional (Junta of National Salvation) 
MANU – União Nacional Africana de Moçambique (African National 
Union of Mozambique) 
MDP – Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic 
Movement) 
MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement) 
MING – Movimento para a Independência Nacional da Guiné (Movement 
for the National Independence of Guinea) 
MLSTP – Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (Liberation 
Movement of São Tome and Principe 
MNE – Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Portuguese Foreign Office) 
MP – Member of Parliament 
MPLA – Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 
MPT – Movimento Partido da Terra (Earth Party Movement) 
MNI – Movimento Nacional Independente (Independent National 
Movement) 
MUT – Movimento Unitário dos Trabalhadores (Workers Unitarian 
Movement) 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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NUT – Nomenclatura de Unidades Territoriais (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Unities) 
ONU – Organização das Nações Unidas (The United Nations 
Organization) 
PAIGC – Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde 
(African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) 
PCP – Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party) 
PCTP/MRPP – Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses / 
Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (Communist Party 
of the Portuguese Workers / Movement Reorganizer of the Proletariat 
Party) 
PDC – Partido da Democracia Cristã (Christian Democracy Party) 
PEV – Partido Ecologista “Os Verdes” (Ecologist Party “The Greens”) 
PH – Partido Humanista (Humanist Party) 
PNR – Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renovator Party) 
POUS – Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (Worker Party of 
Socialist Unity) 
PPD/PSD – Partido Popular Democrático/ Partido Social Democrata 
(Popular Democratic Party/ Social Democrat Party 
PPM – Partido Popular Monárquico (Popular Monarchic Party) 
PRD – Partido Renovador Democrático (Renovator Democratic Party) 
PS – Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) 
PSN – Partido da Solidariedade Nacional (National Solidarity Party) 
PSR – Partido Socialista Revolucionário (Socialist Revolutionary Party) 
RC – Revisão Constitucional (Constitutional Revision) 
RDP – Radiodifusão Portuguesa (Portuguese Broadcasting) 
RTP – Radiotelevisão Portuguesa (Portuguese Radiotelevision) 
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SEDES – Associação para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social 
(Economic and Social Development Association) 
SNI – Secretariado Nacional para a Informação (National Secretariat for 
the Information) 
TC – Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) 
TSD – Trabalhadores Sociais Democratas (Social Democrat Workers) 
UDENAMO – União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National 
Democratic Union of Mozambique) 
UDP – União Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Union) 
UDT – União Democrática de Timor (Democratic Union of Timor) 
UEDS – União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista (Left Union 
for the Socialist Democracy) 
UK – United Kingdom  
UN – United Nations 
UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor 
UNAMI – União Nacional Africana para Moçambique Independente 
(African National Union for Independent Mozambique) 
UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) 
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
UPA – União dos Povos de Angola (Union of the Peoples of Angola) 
US – United States 
USA – Unites States of America 
USSR – Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics 
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Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (TC) 
 
 
Municipality of Peniche 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Peniche 
Initiative Nine members of the Municipal Assembly of Peniche 
Date of 
deliberation 30 April 1991 
Majority PSD 
Subject Creation of parish 
Question 
Do you desire to see the creation of a new parish that 
includes the populations of Bufarda, Casal do 
Veríssimo, Alto Foz and Carqueja? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not being a matter included within 
the exclusive responsibility of the municipality 
Date of 
decision 29 May 1991 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 238/91 
 
 
Parish of Arazede 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Arazede (Montemor-o-Velho) 
Initiative Parish Authority of Arazede 
Date of 
deliberation 20 May 1991 
Majority PS 
Subject Creation of parish 
Question 
Do you want to continue belonging to the Parish of 




Not admitted, for not being a matter included within 
the exclusive responsibility of the parish 
Date of decision 12 June 1991 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 242/91 
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Municipality of Torres Vedras 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Torres Vedras 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Torres Vedras 
Date of 
deliberation 6 June 1991 
Majority PS 
Subject Choice of the municipal holiday among three dates (3 February, 27 October or 11 November) 
Question Not formulated 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not including the actual questions 
and for not allowing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer  
Date of decision  9 June 1991 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 360/91 
 
Parish of Riba de Ave 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Riba de Ave (Famalicão) 
Initiative PSD Group in the Parish Assembly of Riba de Ave 
Date of 
deliberation 28 September 1991 
Majority CDU (PCP/PEV) 
Subject Construction of a treatment plant for solid residues 
Question Not formulated 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not including the actual question and 
for not being a matter included in the exclusive 
responsibility of the parish 
Date of 
decision 14 November 1991 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 432/91 
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Parish of Asseiceira 
Deliberation  Parish Assembly of Asseiceira (Tomar) 
Initiative Three members of the Parish Assembly 
Date of 
deliberation 30 April 1998 
Majority PS 
Subject Creation of parish 
Question Do you agree with the creation of the parish of Linhaceira? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not being a matter included in the 
exclusive responsibility of the parish 
Date of decision 26 May 1998 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 390/98  
 
Parish of Caramos 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Caramos (Felgueiras) 
Initiative  President of the Parish Authority of Caramos 
Date of 
deliberation 12  May 1998 
Majority PS 
Subject Change of parish to another municipality 
Question Do you agree with the integration of the Parish of Caramos in the future municipality of Lixa? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, given that the proposal of the President of 
the parish authority was introduced during the session. 
It did not respect the formalities to call the Assembly 
Date of 
decision 26 May 1998 
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Parish of Serreleis 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Serreleis (Viana do Castelo) 
Initiative Four members of the Parish Assembly of Serreleis 
Date of 
deliberation 20 December 1998 
Majority Group of Citizens 
Subject Construction of a playing field in certain place 
Question Do you agree with the construction of a playing field for several sports behind the church of Serreleis? 
Decision from 
the TC Admitted 
Date of decision 13 January 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 30/99   
 
 
Parish of Abação (S. Tomé) 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Abação (S. Tomé), (Guimarães) 
Initiative Three members of the Parish Assembly of Abação (S. Tomé) 
Date of 
deliberation 6 February 1999 
Majority CDS-PP 
Subject Creation of parish 
Question 
Do you agree with the creation of the parish of Abação 
(S. Cristóvão), with the geographic boundaries 
corresponding to the respective ecclesiastic parish? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted for not being a matter included in the 
exclusive responsibility of the parish 
Date of 
decision 24 February 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 113/99  
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Municipality of Tavira 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Tavira 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Tavira 
Date of 
deliberation 26 February 1999 
Majority PSD 
Subject Demolition of an inoperative reservoir of water 
Question Do you agree with the demolition of the old reservoir of water (inoperative) of Alto de Santa Maria? 
Decision from 
the TC Admitted 
Date of decision 17 March 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 187/99  
 
 
Municipality of Portimão 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Portimão 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Portimão 
Date of 
deliberation 28 May 1999 
Majority PS 
Subject Demolition of an old market 
Question 
Do you agree with the construction of a boulevard in the 
República square, between Diogo Tomé and França 
Borges streets, with the creation of a wide green and 
leisure zone, which involves the demolition of the old 
vegetable market?  
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted for lack of objectivity and clearness of the 
question 
Date of 
decision 23 June 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 398/99   
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Parish of Louredo 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Louredo (Santa Maria da Feira) 
Initiative Parish Authority of Louredo 
Date of 
deliberation 25 August 1999 
Majority PSD 
Subject Localisation of cross 
Question 
1 – Do you agree that the works be made exactly as they 
appear in the project approved by the parish authority 
and the parish assembly with the cross remaining in the 
place where it is already implanted? 2 – Do you want the 
cross to be placed inside the roundabout? 3 – Do you 
want the cross to be placed in the square, near the school 
of Vila Seca, in such a way that it can be bordered? 
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for lack of precision of the questions, 
which does not allow a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. 
Date of 
decision 15 September 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 495/99  
 
Parish of Moita 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Moita (Alcobaça) 
Initiative Three members of the Parish Assembly of Moita 
Date of 
deliberation 6 September 1999 
Majority PS 
Subject Change of parish to another municipality 
Question Do you agree with the change of the parish of Moita to the municipality of Marinha Grande? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not being included in the exclusive 
responsibility of the parish and for lack of precision of 
the question 
Date of decision 22 September 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 518/99  
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Municipality of Barcelos 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Barcelos 
Initiative Member of CDU in the Municipal Assembly of Barcelos 
Date of 
deliberation 3 December 1999 
Majority PSD 
Subject Trajectory of a highway 
Question Not formulated 
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for being introduced during the session, 
making it impossible to uphold  the convocation 
formalities since it was not subscribed by a third of the 
members of the Assembly; for the questions not being 
formulated and the territorial scope of the consultation 
was not defined 
Date of 
decision 22 December 1999 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 694/99 
 
Parish of Vascões 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Vascões (Paredes de Coura) 
Initiative Not specified 
Date of 
deliberation 5 December 1999 
Majority PSD 
Subject Creation of an environmental protected area 
Question Not formulated 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not making it clear who took the 
initiative, for not formulating the questions and for not 
defining the territorial scope. 
Date of 
decision 4 January 2000 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 1/2000  
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Parish of Bico 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Bico (Paredes de Coura) 
Initiative Not specified 
Date of 
deliberation 6 December 1999 
Majority PSD 
Subject Creation of an environmental protected area 
Question Not formulated 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not making it clear who took the 
initiative, for not formulating the questions and for not 
defining the territorial scope. 
Date of 
decision 4 January 2000 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 2/2000  
 
Municipality of Barrancos 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Barrancos 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Barrancos 
Date of 
deliberation 7 January 2000 
Majority CDU (PCP/PEV) 
Subject Bulfights with death of bulls 
Question 
Do you agree with the integral continuation of the Festival of 
August, just as tradition calls for, without any exception? Do 
you agree that the unConstitutionality be required by omission 
to the Constitutional Court, through the President of the 
Republic, in order to turn legal the death of the bulls in the 
framework of the Festival of August? Do you agree that the 
abstract review of the Constitutionality of Executive Law No. 
15355 which prohibits the death of bulls, without exception, be 
required to the Constitutional Court, through the President of the 
Republic, the Attorney General, or one tenth of the members of 
the Assembly of the Republic? 
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for having in view a purpose prohibited by law 
and for not being included within the exclusive responsibility of 
the municipality 
Date of 
decision 15 February 2000 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 93/2000  
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Parish of Bico 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Bico (Paredes de Coura) 
Initiative Parish Authority of Bico 
Date of 
deliberation 16 January 2000 
Majority PSD 
Subject Creation of an environmental protected area 
Question Do you agree with the creation of the protected área of Corno do Bico? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not being a matter included in the 
exclusive responsibility of the parish and for lack of 
clearness of the question 
Date of 
decision 16 February 2000 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 94/2000  
 
Parish of Vascões 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Vascões (Paredes de Coura) 
Initiative Parish Authority of Vascões 
Date of 
deliberation 16 January 2000 
Majority PSD 
Subject Creation of an environmental protected area 
Question Do you agree with the creation of the protected area of Corno do Bico? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, for not being a matter included in the 
exclusive responsibility of the parish and for lack of 
clearness of the question 
Date of 
decision 16 February 2000 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 95/2000  
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Parish of Gaula 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Gaula (Santa Cruz) 
Initiative Parish Authority of Gaula 
Date of 
deliberation 1 March 2004 
Majority PS/CDS-PP 
Subject Localisation of industrial units 
Question 
Do you agree with the retreat of all the units of 
transformer industry (stonebreakers, asphalt and 
concrete centrals and other equipment of this type) in 
Vale do Porto Novo – Gaula? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, due to the proximity of the elections for 
the European Parliament 
Date of 
decision 14 April 2004 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 259/2004  
 
Municipality of Guarda 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Guarda 
Initiative Not specified 
Date of 
deliberation 
5 May 2004 
Majority PS 
Subject Localisation of hospital 
Question Not formulated 
Decision from the 
TC 
Not admitted, due to the proximity of the elections 
for the European Parliament 
Date of decision 11 May 2004 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 328/2004  
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Parish of Costa da Caparica 
Deliberation Parish Assembly of Costa da Caparica (Almada) 
Initiative Three PSD members in the Parish Assembly of Costa da Caparica 
Date of 
deliberation 17 May 2006 
Majority PSD 
Subject Construction of housing and equipment in a certain place 
Question 
Do you agree with the construction of any kind of housing on 
the grounds of the Junta de Freguesia of Costa da Caparica 
property? Do you agree with the construction of three tennis-
courts, two restaurants, a park for lunch, a skating-rink and a 
picnic area, on the grounds of the Junta de Freguesia of Costa 
da Caparica property? 
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for not being a matter included in the exclusive 
responsibility of the parish and for being ruled by a regulatory 
act of the State that is binding for the local authority 
Date of 
decision 8 June 2006 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 359/2006  
 
Municipality of Viana do Castelo 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Viana do Castelo 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Viana do Castelo 
Date of 
deliberation 6 October 2008 
Majority PS 
Subject Integration in an Intermunicipal Community  
Question 
Do you agree that the municipality of Viana do Castelo 
integrate the Intermunicipal Community of Minho Lima 
constituted by the municipalities of the respective NUT III – 
Arcos de Valdevez, Caminha, Melgaço, Monção, Paredes de 
Coura, Ponte da Barca, Ponte de Lima, Valença, Viana do 
Castelo and Vila Nova de Cerveira, in the frame of Law No. 
45/2008?  
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for lack of clearness, objectivity and precision of 
the question. 
Date of 
decision 29 October 2008 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 524/2008 
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Municipality of Viana do Castelo 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Viana do Castelo 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Viana do Castelo 
Date of 
deliberation 5 November 2008 
Majority PS 
Subject Integration in an Intermunicipal Community  
Question 
Do you agree that the municipality of Viana do 
Castelo integrate the Intermunicipal Community of 
Minho Lima?  
Decision from 
the TC Admitted. 
Date of decision 19 November 2008 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 559/2008 
 
 
Municipality of Mirandela 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Mirandela 
Initiative Municipal Authority of Mirandela 
Date of 
deliberation 16 February 2009 
Majority PSD 
Subject Maintaining of the Tua Railway Line 
Question Do you agree with the maintaining of the Tua Railway Line? 
Decision from the 
TC 
Not admitted, due to the proximity of the elections 
for the European Parliament 
Date of decision 3 March 2009 
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Municipality of Santa Cruz da Graciosa 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Santa Cruz da Graciosa 
Initiative PSD Group in the Municipal Assembly of Santa Cruz da Graciosa 
Date of 
deliberation 29 September 2010 
Majority PS 
Subject Demolition of a bandstand 
Question 
Do you agree with the demolition of the bandstand 
placed in the Fontes Pereira de Melo Square, in Santa 
Cruz da Graciosa? 
Decision from 
the TC 
Not admitted, due to the proximity of the elections for 
the President of the Republic 
Date of decision 19 October 2010 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 394/2010 
 
Municipality of Cartaxo 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo 
Initiative BE  Group in the Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo 
Date of 
deliberation 1 September 2011 
Majority PS 
Subject Granting exploitation of a municipal car-park to a private company  
Question 
Do you agree that the Municipal Authority of Cartaxo 
should sign a contract to grant exploitation of public park 
in covered parking, and over 620 parking places 
scattered in the streets surrounding the urban centre, 
which are now public, for a period of 30 years to a 
private company? 
Do you agree that the management of parking in public 
places in the municipality of Cartaxo should be made by 
the municipal services, and revenues thereof, shall revert 
to the municipality?      
Decision 
from the TC 
Not admitted, for lack of clearness, objectivity and 
precision of the question. 
Date of 
decision 3 October 2011 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 435/2011 




Municipality of Cartaxo 
Deliberation Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo 
Initiative BE  Group in the Municipal Assembly of Cartaxo 
Date of 
deliberation 14 October 2011 
Majority PS 
Subject Granting exploitation of a municipal car-park to a private company  
Question 
Do you agree that the Municipal Authority of Cartaxo 
should sign a contract to grant exploitation of public 
park in covered parking, and over 620 parking places 
scattered in the streets surrounding the urban centre, for 
a period of 30 years to a private company? 
 
Decision from 
the TC Admitted. 
Date of 
decision 19 October 2011 
Ruling No. Ruling No. 486/2011 
 
 




National Referendum Proposals 
 
Subject Portuguese Language Orthographic Agreement 
Date of introduction 5 February 1991 
Author of the initiative Independent MPs José Magalhães & Jorge Lemos 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Not discussed 
 
 
Subject Installation of nuclear power plants 
Date of introduction 7 March 1991 
Author of the initiative Independent MPs Helena Roseta, Herculano Pombo & Valente Fernandes 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Not discussed 
 
 
Subject Appointment of the directors of public radio and TV services 
Date of introduction 8 April 1992 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision 
Rejected on 
28 April 1992 
Party positions 
Yea: PS 




Subject Creation of administrative regions 
Date of introduction 17 December 1992 
Author of the initiative Independent MP Mário Tomé (UDP) 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
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Subject Liberalisation of abortion up to 12 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 20 December 1996 
Author of the initiative PSD 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Withdrawn on 4 February 1998 
 
 
Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 6 October 1997 
Author of the initiative PS Government 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Passed on 29 June 1998 
Party positions 
Question: 
Yea: PS, PSD 




Nay: PSD, 1 PS 
Abstentions: PCP, CDS-PP, 
PEV 
Constitutional Court’s decision Declared unconstitutional on 29 July 1998 
President of the Republic’s decision No calling 
 
 
Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 6 October 1997 
Author of the initiative PSD 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Replaced on 27 May 1998 
 
 
Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 6 October 1997 
Author of the initiative PCP 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Rejected on 29 June 1998 
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Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 4 March 1998 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Replaced on 23 June 1998 
 
 
Subject Liberalisation of abortion up to 12 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 9 January 1998 
Author of the initiative PSD 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision 
Sent to the Committee without voting on 
19 February 1998 
 
 
Subject Liberalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 19 March 1998 
Author of the initiative PSD and CDS-PP, replacing the PSD proposal 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 19 March 1998 
Party positions Yea: PSD, CDS-PP, 2 PS Nay: PS, PCP, PEV 
 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion 
Date of introduction 19 March 1998 
Author of the initiative PS, replacing the PSD proposal 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Passed on 19 March 1998 
Party positions 
Yea: PS 
Nay: PCP, PEV,2 PS 
Abstentions: PSD, CDS-PP, 12 PS 
Constitutional Court’s decision Declared constitutional on 18 April 1998 
President of the Republic’s decision Calling for 28 June 1998 
Result No: 50.9% Yes: 49.1% 
 




Subject Institution of the administrative regions 
Date of introduction 27 May 1998 
Author of the initiative PSD 
Assembly of the 




Abstentions: CDS-PP, PCP, PEV 
 
 
Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 27 May 1998 
Author of the initiative PSD 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision 
Question withdrawn and electoral 
universe rejected on 29 June 1998 
Party positions 
Electoral universe: 
Yea: PSD, CDS-PP 
Nay: PS, PCP, PEV 
 
 
Subject Institution of the administrative regions 
Date of introduction 19 June 1998 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Passed on 29 June 1998 
Party positions 
Yea: PS, CDS-PP 
Nay: 1 PS 
Abstentions: PSD, PCP, PEV 
Constitutional Court’s decision Declared constitutional on 29 July 1998 
President of the Republic’s 
decision Calling for 8 November 1998 
Result No: 60.8% Yes: 34.9% 
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Subject Institution of the administrative regions 
Date of introduction 23 June 1998 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Invalidated on 29 June 1998 
 
 
Subject Amsterdam Treaty 
Date of introduction 23 June 1998 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Rejected on 29 June 1998 
Party positions 
Yea: CDS-PP 
Nay: PS, PCP, PEV 
Abstentions: PSD 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of drug consumption 
Date of introduction 15 June 2000 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Not discussed 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of soft drugs and therapeutic administration of hard drugs 
Date of introduction 20 June 2000 
Author of the initiative 14 PSD MPs 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Not discussed 
 
Subject Nice Treaty 
Date of introduction 10 October 2001 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Not discussed 
 




Subject Main choices of the European Constitutional Treaty 
Date of introduction 22 October 2003 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 3 December 2003 
Party positions 
Yea: BE 
Nay: PSD, PS, CDS-PP 
Abstentions: PCP, PEV 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 20 January 2004 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Rejected on 3 March 2004 
Party positions Yea: PS, PCP, BE, PEV Nay: PSD, CDS-PP 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 11 February 2004 
Author of the initiative Popular Initiative 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Rejected on 3 March 2004 
Party positions Yea: PS, PCP, BE, PEV Nay: PSD, CDS-PP 
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Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 17 February 2004 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 3 March 2004 
Party positions Yea: PS, PCP, BE, PEV Nay: PSD, CDS-PP 
 
Subject Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Date of introduction 18 November 2004 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 18 November 2004 
Party positions Yea: PCP, BE, PEV Nay: PSD, PS, CDS-PP 
 
Subject Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Date of introduction 18 November 2004 
Author of the initiative PCP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 18 November 2004 
Party positions Yea: PCP, BE, PEV Nay: PSD, PS, CDS-PP 
 




Subject Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Date of introduction 18 November 2004 
Author of the initiative PSD, PS, CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Passed on 18 November 2004 




on 17 December 2004 
President of the Republic’s 
decision No calling 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 12 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 16 March 2005 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Withdrawn on 20 April 2005 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 22 March 2005 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Passed on 20 April 2005 
Party positions Yea: PS, BE Nay: PSD, CDS-PP, PCP, PEV 
Constitutional Court’s 
decision Not submitted 
President of the Republic’s 
decision No calling 
 
Appendix 2    553 
 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 16 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 19 April 2005 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP, replacing PS proposal 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Invalidated 
 
Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 15 September 2005 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Passed on 28 September 2005 
Party positions 
Yea: PS, BE 
Nay: PSD, CDS-PP, PCP, PEV, 1 PS 
Abstention: 1 PS 
Constitutional Court’s 
decision 
Declared unconstitutional on 28 October 
2005 
President of the Republic’s 
decision No calling 
 
Subject Medically assisted procreation 
Date of introduction 25 May 2006 
Author of the initiative Popular Initiative 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Rejected on 15 November 2006 
Party positions 
Yea: CDS-PP, 2 PS, 1 PSD 
Nay: PS, PSD, PCP, BE, PEV 
Abstention: 1 PS 
 




Subject Decriminalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 15 November 2006 
Author of the initiative PS 
Assembly of the 
Republic’s decision Passed on 19 October 2006 
Party positions 
Yea: PS, PSD, BE 
Nay: PCP, PEV, 1 PS, 1 PSD 




on 5 November 2006 
President of the Republic’s 
decision Calling for 11 February 2007 
Result Yes: 59.2% No: 40.8% 
 
Subject Liberalisation of abortion up to 10 weeks of pregnancy 
Date of introduction 19 October 2006 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP, replacing PS proposal 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Invalidated 
 
Subject Lisbon Treaty 
Date of introduction 14 December 2007 
Author of the initiative PCP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 7 February 2008 
Party positions 
Yea: PCP, CDS-PP, BE, PEV, 
4 PSD, 1 PS 
Nay: PS, PSD 
Abstention: 1 PS 
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Subject Lisbon Treaty 
Date of introduction 21 December 2007 
Author of the initiative BE 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 7 February 2008 
Party positions 
Yea: PCP, CDS-PP, BE, PEV, 
4 PSD, 1 PS 
Nay: PS, PSD 
Abstention: 1 PS 
 
Subject Lisbon Treaty 
Date of introduction 21 December 2007 
Author of the initiative CDS-PP 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 7 February 2008 
Party positions 
Yea: PCP, CDS-PP, BE, PEV, 
4 PSD, 1 PS 
Nay: PS, PSD 
Abstention: 1 PS 
 
Subject Lisbon Treaty 
Date of introduction 8 January 2008 
Author of the initiative PEV 
Assembly of the Republic’s 
decision Rejected on 7 February 2008 
Party positions 
Yea: PCP, CDS-PP, BE, PEV, 
4 PSD, 1 PS 
Nay: PS, PSD 
Abstention: 1 PS 
 




Subject Gay marriage 
Date of introduction 5 January 2010 
Author of the initiative Popular Initiative 
Assembly of the Republic’s decision Rejected on 8 January 2010 
Party positions 
Yea: PSD, CDS-PP, 2 PS 
Nay: PS, BE, PCP, PEV. 
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